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Glossary 
Arme blanche – Or ‘white arm’, includes weaponry that involves the use of ‘cold weapons’, 
such as swords, lances, spears, axes and bayonets; it is distinguishable from firearms and 
explosives. The arme blanche was considered an effective tactic in damaging the morale of 
an enemy and shattering their resistance.  
Enfilading fire – A military tactic describing a position in which weapons can be directed 
along an entire vulnerable target.  
Investment – A military tactic performed by a besieging force. It is an attempt to blockade 
an enemy force within a fort or town, to prevent their escape or entry. 
Kopje – An Afrikaner name for a small hill in a generally flat area. 
Kraal – An Afrikaner word for an enclosure of cattle and livestock. 
Mounted Infantry – A form of mobile infantry, in which soldiers rode into battle, and when 
engaged with the enemy, fought on foot.  
Sangar – a temporary military breastwork fortification, usually built from rocks and stone. It 
is an ideal defensive measure, when entrenching is not possible.   
Uitlander – An Afrikaner word for European migrants that did not have a political franchise 
in the Transvaal. 
Veldt – A term to describe the open plain of Southern Africa. 
ix 
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Introduction 
Ireland and the South African War 
On 14 July 1900, the Black and White Budget published the following excerpt, written by 
George Essex Evans, of Queensland, Australia, entitled, ‘To the Irish dead’: 
 To Ireland, set in the silver water, 
 To the fighting blood that is proved and tried – 
 Our sharpest sword and our fairest daughter – 
 Who saved the Empire and turn the tide!
1
 
 
During the South African War, the Irish soldier was a prominent participant in the British 
army, actively engaging in some of the most infamous and important engagements of the 
conflict. Of course, for this period in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the 
strong military tradition that had once existed in Ireland, it was only natural that soldiers and 
citizens from Ireland actively engaged in imperial and military concerns. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, Irishmen enlisted into the British army and navy, establishing themselves 
as an integral element of the military. In addition, the Irish actively contributed to imperial 
development, finding employment in the civil service, politics, and administration. The 
importance of Irish recruitment in the British army is reflected in the following figures: in 
1830, the Irish represented 42.2 per cent of the United Kingdom’s army; in 1868, 55,583 Irish 
NCOs and other ranks had enlisted, representing 30.8 percent.
2
 Although Irish enlistment into 
the British army steadily declined towards the end of the nineteenth century, their 
participation was constant and Irish interest in the affairs of the British Empire increased. 
Irish interaction and interest in the military would be witnessed towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, when a relatively untrained and unprofessional citizen militia declared 
war on the British Empire. 
  The South African War witnessed the largest muster of Irish troops ever assembled 
during the nineteenth century. Conservative estimations have placed Irish participation in the 
region of 30,000 soldiers;
3
 however, further analysis by Keith Jeffery demonstrated that some 
                                                          
1
 Black and White Budget, 14 July 1900. 
2
 E.M. Spiers, ‘Army organisation and society in the nineteenth century’ in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery 
(eds), A military history of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996), p. 337. According to Spiers, the figure may be 
understated, as some Irishmen were possibly considered as being born in either India or the colonies.  
3
 D.P. McCracken, Forgotten protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast, 2003), p. 133. 
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47,000 Irishmen were involved in the war.
4
 Arguably, if one includes the twenty-six militia 
battalions that were mobilised during the war and despatched across areas of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, the figure could be in the region of some sixty thousand men that played 
some part in the war effort. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Irish participation was significant 
and distinctive throughout the course of the campaign; thirteen regular Irish infantry 
battalions and three cavalry units were deployed for active service in South Africa. Some of 
these units were involved in some of the most celebrated and renowned engagements of the 
conflict, including: Talana, Elandslaagte, Stormberg, Colenso and the siege of Ladysmith. In 
addition to the strong regular Irish contingent, the British army were reinforced by five 
militia Irish infantry battalions and two units of militia artillery that were despatched to the 
front; thirteen companies of the ‘Irish’ Imperial Yeomanry were established; and, the period 
also witnessed the creation of Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital, and the mobilisation of the 
Dublin District Company of the Militia Medical Corps and many Irish nurses and doctors.
5
 In 
addition to Ireland’s impressive military contribution, more Irish generals were involved in 
this conflict than in any previous war during the nineteenth century.
6
 Within those battalions 
and units, this researcher has been able to establish 4,879 casualties,
7
 whilst the General 
Registrar of Ireland reported the deaths of 1,800 Irish natives that died during the South 
African War attached to the British army.
8
 While Irishmen continued to enlist into Irish, 
English, Scottish and Welsh battalions, it is interesting to note that Irishmen were also to be 
found in South African colonial units. Irishman Major Daniel Patrick Driscoll formed the 
Driscoll’s Scouts, as a reaction to the heavy losses suffered by the Irish in the British army 
during the first months of the war;
9
 war correspondent, A.G. Hales, would later call him the 
‘King of Scouts’.10 Moreover, of the 389 men that had enlisted into the Orange River Scouts, 
                                                          
4
 Keith Jeffery, ‘The Irish soldier in the Boer War’ in John Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: direction, experience 
and image (London, 2000), p. 142. In order to come to that estimation, Jeffery took the figure of thirteen percent 
of Irishmen that were in the British army in 1900, and calculated it against the reported figure of 365,693 
soldiers from the United Kingdom that served in South Africa.  
5
 See pages 240 to 242 for a comprehensive list of Irish units involved. 
6
 Alvin Jackson, ‘Irish unionists and the British Empire, 1880-1920’ in Keith Jeffery (ed.), An Irish Empire? 
Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester, 1996), p. 131. 
7
 See pages 249 to 255 for further information on casualties.   
8
 Ciarian Wallace, ‘Lest we remember? Recollection of the Boer War and the Great War in Ireland’, in E-rea, x, 
(2012), np. Online version. http://erea.revues.org/2888  (8 June 2013). 
9
 O.E.F Baker, ‘The South African Irish Regiment: an exemplar of the military traditions of the Irish in South 
Africa’, in Military History Journal, vi (1983), np. Online version. http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol061ob.html (2 
Dec., 2013). Lieutenant-Colonel Driscoll played a prominent role in the Legion of Frontiersmen during the 
Great War, and thus, helped establish the 25
th
 (Frontiersmen), Royal Fusiliers, which would serve in the African 
theatre.  
10
 A.G. Hales, Campaign pictures of the war in South Africa 1899-1900: letters from the front (London, 1900), 
pp 242-252; A.G. Hales, Driscoll, King of Scouts: a romance of the South African War (London, 1901).  
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some eight per cent were Irish.
11
 On the Home Front, the response was equally impressive; 
tens of thousands of pounds were raised through various war charities; thousands of Irish 
citizens lined the streets of Dublin, Queenstown, Belfast and other towns across the island, 
celebrating the departure and arrival of each Irish and British unit; Irish citizens wrote to the 
press, voicing their support for the imperial project, and fêting the contribution of Irish 
soldiers and generals; whilst hundreds of Irish acted upon their words of support, by 
volunteering for the Imperial Yeomanry, and various medical services in support of the war 
effort.  
In contrast to the impressive military and civilian participation from sections of the 
Irish population, the South African War was also an important period for Irish Nationalists. 
With the support of Irish Nationalist Members of Parliament, the Irish Transvaal Committee, 
and the Nationalist press, enthusiasm for the Boer cause was prominent throughout Irish 
society. It helped galvanise support and raise awareness for the Nationalist movement and 
attempted to encourage anti-British and imperialist sentiment within the country. Moreover, 
the opposition to the war in South Africa and British foreign policy in general, was supported 
by eminent members of Irish society – W.B. Yeats, Sean O’ Casey, James Connolly, John 
MacBride (both Connolly and MacBride were executed during the 1916 Rising by the British 
authorities), Maud Gonne, Arthur Griffith (founding member of the Sinn Féin political party 
in 1905), and Lady Gregory. Throughout the war, Irish pro-Boers denounced British 
aggression in South Africa and instigated a public campaign against British recruitment in 
Ireland. It was the early months of the war that witnessed the formation of the Irish Transvaal 
Brigade, under the command of Major John MacBride. Although their participation and 
numbers were minimal, their involvement provided a symbolic gesture of support for the 
Boer war effort. Interestingly, as detailed throughout this thesis, several battles witnessed 
MacBride’s Brigade pitted against several Irish battalions of the British army. With the 
evident lack of research detailing pro-British support and active civilian and military 
involvement, the Irish pro-Boer response has been generally accepted as the established 
history for this period in Ireland.  
Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to offer an insight into an area that has 
been significantly under-researched and generally forgotten in modern Ireland. This thesis 
seeks to present elements of Irish society that were loyal and patriotic members of the British 
Empire, during the South African War. During the nineteenth and early twentieth-century, 
                                                          
11
 War Office: Local armed forces, enrolment forms, South African War. Orange River Scouts (T.N.A., 
WO126/98). 
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sections of the Irish community demonstrated their support for the Crown, the military and 
the imperial project – such responsiveness and interaction with the British Empire are often 
considered ‘an uncomfortable Irish heritage’, in modern Ireland.12 The thesis strives to 
readdress the imbalance in Irish historiography. Since the formation of the Irish state, the 
country has quite successfully distanced itself from its past with the British Empire and the 
part Irish people played in overseas colonialism. Irish society and its historiography has 
attempted to remain focused on events that secured the formation of the state, with an interest 
in presenting Ireland as a nation of dissidence and rebellion against the British Crown. 
Indeed, without serious research into Ireland’s participation in the British Empire during this 
period, the Irish pro-Boer movement and military contribution to the Boer war effort remains 
the accepted history.
13
 
In order to present aspects of Ireland’s patriotic response to the war effort, the thesis 
has been split into five chapters. Chapter one and two will focus on the military contribution 
of regular Irish units in the army during the first months of the conflict. The chapters will be 
based on largely unused primary material, including eye-witness accounts that detail various 
aspects of the Irish experience and participation, from October 1899 to March 1900. The 
reasons for this choice are due to the vast wealth of primary material available during this 
period of the conflict; the importance of the battles in the context of the war; the press interest 
that existed in Ireland; the celebrated sacrifice and contribution of many of the Irish units; 
and finally, it would be impossible to include the entire thirty-two months of the conflict 
within the remit of this thesis.  
Of course, it must be stated at this juncture, that the omission of almost two years of 
warfare, is not a reflection of the lack of importance of the protracted guerrilla campaign, or 
the insignificance of Irish participation during this period. Indeed, as detailed in the thesis 
conclusion, there remains a wide range of research that needs to be investigated, which would 
offer a full and comprehensive study of the Irish experience; including: their role in the 
guerrilla campaign, scorched-earth policy, the concentration camps, their attestation and 
contribution in various colonial units and the question of discipline and morale. There were a 
number of factors that resulted in this omission. The period that is included represents the 
most significant role that Irish units played during the entire war and the most interest that 
caught the imagination and attention of the Irish public; therefore, in order to sufficiently 
                                                          
12
 Hiram Morgan, ‘Empire-building an uncomfortable Irish heritage’ in The Linen Hall Review, x (1993), pp 8-
11. 
13
 D.P. McCracken, Forgotten protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast, 2003); D.P. McCracken, 
MacBride’s Brigade: Irish commandos in the Anglo-Boer War (Dublin, 1999). 
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assess the experience and attitudes of Irish soldiers and civilians, it was essential to offer a 
thorough examination of this period. In addition, following the relief of Ladysmith and the 
capture of the Boer capitals, interest in the war increasingly waned, as the population of 
Ireland and Great Britain grew evidently war weary; this reaction was witnessed across the 
social and political divide in Ireland, as many lost interest in a conflict that did not conform to 
‘conventional’ warfare. With this in mind, in order to examine the Irish reaction and 
responsiveness, it was thus appropriate within the confines of this thesis, to consider the Irish 
experience during a period of significant public interest and involvement during the course of 
the first six months. Finally, the omission was also a result of a lack of varied primary 
material that relates to the Irish experience during the ‘unconventional’ phases of the war. In 
contrast to the impressive array of sources available throughout the first year of the conflict, 
there appears to be lack of diaries and letters that relate to the latter stages of the campaign; 
this is perhaps as a result of: the monotony of service; boredom; and, having no contact with 
the enemy. Of course, it could also be the case that such primary material does exist, but at 
this stage of the research, there has been an insufficient amount sourced that would offer a 
detailed examination of the Irish experience. It would certainly be a disservice to this study 
and the topic in general, to present research without significant and varied primary material. 
With the continued process of gathering sources, in the future, it will be the intention of this 
historian to offer a full and comprehensive study of the Irish experience throughout the entire 
period of the conflict.  
The third chapter is based on the first-ever investigation on the formation of several 
Irish units that helped established the First Contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry. The focus 
on this chapter will be to assess what influenced hundreds of men to enrol into volunteer 
units, despite the majority having employment and private means in which to financially 
support themselves. Was patriotism and the idea of loyalty a decisive factor for recruitment, 
or did economic motivation have an influence? In addition, this chapter will study their 
military contribution and performance, by focusing on the battle of Lindley and their 
subsequent surrender to Boer forces.  Chapter four will discuss and analyse the response 
towards the war effort on the Irish Home Front, notwithstanding the sentiments of Irish 
Nationalists and pro-Boers; the chapter will include: an investigation into the various war 
charities that supported families affected by the war, and the several organisations and 
individuals that raised funds for hospital equipment and valuable material for Irish soldiers; 
the role of the loyalist press; and finally, the valued contribution of Irish citizens in aiding the 
military through various medical services and religious organisations. Through a number of 
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case studies, the fifth and final research chapter will discuss the commemoration of the war in 
Ireland, following the conflict. It will consider why influential members of Irish society and 
sections of the Irish public chose to remember and commemorate their country’s sacrifice. 
Overall, in short, this thesis attempts to illustrate and assess Ireland’s response to the war 
effort and the British Empire. This will have an offer a unique dimension to Irish history and 
contribute to the void in the country’s rich historiography.  
 
Literature Review 
Primary sources 
In order to address the level of Irish participation and interest in the conflict, a wide range of 
primary sources were accessed, contained in various repositories, databases and newspapers. 
In 2012, the National Archives of Ireland launched an online programme, containing the wills 
of over 9,000 Irish soldiers who died in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and 
during the Great War. Within that number, there were twenty-eight informal wills that were 
connected to Irish soldiers that had served and perished during the South African War. In the 
majority of cases the information contained within is excellent and the information is being 
used for the first time in this thesis. Not only do the wills offer information on the soldiers’ 
effects in the event of their death, but also provide detailed accounts of battles, their life on 
the veldt (open plains of Southern Africa), and other personal information. These wills were 
supplemented by dozens of ‘Letters from the front’ that were published in various national 
and regional newspapers during the war, which included the Irish Times, the Anglo-Celt, the 
Nenagh Guardian and the Kildare Observer. The letters that appeared in print were generally 
uncensored, voicing criticism of officers, detailing the harrowing conditions of modern 
warfare, and the anger and resentment towards the level of pro-Boer sentiment in Ireland. 
With such unique primary sources from eye-witness accounts by Irish protagonists, it allows 
a wider understanding of the Irish experience during the war, their valued contribution and 
the type of information included by the soldiers and the press that was disseminated to the 
public. Considering this, the thesis has an advantage over other histories of the conflict which 
tend to rely heavily on official government and staff documents, which arguably prevents a 
true understanding of the nature of this war. Furthermore, it is of interest to note that 
irrespective of the political stance of a newspaper, the majority of them, published letters 
detailing various narratives and conditions from South Africa.  
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As many historians have overlooked this aspect of Irish history, the press proved 
extremely useful in attempting to understand public opinion during the conflict and the level 
of support for the British Empire and the war effort. In the absence of modern research, the 
newspapers provided essential information on: the establishment of various war charities; the 
formation of the Imperial Yeomanry; public reaction to the departure and arrival of troops, 
and their thoughts on the pro-Boer sentiment that thrived in Ireland; full lists of Irish 
casualties, often listing the soldiers’ hometown and families. Moreover, the press provided 
extensive information that allowed the researcher to establish the process and motivation that 
underlined the unveiling of each war memorial in Ireland.   
 As a testament to the level of interest in Irish participation during and after the 
conflict, there were a number of contemporary histories and memoirs which are of significant 
interest. These include several Irish regimental histories, which contain a vast wealth of 
source material; the content includes battle narratives and descriptions of life in South Africa; 
casualty lists; maps, drawings and photographs. C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring’s The 
Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War with a description of the 
operations in the Aden Hinterland (1908) and Walter Temple Wilcox’s, The historical 
records of the Fifth (Royal Irish) Lancers) from the foundations as Wynne’s Dragoons (in 
1689) to the present day (1908) were particularly useful for detailed descriptions of the 
engagements that these units fought during the first months of the war. These books were 
further complemented by contemporary histories, including Leo Amery’s, The Times History 
of the South African War (7 vols, 1900-1909), and Sir Frederick Maurice’s History of the war 
in South Africa 1899-1902 (4 vols, 1906-1910). Whilst some of the analysis and information 
contained within these works can be considered dated and subjective, the studies remain 
integral for research for battle accounts, unit information, casualty lists, maps, drawings, 
paintings and photographs.  
In addition, accounts and personal experiences written by contemporaries have been 
utilised. Works such as H.F.N. Jourdain’s Ranging memories (1934) and Natal memories, 
1899-1900 (1948), who recorded his experiences during the Natal Campaign while serving as 
a captain with the 1
st
 Connaught Rangers. Other South African War veterans produced 
accounts of their experiences during the conflict. These publications include Maurice 
Fitzgibbon’s Arts under arm - an university man in khaki (1901), who was a trooper with the 
45
th
 Dublin Company of the Imperial Yeomanry; and, the edited collection, Letters of Major-
General Fitzroy Hart-Synnott (1912), the officer in command of the 5
th
 Irish Brigade. While 
one must always maintain a certain level of scepticism when using personal memoirs written 
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sometime after the events, the majority of the source material is invaluable and remains a 
largely untapped resource. Interestingly, this researcher was able to secure the privately held 
war diary of Trooper John James Clarke, 45
th
 Dublin Company, Imperial Yeomanry; it 
includes a chronology of events and gives information on the battle of Lindley, a battle-map 
drawn by the participant, and a full list of casualties sustained by his company. 
In addition, this research will include rare source material that relates to Irish soldiers 
and veterans that were committed into the psychiatric institution of the Richmond Asylum, 
Grangegorman, Dublin, following their service in South Africa. The collection of documents 
contains valued information, including: name, address, religion, literacy level, army service 
record, previous medical history, description of the patient (noticeable features, scars, hair 
colour, height), a photograph of the patient on the day of admission, medical diagnosis, and 
arguably most interestingly and importantly, recorded conversations of patients, some of 
whom speak about their experience in South Africa. Over the past number of years there has 
been a growing interest on the effects of warfare on mental health, with studies on Post 
Traumatic Stress Syndrome following the two World Wars, Vietnam, the Gulf Wars and 
Afghanistan. While medical practitioners failed to connect mental illness with the effects of 
warfare during the nineteenth century, it is clear from the evidence detailed in this thesis, that 
the South African War had a detrimental impact on the lives of many soldiers – a range of 
mental illnesses that foreshadowed the conditions suffered during the Great War. 
Notwithstanding the significant amount of information obtained in the hospital’s archive, the 
process of working with the sources was difficult at times. Due to the lack of funding and 
particular interest, thousands of documents that are available were in poor condition, with 
much of the material damaged through years of being stored in an unsuitable and damp 
environment. It was a difficult undertaking to process much of the material due to the poor 
condition of the binding of each document and in many cases, damaged pages and illegible 
writing. With the fragility and brittleness of some of the documents, it was only possible to 
conduct a sample of the source material available.  
 With an absence of modern research on Irish units’ participation during the conflict, it 
was essential to view the wide range of sources available from the House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers. The detail recorded in several volumes of the Royal Commission, a 
parliamentary investigation that followed the war, included important information on troop 
numbers, the militia, volunteers, recruitment, the quality of British soldiers and cavalry, 
tactics, strategic considerations, the enemy, surrenders, general observations, and many 
comprehensive interviews with officers and commanders of the British army. As there is an 
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obvious omission on information on the establishment of the ‘Irish’ Imperial Yeomanry, 
fortunately the aforementioned publications gave excellent detail on their formation, troop 
numbers and depots, training and eye-witness accounts of the battle of Lindley and the 
subsequent British surrender. In order to establish the formation of the Irish units of the 
Imperial Yeomanry, the Imperial Yeomanry Attestations Forms held in The National 
Archives in Kew, London were consulted. The administrative information contained within 
several files was essential to the success of the research; the information included: name, age, 
nationality/place of residence, religion, previous occupation and military experience. With 
such detailed information, it proved possible to establish a profile of 535 recruits, and attempt 
to address the reasons behind enlistment.  
 Throughout this thesis, there are many relevant contemporary photographs and 
drawings included. Combined with some previously unpublished primary sources, these 
illustrations offer a unique and interesting perspective and insight into Ireland’s participation, 
the majority of which have never been published before in modern histories. The images are 
largely sourced from a wide variety of contemporary histories, personal memoirs, and 
illustrated periodicals and newspapers. Arguably the most important images sourced for this 
thesis and perhaps for the study of this war in general, were found in the Grangegorman 
Community Museum, Dublin. Included in the appendices, are several photographs of soldiers 
who had served in South Africa, later to be committed into the Richmond Asylum, for 
psychiatric treatment. Considering that personal photographs of NCOs and lower ranked 
soldiers were relatively uncommon during the nineteenth century, and that these images are 
associated with war veterans that suffered traumatic stress during the war, it is important to 
stress the significance of them to the historiography of Ireland, Great Britain, and the South 
African War. This is noteworthy, as these photographs represent aspects of Irish social and 
military history, and the history of the South African War, that have rarely been studied or 
considered. In the context of historiography and the war in general, these are the forgotten 
and unknown soldiers of the conflict. The lack of research is unsurprising, as there remains a 
continued focus on the idea of mental trauma during the Great War and future conflicts, with 
often little consideration or thought given to war trauma and the nineteenth century.  
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Fig. 25 ‘Reservists at Kilkenny’. A photograph of the 3rd King’s Royal Rifles entering 
Kilkenny Barracks, as the regimental band plays them in. 
 
Source, H.W. Wilson, With the flag to Pretoria: a history of the Boer War of 1899-1900, i (London, 1900), p.  
69. 
 
Secondary Sources 
Notwithstanding, the impressive military and civilian contribution to the war effort, there is 
an obvious dearth of modern research on Irish involvement in the South African War.  As a 
result, there remains a continued focus on the role of Irish Nationalists, the pro-Boer 
movement and their military contribution, which ultimately distorts the country’s 
historiography and the public’s perceptions of its past. The significant omission in Irish 
historiography would be understandable, had Irish interaction and contribution been 
irrelevant and insignificant. Moreover, important and influential general histories on Ireland, 
written or edited by historians such as F.S.L. Lyons, Alvin Jackson, and W.E. Vaughan 
provide little or no information on Ireland’s contribution to the war effort.14 Indeed, as Scott 
Cook observes, Irish historians have ‘contributed to the portrayal of Irish history as a 
chronology of resistance and reaction to British domination’ yet ‘contrary to what most of the 
historical literature has stressed, was that of support ... encompassing conscious and active 
collaboration’.15 Although there has been a gradual movement to readdress these issues 
amongst scholars and historians, in the opinion of one historian, the imperial connections 
between Ireland and Great Britain still remain understandably difficult for many Irish to this 
day; as Ciarian Wallace writes, ‘it has long been a part of the diplomatic image projected by 
                                                          
14
 F.L.S. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London, 1971); Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798- 1998: Politics and War 
(Oxford, 1999); W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A New History of Ireland, vi: Ireland Under the Union, ii (Oxford, 1996).  
15
 S.B. Cook, ‘The Irish Raj: Social origins and careers of Irishmen in the Indian Civil Service, 1855-1914’ in 
Journal of Social History, xx (1987), p. 507. 
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independent Ireland that the Irish were never invaders or colonisers ... It does not fit Ireland’s 
official self image to recall the significant contribution made by Irish in creating colonies and 
maintaining the Empire.’16 As a result, noteworthy aspects of Irish history have escaped the 
attention of scholars and the wider public.  
Although the South African War is an area of immense study, with a surplus of 
historians detailing varied aspects of the conflict, little attention is given to Irish involvement. 
To this date, no comprehensive academic work has been completed that focuses entirely on 
the role of Irish soldiers and citizens during the two and a half year conflict. Nevertheless, 
there has been a significant increase in interest over the past number of years, and this is 
illustrated by a growing number of scholars and researchers highlighting Ireland’s strong 
military tradition within the British Empire during the nineteenth and twentieth century. This 
growing trend has been supported by the royal visit to Ireland in 2011; the coming centenary 
of the Great War; and a growing interest amongst universities to provide students with 
modules that focus on aspects of Irish military history.  
Through studying Irish involvement during the course of the war, it is evident that 
research is limited. References to the participation of Irish battalions, individuals and the 
impact of the war in Ireland, appear throughout various histories, with some material 
appearing in Keith Jeffery’s An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire 
(1996), Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery’s A Military history of Ireland (1996), David 
Murphy’s The Irish Brigades, 1685-2006: a gazetteer of Irish military service, past and 
present (2007), Richard Doherty and David Truesdale’s Irish Winners of the Victoria Cross 
(2000), and a chapter on the Irish soldier during the war, in The Boer War: Direction, 
Experience and Image (2000) by Keith Jeffery. Desmond and Jean Bowen’s book, Heroic 
Option: The Irish in the British army (2005) is perhaps the most detailed work on the 
involvement of Irish battalions and men during the course of the war. The publication 
contains excellent information on the various events that had significant Irish involvement. It 
detailed the role of many Irish officers and generals; the numerous engagements which 
involved Irish units during the first year of the conflict; the Irish civilian involvement with 
the war in South Africa; and, the guerrilla campaign. However, the material offers little in the 
form of original research. While these secondary sources have been invaluable in researching 
the extent of Irish involvement, they offer little in-depth information and analysis. In 
addition, several articles have appeared throughout the last number of years in issues of the 
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Irish Sword, Old Limerick Journal, and Dublin Historical Record. Although the material 
published provides little analysis, these articles illustrate different dimensions of Irish 
involvement during the course of the war, sometimes revealed through interesting diaries and 
letters written by Irish protagonists. However due to the limited scope of these articles, they 
fail to address wider aspects of Irish involvement and the role and impact of the Irish Home 
Front. Perhaps due to the physical reminder of Irish participation in South Africa, it is of 
interest to note that there have been two articles researched on the commemoration of the war 
in Ireland. Martin Staunton’s Boer War memorials in Ireland (1996) offers a brief 
introduction to Irish involvement and the locations of many of the war memorials. Timothy 
Smyth’s The Royal Dublin Fusiliers’ Arch and imperial commemoration in early twentieth-
century Ireland (2012) focuses on the erection of the arch, importantly placing the battalion’s 
commemoration in the context of Irish society following the war. However, whilst the two 
works importantly add to Ireland’s historiography, both historians’ examinations on the 
subject of commemoration are not extensive, and offer only a brief introduction into the 
culture of remembrance in Ireland during that period.  
Meanwhile, the most comprehensive studies of Ireland’s reaction and involvement in 
the conflict portray the pro-Boer support in the country and the military contribution of 
MacBride’s Brigade. Donal P. McCracken’s Forgotten Protest: Ireland and Anglo-Boer War, 
1899-1902 (2003) and MacBride’s Brigade: Irish commandos in the Anglo-Boer War (1999) 
are works are of immense importance that illustrate the extent and influence of the South 
African conflict on Irish politics at the turn of the century; moreover, the involvement of 
MacBride’s Brigade reveals another interesting dimension of Ireland’s military heritage. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the Irish pro-Boer reaction to certain elements of Ireland’s 
historiography, these studies had a tendency to downplay the significant contribution made 
by Irish loyalists and Irish soldiers in the British army. Only a few pages are dedicated to 
Irish participation and the Irish Home Front, much of which is strewn with broad statements, 
supported by minimal research and evidence.  
As a testament of the wider public’s interest in the conflict, there are an abundance of 
modern histories completed on the South African War. Perhaps the most acknowledged 
publication that has emerged is Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War (1979), which offered the 
first comprehensive narrative and study of the conflict. Although the work requires revision 
and has gradually become somewhat dated, it still remains an established text and particularly 
useful study on the military narrative, the history of the conflict and the political situation. 
Other useful texts included: Byron Farwell’s The Great Boer War (1999), Kenneth Griffith’s 
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Thank God we kept the flag flying: the siege and relief of Ladysmith 1899-1900 (1974), Bill 
Nasson’s The South African War, 1899-1902 (1999) and The Boer War: the struggle for 
South Africa (2011) which offers a fresh perspective on the conflict and argues interesting 
parallels with the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When researching the various 
engagements that witnessed Irish participation, several modern texts were utilised to establish 
the role of the Irish battalions and the general conduct of the war in the early months. Ian 
Knight’s Colenso 1899: the Boer War in Natal (London, 1995) provided much detail, 
focusing on the main aspects of the Tugela Campaign, whilst being complemented with 
excellent battle maps. Howard Bailes’s chapter on ‘Military aspects of the war’ in Peter 
Warwick’s (ed.), The South African War: the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (1980) provided a 
useful introduction to various aspects of the conflict. W.B. Pemberton’s Battles of the Boer 
War (1964) contains a chapter on Colenso and several other battles of the first months of the 
war. While this may appear dated, it still remains a valued read and offers excellent insight 
into the conduct of modern warfare. In tandem with this research, it is important to detail the 
extent of the Irish experience in the context of modern warfare during the first six months of 
the war. In order to understand and appreciate this, several works were consulted that offered 
fresh perspective on this thesis, placing the role of Irish units and individuals in the context of 
modern warfare; the studies included: John Keegan’s The face of battle (1976), Robert M. 
Citino’s Quest for decisive victory: from stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940 
(2002), and Jeremy Black’s War in the nineteenth century (2009). 
In order to establish an understanding of the factors that led to the formation of the 
First Contingent, several texts were consulted that offered an interesting range of information. 
Stephen M. Millar’s Volunteers on the veld: Britain’s citizen-soldiers and the South African 
War, 1899-1902 (2007) is the most comprehensive study on the recruitment and wartime 
experience of the Imperial Yeomanry and other auxiliary forces. Although there is little 
information on Irish volunteers, the study was invaluable to understand the varying factors 
that established dozens of companies across the United Kingdom following ‘Black Week’. 
The study investigates the importance of patriotism and popular culture that propelled tens of 
thousands of men from Britain to volunteer for the military. In addition, the work helps to 
place in context, the circumstances and reasoning that motivated individuals to volunteer for 
service in Ireland; thus, it allows the opportunity to compare and contrast the recruitment of 
the Imperial Yeomanry across the United Kingdom.  
Finally, Irish involvement in the war was briefly mentioned in BBC Northern 
Ireland’s documentary series, ‘The Story of Ireland: Age of Union’ (2011). Within a six 
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minute segment, the narrator places greater emphasis on the pro-Boer movement, MacBride’s 
Brigade and the wars’ influence on the next generation of rebellion in Ireland. It failed to 
address or properly acknowledge the role of Irish soldiers and the loyalist community during 
the war and with such scant information provided to the general public, it will do little to 
remove past perceptions of Ireland’s relationship with the British Empire. Therefore, it 
remains an important period for historians and the public to revise certain aspects of Ireland’s 
historiography, and reflect on the importance of the country’s shared history and past 
traditions with the British Empire. A failure in doing so, argues Kevin Kenny, distorts our 
ability to understand the full conditions in which Ireland came to constitute and define itself 
as a nation-state in the modern era.
17
 Despite the growing awareness, appreciation and 
understanding of Irish contribution during the conflict, it has taken more than a century for 
any individual to properly assess the size and importance of Ireland’s involvement. 
Therefore, it is the intention of this thesis to contribute original scholarship in this field of 
military and Irish history, and perhaps most importantly, to fill a significant and noticeable 
gap in the country’s historiography. 
The origins of the war 
In October 1899, the Boers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State declared war against 
the British Empire, which lasted over thirty-one months. Within that period, the British lost 
over 22,000 men, whilst the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
suffered some 7,000 fighting casualties. The war not only embarrassed and damaged the 
reputation of the British Empire, it also cost the British government £200,000,000 to win the 
conflict. Through the British implementation of ‘scorched earth’, the deportation of 
thousands of Boers, and the establishment of concentration camps, the Afrikaners would 
experience unprecedented hardship and misery. With the destruction of their homesteads and 
livestock, the period during the guerrilla phase cost the Boer highly; nearly 30,000 Boer 
civilians – many of them children – died during the war. In addition, the native black 
population of South Africa suffered a minimum of 14,000 casualties, with some 116,000 
interned in concentration camps.
18
 Although the second major war between the British and 
the Boers is often named the 2
nd
 Anglo-Boer War in literature and the media, it is deemed 
appropriate for this thesis to name the conflict the South African War. This title is judged to 
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be an accurate representation of the war as a whole, as in the opinion of historian Peter 
Warwick, the Anglo-Boer War gives the impression that only British and Boers fought in this 
conflict. In fact, it was a South African War, a conflict that also ‘touched the lives of 
thousands of black people’.19 
In 1814, following the Napoleonic Wars and the British acquisition of the Dutch 
Colony, the Cape, the relationship between the Boer and the British remained tense for 
almost a century. The Boers (meaning farmers) or Afrikaners were a mixture of nationalities, 
descended from French, German and Dutch immigrates. The Boers, being fiercely 
independent, wished to remain away from British law and increasingly feared encroachment 
on their traditions and culture. With the British abolition of slavery - an integral element of 
the Boer work-force – several thousand Boers decided to move into the South African 
interior, away from British administration and interference – this is commonly known as the 
Great Trek (1830s and 1840s). Throughout the rest of the century, the Boers attempted to 
consolidate their position and autonomy in the country, by establishing the independent 
regions of the Orange Free State in 1854 and the Transvaal Republic in 1856. However, with 
the British policy of South African Confederacy, and the poor financial affairs of the 
Transvaal, the British annexed the Boer state in 1877, in a bid to approve economic stability 
and development in the region.  
 During this period, it was becoming increasingly evident that the British wished to 
have total control over Southern Africa. Following the annexation of the Transvaal, the 
British sought to extend British control across the east coast of Southern Africa. Under the 
guidance of Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, attention 
drifted towards Zululand, in an effort to exploit Zulu manual labour and resources. The 
autonomy of the Zulu Kingdom was brought to an end in July 1879, after eight months of 
war, resulting in significant economic costs for the British taxpayer, and thousands of lives 
lost on both sides; Zululand was thus brought under Britain’s expansionist policy and split 
into thirteen districts. However, despite relative British success, the region remained volatile 
with increased bitterness and anti-imperial feeling amongst the Boers of the Transvaal. In 
1880, with growing resentment and anger towards British rule in the Transvaal, and with no 
sign of the British government re-establishing their independence in the region, the Boers 
rose up in rebellion. On 16 December 1880, the Transvaal again declared itself a republic, 
and four days later, the Boers attacked a British convoy of the 94
th
 Foot (later to be merged 
                                                          
19
 Warwick, Black people and the South African War, 1899-1902, p. 4. 
 16 
 
with 88
th
 Foot to form the 2
nd
 Connaught Rangers), resulting in heavy casualties for the 
battalion.  
The following year witnessed the war being centred on three major engagements, with 
the British Natal Field Force, under the command of Kildareman, Major-General Sir George 
Pomeroy Colley, Governor of Natal and High Commissioner for South-East Africa. On 28 
January 1881, the battle of Laing’s Nek, witnessed the British suffering heavy casualties as 
the Boers repelled a British breakthrough. On 8 February, George Colley retreated from 
Schuinshoogte (also referred as the battle of Ingogo) suffering some 162 casualties at the 
hands of Boer marksmen.
20
 Three weeks later, the British would suffer a humiliating defeat at 
the hands of the Boers at Majuba Hill, on 27 February 1881. The resultant defeat cost the 
British heavily; ninety-two killed, 134 wounded and fifty-nine taken prisoner; Major-General 
Colley was killed, having been shot once through the head; and, following the victory, the 
Transvaal succeeded in obtaining its independence.
21
  
 Unfortunately for the Boers, their independence would again come under serious 
threat. Following the discovery of gold at Witwatersrand outside the capital of Pretoria in 
1886, thousands of foreign (Uitlanders) prospectors and entrepreneurs – many from Britain, 
Ireland and British colonies – travelled to the Transvaal. Due to the large numbers of 
Uitlanders in the region, it soon became a major concern for President Paul Kruger and the 
Transvaal government. Uitlanders demanded equal rights, a fair tax system and a political 
franchise; however, the Transvaal government were reluctant to allow such concessions that 
could have proved detrimental to their hegemony and their way of life.  The political situation 
became increasingly difficult with the failed Jameson Raid (1895), instigated by Englishman 
Cecil Rhodes, businessman, miner and Prime Minister of the Cape Colony,  in a bid to 
overthrow the Transvaal Government. The failure, in the words of the Royal Commission, 
‘immensely increased the suspicions with regard to British intentions in the mind not only of 
the Transvaal Dutch, but of the Dutch race throughout South Africa’; this is turn, allowed the 
Boers sufficient reason to begin accumulating armaments.
22
 The British however were 
unperturbed, as the Secretary of State for Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, remained adamant 
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that the British would maintain their ‘position as the Paramount Power in South Africa’.23 In 
May 1899, there were further attempts to address the Uitlander question, with the 
Bloemfontein Conference taking place (31 May to 5 June), between the High Commissioner, 
Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger. Discussions failed, and war was becoming more 
likely.  
 On the eve of war, the Boers began an effective armament programme, purchasing a 
range of artillery and weapons from the continent of Europe. From France, Germany and 
England, the Transvaal Government purchased dozens of artillery pieces and machine guns, 
including: 120mm Krupp Howitzers; 75mm and 155mm Creusot guns; and, 37mm Maxim-
Nordenfeldt. Their arsenal was further complemented by the purchase of tens of thousands of 
modern magazine rifles – the German 1896 7mm Mauser.24 In the event of war with the 
British Empire, the Transvaal would also have the support of the Orange Free State, which 
brought together some forty thousand Boers; their forces would be further supported and 
reinforced by foreign volunteers across the globe, including some three hundred Irishmen 
under the command of Major John MacBride.  
As fruitless, protracted negotiations continued in a bid to reach a suitable settlement 
between the two nations, the British concurrently continued to reinforce their garrisons in 
South Africa with regular troops. With anti-British sentiment and distrust growing, the Boers 
became increasingly adamant that war was inevitable, in an effort to finally establish their 
independence. On 9 October 1899, the President of the South African Republic, Paul Kruger 
issued an ultimatum to the British government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and 
Ireland; the ultimatum included:  
 That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn. 
 That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since 1 June 
1899, shall be removed from South Africa... 
 That Her Majesty’s troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any 
port of South Africa. 
The British government were allowed forty-eight hours to consider the ultimatum, and failing 
a ‘satisfactory answer’, the Boers would ‘regard the action of Her Majesty’s Government as a 
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formal declaration of war’.25 The editor of the Irish Times considered ‘the demands of the 
Transvaal Government preposterous, and so it will be a gloomy duty so to declare (war).
26
 On 
11 October 1899, at 1700hrs, the ultimatum expired and war officially commenced. 
 
Fig. 26: The 5
th
 Royal Lancers departing to the front via Fort Napier, Pietermaritzburg, 
South Africa 
 
Source, Black and White Budget, 11 Nov. 1899. 
 
Fig. 27: 2
nd
 Royal Irish Rifles, embarking on the White Star Liner, ‘Britannia’, at 
Queenstown (Cobh), County Cork. 
 
Source, Black and White Budget, 11 Nov. 1899. 
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Chapter One: Irish soldiers’ experiences 
in South Africa (0ctober - December 
1899) 
Following the battle for Inniskilling Hill, Queen Victoria sent a telegram to General Sir 
Redvers Buller lamenting the extent of Irish casualties: 
I have heard with the deepest concern of the heavy losses sustained by my brave Irish 
soldiers. I desire to express my sympathy and my admiration of the splendid fighting 
qualities they have exhibited throughout their trying operation.
1
 
The message from Her Majesty demonstrated the extent of respect and appreciation for Irish 
participation and sacrifice during the campaign. It also revealed the importance of Irish 
recruitment in the British Army, where the Irish proved to be excellent fighters and staunch 
defenders of the Empire. Despite the growing concerns around Nationalist sentiment on the 
island, significant elements of the British and Irish press, and members of parliament 
heralded the value of Irish battalions in the war effort, lauding their martial prowess. War 
correspondent Winston Churchill recalled that Irish regiments fought ‘with the usual 
gallantry of Her Majesty’s Troops’.2 He also noted with reference to the extent of suffering 
and heavy casualties sustained by the Dublin Fusiliers that ‘Scarcely any (regiment) has 
suffered more severely, none has won greater distinction’.3 ‘English people are fond of 
praising’, wrote newspaper correspondent John Black Atkins, ‘with a paradoxical generosity, 
the deeds of Irish regiments’.4 Before departure to the front, General Sir William Gatacre 
counted himself very lucky to have five crack Irish battalions for the war in South Africa.
5
 In 
the House of Commons, J.H.M. Campbell M.P. for St Stephen’s Green, Dublin, acclaimed 
Irish valour and bravery during the conflict, and in particular celebrated the participation of 
Irish generals White, French and Roberts.
6
 In Ireland, despite the Irish pro-Boer sentiment 
that sought to damage the reputation of the British army, letters and articles began to appear 
in the daily press from Irish citizens praising the bravery and courage of their Irish soldiers. 
They praised their heroism and devotion to the Queen, with the word ‘duty’ being their 
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watchword.
7
 The enthusiasm was also matched with the immense crowds witnessing the 
departure of Irish battalions to the front from army barracks and ports.  
Despite the significant contribution of Irish troops, their impressive array of battle 
honours and the massive press interest, little modern research on this topic has been 
conducted. The lack of studies completed on the Irish experience might be understandable 
had participation been minimal; but the opposite was the case where Ireland contributed an 
estimated fifty thousand soldiers to the war in South Africa and were at the forefront of many 
engagements. The following two chapters attempt to fill the void in historical research by 
carrying out the first extensive study on Irish participation during the first six months of the 
South African campaign with a focus on soldiers’ behaviour and overall experiences under 
the extreme conditions of modern warfare. It is impossible to present and gauge their entire 
service within the remit of this thesis, however, the author proposes to shed some light on 
how Irish soldiers performed, reacted and responded to varied situations in conflict. As there 
is no comprehensive study of the Irish experience, the chapters will explore extensive, largely 
unused and neglected primary material which includes eyewitness accounts, diaries, personal 
correspondence and private and regimental memoirs that detail the extent of participation. In 
order to evaluate the soldiers’ experiences throughout the first six months, the research has 
been split into two chapters and has been divided into several subsections which will aim to 
provide a greater understanding of the main issues that affected the Irish soldier. This chapter 
will revolve around several engagements which occurred during the early months of the war 
in Natal, including the battles of Talana, Elandslaagte, Nicholson’s Nek, and Colenso. 
Chapter two will include the battles of Inniskilling Hill and Pieter’s Hill, and the siege of 
Ladysmith. These incidents have been chosen for inclusion because of: the wealth of primary 
material from these events; their relative importance to the early stages of the war; the extent 
of Irish participation and high level of Irish casualties; the immense interest they prompted in 
the Irish public and press; and, their relative neglect from historical research to date.  
It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to highlight the soldiers’ direct experience, 
and service and to provide a narrative which demonstrates the immense and constant 
difficulties that Irish regiments and soldiers faced against a highly motivated and well armed 
Boer, in an age of battlefield and technological advancement. Considering the vast amount of 
literature on the subject of the South African War, there are relatively few modern histories 
that have attempted to provide a narrative that details the extent of the ‘human experience’ 
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during this war. Much of the historical research on the conflict revolves around politicians, 
generals, the operational theatre, tactics, weaponry and the social and cultural impact, often 
researched with little interaction with sources written by the rank and file.  With such a 
selective use of sources, the human element can often be absent and thus hamper a complete 
appreciation and understanding of the conflict. In The Victorian Soldier in Africa (2004) and 
Letters from Ladysmith (2010), historian Edward Spiers provides the reader with an excellent 
insight into the ordinary soldiers’ experience on campaign by using a vast array of letters 
written by the protagonists. In this approach, the reader is given an excellent opportunity to 
explore the experience of the ordinary soldier on duty, within the wider context of the war, 
society and the military tradition of the British army. In short, the following two chapters of 
this thesis will detail the Irish ‘human experience’ in the context of several battles, the Natal 
Campaign and noted military issues that emerged during the first six months of the conflict. It 
will be revealed through an extensive inclusion of letters, correspondence, diaries and 
memoirs written by men of all ranks.  
Mobilisation in South Africa 
Due to the expectation of hostilities, the War Office and the British government allowed for 
sufficient reinforcements for the Natal region and between 1 August and 11 October 1899, 
12,546 British troops were deployed in South Africa as reinforcements to the 9,940 soldiers 
already garrisoned in the country (see page ix for map of the South African Republic, Orange 
Free State, and Natal).
8
 Following the outbreak of war on 11 October 1899, six companies of 
the 1
st
 Royal Munster Fusiliers were stationed across the Cape Colony; in Natal, the 2
nd
 Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers and the 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers were stationed in Dundee, whilst the 5
th
 
Royal Irish Lancers were based at Ladysmith. The numbers of troops in each battalion in 
Natal are noted below:
9
 
Table A) Information on Irish units based in South Africa, prior to war. 
Unit  Officers 
Other 
Ranks 
Public 
Horses Mules 
5th Irish Lancers 24 569 433 20 
1st Royal Irish 
Fusiliers 28 984 118 20 
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1906). As a side note, on 12 December 1899, Arthur Graham and John Hodgson, aged seventeen and sixteen 
respectively, appeared at Guildhall Police Court, London, as deserters of the 5
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2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers 28 984 118 20 
 
Despite the dearth in primary material, the initial mood towards the possibility of conflict 
with the famed Boer was noted at the time. In the regimental history of the 5
th
 Royal Irish 
Lancers recorded by participating officers in the war, an officer’s diary entry following the 
failure of the Bloemfontein Conference,
10
 remembered that the troops shouted ‘who-woop’ 
on hearing the news of the failed discussion, as the ‘excitement of a probable war began’.11 
Throughout the British army the war was seen as an opportunity to wipe the slate clean with 
regards the British defeat at Majuba; ‘I think Mr Kruger will find his master this time, and 
Majuba Hill will be avenged by the British army’, wrote a resolute private from the 5th Irish 
Lancers.
12
 Despite the unprecedented difficulties of the last campaign against the Boers in 
1881, the infantry and cavalrymen sought adventure and action. The 2
nd
 Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers and the 5
th
 Irish Lancers, who had been garrisoned in the country following their 
departure from India in 1897 as a reaction to the growing possibility of conflict in the region, 
were subjected to military manoeuvres, parades, fatigues, and some detailed reconnaissance 
work.  This activity notwithstanding, the general monotony of service was not broken until 
the partial mobilisation during the summer of 1899, and as rumours of war began to spread, 
excitement began to prevail. The prospect of war was seen as an ideal opportunity for 
adventure and exploration across the South African veldt, and the eagerness of the troops was 
compounded by their confidence over the Boer. The zeal is explicable given the position of 
the British Empire, their military training and modern arms, and the inferiority of the Boer 
citizen army in European ‘conventional’ tactics. However, such preconceptions about the 
unworthiness of the opponent would be brushed aside within the first two months of the war.   
 
The battle of Talana (20 October 1899) 
Following the declaration of war, Boer troops from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal 
made a series of movements into the British controlled areas of South Africa. Forces under 
the command of General Piet Cronje invested the towns of Mafeking and Kimberly in the 
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Cape Colony, whilst General Joubert prepared to consolidate their position in the eastern 
theatre by invading the British colony of Natal (see page x for map of Natal). What followed 
within the first three weeks of the war was three extensive engagements with significant Irish 
participation – the battles of Talana (20 October), Elandslaagte (21 October), and Nicholson’s 
Nek (30 October). Following the Boer invasion of Natal, General Sir George Stuart White 
was tasked with the defence of the British colony. George White (1835-1912) a native of 
Rock Castle, Port Stewart, County Antrim, held a distinguished career in Her Majesty’s 
Forces; he served throughout the Indian Munity with the 27
th
 Foot Inniskilling Fusiliers, and 
for his exploits during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) won the Victoria Cross 
and was promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel. He assumed command of the British forces in 
Natal at the age of sixty-four, following employment as the Commander-in-Chief of India 
(1893-1897) and Quartermaster General at the War Office (1898-1899).
13
  
The main intention of the British force under White was to concentrate on the town of 
Ladysmith, which was Natal’s military centre and acted as an important railway junction. 
From there, it would be possible to conduct an effective theatre of operations across the 
surrounding countryside and to protect their interests. However, due to the interference of the 
Governor of Natal, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, an Irish peer, the British forces remained 
split prior to the arrival of General White. Under certain political pressures, the governor 
persuaded the then commander of the Natal Forces, Major-General Sir Penn Symons to 
remain at the coalmining town of Dundee, some forty-five miles from Ladysmith, with a 
strong force of British troops, as reinsurance to the inhabitants of the region. It was a political 
consideration to demonstrate the intent and force of the British army, by reminding Boer 
farmers who were located in northern Natal to remain at their farms and also to keep the local 
Zulu communities calm.
14
  White had voiced concerns about this action upon his arrival; in a 
telegraph to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, he considered his force ‘short’ 
in numbers and believed it made reasonable military sense to withdraw the British forces 
under Symons back to Ladysmith. However upon the advice of the governor, he was 
compelled to hold both positions in an effort to avoid a political disaster.
15
 Major-General 
Archibald Hunter was present at the interview between White and Hutchinson, remembering 
a compelling argument made by the governor: 
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...there are 70,000 Zulus sitting on the border waiting exactly to see which side of the 
fence to take, which side to jump, and how the cat is going to jump ... If you withdraw 
now, (from Dundee) without a blow having been struck, the Zulus will interpret it and 
accept it as a sign of your being afraid to meet the Boers, and they will acknowledge 
the Boers as your masters, and the future effect of that I shudder to contemplate.
16
  
 
Major-General Symons maintained this division of troops with over four thousand men, 
which included the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers. With forty-
five miles of distance between Symons and the main Natal Field Force at Ladysmith, the 
Boers were presented with the opportunity to defeat the British position at Dundee before 
turning their attention to the garrison at Ladysmith (see page xi for map). The precariousness 
of the situation was further augmented by Symons’ choice of camp. Though the British 
encampment was under a mile west of the town of Dundee, surrounded by a series of 
imposing hills, an overconfident Symons did not order an occupation of the hills, which in 
essence highlighted the ignorance of basic military procedure and an evident lack of respect 
for the fighting qualities of the Boer. The tactical mistake allowed the enemy to prepare a 
dangerous position which maximised the potential of enfilading fire (a military tactic 
describing a position in which weapons can be directed along an entire vulnerable target) and 
capitalise on suitable placements that offered concealment and protection from British fire. 
The Boers under the command of General Piet Joubert (1831-1900), a veteran of the First 
Anglo-Boer War, deployed under twenty thousand men from the Transvaal and Free State 
along the Natal Front with their main strategic task to isolate and destroy any British forces in 
the region, and thus hamper the deployment of reinforcements resulting in a rapid conclusion 
to the war. Joubert sent upwards of four thousand men and six artillery pieces under the 
command of General Lucas Meyer to overcome the British position at Dundee, paving the 
way for an unimpeded march towards Ladysmith.  
 A few days before the battle, an Irish soldier stationed at Dundee described the 
situation in a letter: 
This affair we are engaged in at present is a most deplorable business ... I believe 
(Dundee) was a most prosperous and happy little place, but for the past few days I 
have seen a lot of misery. The male population are staying to take up arms, but it is 
pitiful to see them parting with their families ... The Boers are hanging about the hills 
here, and have been within six miles of our camp ... we want them to attack, as we are 
only here in defence of Natal. We find them very annoying, we sleep in full kit every 
night, and out early in the morning for nothing. It is fully expected that we will have a 
brush with them in a few days.
17
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Before daylight at 0500hrs, on Friday 20 October 1899, contact was made between a Dublin 
Fusilier’s sentry piquet and several Boers; following a brief skirmish the entire camp was 
placed under arms. However, with regards to the tactical environment, Boer numbers and 
intentions, a fog of war still existed from a British perspective; following a period of 
inactivity, the British were ordered to stand down, and fall out to get breakfast. Soon after, 
the Boers were preparing their artillery positions along the summit of the hills unhindered; 
Lieutenant T.B. Ely, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers could see ‘hundreds of men on top of the 
mountain all working away...’ The British camp remained relatively immobile, which 
demonstrated a complete ignorance of Boer intentions, coupled with the arrogance of British 
superiority. At 0530 hrs the Boers opened fire from their artillery pieces; Lieutenant Ely 
described it as a ‘roar followed by a rushing noise’ as the shell passed harmlessly over their 
heads.
18
 Now with the knowledge of Boer positions, the British artillery responded in kind, 
firing shell and shrapnel. Symons ordered an infantry advance on Talana hill in a bid to 
dislodge the strong concentration of Boers, with the Royal Dublin Fusiliers giving the 
‘privilege’ of leading the firing line; the 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corp in support and 1st Royal 
Irish Fusiliers remaining in reserve. The 18
th
 Hussars, the 1
st
 King’s Royal Rifles Mounted 
Infantry (M.I.) and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers M.I., were dispatched to turn the right flank of 
the Boer positions on Talana Hill, to threaten their rear and prevent a retreat. An anonymous 
soldier from Cavan wrote to his relative that the enemy ‘appeared in force on a large-hill 
overlooking the camp ... So we had no alternative but to fight them, and went straight for 
them. A tremendous fight ensued...’19 General Symons, a man with a wealth of experience in 
colonial warfare, had never experienced combat with an opponent that chose to remain on the 
defensive, armed with modern firepower; nevertheless Symons, like so many of his peers, 
was confident in the European professionalism of the army, placing faith in their superior 
discipline, their training and the morale impact of the ‘cold steel’. With determined close 
ordered assaults, supported by a barrage of artillery, the Boers would increasingly become 
aware of British methods of fighting. With such a lack of innovation, the awaiting Boers 
would naturally become accustomed to exploiting the British army’s tactical weaknesses.  
  As the infantry advanced in extended order through the town of Dundee, the Boers 
directed fire along their approach. Despite the inaccuracy of fire, Captain C.F Romer of the 
Dublin Fusiliers, concluded that the artillery piece the ‘pompom’ was a ‘under-rated weapon, 
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whose moral effect is so great ... it is always likely to exercise a marked influence, more 
especially on young troops...’20 Although the conditions was relatively new for the majority 
of the soldiers present, their rigid training in discipline and professionalism paid dividends. 
Regardless of the gunfire, the infantry remained a solid fighting unit, as they made their way 
to the bottom of the hill, which afforded some protection as the area consisted of several 
buildings, walls and woods. At 0730 hrs, two hours following the initial bombardment, the 
men began to climb Talana Hill which stood six hundred feet above sea level. The advance 
up the hill stalled due to the intensity of enemy fire as the Boers unleashed a fierce fusillade 
from both artillery and rifle. Captain Romer remembered: 
...all three regiments ... dashed over the wall and began to clamber up the steep and 
rocky slope. The artillery quickened its fire and covered the crest with shrapnel. But 
the Boers still remained firm. Many of them standing up ... and poured a deadly fire 
on the assaulting infantry.
21
 
In a letter to his mother, Private Patrick Campion, 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers, remembered his 
experiences, stating that ‘ware (sic) is a terrible thing’. He illustrated the concentration of 
Boer fire – ‘when the shell Come with whiss over you and the bullets fling by you you (sic) 
would think you would be shot every second’.22 Private Francis Burns, 1st Royal Irish Fusilier 
detailed the unforgiving reality of battle, remarking on the marksmanship of the Boer: ‘When 
within a thousand yards shot and shell began to fly about us. There is no mistake they can 
shoot. Dead and dying were all around, but we lose all feeling in battle’.23 As the men passed 
through the wooded area that covered the base of the hill, the Boer fire intensified, aided by 
the protection of boulders along the crest, and supported by enfiladed fire from an adjacent 
hill. Unlike future engagements with the Boers, the British army managed to exploit the 
environment which afforded some cover and as they continued their advance the men 
progressed to within 150 yards of the Boer positions. The following account from Lieutenant 
Ely is worth quoting at length to illustrate the intensity of their final advance, and the close 
nature of the struggle for the hill: 
The noise all this time was indescribable, and everybody nearly was covered with 
blood and dust ... You cannot imagine the missiles flying, the hissing, splashing, 
banging and rearing, quite deafening, and the rattle tattle of the maxims ... Our men, 
the Dublins, boldly rushed to the top of the hill. Private Merrill of E Company was the 
first up on the top and was instantly shot dead; Captain A. Dibly was the second, and 
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shot through the eye but not killed ... The Boers along the front sold their lives to 
cover the retreat of their friends. They were shot, some falling on their faces, others 
on their backs, more doubling up ... an awful sight ... The sight at the top you may 
imagine, but I could not describe: all our poor fellows, men and Boers in heaps...
24
 
Sergeant-Major Burke, Dublin Fusiliers following his ascent of the hill, was hit in the leg and 
shoulder. As he lay down sheltered, he recalled two men ‘were shot dead so close that they 
fell across my legs, effectively pinning me to the ground’.25 Reported in the Irish Times, 
Private Dawn of the 1
st
 Kings Royal Rifles remembered that ‘we were picked off one by one. 
Worse than that, we had a flat little piece of ground to go over right in the open’.26 Private 
Francis Burns recalled the ‘dead were on top of each other. It was terrible ... The world will 
never know what Irishmen did those fearful nights’. Yet the fearful effect of battle, 
notwithstanding, he continued to write with enthusiasm about the exploits of his fellow 
countrymen: 
The papers say the Dublins were first on the hill, but it was the Royal Irish – it does 
not matter anyhow, for we were all Irish. Tell my mother England’s first battle was 
won by the Irish Brigade.
27
  
Another Irish soldier of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers spoke passionately about the role the Irish 
regiments played at the battle, expressing pleasure in the fact that the hills were to be 
christened the ‘Irish mountains’. Moreover, the soldier had a warning for the Irish pro Boers: 
I was reading in the papers where the Irish people were subscribing to the Boers, and 
are backing them up; but the Irish people will want to be careful of themselves, or we 
will do the same with them as we are doing with the Boers.
28
 
 
In a similar sentiment, a soldier of the Dublin Fusiliers wrote the following piece, which 
demonstrated the doggedness and motivation of the Irish soldiers during the battle, 
undeterred by Irish pro-Boers: 
Oh, those awful Irish members, could I only let them know 
How the Boers liked Irish sympathy that day above Glencoe. 
Old Joubert didn’t like it when we got atop the hill, 
And routed out his gunners with a rare old Irish will, 
And the Irish cheer that followed as down the hill they fled, 
Will be ringin’ in those dead burgher’s ears until those chaps are dead.29 
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Such examples typified that Irish soldiers understood the level of support that existed in 
Ireland during this period for the Boer cause. Furthermore, the response demonstrated the 
anger and resentment that was evidently prevalent from within the Irish battalions. Battles 
such as Talana were opportunities for Irish regiments to live up to their famed military 
prowess, which were dramatically illustrated throughout Britain’s military annals; Irish 
soldiers immediately understood the value of their participation during this war. Moreover, 
the failure of Nationalist sentiment to affect the opinion of Irish soldiers at the front 
demonstrated strong morale, cohesion amongst the ranks, and professionalism in carrying out 
their duty to the best of their ability.  
 The battle of Talana was the first major engagement of the conflict, which revealed a 
wide range of modern battle conditions that would be largely present in the coming months, 
and throughout the Great War itself. Therefore, as illustrated throughout this section of the 
chapter, Irishmen were witnesses to the advent of modern warfare. Outside of the town of 
Dundee, the use and exploitation of potent and dangerous weaponry was revealed, coupled 
with the utilisation of artillery support and close ordered assaults on prepared positions. 
Similarly to conditions experienced across the battlefields of South Africa and Western 
Europe, professionalism, superior numbers and artillery, were deemed appropriate tactics to 
breakthrough defensive positions and achieve decisive victory. Although it is generally 
unclear whether the soldiers understood this relative change in warfare, it is plausible to 
believe that they personally acknowledged a drastic difference in the combat of war. With an 
array of graphic eyewitness accounts illustrated throughout, the Irish soldier experienced 
conditions of a modern battlefield, contrasting greatly with previous wars that the British 
army had fought. 
General Lucas Meyer managed to extract his men rapidly with an Irish soldier 
describing their retreat as cowardice, remarking they ‘ran like sheep’.30 Upon the hill top 
Captain A. R. Burrowes, 1
st
 Irish Fusiliers walked amongst the dead and wounded Boers, 
noticing the scene strewn with ‘Mauser rifles, bandoliers, ammunition, (and) great-coats 
etc’.31 The British had taken the hill but with heavy casualties sustained. The British forces 
suffered some five hundred casualties, with eleven officers and forty NCO men killed, 
included the death of their general;
32
 an impatient General Penn-Symons who rode up to the 
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ranks, shouting ‘Dublin Fusiliers, we must take the hill!’33, was within a few minutes, hit by a 
bullet in the stomach, which proved a fatal wound. Captain George Anthony Weldon, 2
nd
 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, was the first officer killed during the South African War, whilst 
attempting to rescue a wounded soldier during the battle.
34
 Also amongst the dead were 2
nd
 
Lieutenant Arthur Hugh Montgomery Hill and Captain Frederick Henry Connor of the Royal 
Irish Fusiliers.
35
 Of the five hundred casualties, ten officers and 205 men under the command 
of Lieutenant-Colonel B.D. Moller, comprising the 18
th
 Hussars, 1
st
 Kings Royal Rifles M.I. 
and the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers Mounted Infantry (M.I.), were captured by Boer forces. In 
their attempt to cut off the Boer retreat Moller’s command got isolated in an area where a 
strong force of the enemy was present. Following continued pressure, the mounted units 
retired to Adelaide Farm, several miles north of Dundee, and decided to make a stand. As 
ammunition ran short, and Boers began a bombardment of their position with Krupp guns, the 
defence was deemed untenable; their poor situation was further compounded by their lack of 
mobility due to the majority of their horses being dead or stampeded due to artillery fire.
36
 In 
a rather controversial statement, Irish-American John Dunn of the Irish Transvaal Brigade 
remembered that in their capture the Irish M.I. did not show any hostility towards their fellow 
brethren, and ‘didn’t seem to be very sorry they were taken’.37 The contemporary ballad 
below depicts the capture of eighty-one Dublin Fusiliers: 
On the mountain side the battle raged, there was no stop or stay; 
Mackin captured Private Burke and Ensign Michael Shea, Fitzgerald got Fitzpatrick, 
Brannigan found O’ Rourke 
Finnigan took a man called Fay-and a couple of lads from Cork. 
Sudden they heard McManus shout, ‘Hands up or I’ll run you through’ 
He thought it was a Yorkshire ‘Tyke’- ‘twas Corporal Donaghue! 
McGarry took O’Leary, O’ Brien got McNamee, 
That’s how the ‘English fought the Dutch’ at the Battle of Dundee.38 
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Although the Court of Inquiry into the surrender exonerated all men present, in the opinion of 
Lord Roberts, Moller was deemed incapable of exercising command, and was asked to leave 
his regiment, the 18
th
 Hussars, on half pay.
39
 
The battle was an unheeded warning of the determination and effectiveness of the 
Boers and the high risk of advancing towards a prepared defence, coupled with impressive 
firepower. It also demonstrated that the Boers would attempt to retreat at any opportunity 
when hand-to-hand fighting was a possibility; thus inhibiting a decisive victory. This battle 
should have provided suitable warning to the British command that the Boers were capable 
and adaptable fighters, processing effective and modern firearms, and artillery pieces. One 
soldier of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers accurately believed: ‘The war will not be over without 
very great loss of blood on both sides’.40 However, the ‘victory’ reinforced the belief that 
British soldiers were technically superior and maintained a high level of professionalism in 
the face of modern weaponry. Despite the victory, as one historian, Howard Bailes, notes, the 
battle demonstrated an ‘unwise and even reckless choice of positions, scanty defensive 
preparations, and over reliance upon the stolid bravery of British troops’.41 In spite of the 
obvious limitations of a frontal assault in modern warfare, this was just the beginning of a 
series of battles during this conflict that demonstrated the futility of the tactic; a tactic that 
would be deemed appropriate by many British officers during the Great War. It highlighted 
that in many respects, the command structure was unable or refused to adhere to the changing 
face of warfare, and thus relied on ‘conventional’ tactics and trust in the professionalism of 
the British soldier on the offensive.    
The Boers reportedly lost thirty men and sustained 112 casualties – relatively high 
fatalities for a civilian army.
42
 Despite the hardship of the battle and the heavy British 
casualties, one Irish soldier remained optimistic and demonstrated pride in his role in the 
fight for the hill: ‘I long wished for a medal and won it at last, and I mean to exhibit it ... and 
I hope I may wear mine as long as father is wearing his’.43 ‘Talana created a respect for 
British valour’, wrote contemporary historian Amery.44 The Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, Sir 
Peter O’ Brien, believed that the valour shown by the Irish regiments, emulated the spirit and 
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courage of the British forces at the battle of Albuera (1811) during the Peninsular War.
45
 The 
Kildare Observer credited the ‘brilliant display’ by the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, whilst 
rejoicing the close relationship that existed between the regiment and the county of Kildare.
46
 
The Graphic believed that when the campaign was over, Talana would be an outstanding 
episode that highlighted the effectiveness of British infantry and involved a noteworthy and 
‘magnificent’ performance by the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers.47 In contrast, Irish Nationalist and 
former British Member of Parliament Michael Davitt, believed that regardless of how the 
British victory was portrayed by the press, ‘it was a disastrous experience for British arms’, 
and ‘It was the Boer, and not the Briton, who remained the actual victor at the battle of 
Talana’.48  
Amongst General Meyer’s men, there were between thirty and forty Irishmen 
belonging to the Irish Transvaal Brigade.
49
 It was reported through several eyewitness 
accounts that as the Boers were pushed back across the hill, members of the Irish Brigade 
failed to retreat in time as the Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward; as they fell behind 
‘they received no mercy at all’ at the hands of the Irish battalion.50 A further account emerged 
that described the ‘murder’ of an Irish volunteer in the Transvaal Brigade, by a soldier of the 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
51
 Although these accounts may be largely anecdotal, it demonstrated 
that certain Irish soldiers viewed the Irish pro-Boers with disgust and as enemies of their 
country, and evidently had no hesitation in killing them. However one soldier noted his upset, 
as he recalled that wounded members of the Irish Transvaal brigade claimed that they were 
made to fight alongside the Boers; the soldier recorded ‘It is hard times when we have to 
fight against our own countrymen’.52  
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As the British secured Talana Hill, the battle was deemed a tactical success; however, 
the British failed to capitalise on their victory and due to their subsequent withdrawal from 
the area, the British lost the initiative to alter the strategic picture in the region. The British 
retreat from Dundee towards Ladysmith, allowed the Boers an opportunity to strike further 
into northern Natal, and fight an effective war on their own terms. Thus, the battle was 
considered a strategic failure for the British. The decision to withdraw to Ladysmith was 
effected on 22 October, when the newly appointed commander Major-General James Herbert 
Yule received orders from General White to retreat towards the town, fearing a reinforced 
attack on their position. It appeared that the decision to withdraw was supported by 
Lieutenant Ely, as he noted they were ‘practically surrounded by 17,000 of the enemy with 
40 guns and ‘Long Tom’.53 However the decision to withdraw meant the abandonment of 
some two hundred wounded soldiers, including the dying Symons, of many British subjects, 
of the coal mines and of thousands of pounds worth of British army stores in the town of 
Dundee. The wounded were left in charge of Regimental Medical Officer of the Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Surgeon - Major Francis Augustus Bonner Daly, a Dublin man born in 1855. 
Educated at Trinity College Dublin, he served in various campaigns with the British Army, 
including the Egypt Campaign (1882). As Yule’s forces retired to Ladysmith, Daly was 
allowed to enrol four privates from each infantry battalion to aid him in his work; 
consequently this decision rendered the entire wounded and medical team prisoners of war. 
The wounded were brought forward to a Swedish Mission station in Dundee, and in the 
words of Daly, ‘the sight was an appalling one’: 
All the wounded were lying shoulder to shoulder on the floor of the building, some 
delirious. All were wet from exposure from the rain, which was falling all day, and 
their uniforms were marked with mud and dirt off the battlefield
54
 
 
The withdrawal was deemed a cruel act by the men of the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 
naturally considerate of their fellow comrades.
55
 Brevet-Major Douglas Wilfred Churcher, 1
st
 
Irish Fusiliers, believed that the abandonment of stores and their sick and wounded was ‘most 
ghastly’; he estimated that £400 of mess stores and £200 of band instruments was being 
discarded by his battalion.
56
 Unknown to the Boers, the British managed to retreat from their 
position and began a difficult journey back towards Ladysmith. An Irish soldier described the 
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difficulties of the withdrawal, marching the entire distance within three days in arduous 
conditions: 
The day after this fight (Talana) we found ourselves surrounded by the enemy, and on 
Sunday night our brigade stole through the lines and marched day and night until we 
reached Ladysmith. The last day we did 30 miles and you should see the poor men 
when we would halt for a rest, lying down in the wet gutter and dead asleep in a 
minute ... I have nearly lost all my kit as we had to fly from Dundee.
57
 
Corporal Hallahan, 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers also described the exhaustion of the march as 
they neared Ladysmith; ‘It started raining again ... When we would halt some of the men 
would fall asleep on their feet in the mud’.58   
Fig 28: ‘The last rites’ at Dundee. 
 
Source, C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South 
African War with a description of the operations in the Aden Hinterland (London, 1908), p. 10. 
 
The battle of Elandslaagte (21 October 1899) 
On the same day that Major-General Symons’s forces were engaged at Dundee, a 
considerable force of Boers with two artillery pieces advanced into Natal under the command 
of Commandant Johannes Hermanns Michiel Kock in an attempt to harass the British at 
Ladysmith and cut the line of communication between Symon and White.
59
 It was recorded 
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that Kock’s column comprised of several different nationalities- including Dutch, German 
and Irish.
60
 The following morning, General White wanted to remove the threat of this force 
which was stationed at Elandslaagte some seventeen miles north of Ladysmith, and repair the 
damaged railway and telegraph lines cut by the Boers in order to reopen communications 
with Dundee. He despatched Major-General John Denton Pinkstone French (1852-1925), an 
Anglo-Irish officer to intercept the entrenched Boers amongst the kopjes (small hill) at 
Elandslaagte. His staff comprised capable and experienced officers: Colonel Ian Hamilton a 
veteran of the First Anglo-Boer War and survivor of Majuba who was considered by French 
‘an excellent Infantry leader’;61 and Major Douglas Haig (1861-1928) a veteran of the Sudan 
Campaigns, and now his chief of staff. Following a short engagement with Boers in the town 
of Elandslaagte, General French’s column, containing the Imperial Light Horse, 1st 
Manchester Regiment and Natal Volunteer Artillery, redirected their attention to the 
surrounding hills. British subjects that remained in the town gave valuable information 
concerning the strength and position of the Boers.
62
 French, realising that the present force 
was inadequate for a decisive attack, requested reinforcements from Ladysmith; White was 
eager to strike a decisive assault so he sent forward seven companies of the 1
st
 Devonshire 
Regiment, five companies of the 2
nd
 Gordon Highlanders, two batteries of field artillery, one 
squadron of the 5
th
 Dragoons Guards and a squadron of the 5
th
 Royal Irish Lancers; White 
also joined the reinforcements acting as observer.  
 Upon their arrival the infantry were directed out in open formation as the seven 
companies of the Devons made an extended frontal attack on the Boer positions, whilst the 
Imperial Light Horse, Gordons and Manchester regiments marched to the right, attempting to 
attack the Boer left flank. In the event of a Boer retreat the cavalry were ordered to cut them 
off. Following a barrage of artillery and Mauser fire, the Devons were ordered to charge, 
eight hundred yards from the summit of the hill. The flanking movement, the determined 
charge of the Devons and a failed counter-attack by Commandant Kock, left the Boers 
defending an unsustainable position and a general retreat behind the hill was ordered. The 5
th
 
Irish Lancers under Captain M.P.R. Oakes supported by the 5
th
 Dragoon Guards were then 
‘let go’, charging past the right flank of the Boer defence (see page xii for map of the attack). 
Unlike the debacle at Talana, the mounted units demonstrated the effectiveness of cavalry 
against a retreating enemy – the subsequent slaughter of Boer men was reminiscent of the 
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Zulu retreats at Gingindlovu and Ulundi in 1879. Although the charge appeared barbaric, 
‘uncivilised’ and archaic, cavalrymen such as French and Haig supported the idea of arme 
blanche (see glossary, page vii), believing that Elandslaagte demonstrated the profound effect 
of ‘shock’ tactics on the enemy; supporters of steel weapons, such as the lance and sword, 
understood the value of such weapons to morale for cavalrymen and the fear it generated 
amongst their foe, who never before experienced such assaults.
63
 The effect of the arme 
blanche was illustrated by several accounts by 5
th
 Irish Lancers; Private Head, 5
th
 Lancers, 
noted that ‘we got nicely amongst them, and made them cough’, as they caused chaos in the 
Boer retreat.
64
 A Lancer remembered ‘We went along sticking our lances through them – it 
was a terrible thing, but you have to do it in a case like this’.65 The carnage of the attack was 
aptly illustrated from a private of the 1
st
 King’s Royal Rifles, as he remembered the 
horsemen, ‘hacking, cutting, slashing’ their way through the Boer men, with some dying in 
‘praying attitudes’.66 
Some forty Boers were speared by the lance, with one account emerging of Lance-
Corporal Kelly of the Irish Lancers, who speared two Boers simultaneously, as they shared 
the same mount.
67
 It was said that the Lancers’ ‘charge created the greatest terror and 
resentment among the Boers, who vowed at the time that they would destroy all Lancers they 
captured’.68 As historian Bill Nasson states, the ‘virtual annihilation of the escaping Boers 
left the republicans with a legacy of virulent hatred of British cavalry’.69 It appears that the 
cavalry charge did not provoke much indignation throughout the Irish press, but according to 
Michael Davitt, the American and continental press were outraged by ‘British civilised 
savagery’ and ‘inhumanity’.70 In the words of historian Kenneth Griffith, the British army’s 
‘sport of pig-sticking had certainly conditioned the 5th Lancers’;71 with support from several 
eyewitness accounts, the cavalry charge could easily have been judged as a sporting occasion 
for the units. As a result, in the opinion of Bill Nasson, with continued publications 
throughout the press of the arme blanche and close combat, the conflict was created as a 
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‘metaphor representing the war in South Africa as the hunt’, with the Boers unable to sustain 
the force of the ‘cold steel’.72 
Elandslaagte convinced General French that cavalry charges had an important morale 
impact on an enemy, and the British cavalry should continue to use such tactics.
73
 However 
others were not convinced about the future of the British cavalry armed with lances and 
sabres; throughout the South African War, the arme blanche was gradually replaced by the 
mounted infantry (mobile infantry that rode into battle and fought on foot), armed with 
carbines, which was more suited to the changing tactical developments in South Africa. 
Indeed, in the opinion of military historian, Robert M. Citino, ‘it was increasingly clear that 
the man on horseback represented nothing on the modern battlefield so much as a huge, hard-
to-miss target for the rifle-armed defender.
74
 Individuals such as Lord Roberts, Ian Hamilton, 
Erskine Childers and Arthur Conan Doyle, debated that the arme blanche and shock tactics 
were becoming irrelevant in modern warfare; with the progression of effective long range 
rifles and increasing rapid fire, Erskine Childers argued that the ‘steel weapons ought either 
to be discarded or denied all influence on tactics’, followed by the substitution of mounted 
infantry armed with carbines.
75
 In Arthur Conan Doyle’s analysis of the conflict, he stated 
that the lance and the sword belonged in a museum.
76
 Whilst Lord Roberts appreciated the 
power of shock tactics, he understood that the age of the lance and sword was coming to an 
end, believing that they should be abandoned for the carbine, and for the cavalry to be trained 
and prepared to fight dismounted.
77
 Although the lance was removed from the lancer’s kit 
following the conflict, it managed to be reinstated in 1909, by French’s insistence. Despite 
preconceived ideas, Spencer Jones states that the ‘cavalry had learned from its South Africa 
experience’, prior to the Great War, being effectively capable of adapting their cavalry to the 
demands of the situation; with relative success the British cavalry were able to perform 
dismounted, and if opportunity allowed, a cavalry charge to break through enemy lines.
78
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However, with the tactical supremacy of the defensive, and the restricted environment of the 
Western Front, cavalry attacks became increasingly futile on the modern battlefield.
79
 
Fig. 29: The battle of Elandslaagte – charge of the 5th Irish Lancers. 
 
Source, Louis Cheswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, ii (London, 1900), p. 26. 
British casualties for the battle were high, with four officers and forty six NCOs and men 
killed, and thirty one officers and 182 men wounded. The losses in the Irish Lancers were 
minimal - three casualties, the loss of two horses and Private O.T. Kinsey lost his life in the 
charge. The Boers reportedly suffered 363 casualties, which included 188 prisoners and the 
death of their general, Kock.
80
 A year following the battle, His Majesty King Edward VII 
approved the decoration of the Victoria Cross to two officers of the Imperial Light Horse; 
South African, Captain Herbert Mullins and Captain Robert Johnston of County Donegal.
81
 
Due to the isolation of the post at Elandslaagte, and the threat of Boers from the north 
on the town of Ladysmith, General White ordered a full withdrawal back to the town. White 
maintained that his first duty was the security of the town. It was now the intention to protect 
Yule’s column from Boer interference, as they approached from Dundee. Following minor 
engagements at Rietfontein and Tinta Inyoni, Yule’s men managed to arrive safely at 
Ladysmith after an arduous march through miles of mud and rain. The entire British army 
was now stationed at Ladysmith, numbering some thirteen thousand, yet the Boers continued 
harassing surrounding areas of the town, with some twenty-four thousand men. On 29 
November, an officer of the 5
th
 Lancers wrote describing the situation: 
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This town is fairly full of troops now, but the country rather fuller of enemies. I fancy 
we are going to-morrow to try and give them another hammering. There’s plenty of 
beer and port wine, and lots of food, thank goodness. The only things one goes short 
of are sleep and washing. But I’ve never been fitter, and the same with the men – you 
feel as if you couldn’t tire.82 
On the same day an Irish soldier wrote home ‘We have a strong force here and expect to give 
the Boers a good “licking” one of these days’.83  
The battle of Nicholson’s Nek (30 October 1899)                 
Throughout the last week of October, Boers began to entrench along the surrounding hill 
sides of Ladysmith, preparing positions for their artillery pieces. Following reconnaissance, 
the six inch artillery piece, ‘Long Tom’, was spotted on top of Pepworth Hill, which was 
situated north, some 7500 yards from the town of Ladysmith. At the Royal Commission into 
the war, White explained his position: 
I was most unwilling to settle down to the secondary position of a besieged force 
without making an effort in force to defeat the enemy in the field before he had 
entrenched himself round Ladysmith. A partial victory could do no permanent good. I 
therefore thought the occasion called for incurring certain risks in order that if I might 
gain any advantage over the enemy, I might have the means of making it as decisive 
as possible.
84
 
 
In order to protect the lines of communication and the town from bombardment, White 
ordered Colonel Hamilton with three battalions and a division of artillery to be dispatched 
three miles north of Ladysmith; their mission brief was to storm Pepworth Hill and capture 
the guns. On his right flank, Colonel Grimwood with several infantry regiments and artillery 
batteries was ordered to hold down Boer forces at Lombard’s Kop. On the extreme right, 
General French with his Calvary Brigade, composed of the 5
th
 Lancers, 18
th
 Hussars and 
mounted volunteer units, were ordered to protect Grimwood’s flank. In conjunction with this 
attack, White ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Carleton, with six companies of the 1
st
 Royal 
Irish Fusiliers, five and half companies of the Gloucestershire Regiment, and a mounted 
battery to protect the left flank of Hamilton’s force by seizing the kopjes at Nicholson’s Nek 
(see xiii for map of Ladysmith and surrounding heights). It certainly was a risk, as a decisive 
victory needed the attack to go smoothly and complete surprise to be maintained. With 
regards the march towards Nicholson’s Nek, White placed his trust in his Field Intelligence 
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Officer Major W. Adye, of the Royal Irish Rifles, who had personally examined the route. 
Fearing that the march would not meet the required target, White was reassured by Adye, that 
there were several positions that could be utilised for a short term defence. White understood 
the dangers of a night march of a column through difficult terrain, especially with a threat of 
mobile Boers in the vicinity; however White’s trust in Adye was significant in discouraging 
any reservations. White therefore believed that the outcome he hoped for justified the hazards 
– ‘war is balancing of risks against results’, he later claimed.85 
On Sunday 29 October, at 2300hrs, the 1
st
 Gloucester regiment, the 1
st
 Royal Irish 
Fusiliers and the No.10 Mounted Battery, moved out of the camp in a north westerly 
direction. The difficulties of the night march emerged as the column stumbled and staggered 
its way along the rough terrain in the dark, with the Irish Fusiliers leading. As the column 
proceeded, it soon became apparent that they would not make Nicholson’s Nek by first light, 
and so they ascended Tchrengula Hill which was situated nearby and held a waiting position. 
As the column began the difficult climb, panic struck the march as the mules attached to the 
mounted battery stampeded and broke from their minders, scattering into the darkness and 
crashing into the Gloucester regiment below - the Boers were now alerted to their presence. 
The mules carried with them the majority of their reserve ammunition boxes and parts of the 
No.10 Battery rendering it effectively useless.  The soldiers now had a dangerously low limit 
of rounds (twenty per man), no water kegs, no heliographs and no artillery.
86
 This would 
seriously reduce the combat effectiveness of the column in preparing a defence, let alone 
allow for an advance to protect the left flank of the coordinated attack. With few resources 
and no artillery, a defence could only sustain limited pressure until capitulation. Moreover 
with no heliographs, Carleton could not warn the command staff at Ladysmith of his 
predicament.  
Order was restored some time later, and the remaining force scaled the hill and 
gathered on the crest. Colonel Carleton ordered his men to begin preparing defensive 
positions by building sangars (stone breastworks) to offer some protection. At first light it 
became overwhelmingly clear to the column that its position was commanded by nearby 
kopjes, ideal for enfilading fire. Carleton’s situation was now precarious as any hope of 
surprise had evaporated following the commotion. The Boers adapted to the situation and 
began to surround the occupying hills, with one hill commanding a position over the British 
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location, while two other spurs gave the Boers an ideal area of attack. Captain Rice, Adjutant 
of the 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers, recollected the events following first light: 
When it began to dawn we saw our hill was completely surrounded by other hills, 
which towered over ours, and although we could not see a single Boer the enemy kept 
pounding us from every side.  
As time went on the rifle fire became terrific, and our men began to drop on every 
side. The worst of it was that, of course, we had lost every gun, and had no 
ammunition but what was in our pouches. 
We tried putting the best marksmen on to volley fire, but that did not seem to even 
shift the Boers...
87
 
 
The incessant fire, rising casualties and lack of ammunition meant that their position became 
increasingly difficult. At around 1030hrs the British forces were engaged on all sides and the 
Irish Fusiliers and the Gloucester regiment gradually began to lose ground, as they were 
becoming outflanked by the encroaching Boers. 2
nd
 Lieutenant C.E Kinahan of the Royal 
Irish Fusiliers recalled the frustration and intensity of the battle: 
You don’t know what it means to shoot a Boer; he is behind a rock, and all you can 
ever see is his rifle sticking out. For the last hour of the fight I had a rifle and 
ammunition which I took from a dead man, and blazed away for all I was worth.
88
 
 
The difficulties of fighting the Boer were again confirmed with this engagement; the Boers 
adoption of smokeless technology and maximising the potential of defence amongst the 
kopjes, allowed an impressive advantage. The British, limited in ammunition, no artillery, 
poor defensive structures, and being unaware of the exact location of the enemy’s position, 
were placed in a difficult situation. At first the British attempted to overcome their situation 
by adopting independent fire, but soon they were ordered to switch to volley fire to conserve 
ammunition, and fire only when a Boer came into sights; historian Ian Knight observed that 
independent firing ‘was frowned upon’, not only for wasting ammunition but because it 
lacked the ‘moral effect of volley-fire’.89 The Boers readily exploited the outdated and 
ineffective tactic, by choosing to fire in-between volleys. The failure to allow British soldiers 
to act on their own initiative was indicative of this period, which revealed the limitations of 
the British army with regards training, their inability to adapt to a changing situation, placing 
overwhelming faith in the power of volley fire, and revealing the lack of independent thought 
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within the command structure; the volley fire thus wasted ammunition and hampered their 
defence.
90
  
At noon a heliograph message was received from Ladysmith, ordering a withdrawal 
‘as opportunity suits’. However, Carleton later told the Royal Commission that the 
‘engagement was too hot to permit of this being done ... and retirement to Ladysmith had 
become impossible’. At 1245hrs a ‘cease fire’ was heard by Carleton, who first believed it to 
be a ruse by the enemy; it soon transpired that the white flag had been raised on the left flank 
by an isolated company of the Gloucester Regiment. Captain Duncan of the said regiment 
told the court that the ‘fusillade directed upon them was terrific, and shortly only two or three 
could fire, all the others being killed or wounded’. The position being hopeless he ordered a 
handkerchief to be raised, and subsequently a towel. He wished to maintain that his surrender 
was solely for his small isolated position.
91
 Carleton held a consultation with Major Adye for 
some minutes, and as they agreed that it was necessary to honour the white flag, they went 
about burning papers.  
The surrender was recollected by Captain Rice, 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers, revealing 
some levels of insubordination and fierce indignation felt by his men:  
Now, as the white flag had been raised, and we believed an order, it was our duty to 
make the men put down their arms. We gave the order, but were not obeyed, and for 
some time the men flatly refused. In many cases we had to take their rifles from them. 
They were furiously angry, and though most of them had not a cartridge left, they had 
all made up their minds to fight to a finish. 
The other officers and myself had to well, we had to break up our own swords. That is 
not a nice thing at all. Finally, a lot of men and the subalterns flung themselves on the 
ground and wept with rage. Even when they had no weapons they wanted to go on 
fighting.
92
 
The court of inquiry heard that many companies had expended their ammunition prior to 
capitulation, yet according to 2
nd
 Lieutenant C.E Kinahan this had no bearing on their 
motivation to fight, as moments before the cease fire was sounded his men had fixed 
bayonets preparing to rush the Boers.
93
 In conversation with officers of the Royal Irish 
Fusiliers, Winston Churchill recorded several statements made by the officers in relation to 
the surrender: 
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The officers of the Irish Fusiliers told me of the amazement with which they had seen 
the white flag flying. ‘We still had ammunition,’ they said; ‘it is true the position was 
indefensible – but we only wanted to fight it out’.94 
Father Lewis Joseph Matthews, chaplain of the Royal Irish Fusiliers believed that the 
surrender was a ‘great blunder’.95 At the Court of Inquiry into the surrender, Father Matthews 
relayed to the court that Colonel Carleton and Major Adye requested him to return to 
Ladysmith as a non-combatant; he was to tell General White that ‘we could have held the 
place for 48 hours if the white flag had not been put up without authority’.96 Yet that claim is 
contradicted by the commanding officer himself at the inquiry, stating that the defence could 
not hold ‘an hour longer’ due to the enemy’s superior numbers and the scarcity of 
ammunition.
97
 Lieutenant Hill, 1
st
 Gloucester Regiment, rather controversially believed that, 
Carleton and Adye did not complain at surrendering and hailed the raising of the white flag as 
a ‘relief’; Hill judged that it decided ‘a difficult matter without having themselves to take the 
initiative’.98 It is interesting to note that all officers and men were exonerated for 
surrendering, except Captain Duncan of the Gloucester Regiment; the court found that for 
hoisting the white flag, he therefore became a ‘prisoner of his own misconduct, and not by 
chances of war’.99 
It was the largest surrender of British troops since the Napoleonic Wars; twenty four 
officers and 973 men surrendered, while thirty-eight men were killed and seven officers and 
ninety-eight men wounded.
100
 The Boers suffered sixteen killed and fifty-five wounded; the 
figure included two dead and five wounded from the Irish Brigade.
101
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Fig. 30: Victims of the diaster at Nicholson’s Nek. British prisoners at Pretoria 
 
          Source, The Graphic, 16 Dec. 1899. 
As a prisoner of war, Colour-Sergeant Jack Maradan, Royal Irish Fusiliers, wrote home to his 
wife in Armagh, from Pretoria; in the letter he details his experience of the battle: 
We were sent out on Sunday night ... and were cut off from Ladysmith, and after 7.5 
hours’ fighting we had to surrender. We had a lot of casualties. I could not tell you all 
of them; but, thank God, I came out safely, although I had some narrow escapes.
102
 
In a letter to his sister in Mongahan, Thomas Brannigan, Irish Fusiliers, gave some detail of 
his incarceration at Pretoria: 
There are about 1,400 English soldiers here altogether. We get fairly well treated. We 
get plenty to eat, only it is very cold at night, and we have scarcely enough to keep us 
warm.
103
  
Officers, as expected, were treated with the consideration that was due to their rank; in a 
letter to his father, 2
nd
 Lieutenant C.E. Kinahan, Royal Irish Fusiliers, gave a number of 
reasons why ‘all you read about the Boers in England is absolutely untrue’: 
We were all taken then taken prisoner ... and marched to the Boer laager and sent off 
that night to a station twenty miles distant in wagons. While we were in the laager we 
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were treated extremely well and they gave us food and tobacco ... They are most kind 
to the wounded and prisoners, looking after them, and anything they have got they 
will give you if you ask them, even if they deprive themselves. 
We came up to Pretoria in first class sleeping carriages ... They provide us with 
everything, from clothes down to toothbrushes ... In fact, we can have anything we 
like except our liberty...
104
 
The disaster at Nicholson’s Nek damaged the reputation of General White, with some 
colonists comparing the general to his fellow countryman Sir George Colley; for the South 
African, the name Colley, ‘signifies an unsullied ignorance of the conditions of warfare in 
South Africa’.105 The Anglo-Celt described the defeat as a ‘humiliating fall’ which caused 
great ‘consternation’ in Cavan as many of the locals had enrolled in the Royal Irish 
Fusiliers.
106
 The attack on his character and military leadership, gave White no option, but to 
defend himself at the Royal Commission. 
I am always doubtful of reaching a desired point by a night march through a difficult 
country, but the result I aimed at seemed to me to justify the risk ... In this case the 
result is known, and was disastrous.
107
 
The defeat at Nicholson’s Nek also revealed the importance and necessity of preparing an 
effective position of defence; the sangars constructed by the men, were considered ‘pitiful’ by 
Lord Roberts; he believed that the British regulars were unable to improvise with cover 
individually, as the Boers were so capable of doing.
108
 Throughout the British campaign to 
relieve Ladysmith, inferior Boer numbers were able to hold areas of tactical importance with 
the construction of entrenchments; they proved effective for protection from artillery and rifle 
fire, and reconnaissance. Although the British favoured manoeuvrable warfare, stressing the 
importance of remaining on the offensive, veterans of the war began to notice the importance 
of cover and entrenchments. The construction of suitable entrenchments was considered vital 
by Lord Kitchener, to provide cover under the ‘modern conditions of rifle fire’, and he 
believed, that in the future it would be imperative, with the increased accuracy of weapons, 
that infantry and the artillery should carry sufficient tools for digging in;
109
 Lieutenant-
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General Sir Ian Hamilton understood that trenches played an important role during the South 
African War, and advocated, that in future, large quantities of entrenching tools should be 
provided, so soldiers would be sufficiently prepared to dig in.
110
 The Boer method of 
constructing deep narrow entrenchments, barely invisible to an attacker, was an important 
lesson for Lord Methuen; he believed that the conditions of modern warfare, made it vitally 
important for British officers and soldiers to be effectively trained in future to instinctively 
exploit cover.
111
 Major- General Sir H. M. Leslie Rundle believed that the soldiers ‘ought to 
entrench just as naturally as he eats his dinner’.112 Although the South African War never 
reached the same levels of static warfare commonly associated with the Great War in Europe, 
the entrenchments provided a suitable and interesting prelude to the vast construction of 
trenches on the Western Front. Trench warfare in the Boer context, demonstrated an 
unheeded warning that relatively few troops with deadly weaponry, could defend an area 
against a frontal assault with superior numbers and artillery barrage.  
        
Fig. 31: 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers captured by Boers’ and Blake’s Brigade. Arrival under 
escort at Pretoria. 
 
Source, The Weekly Freeman and National Press, 11 May 1901. Available on the website of the National 
Library of Ireland 
(http://catalogue.nli.ie/Search/Results?lookfor=boer+war&type=AllFields&page=2&view=list) (10 Jan. 
2014) 
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Returning to the Ladysmith theatre, the coordinated attacks mounted that morning by the 
British were all indecisive, and all withdrew to the confines of the town (see page xiv for map 
of attacks on 30 October 1899). Thus, the Boers were able to continue their advance on the 
British position and begin preparations for besieging the town. ‘It is all over’ cried war 
correspondent Bennett Burleigh of the Daily Telegraph, ‘we are beaten, and it means 
investment (being besieged). We shall all be locked up in Ladysmith’.113 With regards the 
defeat, the Southern Star remained sceptical and unconvinced by the British defence; the 
newspaper concluded that the ‘less that is said about the “glorious stand at Nicholson’s Nek” 
the better’.114 
 
The relief column and the battle of Colenso (15 December 1899) 
The following day General Sir Redvers Buller arrived at Cape Town, becoming the newly 
stated commander-in-chief of the forces in South Africa; White’s independent command in 
Natal subsequently came to an end.
115
 It was Buller’s first autonomous command of a large 
force; an army corps including the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Infantry Divisions, a Cavalry Division, 
Corps Troops and troops for the lines of communication, totalling 47, 081.
116
  Buller’s initial 
plan was to strike at the heart of the Orange Free State by taking the capital of Bloemfontein, 
thus relieving in Buller’s opinion, the pressure on Kimberly and Ladysmith. However, it 
became clear that Buller’s original plans had become void given the grave situation in Natal; 
General White was deemed powerless to protect the colony within the confines of Ladysmith, 
and his condition would become precarious if aid failed to materialise. The relief of 
Ladysmith became the principal objective and it would be led by the commander-in-chief. 
Buller, ‘very reluctantly’ decided to divide his forces in order to support further theatres of 
operation. As he became increasingly aware of the plight of Kimberly, he decided to despatch 
Lord Methuen, along with a division, as a relief force. Upon the arrival of the Cavalry 
Division, General French, having escaped from Ladysmith, was posted near Colesberg to 
hinder any advance of Boer forces; General Gatacre was positioned at Queenstown to cover 
East London and King Williamstown; and General Clery was appointed in command of three 
brigades in Natal, of which, Buller subsequently took control. With this thinking, Buller 
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believed that if each operation was successful, the strategic situation would be restored to its 
pre-war make up.
117
 From November to December 1899, further British reinforcements were 
arriving in South Africa; below are listed the Irish regiments that were ordered to the front:
118
 
Table B) Information on Irish regiments ordered to the front (November-December 
1899). 
Unit 
Officer
s 
Othe
r 
Rank
s Horses 
Gun
s Ship 
Date of 
embarkation 
Date of 
disembarkatio
n 
6th Inniskilling 
Dragoons 25 557 498 1 
Persi
a 
24 October 
1899 
11 November 
1899 
1st Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 29 969 3 1 
Catal
o-nia 
5 November 
1899 
5 December 
1899 
2nd Royal Irish 
Rifles 25 875 3 1 
Brita
n-nic 
26 October 
1899 
16 November 
1899 
1st Connaught 
Rangers 28 855 3 1 
Bavar
i-an 
10 
November 
1899 
1 December 
1899 
1st Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers 28 923 0 1 
Bavar
i-an 
10 
November 
1899 
1 December 
1899 
2nd Royal Irish 
Fusiliers 29 946 3 1 
Hawa
r-den 
Castl
e 
23 October 
1899 
10 November 
1899 
 
The departure of these troops was typified by scenes of enthusiasm in towns and cities across 
Ireland, as civilians gathered together to bid fond farewells. The thousands that witnessed the 
departure of each battalion, was testament to the public’s interest in the British military and 
the conflict in South Africa. The appearance of solidarity, with citizens waving Union Jacks 
and singing patriotic songs, demonstrated that sections of the Irish public remained 
unresponsive to the strong and constant pro-Boer rhetoric witnessed throughout the country. 
In Ireland, following the declaration of war, the 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers were the first 
regiment to be mobilised and sent to South Africa on board Hawarden Castle. On 25 October 
1899, the Royal Irish Rifles left Victoria Barracks in Belfast for departure to the front; a large 
crowd of friends, family and well-wishers congregated along the route that the regiment 
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would take to the train station. The following contemporary account taking from the Belfast 
News Letter illustrates the public excitement that prevailed in Belfast: 
Along the whole line of route the illuminated windows were thronged with numbers 
of spectators, who waved handkerchiefs and flags and shouted friendly and 
encouraging farewell to the troops. The cavalry escort could not withstand the 
pressure of the crowd, who broke in in (sic) all directions upon the ranks, and the men 
had the utmost difficulty in preserving their formation...Many of the men were almost, 
in the literal sense of the word, “killed by kindness”...There were women weeping 
inside the barrier at the impending departure of husbands, sons, or sweethearts; others 
outside it who struggled in vain to reach their relatives.
119
 
The departure of the 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers on board the transport ship SS Catalonia 
was accompanied by similar scenes; on 5 November 1899 in Queenstown, Private Bryant 
recorded in his diary the events at the harbour: 
Our band played a few patriotic airs to while the time whilst everything was being got 
on board the ship before she sailed. We left Queenstown about 4 p.m. amid loud 
cheering and waving of handkerchiefs from the crowd assembled on the Quay ... 
Many of the people of Queenstown had their houses beautifully illuminated with 
coloured lights etc., which they displayed as we steamed out of the harbour.
120
 
On board that same ship was Major-General Hart, in which he recorded, ‘The send-off from 
Queenstown was the most splendid demonstration I ever saw...’121 Prior to the departure of 
the 1
st
 Connaught Rangers to board the transport ship, Bavarian, the Irish Times reported 
scenes from Athlone Barracks: 
At 2 o’ clock on Friday morning under a heavy downpour, the military gates were 
opened for the exit of the Connaught Rangers ... hundreds of people at the early hour 
named had congregated in the Market Square, close to the barracks, to take part in the 
farewell programme. The morning being intensely dark, the Urban Council had a 
band of torchbearers to light the streets traversed by the soldiers ... The bands played 
at intervals their favourite regimental airs, and all the time the concourse of civilians 
who accompanied cheered vociferously ... many affectionate leave-takings as the 
trains moved off for Queenstown amidst great cheering.
122
  
Such scenes, in the opinion of Captain Jourdain demonstrated that the ‘Irish are immensely 
proud of their old Regiments’.123 He recorded: 
... the rangers had a wonderful send-off at Athlone, and it was simply amazing to see 
the vast concourse of people at the barrack gates so early on that cold, wet November 
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morning, and the torchlight procession to the station. At Queenstown the whole front 
was lighted up with fireworks and coloured lights. A wonderful sight.
124
 
 
Preceding the departure of the 1
st
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers and a squadron of the 6
th
 Inniskilling 
Dragoons, the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s Forces in Ireland, Field-Marshal Lord 
Roberts, V.C., inspected the troops at the Curragh Army Camp, County Kildare. Addressing 
the Dublin Fusiliers he recalled the battle honours of their regiment throughout its existence, 
their proud tradition and the honour that they bestowed on the British Army.  Lord Roberts 
was confident in their ‘splendid reputation in the future’ and acclaimed the regiment was 
‘privileged’ in taking part in a ‘great campaign’.125  
The excitement was infectious and would certainly have boosted the spirits of many 
men as their boarded their respective transport. The departing speeches attempted to rally the 
troops by providing a sense of occasion; by emphasising their purpose for the forthcoming 
campaign; and, highlighting their participation within the confines of their regiments’ 
historical annals and legacy. Naturally, however, soldiers’ thoughts and prayers remained 
with their families, friends and sweethearts. As soldiers departed from the United Kingdom, 
many took the opportunity to write a few lines to their loved ones. On the eve of war, Private 
Joseph Robinson, 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers wrote home to his girlfriend: 
i wish I could see you before we go abroad i would be contented then but i dont think 
I see you anymore till the war is over and then i see you keep your heart up dont be 
fretting i am all right i mind my self till i see you again so i think this is all this time 
from your fond sweetheart ... remember me to all the boys as i taught (sic) i would see 
them this furlough dont get married till I go back and we will be happy i am always 
thinking of you and i love you and no one else.
126
 
Conversely, the Irish pro-Boers and Nationalists did not express such enthusiasm at Ireland’s 
contribution to the war effort and the departure of Irish troops to South Africa. The soldiers 
were considered by the Tipperary Board of Guardians as, ‘thoughtless, ignorant and 
dispirited’.127 Prior to the conflict, the Cork Corporation further stated that ‘any Irishman who 
joined the English army ... was no Irishman and should be regarded as a great foe as the worst 
type of Englishman’.128 Such rhetoric was understandable considering the stance undertaking 
by the Irish Transvaal Committee attempting to dissuade recruitment; pro-Boer placards 
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distributed across Dublin read: ‘Enlisting in the English Army is Treason ... the recruiting 
sergeant is an enemy, and it is a disgrace to any decent Irishman seen in his company ... in 
preventing recruitment for the English army you are working for Ireland’s honour.’129 While 
some condemned the role the Irish played in the war, others lamented the participation but 
found room for praise; in the House of Commons John Redmond understood the soldiers’ 
duty and obligations to the army: ‘I, as an Irishman, cannot help feeling a thrill of pride at the 
record of heroism of the Irish lads ... who have suffered so terribly in this war.’130 
Despite the obvious schism in Irish society regarding the conflict and Irish 
participation, others considered the war beyond politics and focused on the human impact; 
one observer of these departures viewed the occasion as poignant, as the individual looked 
beyond the fanfare and celebration, and focused on the family that was left behind: 
In several instances I observed them (the soldiers) with their wives and children, and I 
noticed how the little fair-headed lasses and the little lads surrounded their father in 
this, possibly, their last companionship together, and I felt exceedingly sad at the 
approach of Christmas and the deep shadow it will bring to many little homes. The 
men march past, with crowds cheering, with bands playing, with colours flying, to  
embarkation, full of resolve. The women return to their little homes, alone, full of 
anxiety, full of grief, full of care about to-morrow. The breadwinner is gone, his chair 
is empty, he speeds to Table Bay.
131
 
 
The initial excitement of embarking amid widespread elation naturally ebbed away, and the 
difficulties and hardship of service became immediately clear on their transport ships; 
cramped and insanitary conditions; high temperatures (above and below deck); rough 
weather; sickness and inoculation. In three weeks their transports would take the men down 
the Portuguese coast, past Las Palmas and forward towards Cape Town. The rough weather 
was a continuous problem for the men on board, especially for those not accustomed to the 
sea and not familiarised with the regular visitor ‘Father Neptune’.132 On board the SS 
Catalonia, Private Bryant and his regiment the 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers suffered four days of 
storms from the day of departure, with the private falling victim to sea sickness.
133
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Fig. 32: The 6
th
 Inniskilling Dragoons boarding the ‘Siberian’ at Queenstown on 
24 October 1899. 
 
           Source, J.W. Yardley, With the Inniskilling Dragoons: the record of a cavalry regiment during the 
Boer War, 1899-1902 (London, 1904), p. 2. 
The men passed their time by playing cards, reading periodicals, magazines, and newspapers, 
playing bingo, singing, concerts, boxing, church parades and in cases, discussing Irish 
politics, religion and their concerns regarding the war. The soldiers had relatively little time 
to think about the coming campaign as free time was a luxury, and their time on board was 
filled with varied occupations. The soldiers partook in rifle, small-arms and maxim machine 
practice (which included shooting bottles, boxes, make-shift targets, and passing birds), 
gymnastics, physical drills, guard duty, cleaning the messes and troop decks, and if present, 
exercising, grooming and feeding the horses. There was, however, one activity that all 
soldiers on board were ordered to take part in: the dreaded ‘pig sticking drill’. It was a 
typhoid vaccination with far from savoury effects; Captain Jourdain of the 1
st
 Connaught 
Rangers recalled the procedure whilst en route to South Africa: 
Inoculation was in its infancy at this time and was clumsily performed. Thus of the 
seventeen who underwent this rather drastic mode of making a hole in one’s arm and 
putting in about a tablespoon or more of serum, I was the only one who was on his 
legs at 9.30 p.m. that night and the only one except one who had breakfast the next 
morning. One youth fainted even before the overdose of liquid was put inside him.
134
  
Upon their arrival in South Africa, the 1
st
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, 1
st
 Connaught Rangers and 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers were assigned to the relief of 
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Ladysmith. Private W.J. Steele, 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers described the reaction of the loyalist 
population, as the Irish battalions journeyed to the British camp at Frere, Natal: 
We met with the greatest enthusiasm all along the line, kind ladies giving us fruit, tea, 
bread and butter, tobacco, pipes and matches; in fact offering to write home for us if 
we could only give them our addresses. It was great to us tired chaps to meet with so 
much kindness. Everyone, old and young, showed it in many ways. I heard lads and 
girls not more than eight years old shouting ‘Kill the Boers, kill the Boers...135 
Joseph Drumgoon, 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers recalled the above scenes in a letter to his parents 
from Cootehill, County Cavan; he also gave his opinion on the country: 
Dear parents, this is a very nice country, though very hilly, and that makes the place 
more beautiful, and it will be a splendid place, when we have British laws, for any 
person to make a fortune, though at the present state of affairs you would not be long 
spending a small sum.
136
  
  
General Buller’s aim was to lift the siege of Ladysmith, but to do so he would have to push 
the Boers out of the region at the Tugela Heights, which blocked the main route to the town 
(see page xv for theatre of operations). Overall, Buller had within his command, four infantry 
brigades, one mounted brigade, five batteries of artillery and a range of naval guns which 
included the Irish 5
th
 Brigade under the command of Anglo-Irish General Arthur Fitzroy Hart 
of Ballymoyer, County Armagh (1844-1910).
137
 Prior to his appointment in South Africa, the 
general had served a distinguished career in Her Majesty’s Forces; he saw service as captain 
during the Zulu Campaign (1879) seeing action at the battles of Nyezane and Gingindlovu 
and present during the siege of Eshowe; he served with the Natal Field Force under the 
command of Sir Evelyn Wood during the First Anglo Boer War (1881); appointed Deputy 
Assistant Adjutant – General, he was stationed during the war in Egypt (1882), mentioned in 
despatches for his role during the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Although Hart had a wealth of 
experience in the British army, his military familiarity was consigned to tactics more suitable 
for colonial warfare - combat that usually rested on the professionalism of the British 
soldier’s ability to sustain fanatical attacks and rout the enemy through a close ordered 
assault. However, British officers’ infallible belief in close order assaults, their inability to 
adhere to the changing environment of the battlefield, and the Boers possession of modern 
long range rifles in defensive positions, made the process of assaulting a position a precarious 
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and dangerous task.
138
 Interestingly, General Hart, a veteran of the First Boer War, wrote in 
1881 following the declaration of peace: ‘The Boer has been underrated as a fighting man ... 
A nation of rifle sportsmen must and ever will be the best shots in the world’. He remarked 
that the British army ‘cannot compete with him in that’; however they possessed two things 
that would ultimately smash a Boers defence – superior numbers, and artillery.139 Hart carried 
forth this belief into the South African War, and thus at Colenso, the Irish Brigade suffered 
considerable losses due to the tactics deployed by the general, and his belief in the superiority 
of his forces. 
With regards to the Irish Brigade, officers of the 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers initially feared 
that their battalion would become ‘nobody’s child’ and sent away defending lines of 
communications following their escape from the siege at Ladysmith; yet to their relief they 
replaced their sister battalion in Hart’s Brigade.140 The brigade now comprised the 2nd Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers consisting of eleven companies (which included three companies of the 1
st
 
Battalion under Major Hicks with a fighting strength of 287), the 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 
1
st
 Connaught Rangers and the 1
st
 Border Regiment. The 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers was also 
present in the relief forming a part of the 6
th
 Fusilier Brigade under Major-General Barton.  
After news of Major-General Gatacre’s defeat at Stormberg (10 December), in which 
the 2
nd
 Royal Irish Rifles had suffered over two hundred casualties, and upon hearing that 
Lieutenant-General Methuen had suffered a heavy repulse at Magersfontein (11 December), 
Buller believed that decisive action was needed to halt the recent reverses. Buller knew that 
the Boers occupied the hills along the Tugela River but he had little knowledge of their strong 
points due to the difficult topography of the area, coupled with poor reconnaissance and 
inferior maps. The day before the attack, Buller sent for his staff and commanders in order to 
personally explain his plan; that night Irishman Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Clery, a 
veteran of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), and one of the few Imperial officers who survived the 
massacre at Isandlwana (1879) and a veteran of the Nile Expedition to relieve General 
Gordon at Khartoum (1885), drew up the plans for the attack. In the words of Hart, his 
brigade was given the task of attacking ‘one of the strongest natural positions in the world-a 
mountain range and a river at its base’.141 While this observation was recorded days after the 
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battle, the inherent difficulty of the operation did not alter Hart’s tactical mindset and he 
continuously urged the necessity of keeping his men ‘well in hand’.142  
The mission for Buller’s two attacking brigades was to ‘force a passage of the 
Tugela’, in a bid to force a decisive victory. The 2nd Brigade, under Major-General Hildyard, 
was ordered to cross the iron brigade at Colenso and gain possession of the kopjes. The 
official order for the 5
th
 Irish Brigade was as follows: 
The 5
th
 Brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30 a.m. and march 
towards the Bridle Drift, immediately west of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The 
Brigade will cross at this point, and after crossing, move along the left bank of the 
river towards the kopjes north of the iron bridge.  
With little innovation or forethought in their approach, the British command ordered a frontal 
assault, despite the lack of reconnaissance and information on Boer positions or any true 
understanding of how effective their preparatory bombardment might be. Moreover, the 
manner of the attack demonstrated that the British failed to realise or acknowledge the 
military prowess of the Boer, the unsuitability of the environment for frontal assaults, and the 
importance of mobility and reconnaissance. Previous military engagements with the Boers 
should have demonstrated this during the First-Anglo Boer War (1880-1881), but with British 
arrogance and/or ignorance, the British senior command inexplicably failed to analyse and 
learn from past engagements. The results from past encounters would have demonstrated that 
the Boers were extremely tough opponents, excellent at exploiting cover and had the courage 
to hold their positions in difficult situations.  
Fig. 33: Officers of the 5
th
 Irish Brigade (Captain Jourdain on the left) and several war 
correspondents, watching the bombardment of Colenso, on 13 December 1899. 
 
Source, Black and White Budget, 3 Feb. 1900. 
                                                          
142
 Romer and Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War with a 
description of the operations in the Aden Hinterland, p. 34. 
 55 
 
The 4
th
 Brigade under the command Major-General Lyttelton would advance in support of 
the 2
nd
 and 5
th
 Brigades respectively. The right flank attack of the 2
nd
 Brigade was to be 
protected by Major Barton’s 6th Brigade and if necessary, Lord Dundonald’s mounted brigade 
while endeavouring to take a position on Hlangwane. The infantry attack was to be supported 
by British artillery.
143
 Hart was shown on a map the river which his brigade would cross (see 
page 58). A local native was consigned to the brigade and after some initial reservations Hart 
was convinced that he could be led by the ‘trusty kaffir’.144 In a letter dated 14 December 
1899 a ‘Naas lad’ attached to Buller’s column described the preparations to his parents. 
We are shelling Colenso, where the Boers have taken up our forts. We have cleared 
them out with lyddite. They left their guns and convoy behind. They tried to get it 
back, but the fire from our guns sent them away again. We are well looked after in 
every way. We expect to be up in Ladysmith next week. We have a very strong force 
here now, about 25,000 troops and 100 guns. It will be nearly all artillery fighting...
145
 
 
This letter expresses optimism with regards the effect of bombardment and the use of high 
explosive lyddite shells on the Boer positions. Prior to the battle of Magersfontein, Nenagh 
native Private Bernard Murray of the Grenadier Guards wrote to his family explaining that 
lyddite shells were imperative for victory. He noted that ‘nothing else will drive them out of 
the hills and trenches’.146 On the advance to their preparatory positions at Colenso, Private 
Sheridan of the Royal Irish Fusiliers claimed to his parents ‘we will give the Boers 
“socks”’.147 It was an ignorant overestimation of the effectiveness of artillery on strong 
hidden positions; ‘Except, perhaps, for those who had studied the effect of artillery upon 
earthworks during the Russo-Turkish War’ wrote historian Bailes, ‘the British assumed that 
the bombardment would shatter the Boer defences and demoralise the occupants’.148 The 
artillery barrage had little consequence, inflicting minimal casualties. In fact, it turned out to 
be a counterproductive tactic which alerted the enemy of imminent attack. Conversely to the 
optimism expressed by Private Sheridan, Lance-Corporal Thomas O’Neill of the same 
regiment, had little confidence. Writing from Estcourt Camp, O’ Neill conveyed his doubts in 
a letter to his family; dated 8 December, it was also an ideal opportunity to settle his affairs in 
the event of his death: 
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The battle of Ladysmith will come off in about two days. I think, and I may tell you 
many a poor bugger will kiss the ground before very long. Dear Sister you will have 
no bother in getting my money if I should be shot ... You will also get two and maybe 
three war medals which I will be entitled to for the hardship we have earnt (sic) 
through on the Sunny Plains of S.A. Dear Sister you may think little very little of war 
medals, but it is quite the opposite with me. I would value them as I value my very 
life. You may understand that a soldier’s wealth is honour. No soldier can wear a 
greater honour than a war medal...  
 
In his final line he wrote: ‘Trust me a couple of boers will bite the dust before me if I get half 
the chance and then I shall be content’.149   
On the morning of the battle, Captain H.F.N Jourdain of the 1
st
 Connaught Rangers 
described the final preparations in his diary and the march to battle: 
Got up at 2.30 am and packed wagons at 2.45 am. Got breakfast of tea and dry biscuit 
at 3am. Fell in 3.40. Marched on the Brigade parade at 4.5. Marched off B’gde parade 
at 420 down towards the Tugela River. While we were marching in Mass of Quarter 
Columns, the Brigadier (Hart) in front, then the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1
st
 
Connaught Rangers, and the Border Regt, and lastly the 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers.
150
 
The men carried with them only their haversacks, water bottles, a rifle and 150 rounds of 
ammunition. As the soldiers marched across the damp ground with little natural cover 
towards their position, few could foresee what was in store for them over the next few hours. 
As Sergeant Brennan of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers related in an interview three months 
following the battle to the Kildare Observer: ‘We went marching on, scarce knowing what 
our destiny might be.’151 Conversely, as the column advanced towards Ladysmith days 
previously, one soldier was ‘expecting to have a great battle at Colenso.’152 The naval guns 
prepared the ground by beginning a bombardment of the hills. The hills appeared deserted 
from a British perspective, as the Boers did not respond to the artillery fire and continued to 
remain concealed from the advancing British. However, Captain Romer believed that ‘many 
foes might be watching the advancing khaki-clad troops’.153 The Boers remained hidden, 
awaiting the impending infantry assault. 
The Boers understood the value of surprise and the benefits of remaining hidden until 
the pivotal moment. They had waited in their positions for several days, ordered not to return 
any fire during the two day bombardment. Following the Boer victory at Magersfontein (11 
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December), General Cronje advised General Botha to order his men to remain in their 
trenches, as it was now apparent that the high explosive shell lyddite was ineffective and 
relatively harmless if men remained sheltered. Botha had decided to defend the main crossing 
points across the Tugela with some 4,500 commandoes and Johannesburg police across a 
front of six and half miles. Due to the topography of the region, the Boer position was 
defensively formidable amid the kopjes, which naturally instilled confidence in the civilian 
army. Not only were the Boers defensively secured in a line of trenches and concealed from 
British observations, the men were crack shots armed with modern rifles, and five artillery 
pieces. Their artillery consisted of a 120mm Krupp howitzer, a 75 mm Krupp field gun, 
37mm Maxim- Nordenfeldt ‘Pom-Pom’ and two 75 mm Creusot field guns.154 Their firearms 
also added to their effective defence. The Mauser Rifle, M1893-6 was a magazine fed rifle 
with a clip loading mechanism that could discharge five bullets rapidly. The cartridge also 
offered an undoubted advantage over the British; the Mauser discharged a bullet with 
smokeless gun powder offering near invisibility from the advancing British brigades. 
Following the battle of Colenso, several accounts would emerge from Irish soldiers fighting 
an ‘invisible’ enemy. The Boers also had the motivation to fight; they believed that British 
aggression and interference inhibited their livelihoods, and their traditions. Indeed, in the 
words of a soldier of the 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers: ‘They are a tough lot, and will fight to the 
last for their independence’.155  
As the Irish brigade continued their march, Hart noted, with great annoyance that the 
local guide was adamant that the only crossing point was at the loop – Hart had been ordered 
to cross a drift that he marked as point ‘A’ on the map below.156 In retrospect, Hart noted that 
‘this was serious news ... I must go on or go back. But I had no authority to go back’. Hart 
was adamant to follow Buller’s orders and attempt to force the passage across the river 
despite the substantial confusion in reconnaissance. Historian Thomas Pakenham claimed: 
Now Hart knew enough about war to know that there are few more dangerous places 
to send men on a battlefield than into a salient-the open end of a loop. To march into a 
well-defended salient is like putting your head into a noose
157
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Fig. 34: Map detailing the advance of the 5
th
 Irish Brigade at Colenso 
 
Source, B.M. Hart-Synnot (ed.), Letters of Major-General Fitzroy Hart-Synnot (London, 1912), p. 296. 
Hart ordered the entire brigade of over four thousand men into the loop that was only a 
thousand yards wide. The hills surrounding the loop were defended by two artillery pieces, 
and four commando units entrenched – the Zoutpansberg, Ermelo, Swaziland, and 
Middleburg.
158
 The Irish Brigade’s fate was sealed. 
Fig. 35: General Hart’s flank attack from the Boer point of view. 
 
From a sketch by Colonel H. Tempest Hicks. Source, Source, C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The 
Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War with a description of the operations in the 
Aden Hinterland (London, 1908), p. 34. 
As the Irish Brigade entered the loop, they immediately sustained effective fire; Private 
Richard Wilson, 2
nd
 Connaught Rangers, related to his brother that ‘Our brigade was taken 
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completely by surprise’.159 Private M Dwyer, D Company Connaught Rangers noted that as 
the men entered the loop in a dense formation, the ‘mistake’ of the deployment, was not 
recognised ‘until the Boers dropped a shell’.160 Such declarations evidently portray the Irish 
Brigade as tactically unprepared for the advance, and a total failure of British reconnaissance 
in providing suitable information on the positions of the Boers, their defensive 
entrenchments, and their numbers. Private Lally 1
st
 Connaught Rangers felt the ‘Boer were 
firing the same as a field day at home’.161 Captain Jourdain described the incessant fire from 
the enemy, as they moved behind in support of the Dublin Fusiliers, before they advanced 
onto the river bank with the Inniskillings on their left. He remembered the ‘fire at this point 
became very heavy, & man after man fell down’.162 A soldier lamented the first shell that 
burst into his company; ‘thirty poor fellows fell never to rise in this world, some with the 
heads off, some with the hands off, others cut in two’.163 As D Company of the Connaught 
Rangers approached under Captain Jourdain, Private Michael Cahill was killed instantly; his 
death was lamented by his captain, who believed that he lost a ‘fine soldier and one of the 
best shots in the Company’.164 From the eyewitness accounts, it is evident that the battle was 
a harrowing experience for the Irish Brigade, as Private Lally 1
st
 Connaught Rangers put it, 
‘the same as pigs going to the slaughter yard’.165 Private Patrick Reilly, Royal Irish Fusiliers 
noted ‘our men fell like apples off a tree’, 166 whilst Private Philip Quinn, Royal Irish 
Fusiliers likened the heavy casualties as ‘our men fell like chaff before the wind.167 
Humorously Private Michael McLoughlin, 1
st
 Connaught Rangers, who lost his left hand in 
the battle, wrote, ‘it was a very nice breakfast we got, plenty of powder and ball flying – and 
buzzing all round us’.168  
Those examples highlight the ferocious battle conditions, but also revealed the 
inadequate tactics and formation of the brigade that necessitated such straightforward targets. 
A soldier described the congestion of troops as a reason for the high casualty rate: 
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The attack was made in such a way that we were overcrowded in the ranks and the 
consequence was the Boer artillery had full play on us ... The fire we came under was 
simply terrifying; almost every second man of ours was dropped.
169
 
Moreover Captain Cecil Francis Romer, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, described his battalions 
overcrowding as the artillery and rifle fire cut into the Irish infantry: 
Another shrapnel burst over the line and then the enemy’s musketry blazed forth, 
finding an excellent target in the massed brigade ... The battalion was dangerously 
crowded together, for it had been advancing as if drilling on the barrack square, 
although Colonel Cooper had tried to open out to double company interval, a 
proceeding which the General had promptly counter-ordered ... The men rushed 
forward after their officers, and their signal lay down in the long grass, whence fire 
was opened at the invisible foe.
170
 
The dense columns advance wavered under the pressure and the Irish brigade was ultimately 
pinned down. The men held their ground but it was evident that confusion and lack of 
cohesion was hampering any positive reaction to the situation. Dangerously, their officers 
continued to rally the men and encouraged them to break from cover and head for the bank. 
Some men summoned the courage and rush forward in small groups; the scene was 
appropriately described by General Hart: 
I could see officers here and there urging on the advance; and all this was so far 
successful that a slow advance was made. Here and there men with better nerves 
pushed on. There was no panic, and once when I said to a lot of men who were deaf to 
my commands to advance – ‘If I give you the lead, if your General gives you a lead – 
will you come on?’ they answered quite cheerily with their brogues ‘We will sir’, and 
they jumped and forward they went.
171
 
 
Although Jack Hendry, 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers, claimed that the Borderers and the 
Connaught Rangers refused to advance in the face of Boer fire; ‘I am ashamed to say that not 
a single man of them moved, although the General threatened to shoot them’.172 That opinion 
can be measured as harsh considering that the majority of the battalions had relatively little 
experience in any form of battle, their training did not counteract the conditions, and the 
‘baptism of fire’ in conjunction with the noise of hundreds of smokeless rounds constantly 
firing into their packed position would ultimately add to fear and confusion. Hart himself 
relayed to Buller that he considered his soldiers ‘inexperienced’ and noted that the reluctance 
of his brigade to advance towards the river bank was due to it being their ‘first experience of 
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fire’. He hoped that their performance would be much improved next time.173 Conversely, 
Captain Jourdain was impressed by the bravery and discipline of his company, 
notwithstanding that none had any previous battle experience, bar one sergeant who had seen 
action at Tel-el-Kebir (1882) as a drummer boy.
174
 This relative battlefield inexperience of 
the infantry was further compounded by the regulations imposed by infantry manuals. 
Soldiers were still being trained on tactics that were considered suitable for colonial warfare, 
focusing on close formations, discipline, volley fire and infantry assaults; such drills were 
impractical and generally ineffective against a well armed enemy, with long range fire 
power.
175
 Furthermore, historian Jeremy Black argued that it revealed ‘a lack of emphasis on 
the use of cover and of understanding of the consequences of smokeless powder; and, more 
generally a lack of understanding of enhanced defensive firepower’.176 At Colenso, due to the 
terrain, and the high rate of Boer fire, the Irish Brigade was unable to put their training into 
practice, thus resulting in being an ineffective and incapable strike force.  
Nevertheless, what was certainly evident was the bravery of the officers in 
maintaining professionalism and coolness in a difficult situation. General Hart was one such 
officer; as Sergeant Brennan, 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers, lay on the ground suffering from a piece of 
shell between his elbow joints, he remarked that Hart  ‘seemed to bear a charmed life, and he 
poured out his words of encouragement heedless of the danger in which he was placed’.177 
Despite some soldiers having scant confidence in Hart’s tactical abilities, many were 
impressed by his physical and morale courage. Jourdain noted that the men ‘were fascinated 
by the gallant bearing and bravery’ of Hart178- such performances earned him the nickname 
‘No-Bobs’. 
At this juncture, a fourteen year old bugler of the Dublin Fusiliers, named John Dunn, 
ordered an advance without prior instruction.
179
 The sound of the bugle galvanised sections of 
the brigade and with renewed optimism and confidence, they managed to force their way 
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towards the river bank.  Private M Dwyer, 1
st
 Connaught Rangers wrote ‘When we reached 
about 300 yards from them everyman thought at last we will get at them with the bayonet.’180 
However it became immediately clear as the men plunged into the river, that their optimism 
was misplaced. The soldiers mistakenly judged the river to be at knee deep and fordable, with 
Sergeant George Murray, 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers remembering ‘we had to hold our rifles over 
heads, ploughing through muddy water, which was half-red with blood.’181 In preparation for 
the attack, the Boers had dammed the river causing sections of water to rise by a few feet; in 
addition, their position was aided by barbed wire deployed along the river bed. The brigade’s 
failed crossing of the ford was told by Private M Dwyer, Connaught Rangers: 
We thought we would pay back our chums, but we came to a river. This was the 
crowning horror. I saw a staff officer, who shouted, ‘In with you, Irishmen; swim the 
river’. Mad with anger and excitement we rushed into the river. It was a death trap. 
There was wire netting under the water, and those of us who got out were very few, 
and we are wondering yet how we did get out and when I tell you we never saw the 
men we were fighting...
182
 
 
It is obvious throughout the eyewitness accounts that the Irish Brigade was exasperated in 
never seeing their enemy. The undeniable and outstanding change in the nature of warfare 
was considered by a war correspondent; he remembered the days when ‘the enemy could be 
seen, the smoke could be seen, and rifle had to be reloaded with every shot’. ‘Nowadays’ he 
lamented ‘all is changed’ – ‘Nothing is seen, no man, no smoke.’183 For the entire brigade it 
was a new experience, for which history offered no comfort; the battle of Omdurman, 
fourteen months previously, and the battle of Ulundi (1879) demonstrated that those 
‘conventional’ colonial set-piece battles were evidently defunct. Training had not prepared 
the men for an enemy who chose to play to their strengths by remaining ‘invisible’ and 
defensive. Such technology increased the soldiers’ tactical power on the defensive, with an 
effective ability to remain in advantageous positions, concealing their position from 
reconnaissance.
184
 From the evidence illustrated below, it appears, quite understandably that 
encountering such an enemy was an incredibly frustrating and disconcerting experience for 
the professional soldier. General Buller, in his report to Lord Lansdowne admitted that his 
men had suffered heavily, and told of his dispirited men ‘because they have not seen a dead 
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Boer’.185 The difficulties were best summed up by Lance Corporal Doake, 2nd Royal Irish 
Fusiliers:  
You must know that although we were out for I may say 10 hours, we did not see a 
single boer as they kept well behind the rocks + it was very hard on us to be there 
firing + not knowing whether we were doing any harm or not.
186
 
This is reinforced continually throughout memoirs and eyewitness accounts. On 28 December 
1899, a soldier along the Mooi Rover wrote a letter to his wife describing his experiences at 
Colenso and noting the vast limitations of fighting a concealed foe. He wrote ‘They are very 
difficult to get at. You see nothing but hills in front of you, and the bullets coming over your 
head...’187 Major-General Hart described ‘there was no smoke and not a sign of the enemy 
himself’.188 Private L.J Bryant of the Inniskilling Fusiliers remembered ‘we could not see any 
of them ... whilst they were practically safe in their trenches, we had no cover at all...’189 ‘I 
only saw three Boers’ remembered Captain Jourdain.190 In criticism, Private T. Corcoran of 
the Connaught Rangers wrote that ‘We had a general in charge who led us into the mouth of 
an enemy without ever seeing them.’191 
Fig. 36: The battle of Colenso – The Dublin Fusiliers attempt to ford the Tugela. 
 
Source, Louis Cheswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, ii (London, 1900), p. 192. 
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Buller watched the unfolding disaster through his telescope from Naval Gun Hill (Buller’s 
HQ). He ordered Lyttelton’s 4th Brigade to support Hart’s withdrawal by providing covering 
fire in open order, whilst the 63
rd
 and 64
th
 Field Batteries kept shelling the kopjes in support. 
As he gave the orders he said, ‘Hart has got into a devil of a mess down there. Get him out of 
it as best you can’.192 Hart received the order to retire by Colonel F.W Stopford, from Dublin 
and Buller’s Military Secretary. The men understandably attempted to double back, but the 
brigadier drew his sword, stretched his arms and ordered them to halt until the men at the rear 
caught up. The order to retire was in the words of one private the reason that many got hit; in 
a letter to his wife Private Fitzpatrick details the confusion and horror experienced during the 
withdrawal: 
Poor Toole of two-mile house, was shot three times in the back and the last words he 
said were: ‘Oh! Lord we are riddled with bullets!’ All the companies were confused 
and all were mixed up. By my side was poor Flynn, I mean Sgt. Flynn next door to 
you at home. He got riddled in the back of the head and I had only time to say ‘Good 
bye my poor fellow’. He said to me when he fell ... ’Fitz, tell her and all at home that I 
am gone’. Colour-Sgt. M’Gee got a terrible death ... his whole stomach was torn clean 
away by a shell ... also Capt. Bacon and Sgt. Callan.
193
 
 
In a letter home, Sergeant A.J. Windrum, 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, believed the 
withdrawal was a necessity following the failed breach of the defences: 
Our fellows had nothing else to do but retire, and by George! Didn’t they suffer then? 
Some men got as far as five or six bullets in them; one fellow actually strolled into 
camp in the evening with three bullets in his leg ... we got out of range at last, about 
12 noon, after being in action seven hours, and I wasn’t sorry either...194 
 
As the men were ordered to withdraw many soldiers were still unable to move due to 
exhaustion, wounds, for fear of being shot or failing to hear the order. In one such case, yards 
from Boer trenches, ‘C’ Company, 1st Connaught Rangers under the command of Captain 
Ford Hutchinson, failed to retreat from their position due to extent of the wounded; the 
company remained concealed until Boers surrounded their position and compelled them to 
surrender.
195
 
Across the entire front of the Tugela the British attack had grounded to a halt. Colonel 
Long’s 14th and 66th Field Batteries had deployed their pieces just one thousand yards from 
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the Boer positions, with a complete disregard of further support from infantry and the six 
twelve pounders naval guns. With unreliable maps, poor reconnaissance, and no support, 
hundreds of Boer rifles directed fire on their position. Lance Corporal Doake, 2
nd
 Royal Irish 
Fusiliers, attached to Major Barton’s 6th Fusilier Brigade witnessed the carnage: 
 
It was hard to see the horses + men getting killed and wounded, one battery of 
artillery which were not 50 yards from me + it was hard to see the horses getting 
knocked over by the shells from the enemy...
196
 
 
Several courageous attempts were made by officers and men to limber up the guns, and carry 
them off to safety; three Victoria Crosses were awarded to the volunteers in these attempts-
two Irishmen and the son of Lord Roberts. Corporal George Nurse, 66
th
 Battery of 
Enniskillen, County Fermanagh and Captain Hamilton Lyster Reed, 7
th
 Battery from Dublin, 
son Sir Andrew Reed, Inspector-General of the R.I.C., were awarded the medal for their role 
in trying to save the guns. Lieutenant Frederick Roberts, 1
st
 King’s Royal Rifles, of ‘Irish 
stock’, was mortally wounded in the dangerous operation, and was awarded the Victoria 
Cross posthumously.
197
 On all fronts, the attack had been checked within an hour; at 1820 
hours, General Buller communicated a telegram to the Secretary of State for War, Lord 
Lansdowne, detailing a ‘serious reverse’. Notwithstanding the failure of Hart’s operation, 
Buller heralded his ‘great gallantry’ but feared the losses were heavy for the brigade. He 
reported also that Long’s batteries suffered severe losses which included the loss of ten 
artillery guns, abandoned on the battlefield.
198
 Five hours later, Buller again telegrammed 
Lord Lansdowne, in which historian Pakenham believes the emotions of the battle finally got 
the better of him; Buller considered that his forces were incapable of relieving Ladysmith and 
judged ‘letting’ the town go. That message, and the one that encouraged White to fire off all 
his ammunition, were ill advised, and all faith was lost in the ability of Buller to resume an 
effective independent command. Lansdowne urged Buller to devise another attempt to break 
the Boer defences, as the British government judged the abandonment of Ladysmith as a 
‘national disaster of greatest magnitude’.199 
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In the words of Sir William Thompson, ‘for nearly fifty years Great Britain had not 
met a white faced foe and the weapons of war had entirely been revolutionised ... thus we 
entered upon the war in South Africa without any comprehensive idea of the surgical 
results...’200 The battle illustrated the disastrous effect that modern warfare had on the soldier. 
Rapid artillery and rifle fire directed into packs of infantry resulted in grave wounds and 
death. One soldier wrote to his wife describing the extent of the wounds suffered at Colenso: 
 
It was a terrible affair ... It was something pitiful to see the men getting carried away- 
some with bullet wounds in their legs hopping about, and others with their limbs 
blown clean off ... The trains were running all night long taking poor fellows away to 
the hospital, many of them dying before they reached it. On coming away from the 
battlefield I saw poor Jem Flynn lying dead on the field, also Pat Deevey and Jerry 
Dunne...
201
 
The British casualties at Colenso including dead, wounded and prisoners were 1139.
202
 Over 
five hundred casualties were attached to Hart’s brigade with the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers 
accounting for 216 of that number.
203
 Some of the wounded of the Irish brigade were brought 
to the 5
th
 Brigade Field Hospital under the command of Major G.H. Young, R.A.M.C. The 
hospital admitted twenty four officers and 285 of other ranks with bullet wounds. The 
following table illustrates the character of the wounds caused by bullets: 
 Table C) The character of wounds sustained by the 5th Irish Brigade at Colenso 
 
Head 19 
Face  7 
Neck  3 
Back and spine 20 
Upper 
extremity  76 
Lower 
extremity 118 
Other wounds 6 
 
In Major Young’s hospital only eight men were injured by shells and the majority of wounds 
were considered without exception caused by the Mauser bullet.
204
 With regards injuries after 
the battles of Colenso, Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz, the Irish hospital treated just eighty-seven 
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wounds caused by artillery shells of a total 1,140.
205
 ‘Had the Boer fuses been as good as 
their guns and their gunners’ noted Conan Doyle, ‘our losses – especially in the early part of 
the war – have been much more severe’;206 this is confirmed by Private Wilson, Connaught 
Rangers.
207
 Despite the unprecedented casualty list at Colenso, Sergeant Brennan of the 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers refuted any claim that the Boer’s marksmanship was effective; in an 
interview with the Kildare Observer: ‘The Boers are absolutely no good. Had their shooting 
been all that it was said to be, there would be none of us left to tell the tale that morning.’208  
Dr Frederick Treves, Consulting Surgeon with the British forces, commended the 
attitude of the British soldiers as they lay waiting for treatment remained ‘plucky, patient and, 
uncomplaining’.209 As hundreds of men waited to board the train to Chieveley from their 
respective field hospitals, Dr Treves gave a vivid description of the wounded and ill men 
which he commented was a ‘depressing sight’.210 One of the individuals that were among the 
wounded was Private Thomas McCarthy, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, from King’s Avenue, 
Ballybough Road, Dublin.  During the engagement, he was struck in the head by a fragment 
of a shell or bullet which possibly ricocheted. According to the Dublin Journal of Medical 
Science, ‘a great number (of bullets) strike the ground, or a stone, and become much more 
formidable in their effects’.211 In a rare medical report of an Irish wounded soldier, the 
surgeon notes the extent of injury sustained by Private Thomas McCarthy. The individual 
was brought by ambulance train to Maritzburg following the battle; Dr Treves and Sir 
William Stokes
212
 both took an interest in the soldier’s case: 
Depressed fracture of skull Summit anterior. Had paralysis of right arm, one or two 
days after admission. Convulsive twitchings set in in(sic) face, became unconscious. I 
was immediately sent for, and at once Trephined. I found the inner table set from the 
outer, and fractured to about four times the extent of the outer table. Had to make a 
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second trephine hole to get inner table out. There were also a couple of splinters 
embedded in brain matter. There was a large amount of clotted blood ... He had a 
severe attack of enteric fever which was very prevalent at that time He was invalided 
home ... The wound was caused either by a piece of shell or a ricochet bullet. The 
edges were jagged.
213
 
 
The soldier survived his wounds but he would be later admitted into the Richmond Asylum, 
at Grangegorman, Dublin for psychiatric treatment. At the Royal Commission on South 
African Hospitals, the court heard that Private Farrell, 1
st
 Connaught Rangers, was shot in the 
left arm, in the spine, and twice in the foot during the battle; the bullet that hit his spine left 
him paralysed in both limbs. The private spent over three months in Maritzburg Hospital, 
‘being very well treated’ and having no complaints to make.214 During the Royal Visit of 
Dublin in April 1900, Princess Henry of Battenberg, daughter of Queen Victoria, visited 
Saint Vincent’s Hosptial located beside Saint Stephen’s Green.  Reported in the Irish Times: 
In St. Patrick’s surgical ward, in charge of Surgeon M’Ardle, a young man named 
Alfred Carroll Browne, who belongs to one of the Irish Regiments, and who was 
severely wounded on the 15
th
 of December at Colenso, lay in bed. The Princess heard 
with marked attention the character of the wound by which the young Irish soldier 
was put hors de combat. The bullet entered his leg just below the knee and took a 
somewhat extraordinary course, passing between the bones into the flesh just above 
the ankle.
215
 
The accounts of survivors reveal the battlefield environment of modern warfare, and the 
extent of the injuries illustrate that it was apparent that military technology superseded British 
contemporary tactics. The Times History critically noted that ‘Colenso was a striking 
demonstration of the power of modern weapons to punish those who refused to recognize or 
pay heed to the new conditions of war’.216 Considering this was the first engagement for the 
majority of the brigade, the battle certainly would demonstrate the reality of  future warfare; 
following the engagement soldiers of the Irish Brigade began recall their experience; Private 
Lally 1
st
 Connaught Rangers remembered in a letter to his sister the horrors of that day: 
It grieved me to see to see all my brother soldiers shot dead. The moans of the poor 
fellows shouting for their wives and children! There was never such a war.
217
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Considering Private Lally’s statement above, it can be argued that some Irish soldiers’ 
understood the impact of modern weaponry and that the experience was relatively new, in the 
context of warfare and British military history. An intuitive Private Wilson, 1
st
 Connaught 
Rangers, considered that the battle ‘would be remembered for a long time in the annals of 
British war history’.218 However following their experience at Colenso, it remains unclear 
whether they were aware of the tactical and significant technological changes occurring on 
the battlefield. It was evident to some veteran soldiers that the death toll and difficulties of 
the campaign surpassed previous experiences on campaign; one soldier commented that ‘I 
thought the “Nile Campaign” bad, but this is a far sight worse’;219 whilst Father Lewis 
Matthews, chaplain of the Royal Irish Fusiliers stated: ‘My Soudan experiences were mere 
child’s play in comparison’.220  Soldiers understood the difficulties of fighting an ‘invisible’ 
enemy, adhering to smokeless technology, whilst officers and men of the Irish Brigade 
believed that the tactics deployed by their officers were defunct and ineffective.  
Amongst the rank and file, soldiers’ letters and reports of the battle withheld any 
criticism of their commander-in-chief; instead upon reflection, many soldiers blamed Fitzroy 
Hart. General Hart, like most Victorian generals, was unable to adjust to new methods of 
warfare and had very conventional views that were unsuited against the Boers. In analysis, 
historian Pemberton remarked: ‘This dashing Irishman might have stepped straight out of the 
Crimea for all his apparent ignorance of what had been achieved in gunnery and small arms 
over the past fifty years’.221 While Buller took most of the criticism after the battle, he was 
still a part of the British Army doctrine that was not accustomed to this new type of warfare, 
and he was surrounded by conventional staff. Nevertheless, as several historians, including 
Edward M. Spiers have noted, Buller maintained the respect of his troops despite the extent 
of difficulties during the Tugela campaign.
222
 However, in the opinion of men of the Irish 
brigade, the same could not be said for Hart; a Royal Inniskilling Fusilier blamed Major-
General Hart for ‘another Majuba’(see page 16); the soldier wrote a letter to his mother in 
Belfast dated three days following the battle: 
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The General commanding the Irish Brigade will get into some hot water for the 
blunder he made; but maybe they will hide it and not show him up, though he deserve 
to be exposed, for he might have got the Irish Brigade cut up.
223
 
A private attached to the Irish brigade evaluated the reasons for their defeat; ‘We had a bad 
general in command of us, Fitzrophant [sic], which was the cause of so many lives being lost. 
I am not talking to you of what I have heard but what I have seen’.224 Private Patrick Farrelly, 
1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers echoed the same opinion – ‘We had a lot killed and wounded 
last Friday, all by the wrong command of our General.’225 ‘Rumour of Hart going’, simply 
wrote Captain A.C. Jeffcoat, Inniskilling Fusilier, ‘Hope its true.’226 With the following 
account the sense of discontent amongst officers, rank and file is conveyed; in a letter to his 
brother, Private M. Dwyer, D Company Connaught Rangers detailed the advance forward in 
a mass of quarter columns, ‘which was very close’: 
...This way we marched along until our scouts came in with the news that the Boers 
were entrenched in front. I don’t think the general believed them, for instead of 
opening us out, as in the rule laid down in every military book that ever was printed, 
he closed us up until we were a solid mass, thus making a target for artillery...
227
 
 
In private, Buller reprimanded Hart for his actions, to his ‘surprise’; Hart attempted to defend 
the role he played during the battle, but in his opinion, Buller’s replies and arguments were 
considered ‘inconsequent and illogical and wild’.  A few days later the pair met again, and 
Buller appeared to have calmed down and was reported to say ‘I am not going to say 
anything more about it.’228  
Little evidence suggests that the Irish soldiers were aware of the changing face of the 
battlefield, yet their criticism of tactics and the difficulties of the battle expressed through 
their letters, state that they were not entirely ignorant of the importance of technological 
advancements. However had the Irish soldiers not been hampered by the terrain, there was an 
expectation and a reliance on the cold steel and ‘shock’ tactics, more suited against less-
armed adversaries; ‘The Boers are not good shots at all’, reinforced one soldier, ‘They are 
good fighters while in a trench, but cowardly if cornered.’229  
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Interestingly a soldier attached to the 5
th
 Brigade, suggested that officers now began 
to show respect to their adversaries, by making themselves less distinguishable: ‘It is 
surprising how humble war leaves officers. In this case they march in the ranks, carry their 
rifles, accoutrements and ammunition, so that you can hardly tell them from the rest of the 
men.’230 As the rank was often an acquired special target by an enemy, the method of 
blending in with the troops was reintroduced during the Great War, in an effort to reduce 
casualties. 
On 16 December the 5
th
 Brigade buried their dead following an armistice secured by 
Buller. At one plot, the Manchester Guardian war correspondent John Black Atkins recorded 
the appearance of one grave of a soldier attached to the Royal Dublin Fusiliers: 
“A Company, R.D.F.,” was picked out in flint stones on the sides of the mud; in the 
grasp of a clamp made of twisted tin was a scrap of paper on which some Irish soldier 
had written in pencil, with the tenderness of the Roman Catholic, “Pray for the souls 
of our dead comrades”, and at the head of the grave perhaps the same hand stuck in 
the earth a picture, torn from a book, of the Madonna and Child.
231
  
 
From this short description of a grave plot, it is evident that religion and faith played some 
role during this war. Throughout letters and correspondence, Irish soldiers placed their trust 
in God for their survival and victory at the front; following the battle of Colenso, Private 
David Braden, Royal Irish Fusiliers, thanked ‘God for all His goodness and mercy to us all’, 
whilst also stating ‘we will beat them (Boers) with God’s help’.232 An army surgeon of the 1st 
Manchester Regiment wrote home to his mother in County Cork, three days after the battle of 
Elandslaagte, detailing the stark reality of modern warfare; within the letter, he expressed 
thanks to God for sparing his life: ‘God alone extended his Mercy to me, and I prayed to Him 
for it’.233 A soldier named ‘Bill’ from the Royal Dublin Fusiliers wrote home to his parents, 
stressing comfort with his religious items in his possession: 
...hoping that God will watch over me. I have the sacred heart that Aunt Bridget sent 
me, and I am carrying my father’s prayer book in my breast pocket throughout it all, 
also the one that aunt sent me, so I ought to be well guarded with God’s help.234 
   
Whether these soldiers were practising their religion or not, arguably their faith in God 
helped improve the morale of the troops, increasing their ability to endure the difficulties of 
life on campaign; in turn, there is also a sense that soldier’s prayer books and religious 
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medals provided a psychological influence in helping soldiers improve their combat 
effectiveness. It also appears in some circumstances that soldiers were relatively content in 
accepting whatever outcome they might face on the battlefield; John Connor (alias Francis 
McConnell) attached to the Cape Garrison Artillery, stated in a letter that he was ‘prepared to 
meet him above’.235 In a philosophical approach, Irishman, Private Thomas Kenney, 2nd Rifle 
Brigade, stated that ‘it is only the fate of a soldier, we will all have to go sooner or later and 
the battlefield is an honourable death’.236 
 
Fig. 37: Satellite image of the Tugela River. The ‘loop’ that the 5th Irish Brigade entered 
is clearly visible in the centre 
 
Source, Google Earth. (https://maps.google.com/) (24 Jan. 2013). 
Concluding remarks 
The first two months of the conflict presented inherent difficulties for the British army and 
the numerous Irish battalions and cavalry units that were present. From several examples 
illustrated throughout this chapter, the British army were tactically unprepared for this war. 
British military doctrine which encouraged the offensive, depending on the morale and 
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professionalism of the British soldier, became evidently ineffective – such tactics were more 
suited to fighting during the Crimean War, over forty years previously. Of course, prior to the 
South African War there were numerous examples from wars across Europe and the first 
Anglo-Boer War, that increasingly demonstrated the revolution of firepower and the 
importance of communications, which would have an ultimate impact on battle tactics and 
operations. However, with an impressive success record in Africa, the British command 
entered the South African War with natural confidence, with a belief that the war would be 
over by Christmas. The British completely underestimated the fighting capabilities of their 
adversary. The Boers excelled in exploiting the British weaknesses by adhering to the 
changing developments of the battlefield, and the advancement of technology. From the first 
battle, it was evident that the British struggled to combat the Boers; the citizen army 
understood the importance of cover and the defensive, by constructing entrenchments that 
provided concealment from reconnaissance and protection from artillery and rifle fire. In 
addition, their defensive measures were further enhanced with utilising smokeless 
technology. Such conditions and tactics would bear some relevance to the front line 
battlefields of the Western Front during the Great War.  
 Within this period of the war, the Irish soldier experienced the harrowing conditions 
of modern warfare, with many soldiers engaging in their first ever action. Their accounts – 
some of which are detailed here for the first time – illustrate that the Irish soldier endured 
difficult conditions during these months. The detail expressed in their letters and personal 
accounts range from: the futility and ineffectiveness of their tactics, whilst combating an 
‘invisible’ enemy; their relationship with God in battle; the emotional struggle of losing 
friends and comrades in unprecedented numbers; all of which was further compounded with 
adverse weather conditions. The accounts also reveal the fortitude of the Irish soldier, with an 
interesting ability – despite the reversals – to remain positive, and to maintain their focus on 
the larger strategic goal. It confirms that the soldiers remained a strong, cohesive group, with 
encouraging morale. Their bravery and pluck was dramatically illustrated throughout the Irish 
and British press, and it was encouraging for Irish loyalists to read about the important 
contribution that was being made by Irish battalions and officers. Their participation was 
followed intensely by the Irish press and public, lauding the fortitude of the assault at Talana, 
to the local despair upon hearing the news of Nicholson’s Nek and Colenso. Regardless of the 
outcome, the Irish public were given a real sense of their struggle and sacrifice, encouraged 
by press reports and the publication of letters from the front. This interest and reaction to the 
affairs of the Irish battalions, translated into the desire to form contingents of the Imperial 
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Yeomanry and financially support war charities. With regards to the formation of the 
Imperial Yeomanry, the prevailing sentiment that emerged from the sacrifice of Irish troops is 
reflected in the reasoning behind the recruitment of Maurice Fitzgibbon into the 45
th
 Dublin 
Company:  
Men who had been at school or college with us had already fallen, or might be 
included in tomorrow’s list of casualties. Why not let us go and do our best to retrieve 
their situation, or, if that was not to be, let us go down with them?
237
 
 
The period of relative British superiority in Africa during the Victorian era was eradicated, 
when news reached British shores of the three successive reverses during Black Week; the 
poor beginning of the campaign was further compounded by embarrassing surrenders, and 
the isolation and besieging of Kimberley (14 October 1899 - 15 February 1900), Mafeking 
(13 October 1899 – 17 May 1900), and Ladysmith (2 November 1899 – 28 February 1900). 
This was profoundly felt across Great Britain and Ireland, as given the imperial strength of 
the British Empire, the public were naturally accustomed to victories – the ‘long peace’ 
which began following the British victory at Waterloo (1815), was shattered by a ‘rabble of 
undisciplined farmers’. The first two months demonstrated the misplaced faith and 
overemphasis in the superiority and professionalism of the British soldier; moreover it 
revealed the magnitude of arrogance and ignorance that was evidently present within the 
command structure, with a failure to learn from past experiences with the Boers, and placing 
an unshakable conviction in the frontal assault – such deficiencies cost the British highly. As 
remarked by military historian Robert M. Citino, ‘Black Week’ demonstrated the futility of 
simplistic frontal assaults; the lack of reconnaissance and poor, incorrect maps; and the Boer 
ability to fire, enhanced greatly by the ‘awesome wonder weapon’ – the Mauser.238 In 
summary, contemporary historian Louis Creswicke excellently described the naivety of the 
British authorities at the outset of the conflict:  
Not a hint of doubt as to the success of our arms and the effectiveness of our war 
apparatus was entertained ... Those who knew ventured to suggest that in South Africa 
the same cast – iron principles that existed in European warfare would be valueless, 
and the lessons of Ingogo and Majuba in ’81 might be repeated in ’99 in all their dire 
and dismal reality. But these pessimists were scoffed at.
239
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In the opinion of Norman Dixon, throughout the formal phase of the conflict, several 
examples of military incompetence revealed that there was an ‘inability to profit from past 
experience’.240 
Although initially the response was distress and shock, the British effort would now 
receive greater levels of support from the majority of the British public and press and this 
level of patriotism would quickly translate to the formation of the First Contingent of the 
Imperial Yeomanry, the City Imperial Volunteers (C.I.V.), and the embodiment of the militia. 
At the turn of the century, there was renewed hope that the British Empire would prevail in 
their imperial mission, aided by the introduction of newly appointed Lord Roberts, 
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s Forces in South Africa, and Lord Kitchener, ‘the Hero 
of Khartoum’, as his Chief of Staff. The Irish public’s interest continued unabated, as Buller 
began a new series of assaults to break the cordon that surrounded the town of Ladysmith. 
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Chapter Two: Irish soldiers’ 
experiences in South Africa (January – 
March 1900) 
The relief column 
Throughout Christmas and the New Year, the strategic situation remained the same in the 
theatre, with Buller’s column remaining relatively inactive, and the siege of Ladysmith 
entering its third month. For the next few weeks, the Irish Brigade was subjected to 
monotonous fatigues and duties inside and outside the camp at Frere. Christmas Day 
provided a break from the routine, with the brigade playing football, drinking beer, and some 
extra rations were added to the menu.
1
 A soldier from Naas attached to the Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers wrote home to his parents explaining ‘We had a pleasant Xmas’.2 Lance Corporal 
Hamilton Doake recalled ‘we carried out our sports right under the Boers noses + never got 
disturbed. We had horse-races, Tugs-of-war, + every other sport’.3 Conversely, in Ireland and 
Great Britain, thousands of civilians were actively seeking recruitment in the First Contingent 
of the Imperial Yeomanry, whilst the press and the population discussed the strategic 
situation, the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry, and the appointment of Lord Roberts, as 
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s Forces in South Africa, and Lord Kitchener, as Chief 
of Staff. As mentioned in the introduction to the previous chapter, this section will comprise 
several engagements in the Natal theatre that witnessed participation by Irish battalions, 
including the siege of Ladysmith. The chapter will continue with the same theme, illustrating 
the Irish experience throughout this period of the conflict, and their participation in the 
context of technological advancement on the battlefield.  
 With the arrival of Sir Charles Warren’s 5th Division, which comprised the 10th and 
11
th
 Brigades, Buller now had an impressive thirty thousand men on which to call. As it now 
became apparent that there would be another attempt to break through the Boer defences, 
soldiers now increasingly turned their attention, once again, to the relief of Ladysmith; in the 
words of a soldier of the Irish Brigade: 
The enemy have taken up the strongest position in South Africa. It has a frontage of 
three miles. We can signal into Ladysmith with our search-light ... We are opposed by 
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29,000 Boers between us and Ladysmith but we hope to give a good account of 
ourselves when the final struggle begins.
4
 
In contrast, contemplating the next British assault, Sergeant Walter Appleyard, of the Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers, was less optimistic, believing that the ‘campaign is likely to last much 
longer than was at first supposed’;5 an understandable statement, following the experience of 
the 5
th
 Brigade along the Tugela River. In tandem, Private James Nolan, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 
expected that they would not reach Ladysmith ‘for another while’, with the Boers defending 
‘a very great position’; he believed that victory would come with ‘a terrible loss of life’.6 
It was now decided to force a way towards Ladysmith via a different route by moving 
in on General Botha’s right flank instead of the earlier attempt of breaching their defences at 
Colenso (see page xviii for map of final advance to Ladysmith and key locations). Major 
Hildyard’s and Hart’s Brigades were placed under the control of the Second Division 
commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Francis Clery. It was proposed that the British 
columns would undertake a march towards Potgieters Drift and Trichardt’s Drift, a fifteen 
and eighteen mile march respectively. In order to protect the line of defence and their right 
flank, General Botha reacted to British movement by preparing a series of defensive 
measures to deter the advance along the hills overlooking Potgieters and Trichardt’s Drift. 
Over a number of days, Buller attempted to consolidate their position across the river, by 
making a series of coordinated attacks on Boer positions, in an attempt to outflank and 
threaten the Boer rear. The advance was an unmitigated failure largely due to equally poor 
reconnaissance and decision making; the series of attacks from 17 January to 24 January 
ended with the British disaster at Spion Kop where 1, 733 were recorded as killed, wounded 
or missing.
7
 The week was described in a letter from General Hart: 
...having been for seven days and seven nights continually under fire, no tents, and the 
men without overcoats or blankets...The net result is that we have once more to 
chronicle a complete defeat ... I fought on the 20
th
, and took a strong hill successfully 
from the Boers at a cost of 365 officers and men. I advanced next day, and took a 
further position from them at a cost of only 37; and then I wanted to go on – all my 
men did too ... but my hands were tied ... I was sent repeatedly positive orders not to 
advance without orders on any account, but simply to hold my ground. I did so.
8
   
The attack on 20 January, just left of Three Tree Hill on the Tugela Heights was the most 
active role the 5
th
 Brigade played in the short operation; following orders the brigade 
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remained largely passive but their sheltered position was still the target of Boer fire, and 
casualties were sustained. Following Spion Kop, the British army retreated south of the 
Tugela, much to the relief of Captain Romer, 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers and the Irish brigade who 
were greatly fatigued, hungry and soaked to the skin.
9
  The relief army again attempted to 
smash the Boer line with an attack on the hill of Vaal Krantz between 5-7 February, however, 
the assault was repulsed once more and the army returned to where they had started two 
months before with a further 333 casualties.
10
 
 Despite the hardships throughout the Tugela campaign that culminated in the defeats 
at Spion Kop and Val Krantz, and the recent loss of his brother at Ladysmith, Lord Basil 
Blackwood of Dufferin and Ava remained optimistic and determined; in a letter from Frere 
Camp to his mother he states: 
This war has been a terrible one and one longs for the end but everyone is determined 
to persevere to the end. There can be no doubt as to the result but it is hard to make 
the sacrifices that are necessary ... At present we have had only hope deferred and 
here we are back again opposite Colenso in the position we occupied two months ago 
... Meanwhile one prays that Ladysmith can hold it’s own.11 
 
The relief column once again found itself back at Frere, bringing an end to two months of 
failed operations along the Tugela Heights. Following the retirement of the British forces, 
Irish Catholic Lieutenant John Nicholas Whyte of the Lancashire Regiment listened 
attentively, as Buller told his men, in an optimistic fashion, that the recent operations had 
‘enabled him to find the key to Ladysmith’;12 an Irish soldier considered General Buller was 
‘very confident of success’.13 Buller’s charisma and faith in the outcome of the Tugela 
operations was important for the soldiers’ morale; with the extensive failed assaults since 
Colenso, the British army had to contend with further setbacks, harsh weather conditions, and 
poor rations. A soldier of the Irish Brigade complained about the hot weather throughout the 
day, and the freezing temperatures at night; he also stated that more men were dying from 
disease than a bullet.
14
 Despite the difficult conditions, it appears that the Irish Brigade’s 
fighting spirit did not falter; even though, ’14,000’ stood between the relief column and the 
relief of Ladysmith, Private Hugh M’Govern, Royal Irish Fusiliers, was adamant they would 
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break through their defences.
15
 It is a testament to the morale and character of the troops that 
the ultimate goal of relief for Ladysmith remained in their minds, many of them 
understanding that more lives would be lost. The final breakthrough, as historian Howard 
Bailes explains, was a series of cautious assaults on Boer positions; each position would have 
to be secured before the next attack was mounted.
16
 Attacks would be made at Cingolo, 
Monte Cristo, Hlangwane, Inniskilling Hill and Pieter’s Hill; the last two of these battles 
mentioned will be discussed due to the presence of Irish regiments and the significance of 
these engagements.  
The battle of Inniskilling Hill (23-24 February 1900) 
The attack on Inniskilling Hill (or Hart’s Hill) would be entrusted to Hart’s Irish Brigade with 
reinforcements from the Imperial Light Infantry who had replaced the Border Regiment 
which was now stationed at Chieveley. Similar to the attack on Colenso, the British artillery 
prepared the ground by bombarding the hills, as the Boers remained concealed in prepared 
elevated positions. On 23 February 1900 at 4.p.m. Hart’s Brigade began their steep ascent of 
the hill as the sun began to set. Lieutenant D.G. Auchinleck, 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers, wrote 
in his diary, that the battle, was the ‘most eventful and fateful day of the war so far for the 
Inniskillings’.17 As the Inniskilling cleared the crest of the hill, the Boers opened a terrific fire 
from the front and from the flanks in the adjacent hills that cut into the advancing regiment. 
The advance grounded to a halt as the Inniskilling Fusiliers faced the Boer trenches, some 
300 yards away on the far side of the plateau. Once the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 
Connaught Rangers reached the advanced line of the Inniskilling men, the order was given to 
charge the Boer defence. As the light began to fade, the men rose to their feet, and screaming 
at the enemy with bayonets fixed, charged across the plateau. Lieutenant Auchinleck 
remembered the heavy fire ‘sweeping the whole ridge’ as they advanced: 
Then the Regt. Charged and men, and officers fell in dozens; after going some way 
the Regt. rallied and charged again and this time got to within 50 yards of the enemy’s 
trenches. Here the fire was awful coming from four different directions and it is 
marvellous how the men faced it.
18
 
Despite the failing light, the brigade was sustaining effective fire, causing havoc in the ranks; 
Captain Jourdain remembered the ‘pandemonium’ as officers and men fell under the Boer 
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firepower alongside the dead and wounded of the previous charge.
19
 Lieutenant-Colonel 
T.M.G. Thackeray and Major Sanders fell with their battalion. Captain Romer recalled the 
‘murderous fire’ of the Boers: 
In the gathering darkness the Boer trenches quivered with the rifle-flashes, and the 
bullets struck out sparks as they hit the rocks. At such a short range the enemy’s 
marksmen could hardly miss, and the line of charging infantry was almost mowed 
down. The assault was checked, and the attackers flung themselves to the ground and 
sought what little cover there was.
20
 
Ultimately, the attack ran out of momentum, and the majority of the survivors of the failed 
charge managed to return to the crest of the hill which offered some protection. Other soldiers 
of the brigade were committed too deep across the plateau and many others who were 
injured, were unable to fall back; the survivors on ‘no man’s land’ were subjected to a long 
night of misery. A surviving member of the 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers wrote ‘it was terrible to 
hear the moans of the dying at night on the hill’.21 Captain Jourdain of the Connaught 
Rangers confirmed the suffering experienced by the Irish Brigade throughout the night: 
The wounded men in front of the plateau were left to their fate, and many a man got 
wounded even as much as 6 times during the night. There was a major and a subaltern 
and two men of the 27
th
 in front of me who were badly wounded but we were 
powerless to give them water, or to take them away, so badly were they wounded. The 
shrieks of the wounded during the night were awful...
22
 
On 24 February, as the men prepared sangars and waited for further events, the order was 
given to retire; the men withdrew from their positions badly beaten, exhausted and desperate 
for some water. Private R.H. Gavgan, attached to the Rifle Brigade recorded that the Irish 
Brigade retired with ‘fearful losses’.23 General Buller managed to obtain an armistice for a 
few hours in order to allow time for the stretcher bearers to remove the wounded. The 
casualties suffered attacking the hill were about 450, with the Inniskilling Fusiliers losing 
seventy-two percent of their officers and twenty-seven per cent of their men. The morning 
after the battle, Private Bryant present at his regiment’s Muster Roll Call, noted that sixty 
nine men were dead and 175 wounded. Of the seventy-two per cent casualties rating for the 
officers of the regiment, three were killed including their commander Lieutenant-Colonel 
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Thomas Thackeray, Major Francis Sanders and Lieutenant Walter Stuart from Omagh, 
County Tyrone. The interment was a sorrowful occasion, as a soldier of the Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers remembered: 
We started making a big long grave just beside the railway and the stretcher bearers 
went forward to bring in the dead. Such sights, they were in all sorts of positions, poor 
fellows. The Enniskillens lost the most. I counted 45 poor fellows all laid in a row; 
their Colonel, the second in Command, and a Lieutenant, 3 officers and 45 men. 
There were our own second in Command Lieutenant Colonel C.G.H. Sitwell (Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers), Captain Maitland of the Gordons attached to us, and ten men of 
ours. I did not count the Connaught Rangers as I was getting sick of looking at them 
and, to make it more dismal still, it was raining heavy.
24
 
 
All of the Inniskilling regiment’s ranks were commemorated by a twenty-seven foot marble 
obelisk which was erected by their comrades. The inscription was as follows: 
Near this spot were killed or mortally wounded on Feb. 23
rd
 – 24th, 1900, Lieut. - Col. 
T.M.G. Thackeray, commanding, Major F.A. Sanders, 2
nd
-in-command, Lieut. W.O. 
Stuart, and 65 N.C.O. and men of the 27
th
 Inniskillings whilst advancing to the relief 
of Ladysmith’.25 
 
The battle was typical of the other engagements the British army were involved in the 
previous three months. Hart’s tactics were predictable and consequently incurred heavy 
losses. It was evident that bravery, training, motivation, discipline, professionalism and 
stubbornness could only take a soldier so far into a battle. The battle was characteristic of 
British failures in this war; poor reconnaissance; inadequate understanding of the South 
African topography; and an overreliance on outdated tactics more suited to the Crimean War. 
The British failed on many occasions in these aspects. A concentrated force in full frontal 
attacks against a highly motivated and entrenched enemy with magazine rifles was suicidal 
and as a result, many lives were lost. The battle was summed up appropriately by American 
War Correspondent Richard Harding Davis: 
The attack was one of those frontal attacks, which in this war, against the new 
weapons, have added so much to the lists of killed and wounded and to the prestige of 
the men, while it has, in an inverse ratio, hurt the prestige of the men by whom the 
attack was ordered.
26
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Leinster Leader, 7 Apr. 1900. Quoted in Gary Owens ‘Dear mother-It’s a terrible life’: Irish soldiers’ letters 
from the Boer War 1899-1900’ in Irish Sword, xxi (1998), p. 184. 
25
 M.G. Dooner, The ‘Last Post’: a roll of all officers (naval, military or colonial) who gave their lives for their 
queen, king and country, in the South African War (London, 1903), p. 378. 
26
 R.H. Davis, Notes of a war correspondent (New York, 1910), p. 151. 
 82 
 
The battle of Pieter’s Hill (27 February 1900) 
Notwithstanding the heavy losses to the British forces, Buller remained confident. On 26 
February, General White received a signal from the relief force, stating ‘I hope to be with you 
to-morrow night’.27 The following day, Lieutenant Auchinleck recorded in his diary, 
‘MAJUBA DAY (emphasis in original).The greatest day of the war’.28 On the nineteenth 
anniversary of the Boer victory over British forces at Majuba Hill, the British finally enacted 
revenge; following a twelve day siege of a Boer laager at Paaderberg, General Cronje 
surrendered his force of over four thousand men. It was also the day that the Natal Relief 
Force broke through the lines of Boer defence and paved the way open to lift the siege of 
Ladysmith. In conjunction with attacks on Hart’s Hill and Railway Hill, General Barton’s 6th 
Fusilier Brigade launched an attack on Pieter’s Hill; Barton’s assault would be supported by 
creeping barrage – an innovative British artillery tactic.29 The Brigade consisted only of the 
Scots and Irish Fusiliers, with support from the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The initial assault 
was a success, with the greater part of the hill captured – the Boers, however, still remained at 
the north of the hill, in a dangerous position, directing fire below. General Barton, anxious to 
finish off the Boer threat, ordered three companies of the 2
nd
 Irish Fusiliers to attack the final 
Boer position under cover fire from the Dublin Fusiliers. The attack was described by Private 
John Larkin, 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers: 
As we were going up the hill the roar of the bullets was terrible; when we got to the 
top we got into the trench where there were hundreds of Boers. There were some of 
them dead. We bayoneted some of them and some got away.
30
  
 
J. Connolly, ‘H’ Company, of the aforementioned battalion wrote to his friend in Cavan, 
describing his experiences as he faced the Boer: 
We were walking over them. Any Boer who wasn’t killed was hoked through any 
time we got the chance, but we were not allowed to do it. It was all the day we got the 
chance at them, so we pulled up for lost time. We got them shifted out of the rocks at 
last. I think we can play with them now - we have them on level ground.
31
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Fig. 38: ‘The final advance to Ladysmith’ – Hart’s infantry bivouacking on the banks of 
the Tugela before the battle of Pieter’s Hill. 
 
Source, Illustrated London News, 7 Apr. 1900. 
The last great battle of the Tugela Operations had ended in victory for the British, thus 
breaking Boer resistance in the theatre. The final engagements demonstrated, in some 
respects, that the British were finally responding and altering their tactics to the environment; 
there was now a greater understanding and cooperation between artillery and the infantry 
offensive, with the artillery delivering a barrage of shells on a pre-determined target, before 
an infantry advance – prior to the battle of Pieter’s Hill, around seventy-six guns supported 
the infantry’s assault.32 The coordinated attack between infantry and artillery was a tactic that 
was used continuously throughout the Great War by the British army. However, despite the 
importance of the final breakthrough, it demonstrated that in order to achieve tactical and 
strategic aims in the context of a modern battlefield, more casualties would undoubtedly 
occur. That day, five hundred casualties were sustained; the 6
th
 Fusilier Brigade suffered 230 
casualties, with the Irish Fusiliers suffering around one hundred.33 Of the one hundred 
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casualties sustained by the Irish regiment, one soldier distinguished himself above others in 
the charge; in a report to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, General Buller 
wished to bring attention to the case of distinguished conduct of a soldier in the Irish 
Fusiliers: 
6039 Lance Corporal (Thomas) O’Neill, 27th February (killed). – Conspicuous 
gallantry in attack on Pieter’s Hill. His body was found by the side of a dead Boer, 
transfixed by his bayonet, he himself having been shot dead.
34
   
 
The final push towards breaking the Boer lines of defence cost the Irish heavily; the table 
below illustrated the percentage of casualties:
35
 
Table D) Return of Irish battalion casualties sustained at the battle of Pieter’s Hill 
Unit Officers 
Non–
commissioned 
officers and men 
1st Inniskilling Fusiliers 77.20% 24.14% 
1st Connaught Rangers 26.92% 15.85% 
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers 38.84% 14.27% 
2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers 32.14% 9.69% 
 
Fig. 39: ‘After the fight’: burying the dead following the battle of Inniskilling Hill 
 
Source, C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South 
African War with a description of the operations in the Aden Hinterland (London, 1908), p. 65. 
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The final operations amongst the Tugela Heights cost Buller’s forces heavy losses; between 
the 14 February and 27 February, the British suffered 2,259 casualties, with 307 killed.
36
 
Such figures reveal the extent of sacrifice experienced by the Irish battalions during the final 
stages of the Tugela campaign, sustaining an unprecedented casualty toll – moreover, the 
intense combat witnessed during these operations illustrated the environment of a modern 
battlefield. In addition, the war had a drastic impact on the lives of families across the British 
Empire, and the high death rates were acutely felt in Ireland. When news reached the House 
of Commons of the final breakthrough of the Boer defences and the relief of Ladysmith, Irish 
Nationalist T.M. Healy, M.P. for Louth North, sympathised with the bereaved families in 
Ireland, having lost their loved – ones, and more than likely, their core breadwinner; he 
lamented, that the ‘wearing of black’ is noticeable on the streets of Dublin; in Drumcondra 
and Cook Street, he stated that there were forty eight war widows from the present war.
37
 
Another instance of the impact of the war on families was expressed in a letter from an 
officer, addressed to a grieving mother; Captain Edward W. Shewell, 2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers 
expressed his ‘deepest regret’ at the loss of her son during the battle of Pieter’s Hill. He noted 
his gallantry and his death were lamented by the regiment, his officers and the Colonel 
wished to express ‘how sorry he is to have lost a man who reflected so much credit on his 
regiment’. Considering the sorrow of the grieving mother, he wrote that his death was 
instantaneous and he received a full service burial of the Church.
38
 
Siege of Ladysmith (2 November 1899 – 28 February 1900) 
Fig. 40: The town of Ladysmith 
 
Source, Louis Cheswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, ii (London, 1900), p. 54. 
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 ‘Monday, October 30th, 1899, is not a date which can be looked back with satisfaction by 
any Briton’ wrote Arthur Conan Doyle, following the failed British offensive that resulted in 
the debacle at Nicholson’s Nek – it consequently began the siege of Ladysmith. It became 
known as ‘Mournful Monday’ by the British press, and ‘Little Majuba’ by the Boer victors. 
On 1 November 1899, the ‘unhappy’ news caused much excitement in Dublin, with the Irish 
Times holding General White ‘alone responsible’. However, the newspaper defended the 
valour of the Irish Fusiliers, stating that even Irish soldiers ‘cannot do the impossible’.39 One 
of the continued debates surrounding the siege of Ladysmith was whether it would have made 
strategic sense to withdraw from Ladysmith at this point and hold a defensive line along the 
Tugela.
40
 Yet for General White, a withdrawal was deemed a military and political 
impossibility, noting the strategic importance of the town and the grave political situations 
that would occur. He believed that a withdrawal south of the Tugela would mean the 
abandonment of the English population in Ladysmith, the loss of precious stores and 
munitions that would greatly improve the war effort for the Boers, and overall damage to the 
morale of his men. Considering the mobility of the Boers, their greater numbers and the long 
line of defence needed to deter a Boer attack, a resistance was deemed untenable beyond 
Ladysmith.  As regards this question, several of his subordinates defended his actions at the 
Royal Commission, deeming a withdrawal impractical and dangerous. Lieutenant-General 
Ian Hamilton believed that a defence was largely unsound along the Tugela, while Ladysmith 
offered some stability with a centre, houses and provisions.
41
 Lieutenant-General Sir 
Archibald Hunter himself believed it was imperative to hold Ladysmith at all costs due to the 
vast amount of stores and war materials, and the detrimental effect the capitulation would 
have had on the political situation in South Africa.
42
 He would also gain partial support from 
Lord Roberts; the commander-in-chief telegraphed the Secretary of State for War, who 
deemed White’s actions were correct under the circumstances. However, regardless of the 
political situation, Roberts did suggest that White should have secured a position across the 
Tugela, which he believed would have presented ‘fewer difficulties’. Despite the delay in 
operations in the Cape Colony and the high casualties suffered throughout the relief, Roberts 
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believed that White’s position overall protected the Natal Colony from further Boer 
harassment and invasion.
43
  
White, himself, was thus satisfied by the outcome of the siege, explaining to the 
Royal Commission that the stubborn defence of the town saved the colony: 
The holding of Ladysmith, therefore saved Natal. My task was thus fulfilled. If I 
could keep the Boers round Ladysmith, and thus preserve the integrity of Natal as a 
province ... I had every confidence that after that interval the greater resources of the 
British Empire would be put forth to help our forces. I cannot justly be held 
responsible for the losses incurred in the relief.
44
 
Despite the gravity of losses sustained by the relief force and the delay in offensive 
operations in the Cape Colony, White’s actions in defending Ladysmith tied down significant 
proportions of Boer forces that could have been used effectively elsewhere. It is 
understandable in hindsight to comprehend White’s choice of remaining within the sanctuary 
of the town following the debacle of Nicholson’s Nek. Perhaps the answer to White’s relative 
inactivity is best illustrated by the following segment from a letter to his wife. 
I think after this venture the men will lose confidence in me, and that I ought to be 
superseded. It is hard luck, but I have no right to complain. I have had had a very 
difficult time of it. I don’t think I can go on soldiering.45  
 
On 30 October, the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers and a Natal Field Battery were despatched by 
train to protect the railway bridge across the river at Colenso under the command of Major-
General C.D. Copper: only the battalion transport, ‘G’ Company under the command of 
Lieutenant Renny remained behind. White sent out these troops to try give ‘confidence’ to 
the governor and people of Pietermaritzburg and to satisfy the requests from Lord Wolsely to 
‘take care of Colenso Bridge’.46 He telegraphed Buller of this decision, as the best way of 
protecting the colony.
47
 However, their prepared camp south-west of Colenso was considered 
inadequate by Cooper, believing his section was indefensible against superior Boer numbers 
and artillery. Following discussion with his senior officers, Cooper decided that with 
Ladysmith cordoned, and with only small forces protecting Colenso and Estcourt, it was best 
practice to merge their forces with the British at the latter. Therefore Major-General Cooper 
despatched his battalion to Estcourt and began organising its defence with the Imperial Light 
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Horse, Natal Mounted Rifles and the 2
nd
 Border Regiment. Prior to the arrival of the Army 
Corps to Natal, the period between 3 November and 26 November was deemed a time of 
‘great anxiety and hard work’ at Estcourt.48 The difficulties in Natal were further 
compounded by the infamous ill-fated armoured train ‘disaster’ whilst on reconnaissance 
towards Chieveley.  On 15 November, under the command of Captain Haldane, 2
nd
 Gordon 
Highlanders, attached to the Dublins, and with ‘A’ Company, 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, the 
Durban Light Infantry, with a young war correspondent, Winston Spencer Churchill, left 
Estcourt on an armoured train.
49
 The Boers successfully ambushed the train and following 
incessant rifle and artillery fire, the British were finally subdued, with the capture of Haldane 
and Churchill and seventy soldiers; casualties were reportedly five dead and forty five 
injured.
50
  ‘A’ Company, 2nd Dublin Fusiliers suffered three deaths, three or four wounded 
and forty-two captured as POWs; Private Kavanagh was awarded the Distinguished Conduct 
Medal for his bravery in the action.
51
 It was an isolated incident but it captured the 
imagination of the British public, with the incarceration and celebrated escape of Churchill.
52
  
  Prior to the cut in communications, Buller had requested that French and his staff be 
sent out to the Cape. As the Boers closed in around the town, General French, alongside 
Major Haig and several servants and horses, managed to leave Ladysmith aboard the last 
train; under a hail of bullets, they managed to escape.
53
  The railway to the south and the 
telegram was cut and the Boers began to occupy vantage points in which to place their 
artillery and defences. In the words of White, ‘Ladysmith was thus isolated from the world 
outside it, and from this date (2
 
November 1899) the siege may be held to have 
commenced’.54  
The total number of forces available for the defence of the town numbered thirteen 
thousand, which included regular infantry, mounted troops, artillery and the local town guard. 
The 5
th
 Royal Irish Lancers, two companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and ‘G’ Company of 
the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers which consisted of two officers, three NCOs and fifty one men 
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partook in the protracted siege; the town was also inhabited by several thousand civilians. 
The perimeter of the town was about fifteen miles, split into four sections, defended by a 
series of field works and entrenchments rapidly constructed with a portion of artillery 
allocated to each sector. For the next four months, Boer forces under General Joubert 
continually bombarded the town with two 6 inch Creusot Long Toms, with a ninety six pound 
shell, four 4.7 howitzers and sixteen smaller artillery pieces.
55
 
 Over the next weeks, the British consolidated their position, with the Boers 
maintaining artillery and long range fire. The shell fire would become an ‘esteemed friend’ in 
the words of Private Corporal O’ Rourke, Royal Irish Fusiliers.56 Interestingly, on 12 
November, an Irish deserter from the Boers managed to make his way into the town; from 
him, General White learned the numbers of the surrounding forces.
57
 He claimed he was ‘fed 
up with the business’.58 On 19 November, the Boers released six privates of the Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, having previously being wounded and captured during the armoured train 
ambush.
59
  The following day, a ‘cheering message’ was sent from Ladysmith – ‘all is well 
and cheerful ... and we look forward confidently to the ultimate result’.60 Several attempts 
were made on Boer positions throughout the days leading to Colenso, with attacks on Gun 
Hill, Limit Hill and Surprise Hill. Attention though was now directed to the relief of their 
position by General Buller’s column and there was an air of expectation; Private Francis 
Brunt, Royal Irish Fusiliers, declared ‘we are all looking out for Sir Redvers Buller and the 
soldiers from home’.61  
 On 10 December, Buller received a message from White, stating that his forces 
would march from Ladysmith and support the attack along the Tugela; White expressed in 
the Royal Commission that he was determined to ride out and help.
62
 Three days later White 
received a message from searchlights shone at the clouds, that Buller expected an attack at 
Colenso on 17 December. On 14 December, White issued orders for the flying column and 
the defence of Ladysmith in their absence; despite the grave reservations made upon the 
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character and decisions made by White, it is apparent that he was prepared to offer his 
support to the relief. On 15 December heavy firing was heard from the direction at Colenso, 
south of Ladysmith; journalist Henry Nevinson awaited in anticipation ‘of our deliverance 
from this grotesque situation’.63 ‘The hopes of the garrison were at their highest’ wrote 
Captain Walter Temple Wilcox, 5
th
 Irish Lancers, with Buller’s guns ‘thundering at the 
Tugela Heights’.64 Yet, with no communication received from Buller, White’s flying column 
remained at Ladysmith. The following day, White received the infamous ‘No. 88 Cipher, 16th 
December’ which dispelled all hope of rescue: 
I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed. The enemy is too strong for my force, except 
with siege operations, which will take one full month to prepare. Can you last so 
long? If not, how many days can you give to take up defensive positions, after which I 
suggest your firing away with as much ammunition as you can, and making the best 
terms you can.
65
  
  
Despite the gravity of the situation and the initial thoughts that the message may have been 
faked by Boers, White appeared calm and collective in his response; the failure was naturally 
met with disappointment at Ladysmith, but White was adamant that both soldiers and 
civilians remained cheerful in the expectation of relief: 
I can make food last for much longer than a month, and I will not think of making 
terms till I am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder than you think ... Things 
may look brighter. The loss of 12,000 men would be a heavy blow to England. We 
must not yet think of it.
66
 
 
The confidence and determination illustrated by White here, was a marked contrast to the 
individual who appeared desolate and emotional following the debacle of Nicholson’s Nek. 
The Antrim man was adamant that the British garrison would remain at its post until their 
position was unsustainable with White reflecting the spirit and defiant nature of Lieutenant-
Colonel Richard Winsloe during the ninety five day siege of Potchefstroom during the First 
Anglo Boer War.    
The Boers continued to engage the forces at Ladysmith, with continued bombardment 
resulting in several wounded and fatalities reported: on 22 December one shell injured five 
officers and a sergeant - major of the 5
th
 Lancers.
67
 At the close of the year, White’s ‘chief 
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anxiety’ was with the increased numbers of patients suffering from dysentery and enteric 
fever, with 452 of the former and 376 of the latter on 31 December 1899.
68
 On the first day of 
January, the Boers rang in the New Year by unleashing a salvo that destroyed four houses in 
the town; in one of the houses a ‘valued servant’ of the Royal Irish Rifles got hit by a 
fragment of shell through his back and stomach as he prepared breakfast for an officer in the 
kitchen.
69
  
The siege was described as war without ‘glamour’ and it was evident to war 
correspondent Donald Macdonald that many soldiers ‘wanted to go out and wipe this half-
civilian horde from the face of the earth’.70 An officer of the 5th Lancers wrote in his diary 
that the men were ‘jolly and anxious for a smack at the Boers’.71 An opportunity for the 
soldiers to break from the monotony and the feeling of uselessness and to enact revenge was 
imminent in the Boer attack on Wagon Hill, on 6 January 1900.  As the siege was entering its 
third month, it was apparent to the Boers that action was needed to end the cordon, which 
would essentially free up thousands of men to other decisive theatres. In order to compel the 
British to surrender, General Joubert held a Krijgsaad (a war council) on 5 January, which 
resulted in an ambitious attack along the Platrand Ridge, running south-west of Ladysmith. 
The ridges were known to the British as Caesar’s Camp and Wagon Hill, which commanded 
impressive strategic positions for the defence of the town. The five mile plateau had been 
defended tactically, with sangars, pits and emplacements for the artillery, in areas where an 
assault was likely to occur; the section was under the control of Colonel Ian Hamilton. With 
darkness on their side, the Boers crept silently up the hill, preparing a concentrated attack on 
British positions, somewhat reminiscent of the attack on Majuba in 1881. The British 
defences were taking entirely by surprise, and what followed was some seventeen hours of 
intense fighting; the chaotic nature of the fight is aptly described by an unnamed soldier from 
Cavan: 
You should of seen some of our killed at Waggon (sic) Hill, January 6
th
, that would 
make an angel swear vengeance on the Boers. I never thought that day, I should live 
to write to, or hear from you again. We were in the thick of the fight that afternoon, 
and what between shells, bullets, and the awful thunderstorm, it was a place to be 
remembered.
72
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However British defiance and the mobility of the cavalry in protecting areas of weakness 
from collapse edged the defenders to victory. The cavalry, in the words of General White, 
‘saved Ladysmith’ at Wagon Hill, and it was proof of the necessity of having a mobile force 
to reinforce a threatened point; 
73
 although, Buller previously believed that the cavalry 
regiments stationed at Ladysmith should not have been permitted to remain, as their function 
as cavalry became defunct.
74
 Incidentally, four casualties were reported for the 5
th
 Irish 
Lancers, with 2
nd
 Lieutenant William Henry Tucker Hill killed, and Private Andrews dying of 
wounds sustained.
75
 The British suffered 424 casualties, with fourteen officers and 135 NCOs 
and men killed.
76
 The burials were the ‘saddest part of our work’ wrote a soldier from Cavan; 
thankfully, ‘they tried no more attacks on us after that, preferring to try and starve us out. 
Thank goodness they failed both ways.’77 The victory was profoundly felt in Ireland, with the 
reported death of Lieutenant Archibald James Leofric Temple Blackwood, son of Lord 
Dufferin. It appears he received a commission with the volunteer unit of the Imperial Light 
Horse, and thus was present at the siege of Ladysmith. He was mortally wounded at Wagon 
Hill, whilst acting as galloper to General Sir Ian Hamilton. He was deemed the ‘cheeriest’ of 
soldiers, considered a sporting and romantic individual in the circles of London society;
78
 
echoing that sentiment an Irish sergeant felt ‘You’d never take him for a lord, he seems quite 
a nice gentleman.’79 The news of his death was expressed with sadness in the national press; 
the Irish Times reported that Ireland expressed ‘greatest regret’ and ‘deepest sympathy’ with 
the family, at their recent loss.
80
 On a side note, a Victoria Cross was won by an Irishman 
during the engagement; Lieutenant James Edward Ignatius Masterson, 1
st
 Devonshire 
Regiment, formerly Royal Irish Fusiliers, was awarded for conspicuous bravery during the 
engagement.
81
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The protracted cordon and attritional warfare, which clearly placed emphasis on the 
defensive, was a different experience for the British soldier, who inherently relied on the 
offensive. ‘To soldiers who had endured campaigning such as this’, wrote historian Howard 
Bailes, ‘the early trench warfare in Flanders was not an entirely novel experience.’82 In 
retrospect, it can be argued that the siege of Ladysmith had some relevance for trench warfare 
fourteen years later in Western Europe. As stated previously, the perimeter of Ladysmith was 
divided into four sections, holding the heights that surrounded the town; such positions were 
fortified, but a continuous line of fortification never materialised. The most effective position 
of defence was prepared by Colonel W.B. Knox, at section A; this was unsurprising given the 
fact that Knox was present during the siege of Plevna, during the Russo-Turkish War (1877). 
From his own experiences, Knox clearly understood the effectiveness of preparing an 
effective and strong defence, which could potentially deter an enemy from breaking their 
resistance over a long period. Through his ‘vigorous direction’ the section was heavily 
defended by a continuous stone fortification.
83
 Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Hunter, 
veteran of the siege, commended ‘the very fine way’ in which his defence was entrenched in 
a section dominated by imposing hills and Boer long-range guns; Colonel Knox’s defence, 
considered ‘impregnable’, consisted of ‘enormous stone traverses capable of resisting any 
shell fire’.84 The picture below is an image of the trench fortification commanded by Colonel 
Knox; the photograph illustrates a scene that could easily be acceptable for the trench 
environment of the Great War: 
Fig. 41: ‘In the trenches, Ladysmith’ 
 
Source Colonel M. Jacson, The record of a regiment of the line: A regimental history of the 1
st
 Battalion 
Devonshire Regiment during the Boer War 1899 – 1902 (London, 1908), p. 36. 
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Interestingly Archibald Hunter told the Royal Commission ‘I think we learnt practically 
nothing from the siege of Ladysmith that could not have been learnt out of a text-book. We 
learnt the very same lessons that were taught by the siege of Plevna.’85 Although the 
fortifications never reached the same level of sophistication witnessed during Plevna, or the 
siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), it nevertheless, demonstrated 
a further example of the usefulness in such defensive measures, providing concealment, and 
protection from artillery and rifle fire; therefore, during the siege of Ladysmith, the British 
forces held an impressive defensive advantage over their opponents.  
‘During the period from 6th January to 1st March’, wrote General White, ‘our struggle 
became one against disease and starvation even more than the enemy. Our worst foes in this 
respect were enteric fever and dysentery...’86 The siege became increasingly difficult for the 
British garrison to sustain, continuously hampered by disease and poor rations - it was an 
entirely new environment and aspect of warfare. It increasingly became a coordinated effort 
to aid the sick and wounded with members of the RAMC, the Army Nursing Sisters, the 
hospital staff and ladies from the town continually offering medical support; this became 
increasingly difficult as the staff were heavily outnumbered by the patients in Intombi 
Hospital and food was becoming scarce. In order to hold out for the relief, White took the 
decision to begin the slaughter of horses, much to the despair of the cavalrymen: ‘The cavalry 
are being turned into Infantry’ wrote an officer in his diary, ‘We cannot feed our men, we 
cannot feed our horses, so the horses must suffer to feed the men ... It gives one to think 
about, being one of a brigade of British Cavalry suddenly turned into Infantry and ordered to 
eat their own horses.’87 Under the direction of Brevet-Colonel Ward, two factories were 
established with the object of adding essential rations to the food supply; the first factory 
made different extracts from horse meat, called ‘Chervil’. The meat was turned into meat 
soup; a condensed form of ‘Chervil’ for the sick and wounded; a jelly similar to calf-foot 
jelly; ‘Chervil Paste’ made of boiled meat and jelly issued as rations; and finally ‘neats-foot 
oil’ which was used for the lubrication for heavy Naval Ordnance. In the second factory, 
horse flesh was created into ‘excellent’ sausages, issued at quarter pound per head.88 
Considered an officer of the ‘highest administrative ability’89, White believed that Colonel 
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Ward was ‘the best supply officer since Moses’.90 From these procedures, it is evident that 
White was doing his utmost in prolonging the siege, fearing the worst if twelve thousand 
soldiers capitulated.  
The following paragraphs highlight certain aspects of the siege that emphasise the 
hardship and hunger from an Irish perspective. In the following eyewitness account, a County 
Cavan man at Ladysmith described the rationing, the extent of the hunger and the measures 
that men were involved in doing to obtain meat: 
I daresay you have seen in the papers that we ate our horses during the siege. You 
may not believe it, but it is a positive fact, and we were glad enough to have them to 
eat ... Some of them I can assure you, were anything but tender to eat, sometimes 
would come trotting over to you, if you called it. Our allowance of food for a good 
part of the siege was, a pint of weak tea with very little sugar, no milk of course, two 
biscuits and a half, and ounces of Mealie Meal. We got about a pound of meat, but as 
it was horse you could not eat half of it. That was our daily ration. The biscuits are 
about half the size of a sheet of paper and about a quarter thick. You can scarcely 
credit, but mule flesh was nice and tender, with a sweet taste. I shall never forget one 
day, I saw a mule shot, I was on him like a hawk, and had his tongue, and a couple of 
good steaks off him, almost before he was done kicking. The thing we felt the most, 
was the want of tobacco, you could not buy any ... We used to smoke the leaves of a 
kind of shrub like a geranium, that grew in the rocks. Dried sunflower leaves and 
peach leaves were looked upon as the finest smoking mixture.
91
 
Dated 8 February, Corporal O’Rourke, C Company Royal Irish Fusiliers detailed the 
continued strain of siege warfare: 
We are just beginning to feel it a bit rough here now, our food has been cut down 
considerably, and we are compelled to eat horse flesh ... but the majority of the troops 
prefer the horse flesh to that of the oxen, for the latter were in very poor condition and 
in addition they had they had all been diseased ... However, this is not the worst 
misfortune to which we are subjected, that of the weather being far more severe, just 
imagine, that since the 23
rd
 September last, we have not had a bed to stretch ourselves 
upon...and since the 13
th
 of October we have been lying at night fully equipped: not 
for one night during this time have we been allowed to undress ourselves ... we had to 
sleep with 150 rounds of ammunition on our stomachs...
92
  
Having sprained his ankle, and consequently missing the capture of his company at 
Nicholson’s Nek, Private John Prior, Royal Irish Fusiliers remained at Ladysmith during the 
siege; in his letter to his parents, he described the incessant bombardment, being not ‘sure of 
your life a minute’, and the perilous situation with regards food; ‘we are nearly starved. I saw 
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£4 offered for a loaf and it would not be sold at that. We had to live on horse flesh and Indian 
meal’. 93 In a diary entry from a 5th Irish Lancer officer, he details his meagre diet: 
For dinner to-day we had chervil and the haunch of a mule. No doubt one could 
manage it if the meat and soup were good instead of being tainted by the hot weather 
and the plague of flies. My diet generally runs to one egg every other day, a mess of 
violet powder discovered in a chemist’s shop made with the help of some grease into 
a blanc-mange, which makes one smell like a girl’s school, and what ration biscuits I 
can get hold of.
94
 
Despite the food shortages, the sickness, and general monotony, an officer of the 5
th
 Irish 
Lancers was proud of how his men were behaving in such arduous conditions: ‘People are 
cheerful considering everything ...  Our men are splendid, one never hears a growl, they are 
starved, they live in tents which are worse than useless...’95 
In order to understand the scale of hunger that was experienced in the town, the 
British Medical Journal published information on the food value in their rations; with their 
minimal daily rations of meat, biscuit, meal, sugar, tea and condiments, it was estimated that 
the calorie intake was 1,527. Dr James C. Dunlop of Edinburgh, placed this diet in context; 
‘The comparison between Ladysmith rations with prison and poor house diets shows them to 
be of far less food value than the food of a prisoner, and of even less food value than the food 
of our underfed paupers.’ He concluded ‘one can only express surprise at our gallant soldiers 
being able to continue such a struggle...’96 In addition to the poor rationing, bad water, 
intolerable heat and rain, and cramped conditions led to the spread of dysentery and typhoid 
and an increase in the town fatalities. Although the situation was increasingly difficult for the 
medical staff and civilians to manage, the conditions never reached the magnitude previously 
witnessed during the siege of Plevna; one officer, present at that siege, described the town as 
a ‘savage abomination’, as thousands of soldiers of the Ottoman army succumbed to various 
illnesses, compounded by malnutrition and pitiable sanitation.
97
 Had General Buller failed in 
the relief of the besieged town, it appears evident that the town would have ultimately 
succumbed to disease and starvation, and resulted in Ladysmith’s surrender.  
On 28 February Buller received a message from White of further reduced rations, 
with a daily supplement of half pound of breadstuff, so the camp could last a further three 
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weeks.
98
 With conditions deteriorating, Ladysmith awaited news of the recent British attacks 
along the Tugela Heights and by that evening it was apparent that the British had pushed their 
way clear through the hills; ‘By the God of war it’s the relief column’ wrote an overwhelmed 
officer of the 5
th
 Lancer. Lieutenant L.F. Renny, 2
nd
 Dublin Fusiliers was elated by the ‘joyful 
tidings of General Buller’s victory at Pieter’s Hill ... our wild excitement may be left to the 
imagination. I’m sure we all put on about seven pounds of our lost weight at the mere thought 
of our being at last relieved’. After 118 days, the siege had finally lifted. The reaction is 
naturally understandable given the extent of the conditions, and the general monotony of the 
siege. As it became increasingly evident that the Boers would not commit a large enough 
force to storm the town and compel it to surrender, the British would have to contend with 
diseases, hunger, boredom and mental fatigue. During the final days of the siege Lieutenant 
L.F. Renny recorded that the dwindling rations of ‘one biscuit, one pound of horseflesh, two 
teaspoonfuls of sugar, and a pinch of tea is not much to keep the body and soul together’.99 
As the situation became gradually precarious, with disease and hunger plaguing the besieged 
force, some soldiers would not contemplate a retreat, as their suffering would have amounted 
to nothing. The following extract from Corporal O’Rourke, illustrates that the British soldier 
remained duty-bound, whilst understanding the significance of their stubborn resistance to the 
war effort: 
It is true we could carry out our own relief to-morrow or any day, that is if the 
General chose only to give the word, but what would be the result? The Dutch would 
be in possession of Ladysmith before we were two hours left the place then where 
was the use of our starving here still...
100
 
 
The evening that the siege had ended, two squadrons of the relief column (Imperial Light 
Horse and Carabineers) rode into town led by Major Hubert Gough, an Irishman from County 
Waterford, son of General Sir Charles Gough VC., - the siege had ended. For four months the 
British garrison had awaited relief; the toil of disease, the meagre rations, the constant 
shelling, and the longing expectation for reinforcements and respite, stretched the nerves of 
the defenders and left them weary and weak. Upon arrival at the town, Buller told the Royal 
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Commission that he was ‘shocked’ by the frail appearance of the men.101 The appearance of 
the defenders is emotively described by Dr Treves: 
The men themselves were piteous to see. They were thin and hollow-eyed, and had 
about them an air of utter lassitude and weariness. Some were greatly emaciated, 
nearly all very pale, nearly all were silent. They had exhausted every topic of 
conversation, it would seem, and were too feeble to discuss even their relief.
102
  
Throughout the siege 10,688 were admitted into Intombi Hospital Camp or ‘Camp Funk’, as 
described by war correspondent, George Lynch
103
, with 600 deaths from all causes; dysentery 
and enteric fever representing 17.3 per cent and 16.5 per cent respectively;
104
 between 2 
November 1899 and 25 April 1900, thirty eight men from the 5
th
 Royal Irish Lancers died 
from disease at Ladysmith.
105
 
On 28 February, George White addressed the soldiers and civilians of Ladysmith in a 
‘voice trembling with emotion’106; a scene which the Irish Times believed would live long in 
the memory for those present: 
People of Ladysmith, I thank you and all for your heroic and patient manner in which 
you have assisted me during the siege of Ladysmith. From the bottom of my heart I 
thank you. It hurts me terribly when I was compelled to cut down the rations, but 
thank God, we kept our flag flying.
107
 
On 3 March, the relieving army marched into the town with the Dublin Fusiliers leading the 
infantry and artillery brigades as ‘special recognition of their devoted bravery’. Captain 
Romer of the Dublins, noted that it was an ‘honour that nobody grudged them’, due to the 
heavy casualties that they suffered.
108
 In colourful language Churchill recorded that ‘Many of 
the soldiers, remembering their emerald isle, had fastened sprigs of green to their helmets, 
and all marched with a swing that was wonderful to watch’.109 An anonymous soldier 
attached to the relief column, wrote home to his mother in Naas, that the garrison cheered 
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widely, as they ‘were greatly rejoiced to see us and no wonder as they were nearly done 
up’.110Upon his arrival, Sergeant William Browne, 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers noted ‘Ladysmith 
is not much of a place. It is very small and all shattered. I think the people in it were on their 
last hopes’.111 Recorded in his diary, Drummer Barton, 2nd Irish Fusiliers noticed the besieged 
troops ‘looked very poor’ as they welcomed in the relief force; although they ‘were clean and 
tidy in comparison with us’.112 The sense of relief throughout the town was yet tinged with 
the doubt that Buller would ever have broken through the Boer defences. In a letter to his 
father, Private Head, 5
th
 Lancers, expressed such sentiments: 
We are pleased, I can assure you, to be relieved ... Our rations began to get very 
scarce, and we were getting pretty low and thin ... We could hear Buller’s big guns in 
the distance, and then we were delighted, but we heard them too often, and began to 
think we would not be relieved. But it came at last, and then we could not be held for 
joy. 
The private expected a month’s rest, and then to be fully equipped to reengage the Boers – ‘I 
hope to have another rub at them for keeping us here for so long’.113 
 
Fig. 42: 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers marching into Ladysmith, 3 March 1900. 
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Source, C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South 
African War with a description of the operations in the Aden Hinterland (London, 1908), pp 72 and 74. 
The relief was met with widespread jubilation across the United Kingdom and the Empire; 
the Belfast News-Letter reported euphoria in Belfast, with citizens taking to the streets, 
waving flags, building bonfires and several bands paraded the street.
114
 At the annual 
demonstration of the Dublin Battalion of the Boy’s Brigade at the Metropolitan Hall, Lower 
Abbey Street, Dublin, 1,156 officers and teenagers celebrated the news and feted Sir George 
White; the ‘religious’ brigade ‘thanked God for the preservation of their soldiers in South 
Africa’ and they believed that it was in answer to their prayers that Ladysmith was 
relieved.
115
 According to the Freeman’s Journal there was another element to the celebration 
where fifty Trinity College students broke into Dublin Mansion House, stealing the civic flag 
and assaulting civilians and police; three were captured and fined £2.
116
 
Sections of the Irish public revered George White and personally strove to welcome 
home the ‘noble’ defender of Ladysmith. White was previously invalided home with fever 
and sickness, and due to the extent of weariness experienced throughout the last months, he 
was incapable of taking command of a division. Several banquets were held in his honour 
upon his arrival at Larne, Belfast City, Carrickfergus, Ballymena, and Broughhabane the 
village beside his ancestral home at Whitehall. Upon arrival he was welcomed by the 
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construction of an arch with an inscription, ‘Welcome, Our Hero. Home.’117 George White 
was also granted the freedom of Belfast, which had support from Nationalist members of the 
council. Alderman McCormick, an Independent, spoke about the apprehension of Belfast 
citizens and the valour of Irish men and White during the siege of Ladysmith, an example of 
the ‘Irish genius’ that builds the Empire: 
...so long as there was an Irishman at the head of affairs, surrounded by Irish soldiers, 
there was little likelihood of the flag of England being pulled down.
118
 
 
This quotation illustrates the important contribution made by Irish soldiers in building and 
maintaining the Empire during the nineteenth century. It supports the idea of Irish 
professionalism, of duty and loyalty to the crown, and the impressive martial prowess, in 
protecting Britain’s overseas territories. Moreover it reveals the close relationship that once 
existed, and importantly states that Ireland aided and abetted overseas expansion at the 
detriment of natives and settlers.  
In Ireland, a remarkable one hundred thousand people gathered at Ormeau Park, 
Belfast for the ceremony, to catch a glimpse of their brethren, the ‘hero of Ladysmith’, the 
man they had read so much about in the press. It was a testament of the interest Belfast 
citizens had in the war, and the incredible ‘celebrity’ status that White held.119 White was 
genuinely astonished at the reception he received, stating ‘There is an enthusiasm for the 
integrity of the Empire that I never expected to see even in this part of Ireland’.120 In spite of 
his ‘hero’ status, White was never trusted again by Roberts to hold any responsible 
position;
121
 he remained in service with the British army becoming Governor of Gibraltar 
(1900-1904), promoted to Field Marshal in 1903, and was Governor of Chelsea Hospital 
from 1905 until his death in 1912. In his tenure as Governor of Gibraltar he entertained 
Kaiser Wilhelm, who greeted White as ‘the defender of Ladysmith’.122 
In recognition of the part the Irish Brigade played in the Tugela operations, several 
businesses and institutions offered support and compliments; with the Cardiff Exchange 
expressing ‘Congratulations on the Magnificent Conduct of the Irish troops’.123 Individual 
soldiers of the Irish battalions were cited for distinguished bravery during the Tugela 
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campaign; thirteen soldiers were mentioned in a report from General Buller to the Secretary 
of State for War.
124
 Queen Victoria was to give further recognition to both the Irish troops 
and people of Ireland with two army orders and a royal visit to the country. The first of the 
orders was the introduction of the shamrock to be worn by Irish troops on Saint Patrick’s 
Day, following her ‘deep concern of the heavy losses sustained by my brave Irish soldiers’.125 
Despite the controversy prompted by the introduction of the shamrock amongst many Irish 
Nationalists,
126
 the Irish Times writer ‘Murty’ reacted favourably to the army order stating 
that Her Majesty ‘has given a new glory to the National triple leaf’.127 Leader of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP), John Redmond, an Irish Nationalist and Home Ruler noted in 
Parliament that ‘Irish people will receive with gratification’ the news that Irish soldiers will 
wear the shamrock in the National holiday, ‘as recognition of the valour of their race’.128 
Most importantly for the war effort, Irish soldiers reacted positively to this gesture. The 
effects on morale were apparent to Olive Leslie, a nurse at Van Alen Field Hospital and aunt 
of Sir Shane Leslie of County Mongahan, who stated, that ‘No one wants to fight now except 
for the Irish who say they want to thank the Queen for the shamrock! Bless them!’129 On 17 
March 1900, Rudyard Kipling sent the following ‘impromptu lines’ by telegraph for the 
inaugural issue of a newspaper, ‘for the special edification of the troops’; it was entitled, ‘The 
wearing of the green’: 
Oh, Terence, dear, and did you hear 
The news that’s going round? 
The shamrock’s Erin’s badge by law 
Whenever her sons are found. 
From Bloemfontein to Ballybank – 
‘Tis ordered by the Queen! 
We’ve won our right in open fight –  
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The wearing of the green
130
 
 
The second order was for the creation of a new Foot Guard Regiment known as the Irish 
Guards. In the recruitment poster it stated that ‘Her Majesty the Queen having deemed it 
desirable to commemorate the bravery shown by the Irish Regiments in the recent operations, 
has been graciously pleased to command that an Irish Regiment of Foot Guards be formed. 
The regiment will be called the Irish Guards’.131 The formation of the Irish Guards was a 
proud moment for Irish loyalists, as it recognised Ireland’s contribution to the war in South 
Africa and their strong military tradition in the British army.
132
 On 16 March 1900, Irish 
colonists in South Africa met in Cape Town to discuss and express delight in the news, and 
passed several resolutions to Sir Alfred Milner and Her Majesty. The shamrock 
demonstrated, in the words of Dr Farrelly: 
A recognition of the national sentiment, a recognition of the Irish as a constituent 
force, and not a disruptive element of the Empire ... it certainly marked an event 
which could only have one result, and that was to lead Irishmen to understand not 
merely their national, but their Imperial responsibility.  
Moreover, the individual concluded that the formation of the Irish Guards was a ‘fitting 
recognition of the valour of their countrymen in the field, and the skill of Irish generals’. The 
Queen replied to the message thanking the Irishmen in Cape Town for their ‘loyal message’. 
She was also confident that the courage and allegiance shown by Irishmen would be shared 
‘by their brethren in the colony’.133 In cities across Ireland, celebrations with reportedly large 
sections of the population, regardless of religion or politics, held dinners, marches and 
banquets in Belfast, Cork, Derry, Dublin, Limerick and various other towns.
134
 In London, a 
large proportion of the population reportedly wore the Irish emblem in celebration of Irish 
valour and the London Mansion House and many businesses flew a green flag; celebrations 
were also held in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Sydney, Toronto and Montreal.
135
 Saint Patrick’s Day 
was celebrated with more fervour than in recent years, which further aided the impending 
visit by Queen Victoria in April. The Royal visit, as historian Helen Rappaport states, was a 
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reaction to the conduct of the Irish troops,
136
  and while the visit was an undoubted success, 
many Irish Nationalists remained deeply cynical, viewing the Queen’s first visit in thirty 
seven years as a means by which to encourage recruitment into the British army.
137
 To quote 
one historian, Queen Victoria’s visit ‘demonstrated the importance of Irish soldiers in the 
imperial project’.138 
All these gestures were viewed by Irish loyalists as a tribute to the bravery of Irish 
soldiers; the Kildare Observer believed that it illustrated that the Empire was proud of the 
manner of Irish participation in the war.
139
 The Times of London wrote: 
The Irish regiments, faithful alike to their Queen and to the long-established and often 
- confirmed traditions of their valour and their loyalty, have done more to promote the 
Imperial interest of Ireland than could have been accomplished by legislators in a 
generation and have gilded everything Irish in a halo of romance which is not likely 
soon to disappear.
140
 
 
Continuously throughout the war the British press expressed gratitude and admiration for the 
fighting qualities of the Irish soldier. The Derby Mercury rejoiced for the gallantry and 
courage of ‘those splendid Irishmen’ during the relief of Ladysmith, whilst noting ‘their 
capacity to fight, in memorable contradiction to the traitorous babble’ of Irish Nationalist 
politicians.
141
 In the House of Commons, M.P. John Redmond for Waterford noted that 
‘brave and devoted press correspondents’ continued to send accounts to Ireland that ‘paid 
generous tributes to the gallantry’ of Irish regiments.142 Such performances, the press 
maintained, gave Ireland a stronger and more respected place in the Empire, trusted with the 
defence of British territory.  In an article written by the London Daily Mail, published in the 
New Zealand Tablet, the newspaper wished to note the exceptional performances of each 
Irish regiment in defending the Empire and wished to mention that Lord Roberts, Lord 
Kitchener, General French, General White and General Kelly-Kenny were all members of the 
‘Irish race’: 
                                                          
136
 Helen Rappaport, Queen Victoria: a biographical companion (California, 2003), p. 207. 
137
 See D.P. McCracken, Forgotten protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast, 2003), pp 66-71; Murphy, 
Abject loyalty: nationalism and the monarchy during the reign of Queen Victoria, pp 276-289. 
138
 Christine Kinealy, ‘Politics in Ireland’ in Chris Williams (ed.), A companion to nineteenth century Britain 
(Oxford, 2004), p. 487. 
139
 Kildare Observer, 24 Mar. 1900. 
140
 The Times, 17 Mar. 1900. Murphy, Abject loyalty: nationalism and the monarchy during the reign of Queen 
Victoria, p. 277. 
141
 Derby Mercury, 7 Mar. 1900. 
142
 The Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, House of Commons, 7 Feb., 1900, lxxviii, col. 834. 
 105 
 
The colony (Natal) is providing (sic) itself a precious jewel in the British crown, and 
Irishmen are guarding it with all the magnificent self sacrifice and valour which are 
proud traditions of the race.
143
 
 
Lieutenant Burne attached to the Naval Brigade believed that the Irish soldier behaved 
‘splendidly’ throughout the operations and could only wish that ‘the Irish nation is not more 
like the Irish soldier’.144  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter highlighted a period within the South African War that fully captured the 
attention and imagination of the Irish public. The awareness of Irish involvement in the war 
was unparalleled during the first six months of the conflict, with widespread pride and 
concern at the extent of Irish participation and casualties. The Irish public reacted favourably 
to the battle honours and the Queen’s gestures that were bestowed on the Irish citizens and 
troops. The involvement of the Irish in the British regiments in the South African War 
arguably galvanised Irish support for the British Empire and this translated to the formation 
of the Imperial Yeomanry units in Ireland, Irish war charities and the construction of war 
memorials across Ireland’s landscape. As this chapter has demonstrated, this reaction was 
understandable; the war was presented to the public as a conflict about preserving the British 
Empire, and Ireland was clearly involved in this powerful rhetoric. Accounts of Irish bravery 
and courage emerged continuously in the British and Irish press and this was confirmed 
during the battles of Talana, Elandslaagte, Colenso, Inniskilling Hill and Pieter’s Hill: all 
victories that propelled the Irish infantry and cavalry into the headlines.  
Indeed, this was supported by a deluge of letters published in the press from soldiers 
in Irish regiments that detailed life on campaign and offered a unique eyewitness account of 
modern battlefields. The letters contained in the chapter provided an entirely different 
dimension to understanding the Irish perspective and experience in Natal. Through the lens of 
Irish soldiers, the chapter offered an understanding of the immense difficulties on campaign 
against a well-armed enemy; it demonstrated the physical effects of warfare, with many 
eyewitnesses describing the extent of wounds and deaths of their comrades; in parts the 
letters portrayed the effect the war was having on communities in Ireland, with soldiers 
listing locals that had been killed or injured; it also revealed an interesting paradox in Irish 
history, with Irish men fighting on both sides. These letters, together with countless official 
War Office’s press releases and war correspondent accounts, further cemented Irish interest 
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in her regiments, and their welfare which manifested into war charities and the Imperial 
Yeomanry. 
In addition, these two chapters, heavily illustrated through Irish accounts, have 
provided a context to modern warfare at the turn of the century, and foreshadowed, in many 
respects, the war on the Western Front. As previously stated, the war provided unparalleled 
difficulties for the British army, which rendered the offensive a futile tactic, against a highly 
motivated and well-armed adversary; examples provided through several battles, revealed 
that the defensive had superiority over the offensive. Battles, such as Colenso and Inniskilling 
Hill, demonstrated the over-reliance on close ordered assaults, which placed emphasis on its 
psychological factor. Accounts throughout the last two chapters reveal, that Irish soldiers 
were exasperated for failing on several occasions to see a Boer; smokeless technology and the 
implementation of entrenchments, which guaranteed relative ‘invisibility’, became the focus 
of many letters sent home to Ireland. Although individuals recognised the importance of 
entrenchments, and the primacy of firepower, certain schools of thought remained advocates 
of the morale impact of the offensive and the arme blanche of the British cavalry; the 
resounding cavalry charge - against a demoralised and retreating Boer - at Elandslaagte, still 
convinced officers, like French and Haig, of its importance and utility in the British army. 
The British cavalry would enjoy relative success in the Middle East during the Great War, but 
it became defunct on the Western Front – a battle environment that emphasised static and 
attritional warfare. The siege of Ladysmith also had relevance for the Great War, with the 
construction of fortified placements and entrenchments, the attritional aspects of the siege, 
the spread of disease, compounded by poor sanitation, and its longevity. Although the 
struggle descended into a British war of counterinsurgency – providing ‘a source of 
inspiration’ for future guerrilla wars145 – the formal, and ‘conventional’ set-piece battles 
witnessed throughout the conflict, reflected the primacy of firepower and the increasing 
ineffectiveness of the offensive, against a well-armed opponent; such transformations on the 
battlefield, and the consequential changes of army reform, elevated the South African War to 
the status of a relevant precursor to the Great War. Two days after the battle of Colenso, in a 
letter to the editor of The Times, one individual understood that it was ‘time for our 
commanders to acknowledge that they have worshipped a false god, and that, with the 
weapons of to-day, the attack, whether frontal or flanking ... is impossible ... against a 
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prepared position.’146 However, as demonstrated continuously throughout the Great War, 
some lessons of the previous conflict failed to be considered by the War Office and several 
British generals; as remarked by historian Pemberton: ‘The generals, drawn largely from the 
cavalry (French, Haig, Mahon, Gough) which had played so prominent a part in the later 
stages of the Boer War, continued to think in terms of the veld fighting despite the 
proliferation of the machine gun.’147  
As regards the perceptions of Irish soldiers to the changing face of warfare, little 
evidence exists. In the case of the attack on Colenso, several individuals expressed dismay at 
the reckless deployment of the brigade by General Hart, which resulted in high casualties; 
nevertheless, Irish soldiers remained adamant, placing emphasis on the offensive and the cold 
steel, whilst concurrently, belittling the cowardly tactics of the Boers remaining concealed in 
their trenches. The ability for the Irish battalions to remain positive throughout the first six 
months of the campaign was reflective of their fighting spirit, their courage, pluck, and 
tenacity. The morale was maintained by their training, which cemented group cohesion and 
solidarity, discipline, their comradeship, the inspirational actions of their officers, esprit de 
corps, and their faith – these elements fused an effective fighting force. Although Hart’s 
brigade struggled under harrowing circumstances at Colenso, the value of their training and 
morale, allowed them to maintain a difficult position, without wavering and retreating, until 
ordered; their courage was exemplified by their audacious attempt to ford the river. The 
fighting spirit was further demonstrated with the reluctance of the 1
st
 Irish Fusiliers to 
surrender at Nicholson’s Nek, despite their difficulties, and the charges at Talana, Inniskilling 
Hill, and Pieter’s Hill, through a fusillade of fire.  
When researching for this chapter, the lack of modern research on Irish participation 
during the war was apparent. This chapter and this research as a whole, highlights Ireland’s 
impressive participation in the British Empire and military – a fact that is not often 
appreciated.  The services and the extent of Irish participation and experiences in the South 
African War are revealed in contemporary histories, newspaper accounts and letters from 
soldiers. The first two chapters represent a small yet significant portion of Irish participation 
in the war; in order to comprehend the breadth and depth of contribution, that is, the true 
scale of involvement, one would need to research the entire conflict. There are many 
possibilities for further research in this area, some of which are discussed in the thesis 
conclusion.  
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 Overall the war highlighted the advent of modern warfare, and the ineffectiveness of 
the British army in failing to realise the primacy of firepower, and the senselessness of a 
frontal assault, against a well-armed defender. Despite the military professionalism of the 
British army, their credibility for being such an effective fighting force was massively 
undermined by the Boers. The British military had enjoyed unprecedented successes 
throughout the nineteenth century; the Ashanti, the Zulu, the Matabele, the Maori, and the 
Arab tribesmen of the Sudan all succumbed to the power of modern technology and military 
might. However, this consequently had an impact as the British military placed infallible 
belief in their professionalism, weapons, tactics and formations. Incredibly the British 
military were entirely ignorant of the devastating effect of modern firepower: moreover 
British ignorance and naivety was further revealed, with a failure to remember the tactical 
prowess of the Boer that was so prevalent during the First Boer War. The British army’s 
experiences throughout the nineteenth century became largely irrelevant during the first 
engagements with the Boers, as generals and officers maintained ‘colonial’ tactics that were 
hardly appropriate for later battlefields. 
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Chapter Three: The ‘Irish’ Imperial 
Yeomanry and the battle of Lindley (27 
May – 31 May 1900) 
In 1903 Irishman Adjutant-General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny gave evidence at an inquiry on 
the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry: 
Those that I would call the men who went out through patriotism in the end of 1899 
and beginning of 1900; but as to the other lots of Yeomanry, and also the other lots of 
Colonials, for I do not think there is very much difference, I think we had to buy 
them, and rather dearly, too. With the first lot it was not a question of buying, and 
they came with a rush of patriotism, but after that it was a question of buying.
1
 
The main focus of this chapter, are the individuals that Sir Kelly-Kenny believed enlisted out 
of patriotism. These men, who were sworn into the First Contingent of the Imperial 
Yeomanry, brought about an interesting development in Irish military history; they seemingly 
enrolled out of duty and loyalty to the Empire. As previous studies in Irish military history 
tend to focus on men serving in regular Irish units for a variety of different and complex 
reasons, it is of importance to offer an alternative view on Irish recruitment into the British 
army. It is often portrayed throughout Irish history that the thousands of Irishmen that 
enrolled into the British military and navy were impoverished individuals, with little or no 
prospects for the future; furthermore, they are often depicted as men who wished to escape 
from the desolate conditions of rural and urban Ireland, or from bad marriages or creditors. 
Certainly, economic motivation, the enticement of a steady wage, and regular meals, were 
important factors for enlistment. It is also suggested that the love of adventure and the strong 
military prowess that existed, were important factors for enlistment.
2
 However, as mentioned, 
this study will focus on other factors that have largely escaped the attention of Irish historians 
– the idea that Irish soldiers enlisted into the Imperial Yeomanry through a staunch belief in 
the ideology of the British Empire and the Crown. While this research is very much a case 
study into the Irish units of the Imperial Yeomanry, it will offer broader points with regard to 
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the formation of the First Contingent, the Irish military tradition and Ireland’s contribution 
during the South African War.  
Discussing the reasons why Irishmen joined the Imperial Yeomanry during the South 
African War is difficult, as very few modern histories contain information on the involvement 
of the Irish in the Imperial Yeomanry, let alone the South African War. As remarked by 
historian David Murphy, there is ‘essentially no literature on the history of the Irish Imperial 
Yeomanry units’ in the South African War.3 As a result of a limited amount of information 
connected with Irish troopers, there is the problem of over reliance on existing sources and a 
lack of varied information. Much of the knowledge regarding Irish recruitment has surfaced 
from modern research on British yeomanry battalions, highlighting the main issues with 
enlistment.
4
 In order to overcome these difficulties, the press, as a source, is vital to 
understanding the reasons behind recruitment, the political climate and the public attitude to 
the creation of Imperial Yeomanry units in Ireland.  In order to evaluate Kelly-Kenny’s 
observations, this chapter has been split into a number of components. Firstly, the impact of 
Black Week will be discussed in a bid to understand Irish reaction to the British defeats and 
the environment in which recruitment began in earnest. Secondly, the embodiment and 
mobilisation of troops will be investigated in order to offer the reader an understanding into 
the creation of each unit. Thirdly, the study will include the first examination of the ‘Irish’ 
Imperial Yeomanry. The main component of research for this chapter is the 535 men from six 
‘Irish’ Imperial Yeomanry units within the First Contingent compiled from attestation papers 
in The National Archives, London. These papers reveal age, previous employment, 
nationality/residency, marital status, religion and military experience, all of which are vital 
elements in comprehending the establishment of each company. In addition to understanding 
the recruitment of these men, the research will also compare enlistment in units from England 
and Scotland. This will essentially allow for a wider understanding of recruitment patterns 
across the United Kingdom. Against the backdrop of this further questions emerge: who were 
these men and the reasons for enlistment? Was Kelly-Kenny’s assertion correct, or did other 
economic motivations influence recruitment? Was patriotism such an important factor for 
                                                          
3
 David Murphy, The Irish Brigades, 1685-2006: a gazetteer of Irish military service, past and present (Dublin, 
2007), p. 220. 
4
 See S.M. Millar, Volunteers on the veld: Britain’s citizen-soldiers and the South African War, 1899-1902 
(Oklahoma, 2007); E.W. McFarland, ‘Empire-enlarging genius’: Scottish Imperial Yeomanry volunteers in the 
Boer War’, in War in History, xiii (2006), pp 299-328; Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British working 
class: Working-class attitudes and reactions to the Boer War, 1899-1902 (London, 1972); Will Bennet, Absent-
Minded Beggars: yeomanry and volunteers in the Boer War (Barnsley, 1999). 
 111 
 
mobilisation? Did the press have a part to play in the recruitment, and have a particular view 
or understanding regarding the recruit’s role in the yeomanry?  
Finally, the chapter will explore through an examination of eye-witness accounts, 
diaries, and modern research the only significant military engagement that the Irish units in 
the First Contingent experienced - the battle of Lindley (27 June 1900 – 31 May 1900). The 
battle will act as a case study into the military effectiveness of ‘Irish’ volunteer units and the 
Imperial Yeomanry as an entire entity. The purpose that the Imperial Yeomanry served will 
be discussed on with the question of whether relatively untrained men acted as a burden on 
the British High Command. It is intended that the study will offer an understanding of 
Ireland’s wider participation in the fight for Empire, and the mutual respect that existed in 
those turbulent years. 
‘Black Week’ 
On 10 December 1899, Lieutenant-General Sir William Gatacre’s forces were held back at 
Stormberg in the north of the Cape Colony, suffering over seven hundred casualties. The 
following day, British forces withdrew from the battle of Magersfontein with over one 
thousand dead and wounded under the command of Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen. The 
week ended with the British suffering a humbling ‘reverse’ at Colenso under the 
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s Forces in South Africa, General Sir Redvers Buller. 
There was disbelief throughout the United Kingdom and the Empire that the British Army 
could be out manoeuvred and repulsed three times in one week. Arthur Conan Doyle 
expressed that the period was ‘the blackest one known during our generation’.5 The British 
had suffered defeats throughout the century, with exceptional examples at Isandlwana (1879), 
Maiwand (1880) and Majuba Hill (1881), yet to the public these were considered small 
reversals on an otherwise dominant conquest for empire.
6
 
During Christmas of 1899, the impact of the defeats, especially Colenso, was apparent 
in Ireland. The Irish 5
th
 Brigade, under Major-General Fitzroy Hart comprising the 1
st
 Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers (3 companies), the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers and the 1
st
 Connaught Rangers had led a frontal attack on Boer positions. Along the 
Tugela River, the Irish regiments suffered heavy losses. The national press recognised the 
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extent of Irish casualties by declaring a day of ‘humiliation and prayer’.7  Maurice Fitzgibbon 
recalled the atmosphere in Ireland when the press began publishing details of the 
engagement:  
At home in our houses, and abroad in our streets, communion was avoided, and the 
usual amenities of life omitted; how could the ordinary topics of conversation be 
entered upon at the breakfast-table, while upon it lay that paper with its double-leaded 
war type and its lengthy lists of casualties?
8
 
For the Irish that were associated or supported the soldiers in South Africa, their despair 
quickly turned into fervour and resilience. In contrast Irish Nationalists demonstrated 
widespread elation towards the British defeats.
9
 Letters began to appear in the press from 
enthusiastic Irishmen willing to offer their services to the British army. The content of these 
letters offered military service as a token of Irish loyalty for the preservation and welfare of 
the empire. One individual claimed that the Irish would be worthy of recruitment for South 
Africa regardless of appropriate military training.
10
 The emerging resolve was echoed in the 
Fig. 43: 9608 Trooper Maurice Fitzgibbon, 45
th
 Dublin Company, 13
th
 Battalion, 
Imperial Yeomanry 
 
Source, Maurice Fitzgibbon, Arts under arms – an university man in khaki (London, 1901), frontpiece. 
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The emerging resolve was echoed in the words of Colonel F Luttman-Johnson of the 3
rd
 
Leinster Regiment stating that there was a ‘dogged determination to carry through the war at 
all costs’.11 Across the United Kingdom that sentiment became the driving force for 
recruitment throughout the early stages of embodiment for the Imperial Yeomanry.
12
 It was 
suggested by contemporary historian Amery that ‘the nation was in a mood to respond to 
every demand that might be made upon it’.13 In a letter to the editor of the Irish Times, a 
‘Loyalist’ believed that Ireland should demonstrate their allegiance to the Empire by 
enrolling alongside their ‘brothers’ from the colonies. The individual asked:  
Is Ireland with its numerous loyalist population to stand idly by with its hands folded 
while others are taking part in the glorious fight for freedom and progress? ... Are 
there no Irishmen at home to emulate their deeds of valour and follow that grand old 
chief, Lord Roberts, their countrymen, to the seat of war?
14
 
In Ireland, this level of interest and interaction was unsurprising. Throughout this period, 
Irish society was immersed in the idea of British imperialist culture and engaged effectively 
with matters concerning the Empire and the war. In Irish newspapers, matters concerning 
imperial policy, the war and military issues were discussed freely and hotly debated. As Paula 
Krebs suggested, newspapers were extremely effective during the South African War, with 
influencing public opinion; the increase in literacy across the United Kingdom, and the 
introduction of the half-penny papers, allowed for a greater public interaction with the war.
15
 
During the first months of the war, the press, Irish War charities, Music Hall ballads, 
literature and Irish military involvement, helped maintain a public interest; effective 
propaganda increased the likelihood of a positive Irish reaction, following the events of Black 
Week. Patriotism, loyalty, and duty became coined expressions when attempting to explain 
Ireland’s contribution to the Empire. Notwithstanding the eagerness and interest expressed by 
the Irish public, there could be no active participation with the armed forces without prior 
approval from the British government and the War Office. During this period, there was no 
volunteering in Ireland as the numerous volunteer acts introduced by the British government 
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excluded Ireland. To one commentator this was due to the fact that Irishmen were not 
trusted with possession of firearms in the country.16 Interestingly this was not an isolated 
opinion; in 1897, in a letter to Lord Lansdowne regarding the mobilisation of three Army 
Corps in the case of war, Lord Garnet Wolseley stated that it would be wise ‘that we bring 
the Irish militia to England to draw the teeth of possible rebellion’.17 As the following 
paragraphs illustrate, ‘Black Week’ was to mark a drastic change in policy for the British 
government and War Office. The public would rally to the next phase of the war with 
trepidation, attempting to rectify previous mistakes and ‘Avenge Majuba’. 
Mobilisation and public reaction  
Black Week exposed the failures of the army and the War Office; it highlighted the British 
commanders’ lack of imagination and innovation; it demonstrated that British tactics were 
outdated and obsolete in the face of modern warfare. The Boers exploited British inadequacy 
with smokeless accurate fire, trenches, camouflage, good leadership and a mobile mounted 
force that knew the terrain. Historian Meriwether noted that the war uncovered the failures of 
the War Office and the British government, showing their inability to mobilise an army to 
fight a major war. Order had to be restored for national pride and to quell any public mistrust. 
On 19 December, the War Office issued a statement allowing for the raising of volunteer 
units for service in South Africa; this would deflect attention away from their shortcomings 
by embarking on a series of active measures, by enlisting volunteers and requesting the 
service of colonial units.
18
 The Belfast News-Letter was encouraged by this initiative and 
hoped that the people of Great Britain would be given their chance to serve the Empire.
19
  
It profited the War Office to allow the public to be carried away by this new wave of 
enthusiasm and to feel part of the occasion: to do service for their Queen and country. The 
War Office statement contained information regarding: the change in leadership; the 
mobilisation of the seventh division; the embodiment of nine militia battalions; the strong 
force of volunteers selected from yeomanry regiments; and establishment of colonial 
mounted troops. It was, the Belfast News-Letter believed, ‘the first movement on the part of 
the authorities which is likely to bear fruit’.20 In the spirit of jingoism, the press revelled in 
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the fact that the British were superior in arms, horses, money and men. The superior fighting 
qualities of the British man were reinforced by the Belfast News-Letter; the writer declared 
that the volunteers ‘would be successful in nine cases out of ten with their superior 
discipline’.21 Encouragingly for the War Office and the government, the public were 
determined, animated and demonstrated unwavering support for the introduction of the new 
mounted force. It was a time of national redemption and this was reinforced with the news 
that Lord Roberts VC of Kandahar, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s Forces in Ireland 
was to replace General Buller as commander of the British forces in South Africa;
22
 he was to 
be assisted by Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the newly appointed Chief of Staff.
23
 Buller’s 
position was deemed untenable following his failure to relieve the town of Ladysmith and his 
fate was sealed when he encouraged the British garrison to surrender their position.
24
  
The newly embodied mounted infantry would solve the shortage in manpower and the 
obvious need for an effective mobile force in South Africa. In a letter from The Right Hon. 
A. J. Balfour First Lord of the Treasury to Lord Haddington, the purpose of mounted infantry 
was explained. It would effectively counteract the Boer’s ‘ease and rapidity of their 
movements’ preventing them from attaining a position of great strength.25 It would add an 
essential component to the static and vulnerable British army. In the Irish Times it was noted 
that, ‘a fightin’ force of this sort is what may be called takin’ a leaf out of the book of the 
Boers ... ’tis a move in a right direction’.26 Amidst the enthusiasm and patriotism that was 
witnessed across the press and the recruitment depots, there was a clear belief in the fighting 
ability of Britain’s citizens and volunteers. The Boer’s tactics of utilising trenches and 
effectively deploying a mobile force was an irregular approach to warfare and considered 
distasteful by the British public. The public and the press believed they understood the main 
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tactical issues that were plaguing the British army; a mounted force was needed and it would 
prove to be a vital factor for overall British victory. As the Belfast-News Letter asserted, the 
introduction of irregular tactics would be adopted by the mounted infantry to remove the 
threat of the Boer.
27
 However to suggest that these men would prove an able adversary to the 
Boers was naive with no regard to the ability of the volunteer or the Boer. Despite their sense 
of patriotism, duty and adventure, the yeomen were inadequately trained compared to the 
Boers and the press and members of the public were premature in their perceptions of the 
yeomanry’s superior fighting ability. In the words of Conan Doyle, the Boers were ‘the most 
formidable antagonists who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain’; trained for seven 
generations in constant warfare.
28
  
On 26 December, the War Office issued a ‘Call to Arms’ throughout Ireland’s 
national press. The notice requested the formation of an Imperial Mounted Force which was 
to be recruited from the Yeomanry, Volunteers and civilians.
29
 For the southern Irish 
companies of the Imperial Yeomanry, enrolment would occur at Newbridge Barracks and a 
small recruitment office in Grafton Street, Dublin. In the north, enlistment would take place 
at Victoria Barracks, Belfast under the direction of the 83
rd
 Regimental District. Maurice 
Fitzgibbon remembered the moment the call was issued for the formation of the Imperial 
Yeomanry. When boarding a train from Dublin to Kilkenny, for a few days’ shooting, he 
opened the Irish Times and before the train embarked he had decided to enrol in the Imperial 
Yeomanry.
30
 This remarkably quick decision by Fitzgibbon was not an isolated incident; 
rather it was an episode that was repeated across the United Kingdom where tens of 
thousands of men began to line up outside the recruitment depots.
31
  
Irish Companies  
Throughout the course of the war, 1,393 officers and 34,127 N.C.O.s and men served with 
the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa.
32
 All of these men helped establish dozens of 
Imperial Yeomanry units’ throughout the United Kingdom, leading to the formation of three 
                                                          
27
 Belfast News-Letter, 1 Jan. 1900. 
28
 A.C. Doyle, The great Boer War (London, 1900), p. 1. 
29
 Dublin Daily Express and The Irish Times, 26 Dec. 1899. The notice also carried the terms and conditions of 
their service including applications; period of enlistment; pay; age and standard of men; medical examination 
and enlistment and further general instruction relating to the formation of the companies, horses and equipment. 
30
 Fitzgibbon, Arts under arms - an university man in Khaki, p. 8. 
31
 The accounts of men rushing to join the Imperial Yeomanry, was reminiscent of the reaction of young 
Irishmen recruiting for the British army following the outbreak of the Crimean War. See David Murphy, Ireland 
and the Crimean War (Dublin, 2002).  
32
 Report of His Majesty’s commissioners appointed to inquire in the military preparations and other matters 
connected with the war in South Africa, [CD 1789], H.C. 1xi, 70. 
 117 
 
contingents. The First Contingent that was raised during the New Year 1900 was the first to 
be dispatched for service.
33
 The contingent had 550 officers and 10,731 men in service, 
dispersed into twenty battalions containing four companies each.
34
 It included the 45
th
 Dublin 
Company; the 46
th
 Belfast Company; the 54
th
 Belfast Company and the 47
th
 Duke of 
Cambridge’s Own which consisted of ‘English and Irish men about town’.35 The companies 
were formed into the 13
th
 Battalion. In addition, the 60
th
 Belfast Company and 61
st
 Dublin 
Company were attached to the First Contingent, forming half of the 17
th
 Battalion serving 
with the Rhodesia Field Force.
36
 In the words of historian Pakenham, the 13
th
 Battalion ‘was 
the social and political show-piece of the new volunteer army’.37 There was confidence in the 
ability of Irish volunteers, as expressed in the press. The Irish Times was optimistic in 
anticipating ‘a few hundred good shots’ that would rival the English and Scottish 
companies.
38
  
The Irish companies serving in the First Contingent were considered ‘special’ units by 
the War Office as they were Independent Corps with no affiliation to any yeomanry brigade. 
The desire of hundreds of volunteers in Ireland to enrol themselves in Her Majesty’s service 
was acknowledged and appreciated by the British government with A.J. Balfour noting their 
‘patriotic loyalty’.39 Despite the token of a ‘special’ unit, the Independent Corps were still 
under the charge of the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, with the same conditions of 
enlistment and other provisions. No unit could be formed without the express permission 
from the committee. Officers’ names had to be submitted to the committee and upon 
appointment, they were expected to train and pass recruits through the riding and shooting 
tests stipulated by army regulations.
40
 The Imperial Yeomanry Committee had made it a 
general rule that no officer could be accepted into the unit without previous military training 
from the regular army or auxiliary forces.
41
 The War Office requested that: each recruit be 
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between the ages of twenty and thirty-five; that each recruit be of height of 5 ft. 3 in. and 
upwards; that all men be medically assessed before enrolment. The company would include 
115 men of both rank and file with their arms and ammunition provided by the Government, 
while offering a capitation grant to the men for clothing, horse equipment and stable 
necessaries. 
Throughout January 1900, recruitment began in earnest for the Imperial Yeomanry. It 
was reported in the press that high numbers of men presented themselves at the recruiting 
office at Victoria Barracks, Belfast
42
 but many were turned away due to lack of 
horsemanship, as this was considered the ‘principal qualification’. Men who were ‘desirous 
of joining the branch’ were advised to learn horse riding immediately.43 It was recorded that 
many men had previous employment working as clerks, huntsmen, professionals, artisans and 
sons of clergymen. Recruitment for the 45
th
 Dublin Company was under the supervision of 
the appointed superintendent of recruiting, 5
th
 Earl of Longford, Captain Thomas Pakenham. 
Similar to the scenes witnessed across the United Kingdom, the recruitment offices were full 
of applicants. In a matter of days, the company was formed under the captaincy and 
command of Captain Thomas Pakenham of the 2
nd
 Life Guards and Master of the Westmeath 
Hounds. The company was also under the command of Captain Stannus, Lieutenant 
Blackburne and Lieutenant Richard G Viscount Ennismore previously of the 1
st
 Life Guards.  
The enthusiasm across Great Britain and Ireland with regards participating in the 
South African War is illustrated by author and historian Arthur Conan Doyle; he wrote: ‘to 
see those long queues ... of young men who waited their turn with desperate anxiety as if ... 
Boer bullets were all that life was worth the holding’.44 When news was received for the 
formation of the City Imperial Volunteers (C.I.V.), Robert Erskine Childers (1870-1922), a 
clerk in the House of Commons and future member of Sinn Féin, who had returned home to 
Ireland on Christmas holidays, remembered ‘the hurried run over from Ireland, the 
application of service, as a driver, the week of suspense, the joy of success, the brilliant scene 
of enthusiasm before the Lord Mayor’.45 Corporal P.T. Ross of the 69th Sussex Company, 
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Imperial Yeomanry, recalled the ‘great outburst of patriotism, which like, a volcanic eruption, 
swept every obstacle before it, banishing Party rancour and class prejudice, thus welding the 
British race in one gigantic whole ready to do and die for the honour of the old Flag’.46 Black 
Week was the catalyst for the rallying and enlistment of eleven thousand men into the First 
Contingent.  
The profile of the forces 
The Imperial Yeomanry units raised in Ireland were composed of different elements of 
society, representing a diversity of backgrounds; nationality, previous employment, age and 
religion. The following paragraphs investigate the makeup of the ‘Irish’ Imperial Yeomanry 
and will discuss the formation of the forces, the background of the individuals and the 
motivations for enlistment. The data presented will also be compared and contrasted with 
research already completed on yeomanry units in Scotland and England in order to contribute 
to a more comprehensive picture of the yeomanry units in the United Kingdom as an entity.  
Of the 535 men recruited into the five ‘Irish’ units of the First Contingent, thirty-one 
counties of Ireland were represented. As the figures below illustrate, Ulster was a substantial 
recruitment ground with fifty-three per cent of all attestations; this was hardly surprising due 
to the strong unionist and Protestant population in the North (see page 124, below, for 
population figures). The county of Antrim provided over twenty-four per cent of the 
country’s recruits. However, this figure is slightly biased as three of the companies were 
based in that province. In the south, at first glance, the recruitment levels for Leinster are 
generally impressive, representing one-fifth of the island’s drafts. Dublin was the most 
substantial with over twelve per cent noted in an area which was the centre of Irish pro-Boer 
strength and the heart of the British administration in Ireland. Yet if Dublin is removed from 
the equation, only ten per cent of the province is represented in the ranks of the yeomanry. 
Figures are low for the county of Kildare, despite it being the home of the Curragh Army 
Barracks: only seven men were recruited from the county. The provinces of Munster and 
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Connaught enlisted at a rate of just over nine per cent and just below six per cent 
respectively.   
Within the enlistment that occurred in Ireland, forty-nine men noted addresses in 
Great Britain, India, Canada, the United States of America, Australia, Gibraltar and the Cape 
Colony. Their motivations for returning to Ireland in the first instance are not recorded nor 
are the reasons for joining Irish units. They may have had a previous association with the 
country and wished to enlist with friends; they may have been refused recruitment in Britain 
and so decided to enlist in an Irish company. However it was not uncommon for men to 
return home to the United Kingdom to enlist in the Imperial Yeomanry; contemporary 
historian Amery noted that ‘patriotic Englishmen hurried’ home from British Columbia, 
Chile, China and every corner of the world to serve their country’.47 
Table E) Registered County/Country of recruits in the 'Irish' units of the First 
Contingent 
Registered 
County/Country No. Of recruits 
Antrim 132 
Down 68 
Dublin 66 
England 38 
Cork 24 
Armagh 22 
Derry/Londonderry
48
 16 
Tyrone 16 
Mongahan 14 
Tipperary 10 
Westmeath 9 
Sligo 8 
Mayo 7 
Roscommon 7 
Leitrim 7 
Kildare 7 
Donegal 7 
Fermanagh 6 
Wicklow 6 
Meath 6 
Kerry  5 
Kings County (Offaly) 5 
Queens County (Laois) 5 
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Unknown 5 
Clare 4 
Limerick 4 
Kilkenny 4 
Scotland 3 
Cavan 3 
Galway 3 
Waterford 3 
Longford 3 
Louth 2 
Carlow 2 
India 3 
Cape Colony 1 
Canada 1 
Australia 1 
United States 1 
Gibraltar 1 
Total 535 
 
Age and marital status 
Stephen Millar sampled the age groups of five units based in Nottingham, Wrexham, Bath, 
Leicester and Lanark that formed a section of the First Contingent. He revealed that the 
average age in the attestation forms were 24.8, 25.3, 23.5, 26.3 and 24.4, respectively.
49
 The 
‘Irish’ units revealed an average age of 25.1.50 With regards to the formation of the Imperial 
Yeomanry, an age restriction was implemented by the War Office, with recruits technically 
only accepted between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. Millar notes that despite the 
constraint on age, both younger and older men managed to evade both the red tape of the War 
Office and the regulations of the medical inspector;
51
 this fact does not explain whether the 
potential recruits lied about their age, or the officials turned a blind eye. Interestingly, four 
men in the Irish units were over thirty-five: the youngest of them, a grocer aged thirty seven, 
had no previous military experience; George Brown, 61
st
 Dublin Company, aged forty-four 
from St Matthew’s Parish Dublin had twenty four years service in the British regular army; 
Waiter Alfred Lapham, aged forty-one, had seen twelve years service attached to the 12
th
 
Lancers; finally James William Bayliss of the 45
th
 Company aged forty-eight, was a 
interesting case where age and health was completely discounted by his length of military 
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service and his then present occupation - before enlistment he was a riding master with 
several years in the Dragoons and the 1
st
 Life Guards; despite being medically unfit to remain 
in the regular army, he was still able to pass the medical examination set by the Imperial 
Yeomanry.
52
 The soldier had notable experience in the Sudan, where he received the 
Khedive’s Medal.53 It may have been that that these four men and others like them were 
accepted due to the lack of previous military experience in the units generally; it is reasonable 
to suggest that the company commander ignored the age restrictions in order to allow men 
with knowledge and familiarity with horses, drilling and shooting to pass into the ranks. 
There were also three counts of underage recruits at the age of seventeen, eighteen and 
nineteen attached to the 60
th
 and 61
st
 companies. Not surprisingly none had previous 
experience in the military, whilst the youngest had no previous employment. Of the men 
sampled in this study, fifty-six of 535 men had noted previous military experience with five 
members attached to Ireland’s police forces. Trooper Fitzgibbon detailed that several troopers 
under the rank of sergeant had previous military experience in the North-West Rebellion in 
Canada (1885) and in the Matabele wars in South Africa, throughout the 1890s.
54
 That only a 
little over ten per cent of the overall yeomanry units had any military experience was all too 
evident to the British parliament and the military when news reached British shores of the 
battle of Lindley (27 May – 31 May 1900).  
From the evidence presented in the attestation forms, very few recruits were married; 
the War Office preferred to enrol unmarried men, or widowers without children.
55
 Enlisting 
unmarried men or individuals without a family made financial sense – it removed the 
prospect of providing monetary support to the widow or orphans. Thirty six men had a spouse 
which represented fewer than seven per cent of this study’s sample. In Scotland, the figure 
was less, with ninety-six percent of recruits unmarried.
56
 With little responsibility at home, 
the war offered an exciting opportunity for adventure within the community of each 
company. With regards the men who were married, the vast majority had previous 
employment, suggesting that economic motivation was not a factor.    
Religion 
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At the turn of the century, Ireland was multi-denominational. According to the 1901 Census, 
there were 3,310,028 Catholics, 579,385 Church of Ireland members, 443,494 Presbyterians, 
61,255 Methodists, 3,769 Jews and 59,703 of other religious persuasions.
57
 As the table 
below illustrates, the Imperial Yeomanry was also multi-denominational, showing no 
discrimination or intolerance. Following the threat from revolutionary France and the 
removal of a ban that prohibited Catholics serving in the regulars (1793), Irish Catholics 
became a prominent component of the British army. Despite the large numbers of Catholics 
in the country, they formed less than ten per cent of the five Irish units considered for this 
study. The majority of the Catholic volunteers were attached to the two southern companies, 
which is not surprising, considering that 2,610,976 Catholics lived in the three southern 
provinces – Leinster, Munster and Connaught. Studying the attestation forms, one captures a 
glimpse of the background of each individual. Viewing the previous occupations of each 
Catholic, eighty-eight per cent of them had employment such as clerks, factory inspector, 
medical students, bank officials, gentlemen and solicitors, members of the police force, 
engineers, state officials and grooms. As economic fulfilment was not a compelling force for 
recruitment for this group, their motivations for enlisting in predominantly Protestant units is 
of interest. It may have been a political choice as Catholic Home Rulers, like some Irish in 
the Great War, saw supporting and offering solidarity with the British Empire, as a method 
by which to obtain self-government. Furthermore, it may have been a political decision by 
Catholic Unionists, who were often ‘unimpressed by the case for Home Rule’.58 This is an 
argument that appears quite frequently in the press throughout the war.
59
 Moreover, the 
Catholic response in the northern units is interesting, as according to the 1901 Census, there 
were 699,052 Catholics in Ulster, yet only nine were recruited into the northern units, whilst 
one recruit from Antrim volunteered for the 45
th
 Dublin Company.
60
 In Belfast itself, the 
centre of recruitment for the Imperial Yeomanry in the north, there were over thirty thousand 
males of the Catholic faith, many of who would be eligible for military service.
61
 It is unclear 
why the Catholic response up north was so limited, whether it was due to politics, class and 
religion or the lack of military expertise amongst the Catholic population. Arguably, money 
and class may have had an impact on Catholic recruitment; at the turn of the century, 
Catholics in Belfast were ‘overrepresented in the ranks of the unskilled or semi-skilled 
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workers, and servants’.62 However of the ten Ulster Catholics that joined the First Contingent, 
they all had previous employment – Labourer, Inspector of factories, medical student, clerk, 
gentleman, dealer, groom, saddler, carpenter, and farrier (horseshoe maker). Furthermore, 
two of the recruits had previous military experience. Arguably, economic motivation was not 
a factor, and it can be considered that these recruits joined for the experience, adventure or as 
staunch Catholic Unionists serving the Empire with their fellow subjects throughout the 
United Kingdom. Although Catholic participation never reached the impressive recruitment 
figures that occurred in 1914, their level of involvement in the First Contingent was 
significant and worthy of note.  
As previously mentioned, Ulster was an important recruitment ground with fifty-three 
per cent of all attestation into the ‘Irish’ units; twenty-four per cent of these gave an address 
in Antrim. In 1901, 880,105 Ulster citizens had a Protestant faith, with 346,539 people were 
located in Antrim.
63
 Of the 132 volunteers from Antrim, ninety-two per cent were of a 
Protestant denomination, with fifty per cent of them Presbyterian. Irish unionists’ active 
showing of support for the British Empire at this time is more easily explained by the strong 
bonds of religion, culture and politics that existed between Britain and Ireland which were 
arguably the main driving force behind their recruitment.  
Table F) The religious denominations of the 'Irish' yeomanry in the First Contingent 
Religion Number 
Church of 
England 159 
Presbyterian 135 
Other 
Protestants
64
 169 
Roman Catholics 51 
Wesleyan 5 
N/A 16 
 
Reasons for enlistment 
The decision to volunteer was a serious undertaking and one that could not be taken lightly. 
The men were leaving the safety of their homes, their loved ones, and risking their lives 
against a formidable opponent. Reasons as to why these men enlisted vary from patriotism, 
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devotion, military tradition, economic, social and family pressures, adventure or a means of 
escape. For Maurice Fitzgibbon it was out of loyalty and duty; he remembered:  
‘It was a time when many of us felt that possibly we might be of use; but, useful or 
useless, we wanted to be up and doing something. Would we be let? ... Good luck, our 
chance came in its own good time’.65  
The Freeman’s Journal commented that Irish volunteers had enlisted for the ‘love of a free 
fight’ and despite the grave dangers that the men might encounter, the newspaper does 
partially assume that these men believed in the union and the British Empire.
66
 In Corporal 
P.T. Ross’s recollection of his service in the 69th Sussex Company Imperial Yeomanry, he 
listed his forty reasons for volunteering after the turbulent period of Black Week with a heavy 
rationale, that Millar explained was ‘produced by both long-term societal influences and 
immediate events ... directly linked to his sense of patriotism, obligation, and duty to his 
country’.67 Below is a sample of his reasons for enlistment: 
2) Patriotism 
8) I considered it was the right thing for an Englishman to do  
9) Because I thought it was my duty; 
13) Patriotic Fever!!!  
14) I did it during the Patriotic Mania, 1899-1900 
15) Sudden splash of patriotism upon visiting a Music Hall 
34) Had always preached Patriotism and thought it was the time to put theory into 
practice
68
 
 
Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, despite the growing threat from Irish 
nationalism, Ireland was subjected to the culture of new imperialism and empire. As 
portrayed in the previous chapter, Ireland continued to interact with the ideals of the British 
Empire and the Irish military tradition. As Stephen Millar argues, powerful social forces 
shaped public attitude towards the ideals of patriotism and loyalty - literature, education, the 
music hall, sermons and political speeches helped promote British nationalism and 
superiority.
69
 Richard Price noted that the January recruits in Britain, enlisted through 
‘frenetic patriotism’, but overall disregarded that motive for the majority of the working class 
individuals that enlisted in the Second and Third Contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry.
70
 The 
patriotic reaction foreshadowed the public response that was witnessed following the 
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outbreak of war in Europe and after the British defeat at Le Mons in August 1914 – the 
British public reacted with devotion and patriotism, exemplified by scenes of thousands of 
men outside the recruitment office. Considering the idea that economic motivation was not a 
push factor, it is important to view the attestation forms. Below is a table, which lists the 
fifteen most common  
trades and professions of Imperial Yeoman, which enlisted in the five ‘Irish’ units of the First 
Contingent: 
Table G) Fifteen most common trades and professions of Imperial Yeomen in Ireland 
1900 
 
 No/535  % 
Clerk 93 17% 
Farmer 40 7% 
Groom 31 6% 
Building Trades 28 5% 
Draper 24 4% 
Engineer 23 4% 
Gentleman 23 4% 
Student 15 3% 
Labourer 13 2% 
Traveller 12 2% 
Barrister/Solicitor 12 2% 
Merchant 12 2% 
Grocer 11 2% 
Driver/tram conductor 10 2% 
None 58 11% 
 
The Royal Commission’s report into the war claimed that the ‘First Contingent consisted 
almost entirely of men superior to the classes ordinarily enlisted (in the regular army).’71 
Regarding the Irish yeomanry, in some respects that assessment was correct. The majority of 
volunteers enlisted into the First Contingent were predominantly middle and upper class. 
That makes an interesting comparison with the traditional view of Irishmen enlisting into the 
regular army, the majority being of low income from a rural background; from 1790 to 1890 
there was little difference between Irish recruits: agriculture labourers being the most 
common, followed by servants and a host of men without land or property.
72
 The yeomanry, 
as Millar asserts, enjoyed recruitment from a wider variety of people than usually associated 
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with the British army, offering a thorough representation of Britain as a whole.
73
 This is 
supported by Ian Beckett who revealed in his research that volunteers of fifty three units were 
enrolled from 125 different occupations, with around forty per cent consisting of lower 
middle-class and artisans.
74
 Subsequent contingents, as Richard Price suggests, enjoyed a 
wider recruitment from the working class of the United Kingdom.
75
 In Ireland, the 
occupations listed above illustrate that recruitment for the First Contingent drew from diverse 
backgrounds. The men were predominantly white collar workers including clerks, travellers, 
grocers, students, barrister and solicitors. There is also a significant number of gentlemen and 
upper class individuals in the First Contingent, accounting for twenty three of the 
occupations; the figures for these categories was in all probability higher as the individuals 
who were listed as having no occupation, were more than likely gentlemen with private 
means.
76
   
However, there was a small yet significant element of skilled working class 
individuals in the Irish companies. Labourers and builders accounted for seven percent of the 
total number of individuals who attested. Despite the relatively low wages and the price of 
enlistment, it is surprising they had the opportunity to enrol. Unlike the rest of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland had no yeomanry brigade. This left them at a considerable disadvantage as 
there would be no county funds available to pay for equipment. The Imperial Yeomanry 
Committee advanced £100 to equip the staff of the 13
th
 battalion,
77
 but other funds would 
have to be raised by private means. Similar to other examples throughout this thesis, the press 
was utilised to promote awareness of soldiers fighting in the war; Captain Pakenham keenly 
observed that ‘publicity is all that is required’ to raise appropriate funds.78 On 12 January 
1900, Pakenham received £100 pounds from the Lord Lieutenant Lord Cadogan.
79
 The 
following day, the Irish Times published the list of donations received into the Irish Imperial 
Yeomanry Fund. They had received £670 14s. 6d from contributors such as the Earl of 
Meath, the Countess of Wicklow, Lord Dartrey and Sir John and Lady Arnott. The fund also 
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accepted subscriptions from men who had enlisted in the 45
th
 Company- Victor Gibson and 
H.C. Villiers Stuart.
80
 By 17 January 1900, the fund had increased to £1,012 8s. 6d, one 
hundred pounds of which was donated by the Earl of Listowel.
81
 By 3 February, subscriptions 
had risen to £1,589 9s.
82
 Without the financial support from the Irish landed class, a large 
percentage of the Irish units would have failed to fund their recruitment which would have 
potentially reduced the numbers of volunteers.  
Across the United Kingdom, the figures for white collar recruitment within the first 
months of attestation were quite similar. In E. W. McFarland’s study of the Scottish Imperial 
Yeomanry, she notes that in the first three months of recruitment, clerks, grocers, students, 
gentlemen, salesmen, travellers, farmers, labourers and trade jobs form a substantial 
component of the units, merging white collar and blue collar individuals.
83
 In Stephen 
Millar’s research on several English yeomanry units, people with skilled trades formed a 
more substantial element of the force with a heavier emphasis on farming and skilled 
workers. However Millar’s work also illustrates the diverse nature of occupations and classes 
involved in the yeomanry.
84
 The diversity notwithstanding, the majority of the occupations 
represented suggest that the First Contingent was a largely middle class experience across the 
United Kingdom. According to Ian Beckett, clerks formed the largest single occupational 
grouping, accounting for thirty percent of recruits. This, he explained, was due to the 
willingness of employers to allow their employees to enlist and as such a testament to the 
enthusiasm expressed by the middle class
85
 who were interacting with the war with 
motivation, leaving the stability of their lives and safety, for adventure and the promise of 
glory.
86
 The army which was once seen as a breeding ground for undesirables, vagrants and 
the unemployment, within the turn of the new century, was becoming a respectable element 
of society, regarded as the corner stone of success for the preservation of the Empire.  
The most dynamic social group that engaged with the Imperial Yeomanry was the 
Irish landed gentry and Anglo-Irish gentleman class. The Irish landed gentry were perhaps 
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the most vocal in providing unwavering support for the military and the imperial mission. 
The military tradition was strong among the families of the landed class; they were 
considered one of the most militarised social groups in the British Isles, who viewed the 
military as a means by which to identify with their families, their empire and service to the 
monarchy.
87
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Ireland was heavily represented in 
the officer class in the British army, with around 17.5 per cent of officers from the country. 
Those officers mostly enlisted from the Anglo-Irish Protestant landowning class, with Jeffery 
asserting that they were natural unionists.
88
 They offered their services to the Imperial 
Yeomanry by; aiding its organisation in Ireland; providing financial assistance to men to buy 
equipment; engaging with the local and national press in promoting charitable assistance for 
the companies; and offering themselves as an extra man in the rank and files. Their actions 
embodied the symbiotic relationship that existed between them and the military.
89
 
 The motivations to enlist are of interest, particularly the question of whether it was 
linked to patriotism or economic motivation. Alvin Jackson suggests that the empire, along 
with its grandeur, tradition and patriotism played a secondary role to potential Irish recruits; 
the appealing affordable lifestyle which the Victorian army offered to young officers was the 
primary factor for enlistment.
90
 It was a time of change for the landed gentry. Their power 
and financial strength was diminishing and they were becoming more isolated in a hostile 
nationalist environment. As Nicholas Perry argues, despite the political and economic 
problems they faced, it seems apparent that their commitment to the military, monarchy and 
the empire remained unchanged. Indeed the origins of this loyalty have some basis in the fact 
that the Irish landed families sent their sons to England for education, which deeply 
embedded in them the ideas of imperialism and loyalty to the empire.
91
 Moreover, according 
to historian R.B. McDowell, the ‘gentry were, with rare exceptions, staunch unionists’.92 The 
Imperial Yeomanry offered a chance for men to escape from the pressures of Irish society 
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and facilitated an engagement with the United Kingdom and throughout the military.
93
 The 
Imperial Yeomanry also provided the opportunity for men to begin or re-engage a career in 
the military. Several men seem to have understood this, as many would remain in the British 
army to see active service in the Great War; Pakenham would lose his life during the 
Gallipoli campaign in 1915, having reached the rank of Brigadier-General of the British 
army; Richard Annesley West, 45
th
 Company, became Lieutenant-Colonel of the North Irish 
Horse, Tank Corps, during the Great War, winning the Victoria Cross, before being killed; 
Major Holt Waring, Royal Irish Rifles, previously of the aforementioned unit, died in France 
in 1918 of wounds received in action. Those examples provide an argument that their service 
in South Africa had a profound impact that led to their continued interaction with the British 
Army.  
Ultimately, patriotism and devotion to the Empire could not be downplayed. As 
Millar argues the disasters of ‘Black Week’ and the impact of social pressures created an 
environment that allowed for ‘psychological fulfilment’ found in the expression of 
patriotism.
94
 Their parent nation had suffered three embarrassing defeats before Christmas, 
presenting the Irish elite class with the opportunity to show their qualities and unique shared 
history with their peers in the United Kingdom. The war provided a chance to express loyalty 
to the forms of Irish military tradition that had long been established in the British Army. It 
was also suggested at the time that the war provided hunting clubs with an ideal opportunity 
in which to combine their sporting appetite with their sense of militarism. These hunting and 
social clubs provided an excellent breeding ground for recruits as the men were fit, well 
trained on horseback and could handle fire-arms. The chance of adventure and glory with 
their friends and comrades may have been too enticing to turn down.   
And yet motivations did vary amongst soldiers and civilians when recruiting for the 
regular forces, the militia or the Yeomanry. Trooper Sidney Peel, 40
th
 Oxfordshire Company 
Imperial Yeomanry, offered a contrast to the level of patriotism that P.T. Ross experienced 
during his time of enlistment: 
I can only remember one man who declared that he had enlisted from reasons of 
patriotism, and he was generally regarded as peculiar. If others were so influenced, 
they would by no means confess to it. Some came because they saw a chance of 
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emigration at Government expense; some for love of sport and excitement; some, 
because their domestic affairs were in a tangle, from which enlistment offered a ready 
escape; some, because they were tired of the present occupation; some, because they 
wanted a job; some, because they wanted a medal, and some because others came.
95
 
As regards this study, it is apparent economic motivation was not a decisive factor for 
enlistment. Considering the sampled attestation forms of the Irish companies, eighty-nine per 
cent had employment or were currently students. The other eleven percent, considered 
‘unemployed’, would have needed private funds by which to guarantee a place in the 
company, as equipment and horses were not provided by the War Office. From the evidence, 
it is clear that some did enlist for the adventure, comradeship, the excitement, escape from the 
general monotony of life in the United Kingdom, and perhaps the opportunity to travel to 
South Africa with the British army, and remain there once their term of service was 
completed. Several yeomen remained in South Africa in where they found work in the new 
British controlled South Africa. One individual, of the 46
th
 Company obtained work on the 
Natal Government Railway; a previous organist, of the same company, joined the 
Johannesburg Mounted Police, clearly using the skills he had obtained in the yeomanry. 
There were several others who found work in the Transvaal Police and civil employment in 
Johannesburg District and Maritzburg. Many others, for reasons of further employment or 
adventure, remained in South Africa following the demobilisation of their company, with 
some transferred to other units, and others obtaining civilian jobs in government 
departments.
96
 Interestingly, between 1901 and 1903, of the 1,010 recruits that joined the 
Natal Mounted Police and Cape Mounted Police, seventy-five per cent were Irish.
97
 The 
Royal Commission inquiry into the war had claimed that many men of the First Contingent 
remained in South Africa and ‘obtained good positions’.98 The Irish Independent claimed that 
the ‘majority of the Dublin Yeomanry went out with the object of developing into landed 
proprietors at the expense of Boers whose lands are to be robbed from them and given to 
“desirable settlers”’.99 Little evidence exists to defend such a claim with the odd exception; 
Trooper Middleton of the 45
th, wrote home to say that he ‘intended to come home for a bit 
when all is over, as the country wont (sic) be settled for some time’.100 Formerly a mining 
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engineer, it is likely that he saw an opportunity in the gold and diamond mines of South 
Africa. By 1904, there were 17,899 first-generation Irish in South Africa, which included 
Irish troops of the British army and Irish people who were ‘stirred by the fanatical espousal of 
pro-Boerism in Ireland and fascinated by tales’ of South Africa.101 There also appeared to be 
wider patterns of soldiers from the colonies of Australia and Canada remaining in South 
Africa, following their service; with regards Canadian recruits, historian Carmen Millar states 
at least 349 Canadians demobilised and found civilian employment.
102
 Historian Craig 
Wilcox estimated that by 1904, over 5,000 Australians were settling in South Africa, some of 
whom had seen active service during the war.
103
  
              While motivation to enlist varied from man to man, once they were organised into 
their respective companies of the Imperial Yeomanry their individual reasons became 
superseded by the desires and rhetoric of the British government, the British army and the 
press. The idea of loyalty and self-sacrifice was already incorporated into the psyche of the 
British people through years of propaganda and it found an outlet during ‘those dark 
December days’.104 As Stephen M. Millar has illustrated, the imperial mission throughout the 
late Victorian society was implemented through education, literature, the press, the music 
halls and Christianity leading to exposure to ‘ideals attached to the military and the empire: 
loyalty, duty, self-help, and patriotism’.105 The introduction of patriotic and militaristic ideals 
which were promoted and induced from a young age through education, left historian M.D. 
Blanch to conclude that ‘powerful pre-war influences helped shape popular response to the 
war itself.’106 The masses had been subjected to tales of heroism and courage in the later part 
of the nineteenth century. The deaths of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill, and the eleven 
Victoria Crosses awarded to the defenders of Rorke’s Drift, were an example of how to 
preserve and enhance the image of the British soldier in times of despair and hardship. 
Examples of courage and self-sacrifice, was as Michael Lieven suggested, to teach ‘the 
young the qualities they must develop’ and to reassure ‘adults of the qualities on which they 
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had been taught to rely’.107 This remained true after the battle of Colenso. The death of 
Lieutenant Frederick Roberts, son of Lord Roberts, was nationally mourned as he died 
attempting to save the guns, while the apparent heroism of Bugler Dunne offered some solace 
to the British public. The British soldier still remained a symbol of self sacrifice for the 
honour and preservation of the British Empire. 
             Prior to departure in March 1900, the Irish companies witnessed displays of 
impressive rhetoric and public scenes of support. The Duke of Connaught told the 45
th
 Dublin 
Company that ‘to help in the defence of the Empire ... that you will one and all show 
devotion to duty and that devotion to your Sovereign and to your country’.108 Reported in the 
Irish Times Major-General Prior, Commandant of the Curragh District was certain the 45
th
 
would ‘do its best to emulate the gallant deeds already preformed by the brave Irish 
regiments’.109 The 61st South Irish Horse Company could ‘be relied upon to worthily uphold 
the splendid prestige already gained by our countrymen’.110 Their impassioned statements 
may arguably, have had profound effects on the men. The messages of unity, comradeship 
and loyalty to the British Empire were important themes which engaged with the psychology 
of each man.
111
 The public and press also played a role in encouraging enthusiasm amongst 
the auxiliary forces and by demonstrated public acts of support for the men. Across the 
United Kingdom and the Empire, there was widespread rejoicing and excitement at the 
departure of troops to South Africa; companies were entertained at dinners and concerts in 
Ireland,
112
 whilst postcards appeared in circulation called ‘The Irish Imperial Yeomanry’.113 
The Irish Times reported the departure of the 45
th
 from Dublin; the company witnessed ‘the 
whole quay being black with people’ waving Union Jacks and singing God Save the Queen, 
Rule Britannia, Soldiers of the Queen and Come Back to Erin. As the men boarded the ship 
‘Cambria’, family, friends and well wishers waved, hats, handkerchiefs and sticks while 
rockets and fireworks were fired off to end an ‘enthusiastic send-off’. Due to the intensity of 
the crowd and their heavy kit bags, the Trooper Fitzgibbon noted ‘here it may almost be said 
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our campaign began’.114 This was a repeated occasion and enthusiasm did not wane despite 
months passing since the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry.  
 
Fig. 44: A contemporary drawing ofthe Duke of Connaught inspecting  the 45
th
 
Company at Dublin’s Royal Barracks, on 7 February 1900. 
 
Source, Black and White, 17 Feb. 1900. 
Fig. 45: A photograph of the Duke’s inspection of the 45th Dublin Company 
 
Source, The Sketch, 14 Feb. 1900. 
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Similar scenes were witnessed across the Empire as tens of thousands of British and colonial 
troops from Canada, Australia and New Zealand boarded their respective ships to fight the 
Boer. The total number recorded, for the number of Colonial troops serving in South Africa, 
was 29,090 of all ranks.
115
 The thousands of volunteers into South Africa was an impressive 
feature of the war’s ability to impact on, and interest many throughout the empire, becoming 
a colonial and imperial melting pot. A corporal of the First Australian Horse observed the 
variations of the English language amongst Her Majesty’s troops: 
There were few distinctions in dress as the campaign grew older, and most men 
looked alike, but one was generally able to locate a man’s habitat in the Empire as 
soon as he opened his lips to speak. From the rounded, full-voiced English, the broad 
Scotch, or the Irish brogue, the Canadian twang and the Australian drawl...’116 
Irishmen were distinctive amongst the men of the Empire doing their fair share for the 
imperial project. The imperial sentiment was infectious, remaining steadfast for the 
preservation of the Empire and reinforcing their shared identity.  
                It is apparent that among elements of the middle and upper classes, the war was 
popular. This was heavily influenced by the Irish landed gentry, the Irish military caste and 
the press. Irish interest in the war had been galvanised by the role of the Irish regiments in the 
war, and it was an opportunity to express their loyalty through patriotism and adventure for 
the British Empire. The predominantly Unionist and Protestant Irish companies understood 
their contribution to the war effort and the empire. They would have their opportunity to 
demonstrate their fighting qualities and patriotism on the hills surrounding the town of 
Lindley.  
The battle of Lindley (27-31 May 1900) 
The final aspect of this chapter is to evaluate the role of the 13
th
 Battalion in the South 
African War, with a case study on the battle of Lindley. In the words of Will Bennett, the 
engagement at Lindley ‘marked the end of the Imperial Yeomanry dream’.117 The battle, 
Keith Jeffery asserts, witnessed the Irish ascendency class ‘on the cusp of virtual extinction ... 
all dressed up to defend the empire, loyally waiting at Lindley for support which never 
came’.118 The battalion, numbering some 500 men, armed with two 7mm M1895 Colt-
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Browning Machine Guns suffered defeat and capture by Boer forces under the leadership of 
General Piet de Wet. The battle which lasted from 27-31 May 1900 was fought on a series of 
kopjes (small hills) outside the town of Lindley, north-eastern Free State. The following 
paragraphs in this section will provide a narrative of the engagement with some detailed 
analysis. This will be supported by eye-witness and contemporary accounts in order to 
determine the Irish experience and to evaluate their performance as an effective fighting unit. 
Public reaction to the defeat is discussed as is their understanding of the conflict and the 
battalion itself. Furthermore, contemporary perceptions of the engagement, which focused 
heavily on training and discipline, will be explored, as will the question of whether patriotism 
improved the overall fighting quality of the Irish units. 
Fig. 46: Some members of No.1 troop of the Dublin Squadron, I.Y., at Maitland 
Camp, Cape Town. (Table Mountain in the background) 
 
Source, Maurice Fitzgibbon, Arts under arms-an university man in khaki (London, 1901), p. 81. 
Prior to Lindley, the 13th Battalion had been in South Africa for nearly two months. In that 
time, the men trained by sections, practised skirmishing drills on foot, and performed outpost 
duty and basic tasks around the camp. The remainder of the time was then spent on trains and 
horseback travelling across South Africa to new destinations. On 23 May 1900, the 13
th
 
Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Spragge,
119
 departed from 
Bloemfontein. Under orders from Lord Roberts’ headquarters, the 13th Battalion was to 
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reinforce Major-General Sir Henry Colville’s under strength 9th Division;120 that division, 
that was to form the right flank for the advance on Johannesburg, was short of mounted units. 
Colville was to march to the town of Lindley and then continue north towards Heilbron en 
route to Johannesburg. The 13
th
 Battalion was to join forces with Colville south of Kroonstad 
at Ventersburg, but due to delays, the battalion was ordered up to Kroonstad. It was there that 
Spragge was handed a telegram with orders to join Colville at Lindley some forty-five miles 
away. The telegraph began a series of controversies with regards to the battle. Colville 
categorically denied ever sending this telegram, which caused confusion to orders and led to 
the isolation of the yeomanry battalion in hostile territory. 
Unaware that the 13
th
 Battalion had been ordered to march on to Lindley, Colville 
moved his force eighteen miles north of the town. As the 13
th
 Battalion continued its march, 
they encountered eight Boers who wished to hand in their arms and obtain passes from the 
commandant so they could return safely to their farms. The Boers handed over several 
outdated rifles with only one Mauser, which Trooper Fitzgibbon believed ‘should have 
aroused suspicion’. It was clear that these Boers were scouts and, instead of being held 
prisoners, ‘they naturally returned to Lindley and told their friends what they had seen.’121 
Trooper Fitzgibbon, clearly emotional from his battle experience, recollected the 
preposterous and unbelievable lack of forethought by the commanding officers:
 
 
The scouts of the Boer commandoes at Lindley had been permitted to enter our lines, 
to find out our numbers, our armaments, and the amount of our supplies, had even had 
lunch with us, and all this information and hospitality at the expense of a few out-of-
date rifles, and of a few perjured oaths.
122
 
 
At 1300 hrs on Sunday, 27 May, the yeomanry arrived at Lindley expecting to find Colville’s 
division. Spragge told the court of inquiry that he found General Colville gone with no 
instructions of any sort left. The town was seemingly deserted save for a few Boers who were 
too frightened to give any information.
123
 For a period of an hour a forward section of the 
DCO patrolled the town, while some officers purchased eggs, bread and chickens in the shops 
until they drew fire from the Boers. Boer scout intelligence had monitored the progress of the 
column and prepared their positions on the surrounding hills. Dr David Martin, a trooper with 
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the 45
th
, remembered: ‘Suddenly, to our amazement, we heard firing commence in front of us 
... the bullets were whizzing over our heads and all around us.’124 Fitzgibbon recalled the first 
time he was under fire ‘as the beginning of a thunderstorm in summer time.’125 Lance-
Corporal St John Blake, of the 45
th, considered it the ‘most unpleasant moment’ of his life but 
the image of Captain Pakenham braving the intense fire in his saddle and encouraging the 
men, instilled belief and renewed confidence.
126
 As the pressure intensified and casualties  
began to mount, the order was given to retire from the town under cover fire. The men retired 
to a position some two miles north-west of Lindley where their baggage was kept and the 
place of defence was chosen.  
The area of defence was a series of kopjes surrounding a valley 500 feet wide; the left 
flank was defended by the DCO; a kraal (enclosure of livestock) which commanded the 
eastern plateau was assigned to the Dublin Company; the right flank was guarded by the 46
th
 
Company; while the 54
th
 was kept in reserve (see page xix for map of Lindley).
127
 Despite it 
being a baptism of fire for the majority of the battalion, and their apparent lack of training 
and discipline notwithstanding, the men withdrew in good order. According to Sergeant 
George Moody, of the 46
th, ‘Col Spragge was so taken by surprise’ by the Boer attack, that 
Lord Longford had to control the situation by encouraging the colonel to react.
128
 As the 
Dublin Company retired, Colonel Spragge called out, ‘That’s the way to retire; not like a 
pack of sheep.’129  
The following day, General Colville awoke to a telegram from Spragge: ‘Found no 
one in Lindley but Boers-have 500 men but only one day’s food, have stopped three miles 
back on Kroonstad Road. I want help to get out without great loss’.130 Colville had options 
but he chose to remain on course to Heilbron which he believed was essential to Lord 
Robert’s strategy. His force was already under pressure from Boers in the surrounding areas 
and was an eighteen mile march away from Lindley. He also thought Spragge’s mobile force 
would be able to break out and make an alternative route. In the opinion of Colville, the 
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message lacked urgency with regards the Boers and their supplies.
131
 Colville sent several 
messengers ordering Spragge to abandon Lindley and retire on to Kroonstad; to live off the 
country and if necessary, abandon the wagons. All of the messages failed to be delivered. The 
decision to abandon the 13
th
 Battalion was met with criticism from Lord Roberts who 
believed that Colville ‘displayed a want of military instinct in deciding to march instead of 
returning to the assistance of the yeomanry’.132 When questioned at the Royal Commission, 
Colville defended his actions by suggesting that if the battalion was killed to a man, it was his 
duty to see out Lord Roberts’ orders.133  
In the following days, the men held out against a growing number of Boers, some 
2,000 armed with two effective artillery pieces; the Maxim-Nordenfeldt ‘Pom-Pom’ and two 
Maxim machine guns. Due to the hardness of the ground and the lack of sufficient 
entrenching tools, the yeomanry were in a vulnerable position from sniper and artillery fire. 
The men prepared their position as best they could by building some stone shelters 
throughout the first night and in some cases, used anthills which added some much needed 
protection and cover. As space became more restricted, several counter attacks were made on 
the neighbouring ridges in an attempt to push back the Boers. Captain Pakenham led one such 
charge; Corporal St John Blake remembered the bravery of their captain- leading a bayonet 
charge he was shot three times, standing facing the shower of bullets in a ‘mass of blood’: ‘A 
truer, braver, finer fellow never put on uniform.
134
 It was recorded that as he finally 
succumbed to his wounds and dropped to the ground, shouting ‘Never mind boys! Let the 
best man lead you; and fight like Irishmen.’135 
The accounts of heroism and hardship were illustrated graphically in reports across 
the Irish press, where several eye-witness narratives were published in both the Irish Times 
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and the Kildare Observer. A letter from William Irvine, of the 46
th
 Belfast Company, 
conveys the ordeal:
 
 
We had a hard fight, and were four days and four nights in the trenches ... We had 
hardly anything to eat, only one buiscuit (sic) and a wine-glass of tea each day and the 
last two days only tea without bread or biscuit ... I was glad to have my pipe, as I 
smoked when I got the chance’.136 
The scarcity was further illustrated by Trooper James Arnold Smithwick, son of the 
Chairman of Kilkenny County Council, who recalled ‘five days on practically empty 
stomachs ... our horses were dog tired.’137 Trooper James John Clarke remembered three days 
of ‘heavy sniping’ and ‘very hot firing.’ Despite the lack of emotion and fine detail presented 
from this trooper, the extent of the battle is clear; continual pressure exerted by the Boer 
forces lead him to believe that the men ‘had to surrender.’138 The details of the battle 
portrayed the intensity of Boer fire-power. Private Irvine, at the same battle, recalled the 
narrow shaves he faced during the siege: 
The anthill I got behind for cover, had several holes made in it, and one shot came 
taking the top of it away just about one inch from my head, and in another places. I 
was lying behind some stones, when a bullet knocked a chip off the stone at my head; 
it was a near shave, and several came within a few feet ... It would remind you of a 
hailstone shower on the lake the way the sand was knocked up by the showers of 
bullets. You would wonder how men could live under such fire.
139
 
As the battle wore on, the pressure began to tell on the men, bringing their training and 
discipline into question. The situation became critical when two hundred Boers attacked a 
kopje defended by Lieutenant Alexander of the DCOs and a small company of men. As the 
situation wavered, the order was made to retire towards Lieutenant Robin at a nearby hill. In 
a state of panic Corporal Jacques offered the white flag which consequently led him to be 
shot by his men. However, Lieutenant Robin, apparently felt bound to this act and 
surrendered his whole position. This allowed the Boers access to the valley which was a 
position of tactical importance. Colonel Spragge, realising the difficulty of their position, 
ordered a general surrender in a bid to avoid ‘useless sacrifice of life’.140 Following the 
surrender, Spragge admitted to his captors that the raising of the white flag ‘was a 
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mistake’.141 Lieutenant Robin was in apparent distress following the surrender, with eye-
witnesses claiming that he threatened to ‘blow out his brains’, before his troops’ 
intervened.
142
 As the men awaited their captors, Sergeant George Moody recalled, that most 
of the men managed to ‘injure their rifles first throwing away the bolt or injuring the sights or 
best of all giving the barrell (sic) a twist between 2 rocks’.143 Remarkably, despite days of 
intense engagement, the battalion mingled freely with their Boer captors discussing the 
battle.
144
 Such examples of respect for the opposing forces reinforced the idea that the South 
African War was ‘the last of the gentlemen’s wars’; it was generally believed that the war 
‘followed some set of rules for behaviour’.145 However, with continued reports of alleged 
Boer misuse of the white flag, the use of expansive bullets, and the British policy of 
scorched-earth, deportations and concentrations camps, the term ‘gentlemen’s war’ becomes 
increasingly void. Indeed, the South African conflict is often portrayed as one of the first 
modern conflicts. 
Following the four days of fighting, the total casualties for the 13
th
 Battalion were 
seven officers and seventy-three men, with twenty-five dead. The Boers suffered seventy 
casualties with thirty killed. The fit and able were forced to endure the twenty-eight day 
march to the Boer prison laager at Nooitgedacht. The march included sleeping in the open 
veldt, breaking the ice in their buckets each morning and enduring intense heat throughout 
the day. Yet, ‘considering everything’, Trooper Middleton believed they were well treated.146 
Some remained behind at Lindley due to the seriousness of their wounds, while others 
remained in Reitz, a Free State town, a three day march from Lindley due to sickness. Several 
cases of acute rheumatism and tonsillitis were reported.
147
 Maurice Fitzgibbon remained in 
Reitz as he was a medical student with three years training and consequently became medical 
officer of the battalion. He had, in his charge, twenty-four patients with several cases of 
dysentery and enteric fever. The rest of the battalion would remain in a ‘beautiful barb-wired 
cage’ for several months until relieved by British forces. One trooper put his situation into 
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perspective, illustrating the extent of weariness, sorrow and memories of the battle. ‘I can 
only reconcile myself to stand it when I think of the ghastly experiences I had at Lindley and 
my own marvellous escapes, my chums falling, day after day, around me-how much, how 
very much, worse off I might be.’148  
Fig. 47: Temporary military hospita at Reitz with casualties of the 13
th
 Battalion 
 
Source, Maurice Fitzgibbon, Arts under arms-an university man in khaki (London, 1901), p. 205. 
In Ireland, the news of Lindley was met with despair in the national press. ‘Ireland is in 
mourning today for more of her gallant sons who have fallen while facing their country’s 
foes’, described the Irish Times; the Skibbereen Eagle reported ‘widespread anxiety in 
Dublin’.149 On 8 June 1900, the ‘melancholy roll of honour’ began to emerge in the Irish 
press of the defeat and subsequent capture of the Irish battalion. The paper noted with 
sadness, the death of Andrew Marshall Porter, son of the Master of Rolls, ‘a fine athlete and a 
thoroughly good fellow’, leaving a notable gap in social circles in Dublin.150 Three days later 
the brother of Trooper McElnea, wrote to the editor of the newspaper expressing his sadness 
at the list of casualties. He recalled remarks made by Lieutenant Villiers Stuart at the Curragh 
before departure; ‘Lads with you at my back I would storm the gates of hell.’151 In the House 
of Commons, politicians sought further details pertaining to the disaster ‘in view of the 
anxiety which prevails’ in Dublin and Belfast.152 
In the Irish Times issue of 8 June 1900, the editor stated that ‘we sympathise, even 
better than before, with the relatives of the many Irish soldiers of humbler position but equal 
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gallantry, who have endured wounds and death for the honour of the Empire’.153 
Interestingly, Nationalist politician Jasper Tully, M.P. for Leitrim South, commended the 
Irish yeomanry who ‘distinguished themselves so greatly’ only to be ‘butchered’ by the 
inexperienced doctors in charge of treating their wounds.
154
 The editor of the Irish Times also 
noted the ‘revolting’ claims that the Irish yeomen being taken prisoner were evidence of lack 
of courage. Nevertheless the extent of surrenders witnessed in South Africa was so great that 
it worried the military and the government. Liberal M.P. George Lambert detailed several 
cases of unwarranted British surrenders at Stormberg, Nicholson’s Nek, Sanna’s Post, 
Reddersburg and Lindley. Regarding Lindley, he questioned ‘whether these troops held out 
as long as they could’ but did not want to ‘impugn the conduct of millionaires’. Yet he did 
call into question the reports that only eight armed Boers provided the escort of the captured 
yeoman, without any attempt at escape; he continued unopposed: 
...what is the value of the patriotic but untrained soldiers who volunteer to go and 
fight the enemy in South Africa or elsewhere? We are undoubtedly largely relying at 
this moment upon the patriotic but untrained men sent out to the Cape, and we want to 
know whether these forces are really capable of sustaining - not by their courage, that 
is beyond doubt, but by their training-the credit of the Empire in foreign countries. 
Would they be sufficient to meet the trained armies of Continental nations should they 
be called upon to face them?
155
 
For Lambert, the engagement at Lindley exposed the deficiencies of the Imperial Yeomanry 
with regards their training and their discipline. Similarly, Lord Roberts expressed great 
anxiety in allowing areas of strategic importance to be protected and monitored by amateur 
soldiers. He asserted, in the Royal Commissioner’s report on matters connected to the South 
African War, that: 
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...the great anxiety I felt in regard to my communications being held in many places 
by partially trained troops, such as the militia and hastily raised Yeomanry ... the 
result was that our ill-trained troops often led me into great difficulties ... the capture 
of the Irish Yeomanry at Lindley ... showed what a danger it was to depend on troops 
who were not thoroughly disciplined and organised.
156
 
Lord Roberts also questioned the battalion’s discipline stating that ‘disciplined troops have 
much more confidence in each other and I think that is the reason why the yeomanry had to 
give in quickly'.
157
 This is an interesting statement as there were several cases, throughout the 
war of regular British units hoisting up the white flag.
158
 From reading his analysis of the 
Imperial Yeomanry, Roberts seemed at ease blaming the training of troops as the main 
concern. Yet this swipe could be seen as a veiled criticism of the Imperial Yeomanry 
Committee and the War Office in preparing those troops for war. The overall opinion of the 
Royal Commission’s inquiry into the war, believed that the majority of the First Contingent 
‘could ride and handle fire-arms, though owing to want of experience with rifles their 
shooting was in most cases indifferent’.159 Despite the reservations made by their former 
Commander-in-Chief, some witnesses considered the men reliable after a short time, due to 
their ‘individual intelligence’, ‘independence’, ‘confidence’ and ‘esprit de corps’.160 This 
message was reinforced by Lord Methuen, following his examination of the battlefield; 
Corporal St John Blake of the 45
th, recorded the message in a letter to his wife: ‘Boy’s don’t 
think you are disgraced, for it was absolutely impossible for you to hold out any longer, and I, 
for you, can’t understand how you held out for so long.’161 
On 21 and 25 September 1900, a court of inquiry into the engagement at Lindley was 
held; this included the questioning of dozens of witnesses including Lieutenant-Colonel 
Spragge, Lord Longford and Lieutenant Alexander of the DCOs. The court found that: 
 That Lieut.-Colonel Spragge took all necessary military precautions and 
occupied the best available position;   
 That he held out as long as possible as he could, but could have continued to 
do so longer had not irresponsible persons raised white flags; 
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 And that the Officers and men whose cases were under investigation were 
taken prisoner by the chances of war 
The court found that Corporal Leonard Jacques of the DCO hoisted the white flag without 
orders, and that the second white flag ordered by Lieutenant Robin ‘was under the 
misapprehension’ that he was bound to respect it. The court exonerated all officers concerned 
with the engagement. Colville left his position as divisional commander and subsequently 
took command of an Infantry Brigade in Gibraltar. However, the court’s findings placed ‘the 
conduct of Colville in an unfavourable light’ which led to his new position in Gibraltar being 
untenable. Colville returned home to England, but refused to resign his command. He was 
sacked and forced to retire on pay having brought his case to the press.
162
  
Given their surrender at Lindley, the question remains whether the men can be 
considered an inadequate independent fighting force. The evidence presented demonstrates 
that the men did exceptionally well in maintaining their position under artillery fire for 
several days. Despite the lack of sleep, food, defences, and artillery support, the men 
maintained their morale and discipline. Given those circumstances, the Battalion did 
remarkably well considering this was their first engagement with the enemy. Colonel Frank 
Graves, who was in command of 83
rd
 Regimental District and in charge of the organisation of 
the Belfast companies, believed that the Ulster men put in a heroic defence despite the lack of 
food and the tremendous odds. It was only when they became the target of artillery, that 
defence was futile. He insisted that the troops were carefully selected and trained which was 
demonstrated by their impressive resistance.
163
 In Lindley some of the blame rested with 
Colonel Spragge having failed to act decisively. Lord Roberts considered his manner of 
defence inadequate, with areas of tactical importance held by only small numbers of men. He 
believed that any position was vulnerable when large numbers attacked a remote party 
placing the whole position at risk.  
  Criticism of the defeat also appeared in the British media, instigated by Arthur Conan 
Doyle. Within the daily British newspaper the Pall Mall Gazette, Doyle was sceptical of the 
behaviour of Colonel Spragge and the battalion. He was disappointed in the organisation and 
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preparations of the defences, while seemingly bemused that the men failed to build adequate 
trenches. He also believed that the action was ‘the most disappointing of the whole war’.164 In 
his book The great Boer War, he impresses on the reader the quality of the men believing that 
they would ‘fight to the death’ as their honour would expect. Nevertheless, he contradicts this 
by claiming that these men prepared inadequate defensive measures.
165
 One trooper, of the 
Forty-Fifth Company took grave exception to Doyle’s narrative and analysis of the action. In 
a letter to the Pall Mall Gazette, the trooper wished to ‘correct’ the statement on the subject 
of trenches: 
Our battalion had not got with them a single spade or other implement by which such 
a measure could have been carried out ... he(Conan Doyle) is aware that the rocky 
nature of the kopjes would render the making of trenches impossible, except by 
processes of blasting 
The trooper was adamant in his defence stating that De Wet claimed they were excellent 
marksmen and demonstrated typical Irish bravery. Doyle replied to the letter, through the 
newspaper’s editor, apologising for impugning the character of the battalion. He retracted his 
previous statement, that the men had spades and shovels in which to prepare a trench, but 
quickly added that a bayonet ‘at a pinch can in time throw up some cover’.166 With regards 
the lack of entrenching tools, this was a failure on the organisation of army stores; each 
battalion of the Imperial Yeomanry was supposed to be supplied with entrenching tools 
including; thirty shovels; six spades; and thirty pick axes. This inventory would suffice for 
the 509 officers and the men of the battalion and would offer the ideal tools in which 
entrenching could be made possible.
167
 The failure to adequately supply the battalion with 
entrenching tools demonstrated a complete disregard, and disjoint from the realities of 
warfare during this campaign. Examples throughout the first months of the war – Nicholson’s 
Nek, Spion Kop and Ladysmith – revealed the importance and necessity of an effective 
defence, from an entrenched position; several examples throughout the Tugela campaign 
illustrated the futility of the offensive in certain scenarios, in the face of modern technology. 
The failure to sufficiently supply entrenching tools and prepare the battalion for defensive 
engagements demonstrates the lack of responsiveness to the changing environment of the 
modern battlefield. 
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                  From the evidence presented it is clear that no single party could be blamed for 
the surrender of the Irish battalion. Bennett believed that the battalion’s defeat was not down 
to their training and their apparent poor discipline, rather it was the inadequate command 
system which confused the orders isolating the 13
th
 Battalion in hostile territory.
168
 In many 
respects, this is a true assessment. The majority of men behaved admirably, displaying 
discipline and good morale. During the battle the battalion did not remain purely defensive as 
on several occasions sorties were conducted to consolidate and improve their position. 
However the enemies’ superior numbers and heavy artillery fire eventually led to their 
capitulation.
169
 Lord Roberts placed major emphasis on the inadequate training and poor 
discipline of the troops. He highlighted concerns over Colonel Spragge’s role in the defence, 
questioning his tactical movements throughout the battle. However, Colville became Lord 
Roberts’ and the government’s scapegoat. The Secretary of State, St John Brodrick, raised 
concerns over Colville’s actions, and Lord Roberts held him ‘mainly responsible’ for the 
surrender of the Imperial Yeomanry. Despite the grave reservation that Lord Roberts’ held 
regarding the actions and shortcomings of the 13
th
 Battalion, it was subsequently overruled 
by the actions of Colville. For the Nationalist MP T.M. Healy, the blame rested with the 
‘mismanagement of certain English commanders’ at Lindley. In the words of Healy, Colville 
simply ‘turned his back’ on the Irish battalion.170 This was a superficial interpretation of the 
situation as the inadequate command system was equally to blame, as was the insufficient 
military preparation made by the War Office.  
                The Irish Times reacted to the negative reports, across the press, with regards 
Lindley by maintaining a firm support for the yeomen. The paper had invested interest in the 
Irish yeomanry since their initial embodiment, excited by the role Irishmen were to have in 
the war. In the face of the shambles at Lindley, solace was found by the paper in their 
patriotism and loyalty to the Empire; the passage from 8 June 1900 reinforces the common 
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contemporary understanding of the First Contingent’s unique embodiment and the strength of 
patriotism throughout the first months of 1900: 
They did not go to the front, be it remembered, at a time when it was thought that the 
war would be a walk-over ... Not till after Magersfontein and Colenso had shown us 
how stern was the opposition to be encountered were their services called for; and 
they knew when they started for South Africa that certain hardships, probable 
wounds, and possible death, would be their fate. They never flinched, but left their 
offices, their college rooms, their pleasant country houses, and went forth joyfully to 
their part in fighting for QUEEN (emphasis in original) and country.
171
    
Fig. 48: Officers of the 45
th
 and 47
th
 Companies, captured at Lindley, 26 June 1900. 
Colonel Spragge sits at the head of the table, to the right of the picture. On his right (in 
order) Lieut. Stannus (45
th
), Captain R. Robinson (?), Lieut. Villiers Stuart (45
th
), Lieut. 
Du Pre (47
TH
), and Veterinary Lieut. Fenner (I.Y. staff). On his left Surgeon Captain 
Hadley (I.Y. staff), Captain Robin (47
th
), Lord Longford (45
th
), Lieut. Wright (47
th
), and 
Lieut. Lane (47
th
) 
 
Source, H.W. Wilson, With the flag to Pretoria: a history of the Boer War of 1899-1900, ii (London, 1900), 
p. 666. 
Concluding remarks 
Few tangible reminders exist in Ireland of the 13
th
 Battalion. Shortly after the end of 
hostilities comrades of the 45
th
 erected a monument in St Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin. It 
was dedicated to the nine members of the company who died serving ‘their country’ in South 
Africa.
172
 A personal memorial was dedicated to the memory of William Chetwode by his 
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mother and sisters in St John the Evangelist Church, Emo, County Laois. At City Hall, 
Belfast, there is a plaque dedicated to the 46
th
, 54
th
, and the 60
th
, alongside four other 
companies of the 29
th
 Battalion – Lindley is included as a battle honour.173 These physical 
reminders were a distinguishing feature throughout the Victorian era as a result of Irish 
participation in British expansion. Andrew Marshall Porter, a student in Trinity College, is 
perhaps the only member of the company that remains somewhat, in the public consciousness 
– although it is highly doubtful that many know the Lindley connection.174 In addition to the 
scholarship, a stained glass memorial was erected in memory of the trooper, which is situated 
in the Graduates Memorial Building, Trinity College.
175
 The dearth of public memory on the 
military participation of the Irish yeomen extends to Irish historical and military research. 
This is partly as a result of the small Irish numbers, their short term of service and the limited 
impact at the battle of Lindley had on the overall outcome of the war. Despite this, the study 
of Irish involvement in the Imperial Yeomanry highlights many important issues regarding 
Ireland’s military tradition, their imperial footprint and the ability of the Empire to interact 
with Irish society.  
                 Sir Kelly-Kenny observed that the individuals, who attested into the First 
Contingent, did so through the spirit of patriotism. The evidence that has been presented in 
this chapter, points to patriotism being a powerful influence. Despite growing Irish 
Nationalism and their anti-recruitment campaigns, the imperial sentiment remained strong in 
Ireland amongst loyalists, Protestants, and, in addition, within small sections of the Catholic 
community. The northern and southern Irish companies enlisted at a time of imperial crisis. 
The brotherhood expressed in their overwhelming enthusiasm to enrol was linked to the 
bonds of the Irish military tradition, politics, culture and religion, and quite possibly to an 
active reaction to Irish Nationalism. The landed class was the most vocal of all Irish social 
groups in expressing their loyalty to the British Empire. This is not surprising due to the 
massive military and imperial link between this class and Britain. Because of the loss in 
revenue, land and political power, the landed class were isolated in Ireland and this may 
account for the enthusiasm and passion with which they approached the Imperial Yeomanry 
which in turn led to its successful embodiment. Their support for the imperial mission was 
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furthered by the desire to remain patriotic to the British Empire, and the Irish military 
tradition, despite the evident dangers they would face. The embodiment of the Imperial 
Yeomanry is an example of how aligned certain elements of Irish society were with the 
British Empire. Similarly to Great Britain and the Empire, Ireland demonstrated unequivocal 
support for the imperial project. Overall this material demonstrates that Ireland was a 
responsive nation to the demands of the British Empire. Similarly to Irish soldiers in the 
British army, and Irish citizens forming an integral component of the auxiliary forces, the 
formation of the Imperial Yeomanry by individuals, across a wide spectrum of Irish society, 
revealed that individuals were influenced by the ideas of imperialism. Clearly Black Week, 
the involvement of Irish regiments, the influence of the press, literature, war charities and 
politics had an impact on Irish interest in the war. The public interest manifested itself with 
Irishmen volunteering to serve their country. Moreover, it further demonstrates that elements 
of Irish society remained undeterred by the nationalist and pro-Boer movements and 
sentiment, and that Ireland was not entirely an island of insubordination. Over the next two 
years, several new Irish companies were formed into the Second and Third Contingent of the 
Imperial Yeomanry.
176
 This included the 74
th
 Dublin Company, originally of the 16
th
 
Battalion, who participated in the defence of Rooikopjes, on 24 August 1901. The battle 
which occurred near the town of Griquatown in the Northern Cape, was described ‘as a 
terrible sight’ by a trooper of the 74th, ‘one not likely to be ever forgotten by those who took 
part in it’.177 Notwithstanding the war’s fall in popularity, elements of the Irish and British 
public still maintained an interest in the British military, and viewed the Imperial Yeomanry 
as an ideal occupation for a limited service.  
                 Though the battle of Lindley was considered a humiliation by the British Army, 
considering the method of surrender and the social background of the battalion, despite the 
grievances expressed by the British High Command, the battalion performed admirably. In 
the opinion of one individual, ‘for the most part young men who had had but little military 
training  - fresh from the Bar, the Universities, and the public schools, this action is a 
remarkable episode in military history’.178 The battle exemplified much of what was expected 
from Irishmen; brave, loyal and formidable fighters. Their patriotism expressed on their day 
of recruitment, did not wane in the face of adversity and went beyond the expectation the 
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training delivered. The overall performance of the Irish units, and the significant level of 
volunteering, secured the future of Ireland’s yeomanry forces. The development of the Irish 
yeomanry led to the establishment of two Irish mounted regiments of the British army – the 
South Irish Horse and the North Irish Horse.
179
 The war, the Adjutant General asserted, 
‘evoked such patriotism, in Ireland, at Belfast and elsewhere that it is thought it would be 
only a suitable method of recognising this loyalty’ to establish yeomanry forces in the 
country; six units were formed which comprised 1,800 men.
180
 The ‘loyalty’ expressed was 
rewarded with an opportunity to serve the British armed forces throughout the Great War.
181
 
Fig. 49: Members of the 13
th
 Battalion inside a prison at Nootigedacht 
 
Source, H.W. Wilson, With the flag to Pretoria: a history of the Boer War of 1899-1900, ii (London, 1900), 
p. 668. 
Fig. 50: Trooper N.F. Fenner and Trooper H.H. Fenner, 45
th
 Dublin Company 
                                                                            
Source, Black and White Budget, 14 July 1900. 
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Chapter Four: The Home Front 
‘Wherever you go’ wrote one individual, ‘even into the pub behind a shutter to get a pint, it’s 
the same fertile topic.’1 The outbreak of war in South Africa had an instant impact on Irish 
society; from the outset of the conflict, Irish loyalists heralded Ireland’s impressive military 
contribution, lauding their much publicised bravery and tenacity and feting Irish generals that 
rose to prominence. Moreover, sections of the Irish public actively engaged with matters 
concerning the Empire and the war. As a result of Irish interest in the conflict in South 
Africa, the public were inundated with an abundance of press coverage and literature 
publications. Unionist newspapers such as the Irish Times, Belfast News-Letter, Dublin Daily 
Express, Northern Whig, and the Kildare Observer among others, maintained a constant 
interest in the conflict, with the Irish public being continuously informed of latest 
developments, rumours, casualty lists, battle narratives, and Irish participation and 
experiences. In addition, the war filtered into music halls, church services and masses, 
schools, universities, public debates and lectures, taverns, concerts, plays, circuses, sports and 
politics.
2
 The conflict also affected wholesale and retail prices, with items such as clothing 
and household goods increasing in price.
3
  
In tandem, it was a time when nationalism became increasingly prevalent in Irish 
society, and the conflict further revealed the polarisation and significant divergent opinions 
that existed in Ireland, between Nationalists and Unionists. Irish Nationalists and pro-Boers 
instigated a campaign denouncing British aggression, its foreign policy in South Africa and 
Irish recruitment in the British army. Support for the Boers was further galvanised by the 
guidance of the Irish Transvaal Committee and the Irish Socialist Republican Party, the 
symbolic gesture and military contribution of MacBride’s Brigade, and the support of many 
staunch Irish Nationalist newspapers, including: the Freeman’s Journal, Anglo-Celt, Irish 
Daily Independent, United Irishman, Cashel Sentinel, Westmeath Examiner, Connaught 
Telegraph, and the Cork Examiner. The Irish pro-Boers and Nationalists showed their 
support by holding public demonstrations across the city of Dublin; on 1 October 1899, 
20,000 people protested against ‘English’ aggression in the Transvaal at Beresford Place, 
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near the Customs House, and large crowds of pro-Boers continued to protest and cause minor 
disturbances in the city centre.
4
 Furthermore, individuals such as Arthur Griffith, James 
Connolly, Maud Gonne, and W.B. Yeats helped to maintain a public campaign of ‘Boer 
fever’ and attempt to dissuade recruitment and support from the British army and 
government. Pro-Boerism also extended across the country, as corporations and committees 
passed resolutions of support for the Boer cause, whilst chastising the government, Irish 
participation and contribution to the war effort. Prior to the conflict, the Nenagh Branch of 
Trade and Labour Association ‘condemned’ the actions of the British Government, whilst 
praying that ‘God might strengthen the arm ... of the gallant Boer’.5 Limerick Borough 
Council hoped the British would suffer another ‘Majuba’,6 and the Limerick Land and 
Labour Association unanimously passed a resolution that condemned the ‘pharisaical and 
gold-grabbing policy of the English Government ... and we regret that an Irishman could be 
found willing to fire a shot or shed a drop blood in such an unholy war’.7 Galway Urban 
Council passed a resolution that showed their antipathy towards the ‘renegade Irish 
mercenaries’ of the British army.8 Cork Corporation, the Tipperary District Council, and the 
Limerick Branch of the United Irish Land League were other organisations that condemned 
the actions of the British government and voiced strong pro-Boer support.
9
 In opposition to 
the those remarks made by corporations, councils and committees, Reverend J. Fenelon 
believed, ‘Our local councils were not very competent to form an opinion about the South 
African War’.10  
 The level of pro-Boer and anti-British rhetoric instigated by Irish Nationalists 
notwithstanding, sections of Irish society responded with the dutiful obedience expected by 
the values of imperialism. From the available evidence, it appears that the war was popular 
amongst elements of Irish society and they reacted with open enthusiasm throughout 
significant moments in the conflict; such responses were characteristic of Irish patriotic 
support. For loyalists, the war presented an opportunity to reinforce the bonds with the United 
Kingdom, and demonstrate Ireland as resourceful and loyal to the demands of the Empire. 
For some Home Rulers, the war was considered an excellent opportunity to demonstrate 
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Ireland’s suitability for self-governance within the community of nations. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the political stance of Irish citizens during this period, the war personally 
affected tens of thousands of Irish families, as soldiers were quickly mobilised and 
despatched to the theatre of war, and the resultant loss of many of the primary bread winners 
had a detrimental effect on the livelihoods of families across the country.  
The main focus of this chapter is to illustrate how Ireland reacted positively to the 
demands of the British Empire and the South African War: a period that has failed to generate 
significant research and interest previously. Research to date on Ireland during this period, 
illustrates an island that was largely defiant towards their parent nation, with little or no 
reference of Irish participation in the conflict and the positive contribution instigated by the 
Irish public. This chapter attempts to record Ireland as an active member of the British 
Empire. As a result of the dearth of research available on this episode of Irish history, the 
interpretations of Irish loyalists and the significant contribution of elements of Irish society to 
the war have been undermined and/or largely forgotten. In order to discuss Ireland’s positive 
reaction and civilian interaction with the war, several elements must be discussed: firstly, the 
immediate reaction of Irish loyalists to the war highlighted in their response; secondly, the 
impact of the press, their stance on the war, and their publications of ‘letters from the front’, 
war verses and ballads; thirdly, the creation of Irish war charities and the active contribution 
and concern of Irish citizens for British soldiers and their families; the role of Irish nurses, 
doctors and the Irish Sisters of Mercy will also be discussed, as will the establishment of 
Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital; finally, the relationship between Ireland and the military, 
including the intimate effect it had on families epitomised in the committal of thirty two 
soldiers, that served in the South African War, into a psychiatric hospital in Dublin. The 
significance of public demonstrations of solidarity and citizens’ active participation in the 
war cannot be understated; their expressions of loyalty were projected across the United 
Kingdom and the British Empire, revealing the country’s resourcefulness and their qualities 
for the benefit of the union.   
It is intended, therefore, that this chapter will demonstrate an Ireland undeterred by 
Irish Nationalists and pro-Boers and characterised by an active expression of support for the 
imperial project from the Irish home front. The steadfast and unperturbed attitude that will be 
illustrated throughout this chapter was aptly summarised by an ‘Irish Imperialist’; the 
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individual maintained that Ireland’s position in the British Empire ‘was not compromised by 
a few cowardly scamps’ like John MacBride.11  
Loyalist reaction to the war 
On the eve of war, as the Transvaal crisis steadily grew worse, the Irish public were engaging 
with the latest developments from South Africa. Irish loyalists increasingly defended the 
political rights of the Uitlanders and damned the stance undertaken by ‘Irish Krugerites’,12 
while newspapers such as the Irish Times, remained staunch defenders of unionism and the 
British Empire, becoming the focal point of support for British policy in South Africa. 
Conversely, the majority of Irish Nationalists, and numerous councils and committees, 
sympathised with the Boer struggle against the suppressive aggression of the British Empire 
and the role the Uitlanders were playing in instigating a conflict. As political tensions became 
increasingly strained over the question of Uitlander citizenship in the Transvaal, the Irish 
Times editor lamented the ‘misfortune’ of dealing with ‘narrow-minded set of despots’, that 
refused to acknowledge their inability to ‘retain their supremacy’ in the Transvaal.13 To one 
observer, Boer hegemony would have a detrimental impact on the rights and political 
representations of ‘Irish Uitlanders’.14 It is unclear of the exact number of Irish settlers in 
South Africa prior to the conflict; however, Donal P. McCracken was able to establish that 
5,244 first-generation were living in the Cape and Natal, in 1891.
15
 With a substantial number 
of Irish immigrants and a significant nineteenth century tradition of Irish settlement in the 
region, it is understandable that the Irish press would take an interest in the affairs of the 
‘Irish Uitlanders’. If there was a refusal to accept the Uitlanders into Transvaal society and 
politics, the Transvaalers would, in the opinion of the Irish Times, ‘face the consequences’.16 
The question of Boer support in Ireland and the supremacy of Boers in the Transvaal was a 
matter of discussion for the Ennis Urban Council; certain individuals expressed confusion 
over the extent of sympathy for the Boers, believing that Kruger’s control in the Transvaal 
was ‘similar to the policy pursued by (Oliver) Cromwell’ during the 1700s in Ireland. In a 
similar sentiment, following the beginning of hostilities, the Irish Times writer, ‘Murty’, 
described to the readers, that the ‘alliance of Ireland and the Boers is the greatest disgrace 
Ireland has ever had’: 
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Does any man fit to be out of Richmond Asylum mean to tell me that Irishmen is as 
happy under Kruger as under Victoria? Would you rather find roof or altar in Ireland 
or the African Rand, where the government is carried on by leather whips in the hands 
of Boer bravos...It’s a barbarous state and place, and that any boy born in Munster 
could throw in his lot with such a band of swashin’ and rampagious (sic) rifle busters 
beats my comprehension. If it’s to be a question for us in Ireland of Briton or Boer, 
then we’re all bound to become John Bull-men right off!17 
Although there was confidence in their imperial might in defending the rights of British 
loyalists in South Africa, the Irish Times editor understood the gravity of the situation if war 
unfolded: ‘it will be serious, and we must be ready for a hard campaign’.18  
 On 11 October 1899, the two independent Boer republics - the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State - declared war on the British Empire. Following months of constant 
speculation and anticipation, the war unleashed an immediate public response, with national 
and provincial newspapers reacting with fervour and industrious interest. Pro-Boerism spread 
across the country denouncing British aggression, Irish involvement and the Uitlanders’ 
cause; in contrast, Irish loyalists were adamant in advocating the war effort, supporting Irish 
soldiers’ participation and lambasting the actions of pro-Boers.19 The Mayor of Waterford, 
Laurence C. Strange, wrote to the editor of the Irish Times, explaining that he refused to 
attend pro-Boer functions, as it would be seen as an expression of ‘hostility to thousands of 
my own fellow-countrymen’ serving in South Africa.20 As the war entered its first week, 
sections of the population began to demonstrate their support for the war effort: ‘war spirit’ 
was reported in Kingstown as the Kingstown Literary and Debating Society strongly 
condemned Boer policies;
21
 the secretary of the Newry District Loyal Orange Lodge sent a 
telegram to the British Government, expressing their confidence in their South African 
policy.
22
 In the north of Ireland, the war became a focus of loyalist patriotism amongst the 
Ulster Unionist population, with ‘virtually every Unionist newspaper in Ulster’ supporting 
the British government. Throughout the province, ‘Patriotic Days’, lectures, public meetings, 
and ‘War Funds’ were established ‘to maintain support for the war effort’.23 The war also 
‘invigorated the imperial aspect of Ulster Unionism’.24   
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As the public debated the legitimacy of the campaign, Irish reservists were being 
called up for mobilisation; on 12 October 1899, the reservists of the 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers 
departed Armagh to the cheers of an enthusiastic crowd.
25
 The following day, the Kildare 
Observer acclaimed the reservists of the Dublin Fusiliers ‘who were every inch the soldier’. 
The following contemporary account illustrates the excitement and interest that prevailed 
then as the public witnessed the departure of soldiers, casting aside their ‘old dudds’, for a 
new uniform, kit and rifle: 
An enormous and enthusiastic crowd followed the men to the railway station on 
Thursday, where some affecting scenes took place, as several reservists were natives 
of Naas. There were numerous handshakes from relatives and acquaintances, who 
wished them God speed and safety through the ordeal, and though the scene was at 
times pathetic, still the men showed the best of spirits. As the train proceeded on its 
journey a big cheer from the crowd, a return cheer from the soldiers, and shouts and 
cries from their relatives, who now completely broke down.
26
 
 
Since the beginning of the conflict, there was a growing schism in Irish society and as 
dissension became increasingly audible on the streets of Ireland, it became imperative for 
loyalists to stand their ground and demonstrate their unequivocal support for British foreign 
policy, the war effort and, perhaps most importantly, Ireland’s impressive military 
contribution. The concerns over pro-Boer fever in Ireland and the detrimental effect it might 
have on recruitment
27
 and performance in the military notwithstanding, Unionist M.P. for 
North Tyrone, D.J. Wilson, believed that Irish soldiers would uphold the honour of queen and 
country by ‘showing the quality of Irish pluck and patriotism’, which, in turn, would dispel 
the actions and opinions of pro-Boers in the country.
28
 In essence, much of the Irish public’s 
support for the war was a reaction to the hostile rhetoric and behaviour of pro-Boers. The 
bravery exhibited by Irish troops in South Africa, was considered by the Irish Times, essential 
in saving Ireland ‘from the dark reproach of a stupid play actin’ extravagance of 
Nationalism’.29 However, the fear that such actions and words would monopolise Irish 
society and opinion, and damage the reputation of Ireland, was unfounded as Irish loyalists 
began to react with enthusiasm. On 19 October 1899, Irish loyalists from Trinity College took 
to the streets of Dublin, in a public showing of solidarity for the war effort and as a reaction 
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to pro-Boerism in Dublin. Over one hundred students of the ‘Anti Boers of Trinity’, marched 
through the streets of the city centre, distributing posters and exclaiming ‘Wake up Trinity’, 
with the purpose of discouraging ‘the nightly exhibitions of pro Boer sentiment’, and 
vindicating the country’s honour, ‘for true patriotism and loyalty’.30 Fearing an outbreak of 
violence, the Royal Irish Constabulary formed a perimeter around the students as they sang 
God Save the Queen and cheered for the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. Upon 
reaching the main gate of the university, a large Union Jack was unfurled, generating a ‘loud 
applause’. As the students continued their loyalist demonstrations throughout the evening, 
incensed pro-Boers reacted by beginning a small scale riot; by 2300 hrs, the police made one 
arrest, several people had suffered minor injuries and numerous windows were smashed at 
the front of Trinity College.
31
 Irrespective of pro-Boerism, the war was infectious in Ireland, 
especially in the urban areas, with public expressions of union and solidarity with the United 
Kingdom. The degree of support was demonstrated further when reports emerged, in the 
press, of individuals expressing interest in forming a ‘loyal Irish volunteer corps’ for 
deployment in South Africa.
32
 Such gestures were indicative of the support witnessed in 
Ireland during this period. Although nothing came of the volunteer corps at this time, it was a 
notable statement of intent; to one potential recruit, it was a declaration to ‘England and the 
world at large that all her sons (in Ireland) are not rebels’.33 To another individual, it was the 
only opportunity at the time to ‘show our loyalty and devotion to the crown’.34 The rhetoric 
had similar tones to that which underpinned the formation of the first Irish units of the 
Imperial Yeomanry and despite each letter being written anonymously, it is conceivable that 
the writer was a composite of those individuals who had attested into the First Contingent. 
This initial reaction in Ireland to the war was testament to the resilience and determination 
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that would remain in the country during the winter of 1899-1900. Irish loyalists’ response to 
the war was helped by the heralded involvement of their battalions and generals, and was 
quite possibly a strong reaction to the belief of an existing anti-British sentiment that 
continually damaged the reputation of Ireland within the British Empire. As the British 
Empire demanded public solidarity and commitment during the turbulent early period of the 
war, elements of Irish society were found at the centre of the patriotic response.  
The Irish loyalists’ appearances of commonality continued unabated as the public 
were inundated with press releases of Britain’s strenuous efforts in South Africa, which were 
complemented with significant Irish battalion participation and their associated high casualty 
rates. Further evidence of interest in the war, and a possible reaction to ‘Black Week’, was 
observed on 18 December 1899 when a large crowd assembled around Trinity College to 
witness the university bestowing an honorary degree on Joseph Chamberlain. As expected, 
his presence was not welcomed by Irish Nationalists who believed that the Colonial Secretary 
was solely responsible for making ‘numberless orphans and widows throughout the land’;35 
he was christened ‘Judas Chamberlain’ by Galway Urban Council.36 The previous day, Irish 
pro-Boers had demonstrated against the arrival of Chamberlain by staging a series of protests; 
what occurred in Dublin, historian Donal McCracken noted, ‘was one of the most violent 
scenes Dublin had witnessed in a generation’ as pro-Boers clashed with the Dublin 
Metropolitan Police (D.M.P).
37
 Nevertheless, an enthusiastic crowd formed around the 
university to catch a glimpse of the man and in celebration, the crowd unfurled several Union 
Jacks, waved flags, and sang the National Anthem and other patriotic songs.
38
  
During this period, heated debates also ensued in House of Commons between Irish 
Nationalists and Unionist MP, Colonel Edward James Saunderson. On 17 October 1899, Irish 
Nationalists, William Redmond, T.M. Healy and Michael Davitt expressed their outrage at 
the war that sought to destroy Boer liberty, for ‘millionaires’ and ‘Majuba’. In contrast to the 
treasonable comments constructed by the Irish Nationalists, Colonel Saunderson for County 
Cavan, was a loyal defender of Irish unionism, and the most ardent and outspoken Irish 
Unionist in Parliament. Born in 1837, the colonel supported the government’s policy in South 
Africa, believing British hegemony was essential to the stability of the region. Although he 
regretted that the war was being fought against a brave, and ‘above all a Protestant people’,39 
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he was adamant that ‘we cannot afford to allow an independent Power hostile to us set up in 
the midst of our South African polices’.40 As the conflict entered its second week, 
Saunderson’s position remained unflappable, demanding political rights for Uitlanders, and 
heralding: ‘We are going to war because we are determined that Queen Victoria and not 
President Kruger shall be supreme...’ Similarly to other loyalists in Ireland, Colonel 
Saunderson attempted to understand and shame the treasonable stance taken by Irish 
Nationalists, who continued to forsake their oath of allegiance to Her Majesty in Parliament; 
he also chastised their approach of inciting Irish soldiers to munity and to murder their 
comrades.  
  Whilst the policies and character of the war were discussed and argued between 
opposite benches, Unionists took the opportunity to gain political capital from Nationalist 
dissension with regards the question of Home Rule; Colonel Saunderson believed ‘the 
attitude of Irish nationalist members on this question of the Transvaal war had given a death 
blow to Home Rule’. He continued: ‘If a whole lunatic asylum were summoned into 
conference as to how they would most injure Home Rule he did not know that they could 
take a more idiotic course than that which the Irish nationalists’ members have followed in 
the present crisis.’41 In some respects, Saunderson’s statement had merit; in the opinion of the 
Tories, the actions of the pro-Boers and Irish Nationalist M.P.s demonstrated that ‘the Irish 
were unfit to govern themselves.’ Indeed, the once strong alliance of Liberals and the Irish 
Parliamentary Party had evaporated due to their outrage at the extent of Nationalist attitudes 
and opinions with regards the conflict.
42
 Dr Rentoul, M.P. for East Down speaking at a 
constituency meeting on the war, believed ‘nothing could be better for the Unionists’ cause 
than the attitude of Irish nationalists’.43At a Unionist and Conservative meeting in Prescott, 
England, M.P. A. Stanley declared that ‘the war would be the death of Home Rule and those 
who were supposed to represent Ireland would realise that it would not be wise to hand over a 
country so near us to those who stood self-confessed traitors’.44 As expected, however, 
Nationalist response and opposition to the war remained rigorous even if offered Home 
Rule.
45
 Interestingly this remained a source of argument for many Unionist politicians, 
organisations, and commentators after the war; individuals such as Colonel Saunderson, the 
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Marquess of Londonderry, and Sir Edward Carson, continued to remind citizens of the role 
Irish Nationalists played during the South African War that supported and celebrated the 
Boer cause.
46
 For example, at the onset of the Great War, the Unionist Association of Ireland, 
circulated a propaganda article that encouraged members of the Irish public to resist Home 
Rule, whose leaders were illustrated as disloyal Britons and pro-Germans; the article 
reminded its reader, that as ‘England was in a death grip’ in South Africa, Irish Nationalists 
‘raised loud cheers for the Boers’.47   
It can be seen, therefore, that the first months of the war, brought an enthusiastic Irish 
reaction, with elements of the Irish public demonstrating unequivocal support for the war 
effort. With the added elements of Irish participation and significant contribution to the war, 
the Irish public would remain keenly interested in the developments of the conflict, revealing 
a positive engagement with imperial concerns. 
  
The Press and letters from the front 
Throughout the conflict, the Irish press was a key contribution to public understanding of the 
narrative of the conflict and the significant contribution of Irish soldiers to it. During the 
Victorian Age in the United Kingdom, the press and print was a major influence in the 
promotion of political and cultural ideas. The abolition of Stamp Duty in 1855 paved the way 
for cheaper and more accessible national newspapers; the introduction of the penny 
newspaper also encouraged a broadening of the readership. The accessibility of newspapers 
was supported by the Forster Education Act 1870 and the introduction of compulsory 
education in 1880, which helped increase literacy levels across Britain. In Ireland, the 
introduction of the National School Teachers Act 1875 and the Irish Education Act 1892, 
guaranteed free primary education and limited compulsory attendance for children, which led 
to greatly improved literacy; the increase in literacy in turn led to further and wider public 
interest and debate in Britain’s military campaigns. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
close relationship that existed between Britain and Ireland was illustrated through the intense 
interest the Irish press took in imperial matters; from the question of Home Rule to the wars 
of imperial expansion, debate was instigated through the medium of national and provincial 
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newspapers. As a result of war correspondents, war photography, cinema,
48
 and the Irish 
military and civilian involvement across the British Empire, it is no surprise that, in the words 
of Donal Lowry, the Irish public were in ‘little doubt about the prominence of imperial 
concerns in Irish life.’49 Moreover, in the opinion of Edward M. Spiers, constant reports that 
exemplified ‘courage and carnage of battle’ in parts across the Empire, ‘provided a vicarious 
outlet for those trapped in the drab monotony of office and factory life.’50  
At the outbreak of war, the loyalist response in Ireland was vividly portrayed 
throughout the Unionist press; unsurprisingly, the Unionist press were staunch advocates for 
the Empire, relishing the departure and contribution of Irish battalions, and dismissing the 
Irish Nationalists’ and pro-Boers’ stance on the war.51 The Irish Times was the most 
expressive in their Unionist and pro-war sentiment and this was reflected through their 
appreciation of the services of Irish soldiers and the promotion of several activities, including 
war charities and the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry. The pro-British press undoubtedly 
provided an image of the war that reflected the Victorian press at this time, with a constant 
stream of information provided by special war correspondents, with editors encouraging 
imperialism, volunteering, and, in certain cases, providing a romantic stance on military 
participation. The editors of such newspapers also used their own columns to condemn the 
attitude of Irish Nationalists, suggesting that their ‘misplaced sympathy’ and severe remarks 
made upon the British government’s character damaged Ireland’s opportunity for self-
governance. Whilst voicing compassion for the Irish soldiers at the front, the Kildare 
Observer stated: ‘Do you imagine that by wishing success to their enemies and defeat for 
their troops you can gain the good will or secure the votes of the English people? ... Every 
one of these resolutions will be used against you in the next election’.52 In a similar 
sentiment, the Dublin Daily Express stated that there ‘is nothing whatever to prevent an Irish 
Home Ruler from being also a loyal subject of the Empire’ yet the country ‘is woefully 
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misrepresented by the men who exult in the prospect of disaster for British arms and appeal 
to Irish soldiers to murder their comrades in action.’53  
News from the front was carried across many newspapers in Ireland, with active 
reporting and engagement within the main headlines. The newspapers published battle 
accounts from war correspondents and published letters from participants, whilst editors and 
members of the public discussed and engaged with different military issues of the war. 
Similar to publications throughout Great Britain, Irish newspapers received and printed 
almost instant official despatches from the War Office, along with the latest war telegrams, 
movements of troops and engagements. Moreover, the newspapers also included a local 
dimension to the war, publishing reports of Irish public and political attitudes to the conflict. 
The press provided an image across the board of Irish support, which included: the thousands 
celebrating the departure of troops; the resilience of Irish citizens upon hearing the news of 
‘Black Week’ before hundreds hurried to the recruitment depots; the jubilant scenes which 
were witnessed across the country following the relief of Ladysmith and Mafeking, the return 
of General White to Ireland, and the cessation of hostilities. Although press interest waned 
following the capture of Pretoria in June 1900, couched in the belief that the war was nearing 
a successful conclusion, the Irish public were still made aware of the cost of warfare with 
newspapers continuously printing full list of casualties, including frequently a listing of their 
local areas and their bereaved families.  
The South African War was the largest muster of Irish troops since the Crimean War 
and thus it prompted interest from scale alone; this was further encouraged by the 
newspapers’ publishing of the soldiers’ letters. The circulation of hundreds of uncensored 
letters from Irish soldiers and civilians in South Africa, provided an opportunity to add a 
further dimension to war reporting, to increase local interest in the war, and overall, to sell 
more newspapers. The soldiers’ letters were, as historian Thomas Pakenham stated, ‘the first 
dramatic test of the new mass literacy ... by the working class’.54 In The Bookman, a reviewer 
noted that the private correspondence of the soldier was ‘a triumphant achievement of the war 
... and think of our army of a quarter of a million, each one almost to a man a war 
correspondent, unfettered by censorious editors and subscribers!’ The reviewer was satisfied 
by the soldiers’ standard ‘of literary facility ... who scarcely have been more than bright 
students in elementary school’; however, the estimation that 250,000 soldiers had decent 
literacy standards was an exaggeration, as Edward Spiers stated that sixty per cent of the 
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army during this period was ‘either illiterate or were barely literate’.55 Nevertheless, The 
Bookman reviewer’s assessment of the soldiers’ correspondence with their family and friends 
is worthy of note and provides an interesting interpretation of the new phenomenon: 
This class, so costive and reticent, or so limited and conventional, in verbal 
descriptions, has found a more eloquent voice in the pen. The facility is probably due 
to the reprobated cheap literature ... Some evidently take pains and pleasure in 
analysing their thought and presenting them it with genuine if unchastened art ... you 
will sometimes be struck by one of the rarest, most priceless touches-the groan or 
laughter of the inmost soul ... with infinite, with impossible labour, a supreme novelist 
might sift this vast published correspondence to build up some typical soldier-
characters ... These ‘letters from the front’ will long be treasured in cottage 
archives...
56
  
The letters, which were submitted to newspapers by family and friends, helped to sustain a 
personal interest in the war, with Edward Spiers stating that the content of the letters 
‘conveyed images that the official despatches could never capture.’57 In the majority of cases, 
the soldiers’ names were printed, their battalion, regiment or brigade was declared, as well as 
their family and location; such detail revealed the close connections that existed between the 
local community in Ireland and the military. With regards the content of the letters, Thomas 
Pakenham stated that correspondences sent home concealed the ‘horrors, the blasphemies, the 
filthiness’;58 however, Edward Spiers noted that, in general, letters were ‘largely descriptive’ 
revealing ‘the immense difficulties presented by a well-armed and mobile adversary ... 
capable of mounting strategic offensives, conducting sieges, fighting formidable defensive 
positions and engaging in guerrilla warfare.’59 As seen throughout this thesis, the letters were 
expressive and extensive in their content, detailing the harrowing conditions of warfare where 
such correspondences provided: comprehensive descriptions of battles; revealed detailed 
accounts of death and injuries of comrades; personal accounts of soldiers exploring their faith 
in times of distress and suffering; uncensored criticism of senior officers and tactics; the 
prolonged strain of siege warfare; the monotony and difficulties of service; reactions to pro-
Boerism in Ireland; and extensive accounts of their opinion of the enemy. Such content, 
published, arguably fed public interest in the war and generated sympathy for the British 
army and their families, particularly where, in some cases, newspapers highlighted certain 
aspects of the letters to reinforce their overall stance on the war.  
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Debatably, Irish readers’ opinions on the war and the Boer people may have been 
influenced by continued reported accounts of Boer ‘outrages’ against the civilian population 
and the British army; a common theme amongst the vast publication of letters, was Irish 
soldiers expressing their disgust and bewilderment at the extent of pro-Boer support in 
Ireland, notwithstanding, the distasteful actions of Boers on Catholics and their comrades in 
arms. In December 1900, an Irish soldier J. Kelly wrote home: 
Just a few lines from an Irishman who is at present in South Africa serving his Queen 
and country. Now, I say it is time such men (pro-Boers) ... should be banished from 
our land ... Ireland is sorely infested at the present time, trying their best to upset the 
minds of the people against old England. I hope and trust that all Irish who have got 
the interest of their country at heart...the Boers, are nothing but mere savages, the 
cowardly lot.
60
  
The public were frequently subjected to accounts of Boers destroying convents and churches, 
and engaging in ‘uncivilised’ actions on the battlefield. For example, Patrick Carroll of the 
Inniskilling Fusiliers felt that the accounts ‘of British atrocities and Boer humanity published 
in the papers was mistaken’ and that it was too much for him ‘to stand idly by.’ His response 
was to describe the destruction of a convent, in which Irish Sisters of Mercy resided, by Boer 
forces. He was adamant that he would bring back to Bailieborough ‘old Kruger’s whiskers on 
the point of my bayonet.’61 Equally, the destruction of Catholic property in South Africa by 
Boer forces was noted in a Christmas letter from Maritzburg to a local parish priest in Dublin: 
‘I would not own that I was Irish, so disgusted I am ... Their sympathy should be with their 
poor Irish nuns who have been ruined by their friend, that wicked old man Kruger.’62  
 Other accounts emerged in Irish correspondences of disgraceful Boer actions on the 
battlefield. During the early months of the war, war correspondents detailed Boers hoisting a 
white flag with the intention of luring British soldiers into a false sense of security; as the 
British forces emerged from a protected position of cover, the Boer would open fire on the 
men at close range, before withdrawing. This and other similar running narratives and their 
associated validity, was often supported by letters from Irish soldiers, which reinforced these 
apparent acts of cowardice and dishonour. For example, a soldier stationed at Ladysmith, 
remembered one occasion, where the Boers threw down their weapons and begged for 
‘mercy’; as the British approached in the open, many of the Boer reacted quickly and opened 
fire into the advancing soldiers: ‘I myself saw a Boer do this’ recalled an Ulsterman, ‘but the 
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old ruffian missed, and before he could fire again, he had a foot of steel through his ribs’.63 
Such actions were affirmed by a Nenagh man, Corporal Berty Hennessey, of the Gordon 
Highlanders: ‘He (the Boer) pretended he was wounded at the battle of Modder River, and 
when the officer went to give him aid he shot the officer dead. He was taken prisoner, tried 
for treachery and cowardice and shot by the troops in de Aar.’64 A private of the Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers also expressed that such acts of continued treachery altered the rules of the 
conflict from a ‘civilised’ to a ‘savage’ war.65 Private Francis Brunt, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 
claimed the Boers ‘do things a savage would not do’.66 Their reports were echoed by a Naas 
survivor at Colenso who reported, that several Boers cut the fingers off dead British soldiers 
‘to get their rings’.67 Although the accounts were largely anecdotal, eyewitness reports were 
arguably significant in creating and sustaining an opposition in Ireland to the Boers. In the 
opinion of historian Bill Nasson, the idea of ‘enemy criminality’ played an important role in 
propaganda, presenting an evident distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ warfare.68 As 
a result, with evident disdain towards the Boers for their actions on the battlefield and across 
the operational theatre, it arguably encouraged sympathy and support for Irish soldiers and 
the war effort in general, and provided further examples of the need for British hegemony in 
the region.  
 
War poems and ballads 
A further example of Irish interest in the conflict was the publication of war poems and 
ballads in both Unionist and Nationalist newspapers. Across Britain and Ireland the 
involvement of their respective troops led to an upsurge in songs which acted as a means 
through which the individual might relate to the war, patriotism, jingoism and imperialism.
69
 
British music from the 1850s began to include lyrics that referenced great military victories, 
international relations, territorial expansion, civilising and racial superiority.
70
 An increase in 
the standard of education, the growth of socialism and feminism, philanthropy, and the 
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Cardwell Reforms, all produced a new public attitude towards soldiering and war,
71
 and these 
changes on the British mainland, travelled to Ireland, with examples of Irish citizens 
engaging in British politics, foreign policy and their wars of expansion. This shift in attitude 
is reflected in the growth of military ballads, such as the White Ballad Collection in Trinity 
College, Dublin, which contains around fifty Crimean War ballads. They are an excellent 
example of Irish public interest in war, during that period.
72
  
During the war, ballads began to appear in newspapers, as further evidence of the 
influence the war was having on the public’s imagination. Rudyard Kipling’s The Absent 
Minded Beggar, is perhaps the best example of the power a ballad could possess and its 
impact on the British public, highlighting their sense of nationalism and jingoism at the onset 
of the war. The ballad helped to raise more than £250,000 for wounded soldiers in the 
conflict, whilst also creating a strong association between citizens and the military.
73
 Deeds 
of heroism and sacrifice were expected by the civilian population and the abundance of songs 
and verses published throughout the war helped create that environment. Many Irish were 
uninhibited in demonstrating their support across the country, declaring ‘that our talent for 
raisin’ a few bars of home-manufactured song on passin’ events hasn’t grown rusty’.74  
The examples below demonstrate further expressions of the interest that sections of 
the Irish public had for the war in South Africa and the contribution of their battalions. The 
Irish pro-British verse was centred mainly on the Irish regiments fighting in the war and 
mainly in the Natal area.
75
 An impressive quantity of music ballads and verses were 
published in several provincial and national newspapers, as well as a number recorded in 
contemporary books. The Kildare Observer, the main county newspaper in the vicinity of the 
Curragh Army Camp, published several ballads throughout the first months of intense 
engagement involving Irish troops. The ballad ‘Dublin Fusiliers, or the Irish Millenium’(sic) 
combined some of the usual elements of Irish ballads at this time, with the running theme of 
Irish bravery and loyalty; it also shows an awareness of the main political, geographically and 
wartime issues that were present during the time of publication: 
Come all ye loyal Irishmen and listen to my lay, 
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About the glory Erin’s sons has won in Africay, 
The Boers is bet-Owld Cronje’s tuk-with four Thousand musketeers, 
And it’s all down to the daring pluck of the Dublin Fusiliers 
 
For five long months we fought the foe, on Kopje,Drift, and Veldt, 
Our ranks tore up with shot and shell, but still no doubt we felt. 
We faced them deadly trench’s fill’t-with Krugers’s Mountaineers, 
‘Till more nor half iv the boys were kilt, in the Dublin Fusiliers76 
Another example published in the newspaper, lauded the participation of Irish battalions, and 
commends their courage and tenacity. In the following piece, the writer remarks on the Irish 
at the battle of Talana Hill: 
Soldiers of Ireland afar in Natal: 
Only they knew that the guns were before them, 
Only they knew there was honour to gain- 
Charged on the foe for the island that bore them. 
Routed and chased him o’er mountain and plain77 
 
Several ballads also appeared in the press commemorating the bravery and fortitude of the 
Bugler Dunne at Colenso.
78
 Below is the ballad ‘Up saddle and trek’, demonstrating that the 
‘bowld sojer boy is still the favourite of our Irish girls...opposed to the mere talkers who stay 
at home and denounce the war and glorify the Boers’.79 ‘Up saddle and trek’ illustrates an 
element of respect and admiration from the author, for their fighting soldiers in the South 
African War, whilst also demonstrating local knowledge of areas around South Africa and of 
individuals of significance during the war: 
 
  Faith, I’m down in the deepest dejection 
For she loves Sergent Doyle and his crutch; 
Sure the scoundrel has won her affection 
And taught her to speak double Dutch. 
She talks about Cronje and Botha 
And tells me she’ll commander Doyle 
To turr’n my flank-well, in thrath a 
Man’s blood at such language must boil 
 
She knows all the Drifts on the Modder, 
And the Drifts of Tugela as well; 
But if I hark back to the Dodder 
The “drift” of my talk she can’t tell. 
Of Buller she spakes with great pleasure, 
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And Spion Kop melts her to tears, 
And she pours out her love without measure 
On Doyle of the ould Fusiliers 
 
Interestingly, there were several examples of Irish soldiers writing ballads throughout the 
war; for example, the ballad ‘The Dublin Fusiliers’ was written by a soldier of the regiment 
during the siege of Ladysmith, which detailed a particular battlefield experience of the 
regiment: 
When the Boers are on the ridges, and 
The Bullets flying thick; 
And you hear the dying groaning, 
Till it almost makes you sick; 
When the battle rages fiercest,  
When the foe first disappears, 
Faith you’ll hear the general saying, 
There’s thim Dublin Fusiliers80 
 
Less than a month into the conflict, the Irish Times published a poem from a soldier in an 
Irish regiment; the work, entitled From a Dublin Fusilier’s point of view, demonstrated that 
the Irish soldier was clearly familiar with Irish pro-Boer sentiment during the early period of 
the war. It evokes much of what has been illustrated already in this thesis of soldiers writing 
home displaying anger and bewilderment at the level of support being expressed towards the 
Boer republics: 
It hurts us, I can tell you, when we’re marching to the fray, 
To think our friends at home rejoice if we should lose the day 
No, its not the Irish people, for I’m sure each man enjoys 
The readin’ in the papers bout the gallant Dublin boys... 
 
And then there’s not much glory, nor no chance of a V.C. 
In diggin’ spuds for eighteen-pence from 6 a.m. to tea. 
There’s one thing that I am thinkin’, and it’s just as clear as chalk. 
Our charge did more for Ireland than a hundred years of talk
81
 
Moreover, there was a sentimental theme that resonated in several of the verses published, 
illustrating the personal impact the war had on Irish families, who had relatives serving at the 
front. The following piece, A mother’s prayer, published days before the turn of the century, 
was a gentle reminder of Irish sacrifice during the first months of the war, whilst providing an 
insight into the lives of thousands of Irish families across the island, that were intimately 
affected by the conflict: 
                                                          
80
 Kildare Observer, 26 May 1900. 
81
 Irish Times, 13 Nov. 1899. 
 170 
 
His chair is standing empty 
(That’s his portrait on the wall); 
And we do not hear him whistle, 
Hear his footsteps in the hall; 
When his well-loved name is spoken, 
Voices falter-lips grow pale, 
For our eldest is on duty 
At the front in the Transvaal; 
Oh angel, guardian angel, 
I can only watch and pray, 
But I pray thee spread thy white wings 
Round my son on Christmas Day
82
 
 
Overall, it is clear that the pro-British press was a powerful imperialist tool during the 
Victorian era helping to maintain an interest in the war and in the affairs of Irish serving 
troops. The press was further complemented by contemporary histories and music ballads 
that helped to galvanise public awareness. As regards the content of the music ballads and 
verses, this revealed that certain individuals were reacting to particular incidents and 
engagements that were at the forefront of press attention; it also indicated that Irish civilians 
had knowledge of individual personalities, the environment, and the politics, and that they 
were interested in the welfare of British troops. 
 
Irish war charities 
A significant section of Irish society remained undeterred by Irish pro-Boers and soon their 
words of support and defiance translated into action. The most prominent measures in the 
general public were the organisation of relief funds for the families and soldiers affected by 
the conflict and the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry. Due to the sheer number of soldiers 
participating in the war and the high level of casualties, dozens of charities emerged across 
the United Kingdom and the Empire, offering relief and financial assistance. In Ireland, 
several war charities materialised that provided respite for Irish widows and orphans, as well 
as funding equipment for Imperial Yeomanry volunteers, clothes and basic goods for Irish 
soldiers on tour, and subscriptions for hospital beds and medical supplies. The charities were 
publically subscribed, with monies raised through various methods, including, newspapers, 
and concerts, sporting events, auctions, church and school collections and raffles. The most 
prominent charities that emerged in Ireland during the conflict were, Irish Regiments Widows 
and Orphans Fund, the Mafeking Relief Fund, the Transvaal Relief Fund, The Shamrock 
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League, Irish Imperial Yeomanry Hospital Fund, Transvaal Relief Fund, the South of Ireland 
Relief Fund and Lady Roberts’ Irish Branch of the Soldiers and Sailors Family Association. 
It is difficult to attain the exact number of charities and subscriptions collected; however, the 
table below illustrates the minimum funds that were donated in Ireland: 
Table H) List of Irish war charities and money subscribed
83
 
Charity Subscribed 
Irish Regiments Widows and Orphans Fund £14,564 
Lady Roberts’ Irish Branch of the soldiers and families 
association  £32,693 
Transvaal Relief Fund £1,127 
Mafeking Relief Fund £121 
Imperial Yeomanry Fund £640 
Imperial Yeomanry Hospital Fund £2,135 
The Shamrock League £350 
The South of Ireland Relief Fund £1,500 
Belfast Christmas gift to the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles £411 
Transvaal Relief Fund (Belfast Subscription) £1,584 
British Soldiers' Widows and Orphans Fund (Belfast 
Subscription) £10,107 
Total £65, 232 
 
Irish Regiments Widows and Orphans Fund 
On 24 October 1899, the Irish Regiments Widows and Orphans Fund re-opened in union with 
the Irish Times. Since 1 January of that year, it was reported that over £11,000 was in the 
fund, which had been previously subscribed to by the public.
84
 The charity was administrated 
by several individuals, including Lord Frederick Roberts VC., Horace Curzon Plunkett M.P. 
for south Dublin and vice-president of the Agriculture Department for Ireland, Viscount 
Duncannon, Sir John Alexander Arnott and Sir Frederick Falkiner, a distinguished individual 
in Irish society, and committed member of the Church of Ireland.
85
 As an example of the 
close relationship between the press, society and the military, there was an immediate 
reaction and desire to relieve the suffering of families affected by the deaths inflicted on the 
2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers at the battle of Talana. The overall 
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objective of the charity, in the words of  Sir John Arnott, was ‘to relieve the immediate wants 
of the bereaved, and in so doing to manifest itself the gratitude which inspires the Irish people 
for such loyal and splendid services...’ One individual from Dawson Street, Dublin, 
expressed admiration for the charity, as it conveyed a true symbol of Irish feeling, ‘instead of 
the mischievous misrepresentations’ by certain members of Irish society.86 Two days after the 
re-launch of the charity, over £600 had been raised, in which the editor of the Irish Times 
stated it was ‘proof that our Irish people in the truest way sympathise with the men who are 
fighting the battles of the country on the Transvaal borders.’87 By 2 November, the fund had 
reached a handsome sum of £3,262. 15s. 7d.  
Fortunately, evidence exists that reveals the motivations behind many of the 
subscriptions. Attached to the figures donated, various individuals, from diverse sections of 
Irish society, recorded a short message; the Irish Times editor stated that this act provided a 
voice for the subscribers ‘to prove their loyalty and sympathy with brave Irishmen doing their 
duty to their SOVEREIGN (emphasis in original) and country.’88 The content of the short 
messages qualifies the popular support Irish regiments received in Ireland, where many 
subscribers expressed their gratitude at the magnitude of their soldiers’ bravery and sacrifice 
as illustrated in the press, and voiced collective sympathy and understanding for the families; 
in one example, Mr and Mrs Higgins from Ballinasloe donated £3. 2s. ‘to express their 
admiration of the characteristic bravery and loyalty to duty, to Queen, and country, of their 
valiant countrymen in the present war.’89 A woman who contributed £1. 1s., remarked that 
she was ‘proud to be Irish!’, upon hearing the acts of bravery of Irish soldiers dying ‘nobly 
for Queen and country.’90 Thomas Scully from Waterford donated one guinea to the fund, as 
he believed that the Irish character was represented by the ‘solid bravery of our fellows in 
Natal’, which would, ‘go a long way to dispel the shame’ exhibited by Irish Nationalists and 
pro-Boers.
91
 In similar tones, many subscribers used the opportunity to chastise pro-Boerism 
that distorted Ireland’s image; ‘A Limerick Workingman’, who donated 10s. to the charity, 
stated ‘If those men (Irish Nationalists) would only go out and join Kruger, poor old Ireland 
would have a riddance of her worst enemies, though posing as her best friend’; and, 
following a donation of 10s., another individual from County Limerick wrote: ‘Disgust at the 
utterances of our so-called Nationalist members may be forgotten in our pride at the gallant 
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conducts of our Irish soldiers at Glencoe (Talana).’92 Such sentiments and attitudes adopted 
by Irish loyalists did not go unnoticed by their peers in Britain; The Times of London lauded 
the positivity of the charity in the face of dissident Nationalism: ‘...the movement should 
serve as a useful object-lesson; for there can be no doubt that the bulk of the Irish people 
applaud the honourable and gallant conduct of their fellow-countrymen who are under arms, 
and will show their sympathy in a practical way.’93  
In Ireland, the charity was a testament of the sheer popularity and civilian interest in 
the war, and it reveals the impressive reputation of Irish battalions who were held in high 
regard. Moreover, the charity was not restricted to the subscriptions of a wealthy few, rather 
the success of the endeavour was guaranteed by the charity in filtering throughout Irish 
society. An analysis of the subscriptions shows the variety of the backgrounds of many of the 
individuals; the charity ranged from wealthy members of Irish society, to parish priests, 
bankers, medical personnel, solicitors, soldiers and veterans, teachers, servants, porters, and 
family and friends of the soldiers on service. The popularity of the charity is further 
illustrated by the dozens of local subscriptions collected across the country, through raffles, 
and street and parish collections: £10 6s. 7d. was raised throughout the parishes and district 
churches of Westport, County Mayo;
94
  at a Jewish Synagogue in Dublin, a total of £17 14s. 
6d. was raised in a collection, with subscriptions ranging from 1s. to £1.
95
  The philanthropy 
also appeared to have spread to the children of Ireland, with one individual stating his five 
children wished to donate the contents of their money boxes.
96
 
Contributions continued at a pace and by 9 December 1899, the sum had reached £10, 
285 12s. 7d.;
97
 the massive increase was partly due to several rugby matches held in order to 
raise funds, and also to the proceeds from the opening of Earlsfort Terrace Skating Rink.
98
 
There also appears to have been a reaction to events in South Africa that propelled increases 
in donations; one individual donated £5 upon hearing the ‘great disaster’ that befell the Irish 
Fusiliers at Nicholson’s Nek;99 a day after the battle of Colenso, £137. 6s. 9d. was donated, 
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an increase of £104 from the day previous
100
 – perhaps a reaction to the headlines: 
‘Connaught Rangers suffer severely.’101 
The administration of the charity is also of interest. In February 1900, there were 
thirty cases dealt with by the committee, with temporary relief varying between £10 and £24 
a year; it was deemed reasonable following the suggestion by the War Office, that 15s per 
week be donated per widow, plus an additional sum for each child on a permanent or semi-
permanent relief. Other Irish widows were supported by the Daily Telegraph Shilling Fund, 
in which £11,000 was donated to the bereaved.
102
 The month of July, saw a sharp increase 
from February, with the number of cases under the control of the committee rising to 110 
widows; forty one of these widows were to receive £15 a year, and the rest who were under 
temporary relief, on 15s. per week, with 2s. and 2d. per week to each child under fourteen. 
Four cases had been removed from the books, with one case removed for its ‘exceptionally 
unsatisfactory nature.’ In order to avoid confusion and overlapping, the committee stressed 
that a clergy man or responsible person should act as a guardian over the funding that the 
widow would receive. At the end of the year, the number of cases rose to 146, and three 
months later forty additional widows were added to the committee register.
103
 In the summer 
of 1901, the committee published the numbers of widows that were receiving financial relief 
from the charity, as well as the associated regiments: 
 
Table I) Number of widows supported by the Irish Regiments Widows and 
Orphans Fund (1901)
104
 
Regiments No. Of Widows 
5th Royal Irish Lancers 7 
6th Inniskilling Dragoons 12 
Royal Artillery Militia 2 
Irish Imperial Yeomanry 2 
The Royal Irish Regiment 30 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 41 
Royal Irish Rifles 30 
Royal Irish Fusiliers 21 
Connaught Rangers 20 
Leinster Regiment 13 
Royal Munster Fusiliers 16 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers 40 
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Kings Royal Irish Militia Battalion 1 
Total 235 
 
By the close of the year, the committee was supporting a further fourteen widows and 380 
orphans. The amount of money being paid out to the deprived per week was £74 10s., and an 
annual rate of £3,800.
105
 The public subscription reached a total of £14,564, as the 
administrators of the charity decided to continue to support widows and orphans until the end 
of 1903. In the final year, 308 widows and 472 orphans were receiving financial support; the 
number would have been significantly higher, but thirty widows remarried and twenty were 
suspended for misconduct. The final figures released by the charity for publication, are listed 
below: 
 
Table J) Number of widows supported by the Irish Regiments Widows and Orphans 
Fund (1901)
106
 
Regiments No. Of Widows 
13th Hussars 3 
Fifth Royal Irish Lancers 8 
Inniskilling Dragoons 16 
Royal Irish Regiment 34 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 48 
Royal Irish Rifles 46 
Royal Irish Fusiliers 25 
Connaught Rangers 23 
Leinster Regiment 22 
Royal Munster Fusiliers 22 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers 48 
8th Kings Royal Rifles 1 
9th Kings Royal Rifles 1 
6th Rifle Brigade 1 
9th Dragoon Guards 1 
Antrim Artillery 1 
Donegal Artillery 1 
46th Company Imperial Yeomanry 2 
54th Company Imperial Yeomanry 1 
61st Company Imperial Yeomanry 1 
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74th Company Imperial Yeomanry 1 
99th Company Imperial Yeomanry 1 
Irish Horse Imperial Yeomanry 1 
Total 308 
 
Charity also appeared in the form of equipment and clothing; the Kildare Hunt Club raised 
awareness of the need for clothes and gifts for soldiers in the Irish Hospital. Clothing became 
a necessity especially after reports began to arrive back from the front line of the extreme 
hardships faced by the Irish regiments. Continued requests and letters began to surface in the 
Irish Times, seeking charitable support for their soldiers. The most sought after gifts were 
knitted socks, flannel shirts, balaclavas, Tom O’ Shanters, pipes and money.107 It was noted 
in the paper that ‘we are anxiously following the course of their fortunes ... and that we are 
desirous in every way to manifest our sympathy and our good wishes towards them. It is the 
special obligation of Ireland to show this, and it will not fail in its duty.’108 While there was a 
demand for essential items such as, cardigans, pyjamas, cholera belts, and shoes, soldiers 
often requested ‘luxury’ gifts, including, tobacco, briar pipes, sweets and games.109 Irish 
business and communities demonstrated an awareness of the condition of their local 
regiments in South Africa and sought to alleviate some of the stress and hardship; on one 
such occasion, the Quarter Master General of the War Office, Sir James Clarke, received with 
thanks fifty cases of butter from Butter Merchants, County Cork, for the local regiment the 
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
110
  
Moreover, Irish charities did not limit themselves to assisting soldiers and their 
families, as their philanthropy extended to aid the relief of Transvaal refugees and the citizens 
of Mafeking affected by the siege. Following the outbreak of war, the Lord Mayor of 
London, Alfred Newton, established the Mansion House Fund, which was intended to bring 
financial relief to thousands of Uitlanders displaced by the war. The Irish Times voiced 
sympathy with the displacement of loyalists in South Africa and expressed concern over the 
daily reports of outrages being enacted on men, women and children by Boer forces; the 
editor of the newspaper believed that Ireland had ‘true sympathies with the refugees.’111 The 
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Irish Times began to receive charitable donations to the Transvaal Relief Fund: ‘rarely has a 
fund been started in this country that so well deserves the sympathy and support of every 
loyal subject of the Queen’, commented one subscriber.112 Captain R. Staveley hoped that 
Ireland would not fail in supporting the Uitlanders, as he would judge the failure of helping 
the refugees, as a ‘national disgrace’; again, for other subscribers it was an opportunity to 
undermine the rhetoric and policies exhibited by Irish pro-Boers.
113
 
In addition to supporting and sympathising with the displaced Uitlanders, in May 
1900, a fund was established to ‘provide help for the distressed and weakened inhabitants’ of 
the town of Mafeking, following the siege.
114
 Following an appeal by Lady Georgina Curzon, 
£121 82s. 9d. was donated by the people of Ireland; Lady Georgina Curzon, wrote to the Irish 
Times, ‘to express her warmest thanks for this magnificent contribution ... and we both agreed 
that it is exceedingly difficult to find fitting terms in which to express our gratitude for the 
generosity exhibited by the Irish people.’115 The total amount of money collected across the 
United Kingdom and throughout the empire was, £29,267; Daily Mail war correspondent and 
aunt of Winston Churchill, Lady Sarah Wilson, who was stationed in Mafeking throughout 
the siege, recorded how the money was divided amongst the population of Mafeking: widows 
and orphans, refugees, town relief, seaside fund, churches, convents and schools, wounded 
men, small tradesmen, hospital staff, nuns and Colonel Plumer’s Rhodesian Column.116 As 
regards the fund, the money donated appears relatively small in comparison to other 
incentives created during this period; nevertheless, the interest and sympathy expressed in 
Ireland may have been generated after the Irish Times gave accounts of Irish nursing staff and 
doctors, several Irish nuns from the Sisters of Mercy, and ‘four-fifths of officers of the 
Protectorate Regiment ... from the old corner (Ireland)’ that were stationed in Mafeking.117 
There appeared to be one charity that emerged in Ireland that was associated with 
Irish Nationalists and pro-Boers – The Irish Transvaal Ambulance Fund. Over a month into 
the conflict, the committee received £60 with £2 donated by Nationalist M.P. John Dillon.
118
 
To one observer, the relatively low subscriptions collected in comparison to other war 
charities, was an example of the shortcomings and hypocrisy of Irish Nationalists: 
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It has covered the country with its green proclamations; public bodies and public men 
have competed with each other in passing and supporting resolutions overflowing 
with ardent sympathy for the Boers, and with hatred to the Imperial Power. Yet the 
total so far reached by the fund intended to give practical effect to all this sympathy 
amounts to only a little over £60. Three millions of nationalists inhabiting some of the 
richest parts of Ireland and numbering among them many persons of great wealth, 
cannot after all this fuss and talk put together more than £60 ... Could there be clearer 
proof of the utter unreality of the disloyal sentiment which has been so flaunted 
throughout the country...
119
 
Overall, the charities and their subscribers, illustrated an acute awareness of the reality of war 
for the soldiers in South Africa, with an understanding of the detrimental impact it had on 
families; they also demonstrated the importance of the press in raising support and prompting 
public responsiveness, to the demands of the war. Historian Donal P. McCracken noted that 
the vast amount of money that was raised in Ireland ‘reflected not so much large numbers of 
subscriptions as the generosity and wealth of individual subscribers.’120 Whilst it is true to 
say that the charities received generous donations from wealthy individuals, these offerings 
did not monopolise the lengthy list of subscriptions. Regardless of the money donated, each 
charity revealed that the war filtered through Irish society from the landed gentry and military 
caste, to the middle class, and to a lesser extent, the working classes. As seen throughout the 
various issues of the Irish Times, wealthy individuals, businesses and institutions subscribed 
to the different war charities; for example:  Sir John Arnott and Lady Arnott donated thirty 
guineas to the Irish Regiments Widows and Orphans Fund, whilst the Irish Times gave one 
hundred guineas.
121
 However, an example of how the war transcended throughout Irish 
society, is reflected below by a letter to the newspaper’s editor; regardless of politics, class 
and religion, the South of Ireland Relief Fund, exemplified that there was strong support in 
Cork, ‘to the cause of the British Empire and its brave soldiers’:  
The South of Ireland relief fund ... now amounts to 1,500 ... the sum has been freely 
subscribed by Protestant and Roman Catholics, by the poor and the rich, the landed 
gentry, the professional, the mercantile, and even by the working class, many of the 
latter placing pence and halfpence in a box fixed in the street ... I hope your readers 
will also give us credit for the fact that even in what is called ‘rebel Cork’ there is 
widespread a feeling in quite another direction.
122
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Contained within the public subscriptions printed in the Irish Times, it is evident that 
significant elements of the Irish middle class donated money to the various charities – nurses, 
engineers, veteran lower ranked officers, manufactures and drapers appear occasionally. In 
addition, it is evident that the charities reached the wider public on a personal level, with 
modest collections received from Catholic and Protestant churches, and Jewish Synagogues. 
However, in some cases, it is difficult to qualify the class of each individual, as in many 
cases, a name appears with no occupation. Yet, it can be argued, considering that the majority 
of the charitable donations were a few pounds, to as low as a few shillings, the individuals 
that subscribed to the charities, were of a middle or upper class; whilst the donations of pence 
reveal a contribution from the lower classes. Although there is no information contained 
within the newspapers of the religious denominations of each subscriber, it can be argued that 
the substantial numbers of small donations were sourced from the Protestant working-class in 
Dublin. According to the 1901 Census, there were 96,124 Protestants in the County of 
Dublin,
123
 with some 10,000 men of the Protestant working-class.
124
 It is clear that the 
Protestant working-class in Dublin were unified and strong in their approach to politics and 
religion. Being natural conservatives and unionists, the Protestant working-class maintained 
an evident distrust of Catholic authority in the country and grew increasingly concerned 
about the possibility of Home Rule.
125
  Due to the active role of the Protestant working-class 
in Dublin society throughout this period, it can be envisaged that they contributed a moderate 
amount of money towards Irish war charities during the South African War. 
Importantly for this research, it challenges preconceived ideas that Ireland was simply 
an island of defiance and it reveals that the war had a level of popularity in Ireland, which 
was reflected in an active and supportive response to the conflict, the level of which might be 
expected from the culture of imperialism. During this period, the public response to the Irish 
war charities was a clear indication of Irish loyalty to the British Empire; Unionist M.P. for 
Saint Stephen’s Green, Dublin, J.H.M. Campbell, celebrated: ‘it is not merely in the front that 
Irish men have vindicated their loyalty and devotion to Queen and country’; he continued in 
detail:
126
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Even at home we find, if you judge it by any standard capable of recognition, that the 
assumption of hon. Members opposite that they represent the feelings of the majority 
of the Irish race is contradicted. Test it by the subscriptions to the various funds for 
the relief of the suffering and the wounded; test it by the number of those who have 
volunteered for service at the front, and by the number of those who are being 
recruited. What has Ireland done in the interests of the Boers? I know that a 
subscription list was started for the assistance of the people of the Transvaal. I have in 
my hands a record of the magnificent total which has been obtained after six months 
efforts, and it amounts to 300. That, so far as I can make out, is the only active sign on 
the part of any Irishmen of sympathy with the Boers in this war. 
 
Such acts of kindness had a profound effect upon the morale of the troops serving in South 
Africa; upon receiving 1,000 lbs of tobacco from the people of Cork, Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. 
Evans, 1
st
 Royal Munster Fusiliers, described the appreciation felt by his men: 
...they are all very much pleased indeed to learn that our people at home, have not 
forgotten about us, and are taking such an interest ... The fact that our country is doing 
so much for us, helps us very much indeed to increase and strengthen the esprit de 
corp of the regiment, and as a great incentive to a soldier to bear all the hardships of a 
campaign cheerfully, and to do all he can, when opportunity offers, to add to the 
glories of his county.
127
  
Fig. 51: The Countess of Limerick’s Shamrock League 
 
Source available on the website of Limerick City Museum 
http://museum.limerick.ie/index.php/Detail/Object/Show/object_id/41867  (9 Dec. 2013)  
 
A successful war rests on the morale of a soldier, as it improves their combat effectiveness 
and unit solidarity. As seen from the letter above, the impact of support from home had a 
galvanising effect on their soldiers, thus demonstrating the importance of support from the 
home front to the war effort. As it was abundantly evident that Irish soldiers understood the 
level of pro-Boerism in Ireland, the level of generosity of support for soldiers and their 
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families may have proved a welcome relief from the dissident voices in Ireland and their own 
struggles in South Africa. In addition, the success of these charities is demonstrated by the 
example it set for other organisations during the Great War. Following the outbreak of war in 
1914, the chairman and treasurer of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families’ Association, 
Irishman Sir James Gildea, noted that the aforementioned charity would be organised and 
financed ‘in the same way as we did in the South African War’.128    
 
Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital and nursing staff 
The involvement and contribution of the Irish War Hospital was particularly significant and 
their participation is one of the few studies that highlight an Irish involvement in the South 
African War; Anthony Kinsella has written an extensive article on the formation and 
experience of the hospital during the war, so it is not the intention of this chapter to examine 
the subject in detail.
129
 Rather this section will highlight the Irish War Hospital as an active 
measure of civilian support and a further dimension of participation in the war. The creation 
of the Irish Hospital was commended across the United Kingdom and Ireland; in February 
1900, the Irish Times writer ‘Murty’ applauded its formation and its creator, Lord Iveagh: 
While every Irishman worthy of his name has a taste of the fightin’ spirit in him, ‘tis 
an odd, and not an unpleasin’ thing to notice that while we kill our enemies, there’s no 
country in world is successfully devoted to the art of healin’. If we can kill we can 
also cure. And so, while the Irish brogue may be heard all along the front fightin’ line 
in South Africa, blessin’ the Boers accordin’ to the Articles of War, there will be an 
Irish hospital-financed by an Irish nobleman, Lord Iveagh, who has a genius for doin’ 
the right thing at the right time.
130
 
  
A month previously, it was reported by the Irish Times that philanthropist, Edward Cecil 
Guinness, 1
st
 Lord Iveagh, of the Guinness brewery, intended to support the health and 
welfare of troops by establishing the Irish War Hospital in South Africa. The hospital, which 
would be financially supported by Lord Iveagh, received a positive reaction from Irish 
loyalists; Lord Iveagh’s response to the war effort was in the words of the Irish Times, an 
example of ‘practical patriotism.’131 The Irish Times reported that Lord Iveagh equipped the 
Irish base hospital with the ‘kindliness of heart equalled only by his patriotism, having spared 
no expense to equip it with the very best appliances of all descriptions’; the hospital consisted 
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of one hundred beds, the latest and extremely important, Roentgen Ray and various medical 
supplies including, anti toxins for the treatment and prevention of enteric fever, diphtheria, 
smallpox, blood poisoning and snake bites. In addition, Lord Iveagh purchased fifteen 
wagons, two water carts, two forage carts, ten marquees for hospital wards, and twenty bell 
tents for hospital staff accommodation; moreover, pyjamas, socks and handkerchiefs were 
provided for the patients, as well as champagne and brandy, which acted as ‘stimulants.’132  
The privately funded hospital was certainly an Irish enterprise; the auxiliary staff 
consisted of some fifty men employed as ward masters, stewards, clerks, compounders, 
washer men, cooks, and bearers, who were all employed by the Guinness Brewery.
133
 As the 
Guinness Brewery hired the vast amount of its workers from the Protestant community, it is 
interesting to note a distinct Protestant reaction and interaction with the war effort.  The 
Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) allowed the selection of fifteen members of the police force 
to proceed to South Africa, attached to the war hospital, acting as hospital orderlies. The men 
were sergeants, acting sergeants and constables, who were also members of St John’s 
Ambulance Association; once their tour of duty finished, they were able to return to the 
R.I.C.
134
 To provide the best care for the troops, the hospital also had an impressive array of 
doctors and dressers, under the overall charge of the surgeon in chief, Sir William Thompson. 
Sir William Thompson had a wealth of experience in the medical profession, being senior 
surgeon at the Richmond Hospital at Brunswick Street, Dublin, and past president of the 
Royal College of Surgeons, Dublin.
135
 Importantly, the role of hospital director was entrusted 
to Dublin native, Dr George Stoker of Hertford Street Hospital, London; George Stoker had 
valuable medical experiences in three military campaigns: the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) 
as a Surgeon of the Imperial Ottoman Army, being present at the sieges of Plevna and 
Erzeroum; the Turco-Servian War (1878) as Chef de l’Ambulance du Croix Rouge; and the 
Anglo-Zulu War (1879).
136
 Sir William Thompson and Dr Stoker found support from Dr 
Alfred Friel and Dr James Coleman; Dr Friel, a student of Trinity College, Dublin, was 
considered a ‘distinguished medical scholar’, and before enlistment, he was a surgeon in 
Waterford City Infirmary – he was tasked with the management of the Roentgen Ray. Dr 
Coleman, a visiting physician to several hospitals, including the National Hospital for 
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Consumptives, was selected due to his expertise in the treatment of enteric fever. The medical 
support staff consisted of six dressers; four from the Richmond Hospital in Dublin; one from 
Sir Patrick Dun’s Hospital, Dublin; and, one from the Royal Hospital, Belfast.137  
The war hospital also enrolled the help of Captain John Deane, who would be chief 
officer of transport, and Captain W. Mould, R.A.M.C., who had previous experience in the 
military operations in Sierra Leone (1898-99), and would act as liaison officer with the 
British armed forces. Colonel Nixon went to South Africa representing Lord Iveagh; Captain 
the Right Honourable Rupert Guinness, the son and heir of Edward Guinness was also 
attached to the hospital staff. 
On 2 February 1900, Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital departed from Dublin and 
hundreds of civilians gathered along the streets of the city to see off the hospital corps. The 
Irish Times reported the march en route to S.S. Violet: 
Their march, indeed, was quite a triumphal progress, and was one of most enthusiastic 
demonstrations of loyalty seen in Dublin for very many years ... The crowd, growing 
larger and larger every moment, hemmed in the khaki-clothed contingent, until in a 
short time they were completely lost sight of in the vast cheering throng by which 
they were surrounded ... The windows of many of the houses were crowded, and hats 
and handkerchiefs were waved with vigour ... Some of the members of the crowd, 
carried Union Jacks, the waving of which served to increase the demonstrations of 
enthusiasm en route.
138
  
 
Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital remained in South Africa for under a year, having spent 
much of their time in Bloemfontein and Pretoria; their contribution to the war effort was 
acknowledged and appreciated by an officer who visited the hospital, delighted by the work 
rate of ‘seventy-seven’ Irish nationals: 
They are soldiers as true and brave as any that ever wore uniform ... and there is not a 
soldier in the entire British force that will not give three cheers for the wearers of the 
shamrock and one more cheer for Lord Iveagh and the Irish Hospital.
139
 
 
Throughout the war, it is estimated that around one thousand nurses served in South 
Africa,
140
 many of whom were Irish. Attached to the Irish War hospital were Sisters Denton, 
Smyth, McGonigal, Richardson, Walker and Miss Annie McDonnell. Miss McDonnell, a 
native from Derry, was Lady Superintendent to Dublin House of Industry School, and a 
founding member of the first Governing Authority of the Dublin Metropolitan Technical 
                                                          
137
 ‘The Irish Hospital’ in British Medical Journal, i (1900), p. 93. 
138
 Irish Times, 3 Feb. 1900. 
139
 Ibid., 6 June 1900. 
140
 M.S. Stone, ‘The Victorian army: health, hospitals and social conditions as encountered by British troops 
during the South African War, 1899-1902’ (Ph.D., thesis, University of London, 1992), p. 299. 
 184 
 
School for Nurses. Her services were considered ‘invaluable’ by Dr Coleman,141 and 
following her contribution to the hospital she was awarded the Royal Red Cross.
142
 In July 
1900, seven nurses from Ireland boarded a ship from Southampton en route to South Africa 
to join the staff at Imperial Yeomanry Hospital at Pretoria.
143
 The Illustrated London News 
noted that four nurses from the City of Dublin Nursing Institute enrolled into the Army 
Nursing Service Reserve (A.N.S.R.) in 1899; from Count Westmeath, Nurse Mary Talbot had 
eight years previous service in Cork Infirmary and City of Dublin Hospital; she received the 
decoration of Serving Sister of Hospital of St John of Jerusalem for her service during the 
typhus epidemic on the island of Inniskea in 1895. Nurse Sarah J. Callwell, who had also 
received the same decoration, trained as a probationer in the City of Dublin Hospital and 
sought further experience in various other hospitals in Ireland for four years; Nurse Mary 
Anna Davis had a wealth of experience in many institutions across Ireland, including Cork 
Street Fever Hospital, Dublin, the Roscrea Infirmary, Charlemont Street Hospital and the 
City of Dublin Hospital; and finally Nurse Rosa Lawless who had six years experience 
serving in Castlebar Fever Hospital, Lisburn Fever Hospital and Mespil Hospital.
144
 Of the 
sisters of the Nursing Institute nurse Ellen O’Neill failed to be mentioned; however, the nurse 
attached to the A.N.S.R. died from pleurisy, contracted at the Imperial Yeomanry Camp 
Hospital in Pretoria.
145
 Other army nurses that travelled out to South Africa were Miss Potter 
from Sandycove, Dublin,
146and nurse Kate Evelyn Luard who was attached to Queen’s 
Alexander Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve.
147
  
Considering Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital, and Irish nurses’ contribution to the 
war in South Africa, it is interesting to note that their participation was entirely voluntary, 
similar to the Imperial Yeomanry. These examples provide a further dimension to Irish 
involvement in this war and the role that the Irish landed gentry played, revealing the levels 
of active support that existed during this period. Moreover, they illustrate the opportunities 
that Irish citizens were presented with to be an integral part of the metropolitan core of the 
Empire. It is unclear why these Irish citizens decided to travel to South Africa and to risk 
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their lives in a dangerous environment; perhaps, the individuals sought adventure and 
excitement, away from the boredom and monotony of service in Ireland; it is conceivable, 
given the reaction and formation of the Imperial Yeomanry, that Irish citizens were 
responding to the war’s difficulties in a patriotic fashion – the Irish public were undoubtedly 
inundated by an abundance of press accounts that revealed the hardship of the campaign. 
Their willingness and responsiveness may have been a result of economic motivation, 
however this is considered unlikely as a decisive component, as from evidence each 
individual had stability in the R.I.C., the Guinness Brewery and in the medical profession. 
Arguably it was patriotism and interest in the war that may have been most influential in men 
and women attesting into the British army medical services and the Irish War Hospital.      
Fig. 52: Major-General Gosset inspecting Lord Iveagh's Field Hospital staff at Dublin 
before departure to South Africa 
     
 
Source, The Illustrated London News, 10 Feb. 1900. 
Fig. 53: A group of Irish nurses for South Africa – Nurse Mary Talbot, Nurse Sarah J. 
Callwell, Nurse Mary Anna Davis and Nurse Rosa Lawless. 
 
Source, The Illustrated London News, 13 Jan. 1900. 
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Irish Sisters of Mercy at Mafeking (13 October 1899 – 17 May 1900) 
An interesting contribution by Irish citizens can be seen through the work of the Irish Sisters 
of Mercy, members of a Roman Catholic religious order, stationed at Mafeking, prior to the 
conflict. Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a steady flow of Irish immigration to 
South Africa in a bid to establish a new life on the African continent. The Irish immigrants 
included administrators, politicians, and former soldiers of the British army, miners, farmers 
and many from Catholic and Protestant religious orders. Following the British acquisition of 
the Cape at the turn of the nineteenth century, thousands of citizens from the British Isles 
settled in South Africa. In a bid to ‘anglicise’ the region, the British government continued to 
fund schemes to increase the number of immigrants into the country; from 1820, Irish 
emigrants continued to avail of this scheme, which helped establish Irish communities, 
amongst the English-speaking population. The numbers of Irish were further enhanced by ex-
British soldiers who had served in Southern Africa that decided to remain in the country.
148
 
From the 1840s, Irish immigration continued for a chance to escape the destitute conditions 
of the Irish famine, and by the close of the century, Irish emigrants were enticed by diamond 
mining and the gold rush.
149
  
 In response to the growth of immigrant Catholics in Southern Africa, Irish 
missionaries travelled to the continent to serve the European communities and help 
evangelise the region; Saint Peter’s College in Wexford became the ‘first nursery of Irish 
missionaries to the Cape’,150 with Saint Patrick’s College, Maynooth, also providing 
missionaries throughout the world. The largest institution in Ireland that trained priests for 
service in colonial missions was the College of All Hallows in Drumcondra, Dublin.
151
 
During the last quarter of nineteenth century, there was a marked expansion of Catholics in 
South Africa, due to an influx of Irish and European immigrants. As a result, missions like 
the Marist Brothers, the Irish Dominican Sisters, the Brothers of Christian Schools, and the 
Order of the Holy Cross helped provide education to the settlers and preach the Christian 
faith in areas across the Cape Colony and eastern South Africa. Furthermore, following a 
request from Bishop Anthony Gaughren, Vicar Apostolic in Kimberley, Cape Colony, the 
Sisters of Mercy of Strabane, County Tyrone, Ireland, were asked to establish a convent in 
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Mafeking, in 1897. The following year, the Sisters of Mercy found a convent in the town, and 
thus, the founding sisters were closely involved in the siege of Mafeking. 
Fig. 54: The founding sisters of the Mafeking convent 
 
Source, http://www.sistersofmercy.ie/south_africa/ (2 July 2014) 
There is a dearth in contemporary sources on the involvement of the sisters during the 
conflict, but it is evident that they played an important role in providing medical assistance to 
the inhabitants of the besieged town. Following the declaration of war, efforts were made to 
extract all women and children from Mafeking, by train, to an area of relative safety; 
however, it is understood that ‘many brave women’, including nuns and nursing staff, 
decided to remain in the town.
152
 As war began, Saint Joseph’s Convent, which had just been 
built five months previously, was transformed into an auxiliary hospital, from where it treated 
some of the sick and wounded during the 217-day siege. Within the hospital, eight Irish nuns 
of the Sisters of Mercy tended to the wounded, under the guidance of Mother-Superior Teresa 
(Jane Cowley) from Dunshaughlin, County Meath;
153
 in addition to nursing, a Dublin man 
present during the siege noted that the sisters also made haversacks and powder bags.
154
 Their 
contribution and experience was recorded by an Irish sister, named Mother Mary Stanislaus; 
the account below was written in her diary in January 1900, expressing the harsh reality of 
siege warfare: 
                                                          
152
 W.F. Aitken, Baden-Powell: the hero of Mafeking (London, 1900), p. 108. 
153
 Sheila Lunney, ‘Cowley, Jane (Sister Mary Teresa)’ in Dictionary of Irish Biography (Cambridge, 2009) 
online (ed.), http://dib.cambridge.org.jproxy.nuim.ie (4 Oct., 2013) and Julian Orford, ‘Carry on, Doctors’ in 
Military History Journal, ii (1970), np. Online version.  http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol023jo.html  (5 Oct. 
2013). 
154
 Irish Times, 23 June 1900 
 188 
 
As coffins could not be procured, the dead are sewn up in shrouds. Here all of us who 
could be spared from the wards helped, praying the while ... Nothing would have 
convinced me that I could become so familiar with death ... One poor young fellow, 
who looked not more than twenty, asked me to tell his mother that he died fighting 
bravely.
155
 
Following the relief of the town, Inspector J.H.W. Ascough of the British South African 
Police, wrote to The Times, expressing his ‘thanks and gratitude to the rev-mother superior 
and sisters of mercy’: 
It is impossible, Sir, to say too much for these beloved women, who notwithstanding 
having their home shelled over them, were constantly under fire from Boer ‘snipers,’ 
whose trenches were in line with the convent ... I may mention also that their convent 
is in a fearfully risky state, owing to having over 11 shells, including ‘Long Tomes’ 
(96-pounders) in it.
156
 
In November 1900, several members of the Sister of Mercy received an audience with Queen 
Victoria; less than a year later on 1 October 1901, Mother Mary Teresa received the 
decoration of the Royal Red Cross from King Edward VII, for acknowledgment of her 
services during the South African War.
157
 In 1946, aged ninety-four, Mother Mary 
Magdalene died having remained in Mafeking following the war; the Irish Times 
remembered the Tipperary native, for providing ‘invaluable assistance, regardless of danger’, 
throughout the siege.
158
 Moreover, it is of interest to note that following the death of Mother 
Mary Stanislaus in 1939, the Ulster Herald stated that the ‘nursing services of the sisters 
during the Boer War received worldwide recognition.’159 The presence of the Irish Sisters of 
Mercy in South Africa was not substantial, with limited interaction with the conflict; 
nevertheless, the information provided above demonstrated a further perspective and 
connection between Irish citizens and the South African War. Considering Irish participation 
and interaction as a whole, it reveals that Irish citizens served in a wide range of different 
capacities during the war, whether through the British military, the nursing and medical 
service, or as an active contributor to the imperial process, supporting the spiritual needs of 
settler communities and the native people in British controlled regions, and providing 
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‘important ideological support for imperial expansion’.160 Due to the extensive capabilities of 
Irish immigrants, historian, Hilary M. Carey, considered the Irish ‘practical imperialists’.161 
 
Fig. 55: Irish Sisters of Mercy who nursed the wounded at Mafeking received by the 
Queen 
 
Source, Police Illustrated News, 24 Nov. 1900. 
 
Richmond Lunatic Asylum, Grangegorman, Dublin 
At the close of the nineteenth century, the British soldier was witness to the advent of modern 
warfare. Due to intense battle situations, the adverse weather conditions, poor sanitation and 
rations, diseases, and the war’s longevity, soldiers were under a prolonged period of strain; 
arguably, this in turn placed several individuals under constant psychological pressure, and it 
made it difficult if not impossible for them to remain motivated and relatively content in the 
military. For some, the new environment was detrimental to the mental health of a soldier and 
individuals took their own lives. According to the data recorded in the Casualties List, held at 
The National Archives in Kew, two soldiers attached to Irish battalions committed suicide, 
whilst three others died from self-inflicted wounds.
162
 Although the figures do appear low 
and insignificant, it acknowledges the presence of mental instability amongst serving soldiers 
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of the British army. For some soldiers and veterans of the conflict, their experience had some 
profound impact that ultimately led to their committal in psychiatric institutions.  
Between 1900 and 1907, a minimum of fifty-four soldiers were committed to the 
Richmond Lunatic Asylum, Grangegorman, Dublin, with at least thirty-two of the men 
veterans of the South African War. Unfortunately, a comprehensive and extensive 
exploration of psychiatric treatment of soldiers following their campaign is a digression from 
the main theme of the thesis. Nevertheless, it was still an aspect of Irish life during this 
period, impacted by the war in South Africa; Irish doctors, nurses and hospital staff 
contributed a modest yet significant assistance to Irish soldiers, on their return home from the 
front. It also reveals, in a minority of patient cases, that the War Office covered hospital 
expenses for several soldiers who still remained contracted to the British army and who were 
committed through a military warrant. These soldiers and veterans were committed into the 
Richmond Asylum, Ireland’s first public psychiatric institution, built in 1815, caring for the 
country’s population of mentally ill and mentally handicapped.163 The thirty-two soldiers 
were committed under various reasons, including, violence, dementia, paranoia, alcoholism 
(mania a porter), disorder action of the heart (DAH), attempted suicide, delusional insanity, 
acute mania, and melancholia; during the nineteenth century the most common reason for 
admittance was acute mania and melancholia.
164
 In Victorian Britain, neurasthenia (fatigue, 
debility, insomnia and ‘aches and pains’) ‘was the most popular diagnosis made’ in 
asylums.
165
 
Despite the relatively significant number of soldiers admitted into the Richmond, no 
detail exists throughout the vast number of case notes on each patient that relates their mental 
illness to their service in wartime. However, a brother of Private Owen Munster, Royal Irish 
Rifles, who was committed in 1902 for acute mania, believed the war had a significant 
impact on the soldier’s health: ‘I condemn that for it.’166 It is understandable that medical 
practitioners failed to notice any correlation between war and psychological trauma, as in 
1900, Edgar Jones states ‘the idea that soldiers could suffer psychological damage in action 
was barely acknowledged.’167 It is only in the last thirty years, that there has been a growing 
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appreciation of the psychological effects war can cause; this interest has been supported by 
the British Medical Journal, the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, King’s Centre for 
Military Health Research and the Academic Centre for Defence Mental Health in King’s 
College, London. 
Contained in the following paragraphs, are examples of the detrimental impact and 
psychological issues soldiers had to contend with on their unceremonious return to Ireland 
and the effect it had on their family. Following a medical assessment by the hospital’s 
medical practitioner, if it was decided that the person was suffering from a mental disorder or 
was socially deviant, the individual would be committed. During this period, British soldiers 
were committed either by the army, the civil authorities or by family and relatives. The 
various types of committal were stipulated in the following admission forms; if a soldier was 
considered ‘insane’ whilst serving in Ireland, the person would be committed in a District 
Lunatic Asylum through Army Form B 2058 under agreement with the War Office; if a 
soldier was considered a ‘dangerous lunatic’, the War Office and the Secretary of State had 
the authority to commit the individual set out in Army Form B 262; and finally, there was a 
separate form of admission for individuals who were considered a danger to themselves 
and/or others. This was called the ‘Form for Dangerous Lunatic or Dangerous Idiot’, which 
allowed the civil authorities, such as the police, and civilians to commit a person considered a 
risk to society - several veterans of the South African War were committed by relatives and 
the police authorities .  
As the majority of families celebrated the safe return of their loved ones, several 
households were drastically impacted. As seen in chapter one, Thomas McCarthy, 2
nd
 Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers, suffered a serious wound to the head during the battle of Colenso; the extent 
of his wounds concluded his service in the British Army. After his discharge, he worked at 
night for the Freeman’s Journal for several months. However this was short lived, after his 
father committed his son under the authority of the Dangerous Lunatic Act; the father 
reported to the hospital authorities, that Thomas threatened to murder him and had assaulted 
his own sister. Following concerns that his son might be released prematurely, the father 
wrote a letter to the hospital authorities detailing the reasons why his son should remain 
institutionalised: 
Before and after his becoming an inmate of the Asylum he has made direct threats 
against me personally, and his sister, whom he has actually assaulted both in the street 
and at my residence ... from my experience of the three months residences with me I 
have learned that I could not trust on his temper for half an hour. I may state that he 
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was insane the greater part of the time of the stay in South Africa after sustaining the 
wound in his head at Colenso...
168
 
 
In a similar case, a veteran of the British Army and of two years of service in South Africa, 
Michael Hogg from Drogheda, was committed into the asylum for assaulting his mother; 
during his service in the South African War, he stated that he ‘suffered a very great deal.’ The 
difficulties of the campaign were further compounded, arguably, by the actions of his wife; 
upon returning home from duty, he found ‘his home broken up and his furniture sold’. He 
was told by friends that his wife had committed adultery whilst he was away; in a letter to 
Michael Hogg, Colonel Fielding stated his wife was an ‘immoral character’. The soldier also 
had lost his daughter, who had been apparently smothered in bed by his wife; Hogg explained 
the situation to the doctors at the Richmond; he stated: ‘It’s enough to drive me daft, aint 
it.’169 
Certainly there was also the concern of stigma with a family member institutionalised; 
this occurred following the committal of Private Joseph Hoey, 2
nd
 Inniskilling Fusiliers, who 
had service in South Africa, India and Egypt. He was first admitted into Royal Victorian 
Hospital Netley, Southampton, suffering from apparent hallucinations, stating that, ‘he was 
put out of the officer mess because he caught one of the officers cheating at cards. Thinks the 
food is poisonous and that the other patients are going to kill him’; the soldier was also 
considered suicidal and had intemperance to drink. Committed into the Richmond Asylum, 
his mother, from Lower Baggot Street Dublin, sent a letter to the hospital: ‘would you kindly 
see that any letter to Mrs Hoey of 5 Adelaide Place is sent in a plain (non official) envelope 
as she does not want it to appear her son is in the asylum.’170 Private Hoey would later die in 
the hospital. 
 Notwithstanding the apparent difficulty of transition from military to civilian life, 
there were cases in which the family and friends attempted to support their loved ones. 
Following his service in South Africa, Isaac Byrne was a chronic alcoholic and suicidal, and 
thus was committed into the Richmond Asylum. His wife wrote to the hospital: 
I have taught(sic) about my husband coming out and have changed my mind. My life 
will always be miserable and I might as well spend it one way as the other. The Lord 
protect me ... hoping I am not troubling you to(sic) much to advise him not to take 
drink’.171 
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Private William O’Loughlin’s brother attempted to persuade the hospital to discharge his 
sibling:  
I make this application as to claim my brother (William O’ Loughlin), who had served 
in the Pondoland and the Boer Campaigns. He stated to me in his previous letters that 
he has been up for discharge on three alternative times ... I feel, Sir, quite willing to 
take him out, as he has a home with his brothers at Ballymore Eustace or his own 
farm at Valleymount, Blessington with his grand-mother and uncle. I hope, Sir, that 
you will favourably consider my application and recommend the discharge of my 
brother.
172
 
The war left a lasting psychological legacy on the soldiers committed into the Richmond 
Asylum and for some of the troops their service in South Africa had indeed had a detrimental 
impact on their mental health and stability. This can be seen through several recorded 
conversations with soldiers, perhaps showing symptoms of the ‘modern’ psychological 
disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (P.T.S.D.), where P.T.S.D., is defined as a 
‘traumatic memory, featuring nightmares, intrusive recollections and flashbacks’ leading to 
social avoidance.
173
 Private Creen, 5
th
 Liverpool Regiment, told the doctors that he was sent 
‘daft’ by his officers, trying to ‘poison’ him and ‘stone him to death’, while he could ‘hear 
voices from South Africa follow me all round the wall-they never leave me’.174 Similarly 
Private William O’ Loughlin, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, told doctors that he was 
continuously harassed in the army whilst stationed in South Africa; in one case he 
remembered troopers and officers attempted to suffocate him in bed. His difficult experiences 
remained with him on his return to Ireland, as he continued to fear prosecution from officers 
who would appear at night as ghosts; he recollected it was ‘hell-fire struggle to get rid of 
those voices sometimes.’ The soldier was admitted into the hospital suffering from auditory 
hallucinations, constantly hearing voices in French and Dutch.
175
  
 It is fitting to end this chapter on the case of Private Christopher Seagrave, 1
st
 Leinster 
Regiment, which reveals the lasting legacy and effect the war had on some soldiers. Aged 
twenty-four, Private Seagrave was committed in the Richmond Asylum, suffering from 
hallucinations of sight and hearing. The soldier had spent over three years in South Africa, in 
which he stated ‘he was out of his mind’, before managing to desert and find work on a ship 
home to Ireland. After three weeks, he handed himself into the police, and was subsequently 
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arrested and imprisoned; during his time in prison he continued to hear voices of a girl, and 
began to hit his head against the wall every night. When he was transferred to the Richmond 
his condition never recovered, believing he was king of India, and his wife was a princess. He 
remained at Grangegorman until 1921, when he was transferred to St Ita’s Hospital, Portrane 
north of Dublin. In February 1944, as the allies continued to organise the invasion of Western 
Europe, and as the major cities of Germany became under increasing pressure from bombing 
raids and the Russian encroachment from the east, Christopher Seagrave passed away. He 
died at the age of sixty-four, having spent forty years of his life institutionalised.
176
  
 The Richmond case studies reveal the extent to which the war filtered into the daily 
lives of some Irish citizens, and the lasting damage that service could have on the soldiers’ 
health. Moreover, the significance of the sources cannot be understated, for they demonstrate 
that prior to the Great War soldiers were psychologically impacted by war, with a significant 
number suffering from a wide range of mental health issues. The deterioration of mental 
health, arguably as a result of the soldiers’ experience in South Africa, foreshadowed the 
massive influx of patients suffering with psychologically issues during the Great War. In 
addition, it is important to highlight and where appropriate introduce the reader to the wealth 
of source material that is available for further research in psychiatric treatment and P.T.S.D., 
for soldiers of the Victorian army. The wealth of sources include Hospital Case Notes, which 
contain, in most cases, the religion, previous occupation, battalion/regiment, and some notes 
on the soldier’s military background; the notes also include detailed conversations with the 
soldiers, in an attempt to assess the mental stability of the individual. The importance of the 
archive is also highlighted with the invaluable photographs of the soldiers, which are selected 
here for the first time, in this thesis.
177
  
Concluding remarks 
To suggest that Ireland’s loyalist response to war was ‘fairly muted’,178 as McCracken stated, 
is misleading and wholly incorrect. From the evidence presented in this chapter, 
notwithstanding the projection of pro-Boerism in Ireland, it is clear that sections of Irish 
society were supportive of their troops and the British war effort. The war was an opportunity 
for Irish loyalists to demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism for the benefit of the union. The 
Irish loyalists’ continued resistance and their ability to hinder Irish Nationalists from 
damaging the international image of Ireland helped galvanise the union and created the Irish 
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soldier as a hero of the Empire. The popular impact of the war was immense, given the scale 
of military involvement and civilian engagement and interest. This can be seen throughout 
the frequent appearance of letters and reports published in Unionist newspapers, such as the 
Irish Times, with Irish citizens praising the involvement and bravery of the British soldiers, 
whilst detailing their distrust and anger at the extent of pro-Boerism in the country.  
As this chapter has illustrated, the press, as a source, was imperative to the research in 
understanding the loyalists’ motivation and measuring their interests in the war; the press 
revealed that significant elements of Irish society revelled in the bravery and fortitude of Irish 
troops, and the public illustrated their concern for the welfare of troops and sympathised with 
destitute widows and orphans affected by the conflict. Through the war charities that emerged 
in Ireland, a minimum of £65,232 was collected on the island; to place that figure in a 
modern context, it would amount to a substantial sum of over €5.35 million.179 In addition, 
this chapter has illustrated that Ireland actively supported the war effort, with the voluntary 
mobilisation of the Irish War Hospital and Irish nurses; such gestures of support were 
indicative of true patriotism that was conspicuous in this period. The presence of the Irish 
Sisters of Mercy during the siege of Mafeking demonstrated a further dimension to Irish 
interaction with the British Empire, where their efforts evangelised areas within the confines 
of British territory. 
Throughout the war, the Irish public continuously showed support: either by 
witnessing the departure of troops for the front line; holding pro-war meetings and rallies; 
and reacting, like most places across the British Empire, positively and audibly to the relief of 
the besieged towns and the cessation of the conflict.  With continued press interaction, the 
mobilisation of almost every Irish battalion, the militia and the Imperial Yeomanry, the war 
would undoubtedly affect the civilian population. The positive response was not entirely 
surprising for the period: firstly, because the reaction was socially acceptable and mainstream 
for this period and in all actuality Irish Nationalism and pro-Boer sentiment deviated from 
accepted social norms, linked to the rules and institutions of British society; secondly, 
because of the sheer volume of Irish soldiers serving in South Africa, that obviously would 
generate a natural interest in the conflict. On this subject, John Redmond stated ‘It is scarcely 
an exaggeration to say that there is scarcely a family in Ireland, from the poor people who 
live in Dublin slums to the highest in the land, that is not represented, in one shape or other, 
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upon one side or other at the front.’180 Indeed, Irish regular battalions, cavalry, militia and 
yeomanry units suffered in the region of 5,000 casualties, with the General Registrar of 
Ireland recording 1,800 Irishmen killed.
181
 Moreover, as revealed in this chapter, dozens of 
Irish families suffered the emotional stress of a loved one returning home with psychiatric 
problems. Ultimately this would be significant and relevance, as it foreshadowed the 
thousands of Irish soldiers committed with ‘shell shock’ and other mental difficulties 
following their service during the Great War.  
Undeniably Irish Nationalism and the pro-Boers faction was a strong movement, with 
clear political and cultural motivations, that received a strong mandate from the Irish public. 
However, this was just one reflection of life in Ireland. There were elements of Irish society – 
the landed gentry, the military caste, the unionist and loyalist’ communities, home rulers, 
Catholics and Protestants and Irish soldiers themselves – who formed a commonality behind 
the British Empire, supporting its success, which would ultimately have a benefit for the 
population in Ireland. Home rulers especially, and similarly during the Great War, envisaged 
their cooperation with the United Kingdom during the South African War, as a test to 
galvanise trust and to promote Ireland’s movement for devolution. Overall, notwithstanding 
the continued pressure from Irish Nationalists and pro-Boers, there was a failure in deterring 
Irish interest in the welfare of their troops and success for British arms. Ireland emerged as a 
distinctive member of the Empire, with their reputation greatly enhanced by the bravery of 
Irish troops and the population’s demonstrations of collective solidarity. Prior to the Great 
War, Ireland’s importance and emergence amongst the nations of the Empire is reflected by 
English novelist and poet George Meredith; in his poem, entitled, Ireland, he writes that 
Ireland is ‘No longer England’s broken arm’ and these words were indicative for John 
Redmond, who suggested Ireland is ‘one of the strongest bulwarks of the Empire’.182  
However, less than twenty years following the war in South Africa, the level of Irish 
participation and significance of support was ultimately overshadowed by the domestic 
turmoil in Ireland and the events in war-torn Europe. With a renewed focus on Ireland’s 
national identity, and an attempt made to distance the country from the British Empire, little 
or no interest was developed in the Great War, let alone the conflict in South Africa for many 
years. Nonetheless, the significance of public demonstrations of solidarity and citizens’ active 
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participation in the South African War cannot be understated; the expressions of loyalty were 
projected across the United Kingdom and the British Empire and revealed the importance of 
Ireland in empire building. Such scenes, witnessed during the turn of the century, 
foreshadowed the commitment and loyalty expressed by Irish loyalists in 1914.  
Fig. 56: The photograph shows the Lower House, a section of the Richmond Asylum, 
which has been abandoned over many years. It is believed that this structure has a 
preservation order, so it will be incorporated into the new Dublin Institute of 
Technology campus. The photograph was taken on the roof of nurses’ home, by this 
researcher, at St Brendan’s Psychiatric Hospital.  The nurses’ home has since been 
demolished. 
 
Source, Author’s collection. 
Fig. 57: This photograph is directed on the opposite side of the hospital grounds. The 
building on the left is a Roman Catholic Church built in 1849, and, on the right, stands 
unit ‘23’ which is understood to have been present at the turn of the twentieth century. 
 
Source, Author’s collection. 
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Chapter Five: Commemoration 
Fig. 58: Royal Dublin Fusiliers Memorial, St Stephen’s Green, Dublin. 
 
Source, Irish Times, 15 June 1907. 
On 16 November 1903, Reginald Brabazon, 12
th
 Earl of Meath, wrote to the editor of the 
Irish Times following the successful and celebrated homecoming of the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers: 
Many counties and cities throughout Great Britain and Ireland connected with 
regiments which have distinguished themselves in the late war erected memorials to 
the memory of the gallant dead, but as yet no memorial celebrates the noble deeds of 
the heroes of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers who died in South Africa for King and 
country.
1
  
 
Following the South African War, there was a desire amongst sections of the Irish 
community to celebrate the return of each Irish battalion and unit and to commemorate their 
participation. The widespread enthusiasm was instigated on 1 June 1902, when the Lord 
Mayor of Dublin, Timothy Harrington, received a telegram from the Secretary of State for 
War, St John Brodrick, declaring that Boer representatives in the presence of Lord Kitchener 
and Lord Milner had signed a document containing the terms of surrender. The previous day 
the war had officially ended with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging. The news was 
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welcomed with widespread elation across the United Kingdom and the British Empire.
2
 
Despite the heavy rain and deserted streets, newsboys heralded the news throughout Dublin 
city centre, as newspapers busied themselves preparing a special edition for that evening. At 
2200hrs students of Trinity College lit a bonfire at Botany Bay in the grounds of the 
university and on receiving the welcomed news of surrender, the Church of Ireland’s Saint 
George’s Church in Drumcondra, rang its bells for thirty-five minutes.3 Citizens of Dublin 
generously decorated Grafton Street, College Green, Nassau Street, Dame Street, South 
George’s Street, Kildare Street, Dawson Street and Sackville Street with bunting and flags in 
celebration of the news; Trinity College, the Bank of Ireland and the Custom House 
enveloped their buildings with large flags and decorations. Outside of the city, the public lit 
several bonfires in the predominantly Protestant areas of Clontarf, Sutton, Malahide, Howth, 
whilst the entire seafront of Kingstown was decorated in bunting.
4
 There were further 
celebrations in Newry, Omagh, Enniskillen, Limerick, Coleraine, Birr, Belfast, the Curragh 
Camp in Kildare and Kilkenny.
5
 In Kilkenny, as news broke of the cessation of armed 
conflict, loyalists hoisted several Union Jacks over Ormond Castle; a fireworks display and 
music was planned by the local militia, but pro-Boers counter demonstrated and the police 
had to intervene.
6
 Prayers were offered in churches and cathedrals across the country in 
thanksgiving for the restoration of peace in South Africa. The reaction was not unexpected 
given the interest that prevailed in Ireland throughout the war and the loyalists’ response to 
the war effort. On a side note, these celebrations were not an isolated feature in Ireland or in 
the United Kingdom during the conflict; as seen in chapter two, the Irish public reacted with 
public showings of support at the relief of Ladysmith and the return of General White. Three 
months later, there were further friendly celebrations in areas across Ireland, upon hearing the 
news of the fall of Pretoria (5 June 1900).
7
 However, similar to some scenes throughout 
Britain, the relief of Mafeking brought about some disorder in Ireland. In Belturbet, County 
Cavan, ‘jingo-orangeism’ was reported, as crowds burnt an effigy of Paul Kruger, whilst 
juveniles broke into the Petty Sessions Courts, hoisting a Union Jack out the front.
8
 
Moreover, in Belfast, further disturbances were reported, with several accounts emerging of 
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Catholic buildings and individuals being attacked by ‘Orange ruffianism.’9 Overall the 
celebrations were friendly demonstrations of support, showing an interest and awareness of 
the latest developments in the conflict.  
As the formal phase of the war ended, Irish civilian and press interest had waned as 
the British forces embarked on a protracted attritional war, which included containment and 
scorched-earth policy. Nevertheless, with the ratification of the Vereeniging Treaty, the Irish 
population welcomed home the return of the Irish battalions, with celebrations and events 
held in locations across the country. Between 1902 and 1903, Irish towns and cities across the 
island held homecoming celebrations for several returning battalions. On 26 May 1902, the 
local population of Birr, County Offaly, provided a warm welcome for the return of the 3
rd
 
Leinster Regiment; the chairman of the Birr Urban District Council, John Dooly, addressed 
the battalion noting their ‘excellent discipline, courage and manly endurance’, and remarking 
that ‘we simply voice the feelings and sentiments of our fellow citizens of Birr.’10 In 
February 1903, the 1
st
 Inniskilling Fusiliers dressed in their khaki uniform, were engulfed by 
members of the public as they marched through Derry by torchlight procession following a 
banquet held in their honour, attended by the Duke of Abercorn.
11
 One of the most celebrated 
events of 1903 was the arrival of the 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers into the city of Dublin; three 
years of press and civilian interest culminated towards an impressive welcome from the 
Dublin population. A banquet and medal ceremony was held at Central Hall, in the Royal 
Dublin Society’s buildings in BallsBridge at the behest of the 12th Earl of Meath, Hon. 
Colonel of the 5
th
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the earl stated that the battalion deserved a ‘proper 
welcome home after an absence of twenty years, and its brilliant services in South Africa ... at 
a terrible cost in officers and men.’12 Accompanied by the regimental bands of the 3rd, 4th and 
5
th
 Dublin Fusiliers, the soldiers dressed in their civilian clothes marched towards Central 
Hall, via Thomas Street, Cork Hill, Dame Street, Nassau Street, Merrion Square North, 
Lower Mount Street and Northumberland Road. The Central Hall was described by the Irish 
Times: ‘profusely decorated with palms and evergreens ... and the roof and gallery railings 
were handsomely draped with red, green and blue muslin, while the names of the various 
engagements in which the men were prominently displayed.’ During the ceremony the 
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Colonel-in-Chief of the battalion, the Duke of Connaught, commended the performances of 
the line regiment detailing their participation during the first months of the war:  
...you took a leading part in the Battle of Talana. You then went back to Ladysmith, 
and after falling back across the Tugela, you were attached to the army of Sir Redvers 
Buller, in the Irish Brigade under General Hart. During all those weary months on the 
Tugela, you took a leading part in every action that took place, and you distinguished 
yourselves so much at Pieter's Hill that when the relief force of Ladysmith marched 
in, the general officer commanding gave you the post of honour, and you led the 
troops that marched into Ladysmith. 
In addition, a letter written by the Earl of Meath was read out: 
The citizens of the Metropolitan county and City are proud of the men, who mindful 
of their origin, have known how to make the name of Dublin to be honoured in all 
lands. Both officers and men have done their duty to King and country, and we, their 
Irish brothers, accord them a hearty welcome on their return to the dear land of their 
birth. 
Eighteen officers and 523 soldiers of the rank and file received their South African War 
service medals from the Duke of Connaught, as thousands gathered along the streets of 
Grafton and St Stephen’s Green to see the soldiers – public enthusiasm reached great heights 
as the battalion colours came into view.
13
 The scenes typified the profound interest the Irish 
public had during the course of the conflict, its awareness of Ireland’s participation in the 
military and particularly, its pride in their performance. This attention and respect for their 
fellow-countrymen was demonstrated in a desire to commemorate the individuals who lost 
their lives in the conflict, notwithstanding the increasing spread of Nationalist agitation.  In 
order to get a sense of the scenes that were widely prevalent during a homecoming 
celebration, the rare photograph below depicts the return of the 61
st
 Dublin Company of the 
Imperial Yeomanry in June 1901, to the city of Dublin. The second photograph illustrates the 
return of the 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, as they marched through the city of Derry, 
surrounded by members of the public. Considering the large numbers present in these two 
photographs, it can be argued that the two images include interested and enthusiastic Irish 
loyalists from a cross section of the Protestant and Catholic community.  
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 C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War 
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Fig. 59: ‘Ireland’s capital does itself justice’ – the return to Dublin of the 61st Dublin 
Company, Imperial Yeomanry 
 
Source, Navy and Army Illustrated, 29 June 1901. 
 
Fig. 60: The city of Derry welcomes home the 1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
 
Source, Martin Cassidy, The Inniskilling diaries, 1899-1903; 1
st
 Battalion, 27
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
in South Africa (Barnsley, 2001), np. 
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Such an interest in celebrating Ireland’s contribution and sacrifice was understandable given 
the intense press and public attention that had been generated by Irish units’ active 
participation in some of the most celebrated battles and operations of the campaign. 
Furthermore, the importance of commemoration was supported by the close military tradition 
that existed between Ireland and the British Empire throughout the nineteenth century. 
Naturally, given the extent of Irish participation and the culture of commemoration that 
existed in the United Kingdom, dozens of war memorials were erected and unveiled across 
the island of Ireland. Throughout Ireland there are a minimum of fifty-four South African 
War memorials that are found mostly in Church of Ireland cathedrals and churches, 
cemeteries, parks and public spaces. This was not unusual, as throughout the Victorian era of 
imperial expansion memorials were becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the United 
Kingdom, celebrating and remembering the sacrifice of the British soldier. Indeed, as 
illustrated throughout this thesis, the Irish were lauded for their bravery, devotion and 
sacrifice for the Crown and so it was judged imperative by members of the press and public 
to commemorate their deeds. With the war being the largest muster of Irish troops to that date 
and due to the conflict’s longevity, the campaign resulted in unprecedented death rates, which 
were commemorated in to a significant number of public and private memorials. In order to 
place the number of South African War memorials in context, the table below illustrates the 
recorded minimum of war memorials found in Ireland, erected during the Victorian era:
14
  
Table K) The minimum number of Irish war memorials erected during the Victorian 
era 
 
Campaigns 1837-1902 
No. Of Victorian War 
Memorials 
South African War 54 
Crimean War 21 
India 21 
Afghanistan  6 
Egypt and Sudan  5 
Anglo - Zulu War 4 
Burma Campaigns 3 
First Anglo - Boer War 2 
New Zealand 2 
                                                          
14
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2013). Martin Staunton, ‘Boer War memorials in Ireland’, in SAIS, iii (1996) pp 290-304; Timothy Smyth, ‘The 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers’ Arch and imperial commemoration in early twentieth-century Ireland’, SAIS, iv (2012), 
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China 1 
East Africa 1 
Total 120 
 
The majority of the memorials listed are personal monuments that commemorate the memory 
of one particular individual that died, many of which are found on Church of Ireland grounds. 
Their personal memorials demonstrated the significance of religion and faith for the bereaved 
families and friends, who, in the vast majority of cases, had no body to mourn. Moreover, the 
erection of such monuments illustrated the importance of recognising an individual’s 
personal involvement and achievement within the British army and the relatives’ pride in 
their association with the soldier. While these personal plaques continued on throughout the 
twentieth century, there was a growing trend for regimental memorials to be erected in 
conjunction with the extension of the British Empire. The trend of popular imperialism was 
gathering significant pace during the 1870s, especially the period known as, ‘the scramble for 
Africa’. Successive British governments, encouraged by popular demand, sent regiments 
across the globe to ‘civilise’, further their control, and prestige, and increase their stakes in 
trade. As Africa was being painted red by the conquering British, wars were a regular 
occurrence and so too was the increased death toll. Due to public demand and necessity, 
larger memorials were placed in community spaces across the landscape to commemorate 
and remember the fallen. Collectively, however, these memorials were overshadowed by the 
construction of hundreds of monuments across Ireland in celebration and commemoration of 
the tens of thousands of Irish soldiers who died during the Great War, fighting for the British 
army – the most impressive and contentious war memorial dedicated to these soldiers is the 
Irish National War Memorial Gardens, in Islandbridge, Dublin.  
Interestingly, there is considerable literature on Ireland’s commemoration of the 
South African War. 
15
 It is one of the few areas of research on Ireland and the conflict that 
has generated interest amongst historians and scholars. This interest is reflected in the 
growing attention, knowledge and understanding of Ireland’s imperial background and 
moreover, the continued interest in the processes of commemoration in the country. The war 
memorials of the South African War reflected the sentiment of Irish loyalists during this 
period. Following years of press and civilian interest in the conflict, and the contribution of 
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Irish battalions, cavalry units and civilian volunteers, it is unsurprising that supporters and 
relatives of the deceased wished to commemorate and remember their sacrifice and also 
remind the public of their country’s important role within the British Empire. One of the 
series of reminders of Ireland’s contribution to British imperialism was the significant 
amount of war memorials scattered across the country’s landscape, revealing the personal and 
cultural connections with the Crown and Irish participation in empire-building. However, 
throughout the twentieth century many memorials were removed by the Irish government or 
destroyed by Nationalists for their unwelcomed link with the British Empire.
16
 Indeed, after 
the formation of the Irish Free State, and the disbandment of several Irish regiments (1922) 
the political and cultural landscape altered drastically.
17
 The Irish state began a process that 
attempted to dissociate Ireland’s cultural, military and political connections with the United 
Kingdom against the backdrop of the troublesome nature of remembrance in Irish history - 
most notably in connection with the Great War and the Irish Civil War. Throughout the 
twentieth century Ireland’s historiography has been a contentious issue of debate between 
academics, politicians and the public.
18
 Where other war memorials were removed, others 
have largely been forgotten, with the structure and its message blending into the architecture 
of the city. As a result, with little or no public interest in the war memorials of the South 
African War, the majority of memorials have remained relatively unscathed and largely 
unnoticed.  
This final chapter presents a study of the commemorative process in Ireland that 
followed the South African War and the rhetoric which underpinned the memorials, and 
helped to promote and validate their construction. The war memorial that will be discussed in 
detail is Fusiliers’ Arch, which revealed the interest that once existed in Ireland and which is 
still a focus of debate on Ireland’s imperial past. In addition, the chapter will reveal the 
impressive array of other public and private memorials that are dotted across Ireland that 
illustrate the close relationship that existed between Irish society and the military. 
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Royal Dublin Fusiliers’ Memorial Arch 
The total cost of the reception committee for the return of the Dublin Fusiliers was £219 14s. 
6d., a sum generously subscribed by the public. The committee had £29 4s 10d in surplus 
money,
19
 which was subsequently transferred into a new account that proposed the erection 
of a war memorial for the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.  On 16 November 1903, the Earl of Meath 
wrote a letter to the editor of the Irish Times under the title ‘Memorial to the Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers’; contained within were his reasons why Ireland should erect a lasting memorial to 
the arduous efforts and sacrifice of the Dublin Fusiliers: 
Of all the regiments in His Majesty’s service there is none which covered itself during 
those trying years of war with greater glory then the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.  
It is only right, therefore, that the citizens of Dublin and of the metropolitan Irish 
county should have an opportunity of showing their admiration for the soldering 
qualities displayed by their own regiment, and their desire to honour the memory of 
the brave men who sacrificed their lives at the call of duty.
20
 
 
A committee was formed that consisted of several Irish peers, including the earls of Howth, 
Drogheda, Pembroke, Longford, Lord Iveagh, Lord Talbot of Malahide and Lord Plunket; it 
also included many officers and veterans of the line and militia battalions of the Dublin 
Fusiliers, some of whom had seen service in the South African War.
21
 The request for a 
memorial is understandable given the nature of Irish participation, their significant 
contribution in the South African War and the evident success witnessed during the 2
nd
 
battalion’s homecoming. This bolstered the confidence for the organisers to build a lasting 
memorial in the city centre that commemorated the sacrifice of the regiment and celebrate 
Dublin’s close relationship with the regiment. Similarly to the creation of war charities and 
the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry, the landed gentry played an important role in the 
commemorative process following the conflict; the Earl of Meath, a zealous Unionist, 
imperialist, and philanthropist was instrumental in raising awareness for the erection of the 
memorial. He was an aristocratic Anglo-Irish landlord with an estate in Killruddery, Bray 
County Wicklow, who, in the words of Historian David H. Hume, devoted the last thirty 
years of his life, ‘to the ideals which he believed the British Empire should represent.’22 His 
clear passion and exuberance for the ideals of the Empire were illustrated through many of 
his books, which addressed the theme of duty, strength and strong principles. Admiral Lord 
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Charles Beresford recalled that the Earl of Meath showed ‘splendid and untiring effort in the 
cause of Empire’23 - his years of service culminated in the creation of ‘Empire Day.’24 The 
memorial was a representation of the importance of the Irish contribution to empire-building 
and it further exemplified Ireland’s strong military tradition, providing a suitable example to 
the youth of Ireland, of the ideals of devotion and duty. 
From 1904, the momentum to raise awareness and gather sufficient subscriptions for 
the monument gathered pace; the committee worked tirelessly organising raffles, concerts 
and sporting events across the country. The initial idea of a bronze statue was estimated to 
cost £3,000 which would be based solely on the generosity of the people of Dublin and 
surrounding counties. The Earl of Meath believed that all sections of society should 
contribute some money to pay for the monument; this in effect, he claimed, would: 
‘constitute greater honour to the dead than one erected by the gold of a few rich individuals.’ 
Moreover, this would be a positive reflection on the memorial, as the majority of the war 
dead they wished to memorialise were of the poorer working class.
25
 Similarly to the charity 
subscriptions detailed in the previous chapter, the newspapers printed the names of the 
individuals and businesses that donated money, which in turn prompted a greater public 
interaction and interest in the memorial. Interestingly, there was a belief within the committee 
that the proposed memorial would obtain the respect of Irish citizens, irrespective of their 
politics. Indeed, it was generally understood that the people of Dublin wished to 
commemorate the memory and sacrifice of the Dublin Fusiliers, who in the words of the Earl 
of Meath, ‘saved the Empire.’26 It was, however, a rather naive assumption by the memorial 
committee to believe that the entire city and county of Dublin would support the memorial’s 
construction; it might even be considered ignorant, or indeed arrogant, giving the magnitude 
of pro-Boer activity in Dublin throughout the war. Nevertheless, the committee were 
steadfast in galvanising support for the memorial’s construction, as a failure in its endeavour, 
would ‘constitute an eternal disgrace to Dublin’.27 Their efforts were further stimulated by the 
support of King Edward VII.
28
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Over the next two years, there were evident signs of progress. With funds successfully 
secured, the committee agreed to a design submitted by architect John Howard Pentland, the 
principal surveyor for the Board of Public Works; the assistant consultant was Sir Thomas 
Drew. In June 1906, the committee revealed that the memorial would be modelled on the 
Roman triumphal Arch of Titus; it was hoped that it would be a credit to the city and a 
‘fitting tribute to brave soldiers.’29 The Grafton Street entrance of St Stephen’s Green was 
chosen as an adequate location for the memorial. At a height of thirty-three feet, the arch 
would include the names of 212 officers and men of the line and militia battalions of the 
regiment, who lost their lives during the war. It would also include the regiment’s battle 
honours of the war: Talana, Colenso, Hartshill and Ladysmith, Laing’s Nek and the Tugela 
Height. Engraved into the front of the arch were Talana and Colenso, which included a Latin 
inscription: 
FORTISSIMIS SVIS MILITIBVS 
             HOC MONVMENTVM 
EBLANA DEDICAVIT MCMVII
30
 
 
In addition, a bronze cartouche was displayed bearing a crown, a globe, branches of bay and 
symbols from the regimental badge - a tiger and elephant.
31
 The front view also bore the 
motto of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers ‘SPECTAMUR AGENDO’.32 The back of the arch 
recorded the battles of Hartshill and Ladysmith and a panel also read: 
IN MEMORY OF THE OFFICERS NON COM 
                      COMMISIONED OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 
                         ROYAL DVBLIN FVSILIERS WHO FELL IN 
                        THE SOVTH AFRICAN WAR AD. 1899-1900 
 
On each flank, which incidentally bears some bullet holes from the 1916 Rising, the 
memorial commemorated the series of battles along the Tugela Heights and the battle of 
Laing’s Nek. The arch, in the opinion of the Irish Times, would be a ‘reminder of the glorious 
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deeds performed by its sons in the regiments so prominently identified with the county and 
city.’33 
 On 19 August 1907, in the presence of thousands of onlookers, several battalions and 
distinguished guests, the arch was officially unveiled to the public.  The Irish Independent 
provided the reader a taste of the excitement that was prevalent: ‘Grafton Street was gay with 
a profusion of flags and floral decorations, and the windows of the houses in the vicinity of 
the memorial were early crowed with sightseers.’34 In a series of public speeches, the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, John Hamilton-Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, first addressed the crowd: 
...the main purpose of this movement, and of this memorial, is one which when rightly 
understood may be regarded with sympathy and goodwill by the whole community, 
irrespective of widely divergent opinion. We are not here for the glorification of war, 
whether the war in general, or any particular war. We are here especially to celebrate 
and to commemorate the exercise and manifestations of qualities which all thoughtful 
people recognise as commendable and excellent - namely, such qualities as courage, 
self - control and devotion.
35
 
 
Fig. 61: The Duke of Connaught’s opening speech 
 
 
Source, Irish Independent, 20 Aug. 1907. 
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H.R.H., The Duke of Connaught, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Forces, and 
Colonel-in- Chief of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commended the veterans of the South 
African War in his closing remarks: 
 
Men of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers you have reason to be proud of the way Irishmen, 
and especially men from Dublin, have done their duty and have proved themselves 
worthy successors to those who have gone in the regiment before you, and I am proud 
to have been associated with you as your Colonel-in-Chief on an occasion which will 
live long in the annals of the regiment
36
 
                 
The memorial had cost £1,800 for the labour and material, along with sundry expenses of 
£130; the expenses were covered by the generosity of Ireland’s citizens with received 
donations totalling £1,956.
37
 The memorial was considered by Major Cecil Romer of the 2
nd
 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers as a ‘handsome addition to the ornamental architecture of the city’ 
standing in ‘one of the most prominent and most beautiful parts of the city’; furthermore, he 
believed that the memorial had special significance that acknowledged duty and courage: 
...even without the sight of more than one poor woman, silently weeping from the re-
opening of the never healed wound in her heart. For there is nothing truer than that a 
victory is only less terrible than a defeat ... our thoughts flew back through the many 
happy years of good comradeship we had spent with the gallant friends whom we 
never cease to mourn, and whose names will be treasured memories as long as the 
regiment endures.
38
 
 
Fig. 62: Fusiliers’ Arch during the opening ceremony 
                                                                                           
Source, Irish Independent, 20 Aug. 1907. 
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In his memoirs, Memories of the twentieth century, the Earl of Meath mentioned little with 
regards to the construction or the opening of the memorial; however, a letter is included 
written by the High Court Justice in Ireland, John Ross P.C., congratulating him on his great 
success: 
I should have been glad of an opportunity of saying that in substance the memorial is 
your achievement. All the difficulty was in the beginning, and you did not spare 
yourself. You infected everyone with your enthusiasm ... I congratulate your lordship 
on the success of the whole work which was largely due to yourself.
39
 
 
With the grand opening of the arch, Major Romer, wrote that ‘the curtain drops on the last of 
drama of the South African War’ in Ireland.40 The Kildare Observer believed the memorial to 
be ‘one of the most beautiful and artistic ornaments of the Irish capital’.41 Irrespective of 
politics, the editor of the Irish Times believed that every member of the Dublin community 
will be deeply moved by the ceremony that celebrated honour and devotion to duty; the 
writer continued: 
 
This monument to the gallant deeds of their fellow - countrymen will be for all loyal 
Irishmen a permanent record of what Ireland has done for the Empire. To the loyal 
citizens of Dublin especially it will be a continual source of pride and inspiration.
42
   
 
‘Murty’ a writer for the Irish Times, commented on the arch: 
That grand memorial on Stephen’s Green is a fine adornment to the centre of the city 
– a true monument to the valour of Irishmen in the military service of the King and 
the country, and it’s also a great testimonial to the public spirit of the subscribers 
who’ve put it up.43 
The years of work and devotion to the memory of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, was an 
immediate undoubted success. In the words of the Earl of Meath, the memorial ‘will be an 
ever present reminder to the coming generations of the citizens of Dublin of the obligations 
of loyalty, of faithfulness of duty and to honour, which Ireland demands of all her sons.’44 
James M. Mayo notes that war memorials are ‘a social and physical arrangement of space and 
artefacts to keep alive the memories of persons who participated in a war sponsored by their 
country.’45 That, in essence, was the rhetoric and understanding that underlined the process 
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commemorating the Dublin Fusiliers. The Earl of Meath understood the importance of 
commemoration in society for the present and future generations, which acted as a ‘teaching 
tool’ on the importance of sacrifice, loyalty and devotion.46 As remarked by Joep Leerssen, 
‘monumental history is useful because it provides present generations with inspiration.’47 
However, as the political landscape altered drastically, the sentiment and meaning behind the 
arch transformed; in the words of historian Donal McCracken, the memorial became a 
‘lasting reminder to Irish nationalists of the war’, which quickly adopted the colloquial title 
‘Traitor’s Gate.’48 The monument thus was interpreted as a reminder of an imperial Ireland 
serving as an ‘inconvenient truth’ to many who wished to disown their country’s active 
participation in empire- building. The day after the ceremony, Ireland’s oldest Nationalist 
newspaper, the Freeman’s Journal, denounced the arch for what it attempted to represent: 
Dublin has nothing to do with the erection or dedication of it ... From first to last 
Dublin believed, and believes, the war in which those men were engaged to be unjust 
and disgraceful. From such a war no glory is to be gained; such a war deserves no 
commemorating memorial.
49
 
 
This gradually became the accepted understanding; in 1927 Captain Redmond spoke in Dáil 
Éireann: 
Is it suggested that because there is a memorial at the corner of Stephen's Green to the 
Dublin Fusiliers who died in the Boer War that the people of Ireland, or even a 
majority of them, were in favour of that war? Nothing of the kind. There is a 
monument...to a Dublin regiment who took part in a war which nobody in their senses 
would suggest had the approval even of a very small percentage of the Irish people. 
Does anybody coming to Dublin and looking at that gate and at that memorial think 
that the action of these men had anything to do either with our history in the past or 
with our future?
50
 
His interpretation is understandable and not without merit when considering the political 
climate following the Great War and the War of Independence. Nevertheless to simply 
disregard Irish motivations, interest and participation in the British Empire and the close links 
that existed symbiotically, is misleading. The memorial, as Keith Jeffery explains, reflected 
the extent of loyalist passion which was aroused by the South African War.
51
 However, in 
modern Ireland very few people understand the meaning behind the arch, with Timothy 
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Smyth stating that this is unsurprising given the ‘similar cultural amnesia’ which exists with 
regards the memory of Irish soldiers who actively engaged with the British military during 
the two World Wars.
52
 In the opinion of historian Ciarian Wallace, remembering Ireland’s 
active collaboration with the British Empire and the soldiers that died in South African War, 
‘does not fit Ireland’s official self-image, or the sense of identity of the average Irish 
citizen.’53  
Fig. 63: Fusiliers’ Arch circa 1907/1908 
 
Source, C.F. Romer and A.E. Mainwaring, The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South 
African War with a description of the operations in the Aden Hinterland (London, 1908), p. 232. 
Furthermore, this selective amnesia that exists in Irish culture and historiography can be 
illustrated again with the statue of the dead Royal Dublin Fusilier, which was once attached 
to Queen Victoria’s memorial on Leinster Lawns, Dublin. Unveiled in 1908, the memorial 
was a tribute to the monarch and a remembrance of Irish heroism during the South African 
War.
54
 Following the formation of the Irish Free State, the presence of Queen Victoria at 
Leinster Lawns in front of the Irish Parliament was considered highly contentious. The 
changes to the political and cultural landscape demanded the removal of the statue, with 
many considering it unattractive and of no value
55
 - it was eventually removed in 1948, a year 
before the Irish Free State officially became a republic. In 1987, after four decades of 
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obscurity, the statue of Queen Victoria was despatched on permanent loan to Sydney, 
Australia, where it now sits in front of a shopping mall. The fate of the Dublin Fusilier was 
less ceremonious; the soldier now sits in a secluded garden, placed on an air vent in Dublin 
Castle. To view the bronze statue one must pass through a closed gate, cross a private car 
park and continue into a garden. Moreover, there is no sign to direct the public towards the 
statue and upon viewing it, there is no plaque to explain what the memorial commemorates.
56
  
Fig. 64: The ‘dead’ Dublin Fusilier once attached to Queen Victoria’s memorial in 
Dublin. 
 
Source, Ciaran Wallace, ‘Lest we remember? Recollection of the Boer War and the Great War in 
Ireland’ in E-rea (2012), np. Online version. http://erea.revues.org/2888  (8 June 2013). 
 
Regimental and battalion memorials 
Throughout the country there are other memorials, dedicated to the memory of Irish 
battalions and units, which were unveiled prior to Fusiliers’ Arch. In 1906, the 4th Earl of 
Dunraven, Windham Thomas Wyndham – Quin, Hon. Colonel of the 5th Munster Fusiliers, 
wished to commemorate the valour and military character of his regiment from 1882 to 
1902.
57
 Likewise, Colonel O’ Donovan, commanding officer of the 3rd Munster Fusiliers 
wished to emulate the memorial process that was witnessed repeatedly throughout the United 
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Kingdom.
58
 Following a public appeal, subscriptions amounted to £1,039 and the location for 
the twenty four foot iron cross was generously donated by the 4
th
 Earl of Kenmare, Valentine 
Browne.
59
 In September 1906, the Royal Munster Fusiliers Memorial in Killarney, County 
Kerry, was unveiled and in the words of the 5
th
 Earl of Kenmare, Valentine Browne, the 
memorial ‘was to remind us and our children that there cannot be a more splendid ambition 
or more glorious a fate than to give our lives in the service of our King and country.’60 Two 
years previously, following a short campaign by the Irish Times, a small unit memorial was 
placed outside the Roman Catholic, Saint Andrew’s Church, Westland Row, Dublin. It 
commemorated the nineteenth fallen members of the 74
th
 Dublin Company of the Imperial 
Yeomanry who died ‘fighting for their King and Country during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-
1902’. Unveiled by the Duke of Connaught, he trusted the memorial ‘will ever be valued, not 
only by the citizens of Dublin, but by all Irishmen.’61 The Earl of Meath was once again at 
the heart of the commemoration process, being patron for the erection of the memorial.
62
 It is 
believed that there was one other memorial dedicated to Catholic soldiers of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers who died during the South African War. The memorial that was 
unveiled in July 1905, at Saint Brigid’s Church, the Curragh Army Camp, was considered a 
‘very handsome memorial’.63 However, it is thought that the memorial was destroyed in a fire 
that gutted the entire church, in 1923. 
Within the Anglican cathedral of Saint Patrick’s in Dublin there is an impressive array 
of monuments and regimental colours that celebrate Ireland’s illustrious military past 
connected with the British Empire.  The military regalia and the dozens of war memorials 
offer a significant insight to Ireland’s military tradition; there are plaques commemorating the 
service and sacrifice of battalions and individual soldiers who died in many obscure places 
throughout the wars for the expansion and preservation of the British Empire, ranging from 
Afghanistan, to China, to the fields of Europe during the Second World War.
64
 Within the 
walls of the cathedral, there are six memorials dedicated to the war dead of Irish units – 5th 
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Irish Lancers, 8
th
 Royal Irish Hussars, 45
th 
Dublin Company Imperial Yeomanry, 1
st
 Leinster 
Regiment and two memorials for the Royal Irish Regiment.  There is also a memorial for the 
five members of the 16
th
 Queen’s Lancers who died whilst attached to the 8th Hussars. Two 
months prior to the opening of Fusiliers’ Arch, a nine foot Celtic mural cross was unveiled, 
dedicated to soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment who died during the South African War. 
The Very Reverend, the Dean of the Chapel Royal, Canon Carlton, remarked that it was a 
‘privilege ... to be guardians of many memorials of distinguished Irish regiments.’ He 
continued to state that it was ‘fitting ... that we should welcome, a monument which will 
recall to future generations the service’ which the regiment ‘rendered with faithfulness and 
devotion for two years and a half during the last trial of our arms ...’65 Incidentally, the 
memorial was designed by Sir Thomas Drew, the same individual who created the triumphal 
arch at Saint Stephen’s Green. In the opinion of Joep Leerssen, cathedrals such as Saint 
Patrick’s represented the shared history that existed between Ireland and Britain and the 
overall reliance and dependency of the Protestant Ascendancy in maintaining that 
relationship. Moreover, the political element to the commemoration demonstrated that the 
Nationalist tradition in Ireland had no means in which to control and deter the growing 
dedication and monumentalism of British imperialism by the Protestant and loyalist 
Ascendency.
66
 Of the other war memorials, many are found in former British army barracks 
and public spaces that would have had a strong Unionist and loyalist connection. 
Significantly, the memorials dedicated to the war dead of the South African War, were 
testament of how elements of Irish society were committed to the war effort and the 
importance of remembering Ireland’s contribution and sacrifice. Furthermore, such 
representations of Irish loyalty to the Crown would have been hoped by some sections of the 
community to last long in the public memory and act as an important influence on society.  
Illustrated below is a list of regiment and battalion memorials on the island that have been 
recorded by the UK National Inventory of War Memorials, Irish War Memorials Project and 
other sources:
67
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Table L: List of regiment and battalion memorials in Ireland 
Regiment/Unit Location 
Royal Irish Rifles City Hall Belfast, Antrim 
46th, 54th, 60th, 131th, 132nd, 133rd, 134th, Imperial 
Yeomanry City Hall Belfast, Antrim 
2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers Armagh City, Armagh 
5th Royal Irish Rifles Down City, Down 
74th Imperial Yeomanry Dublin City, Dublin. 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers St Stephen's Green, Dublin 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers Soldier Dublin Castle, Dublin.  
Connaught Rangers Renmore Barracks, Galway 
4th and 5th Dublin Fusiliers Curragh Army Camp, Kildare 
Royal Irish Regiment (cross) St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
Royal Irish Regiment (window) St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
5th Royal Irish Lancers St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
16th Queen's Lancers St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
8th Royal Irish Hussars St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
45th Imperial Yeomanry St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
1st Leinster Regiment St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers Enniskillen, Fermanagh 
1st Inniskilling Fusiliers Enniskillen, Fermanagh 
6th Royal Inniskilling Dragoons and Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Enniskillen, Fermanagh 
Munster Fusiliers Killnary, Kerry 
3rd Leinster Regiment Birr, Offaly 
Royal Irish Regiment Clonmel, Tipperary 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers Omagh, Tyrone 
 
Similarly to the construction of Fusiliers’ Arch, the 3rd Leinster Regiment memorial built in a 
cemetery in Crinkill, Birr caused indignation amongst town planners and sections of the local 
population. Despite the motion passing, George Hackett of the Urban District Council of Birr 
voiced his concern of commemorating the destruction of an independent nation; Hackett 
empathised with the Boer struggle, drawing parallels with Ireland: 
I do not see what right we have at all to honour the memory of a few militia men who 
went to South Africa as volunteers to crush, or help to crush, an independent nation - 
a nation of independent farmers who were trying to keep their independence- what we 
have been trying to do for the last hundred years ... there was not one of them killed in 
action; they died of disease.
68
 
                                                          
68
 Dublin Daily Express, 23 Sep. 1903. 
 218 
 
It is abundantly evident that Nationalists were discontented with the commemoration of 
Ireland’s role in the South African conflict, and moreover, the influence of British 
imperialism and militarism on Irish society. The motivations that underpinned each 
commemoration and memorial that was erected in Ireland gradually became irrelevant: all 
that mattered to Nationalists was their association with Britain. Indeed, throughout the 
twentieth century attempts were made by different elements of Irish society, including the 
government and the Irish Republican Army, to break any historical link with the United 
Kingdom – the most infamous case being the destruction of Nelson’s Pillar in 1966 by Irish 
republicans. With regards to the South African War, Donal McCracken wrote that Fusiliers’ 
Arch was one of the few British monuments in Dublin which had not been blown up.
69
 
However ,there were three reported attempts to blow up the war memorial at Connaught 
Avenue, County Cork, which commemorated officers, NCOs and men of County Cork ‘who 
lost their lives in the service of Empire during the South African War 1899-1902’; the 
monument was unveiled on 22 October 1904, following a public subscription. In 1919, 
however, a portion of the face of the Celtic cross was blown away by an explosion; in 1925, a 
further attempt was made to destroy the monument, with witnesses remembering ‘a bright 
light was seen in the sky’, followed by a loud explosion.70 The material damage to the 
memorial was slight indicating that the attack was badly organised and carried out by 
individuals not familiar with the handling of explosive devices; the perpetrators also burned a 
wreath which had been placed at the memorial.
71
 On 28 February 1941, an ‘illegal 
organisation’ once again failed to destroy the memorial and instead damaged eight houses 
nearby.
72
 The act would not generate much media attention until the perpetrators of the attack 
were captured while attempting to blow up Union Garda Station, Cork. Three individuals 
were arrested and charged by the Special Criminal Court in Collins Barracks, Dublin for the 
possession of explosives and for their role in the memorial attack – the men were named 
locally as John Barry, Patrick Casey, and Denis Kavanagh. Moreover, Barry and Casey were 
charged alongside five others in connection with possessing the explosive, gelignite. The 
individuals associated with the memorial attack were charged with possession of revolvers, 
whilst the entire group had an impressive arsenal of two Thompson sub machine guns, 111 
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sticks of gelignite and seven revolvers. The official individual charges brought against the 
men who attempted to destroy the memorial were as follows:
73
 
1) Causing an explosion 
2) Possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances 
3) Possession of ammunition with intent 
4) Placing an explosive near a building 
5) Possession of a firearm and ammunition with intent 
6) Carrying a firearm and ammunition without a certificate 
7) Membership of an unlawful organisation. 
Fig. 65: A contemporary  photograph of the damage caused by the explosion at the 
South African War memorial in Connaught Avenue, Cork (2014) 
 
Source, http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-Detail?memoId=247  (1 July 2014). 
The three pleaded guilty to the charges and were sentenced to between eighteen months and 
five years; they denied any affiliation with ‘an illegal organisation’ which was most probably 
the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.).
74
 Patrick Casey, while awaiting trial in Arbour Hill 
Prison, Detention Barracks, Dublin wrote ‘we are sorry for it and all that, but those things 
cannot be helped. We may be wrong but we don’t think we are. We did what we knew is 
right to our minds.’75 In a letter from Patrick Casey’s mother, dated 2 November 1941, we get 
a sense of the individual’s background and his politics: ‘The war is terrible. Russia is nearly 
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finished & then England comes next she will just get a taste of what her black & tan done to 
the Irishmen and in 1916 too.’76 This case is evidence of the fact that the legacy of Ireland’s 
participation in the British military was uncomfortable for certain individuals, particularly for 
members of the aforementioned Nationalist organisation. The failed destruction of the 
memorial was an attempt to erase the physical evidence which recalled the memory of Cork 
natives fighting for the British Empire and the close symbiotic relationship that once existed 
between Ireland and Britain.  
Personal plaques 
It is estimated that throughout the island there are thirty-one personal memorials dedicated to 
a number of officers and men that lost their lives during the conflict. It is conceivable that the 
number is higher given the extent of Irish participation and the lack of a complete national 
database of all war memorials in the country. The majority of the memorials listed below are 
monuments dedicated to specific individuals, whilst the Portora and Cork memorials 
commemorate a group of individuals, but not necessarily the battalion:
77
 
Table M) List of personal memorials in Ireland 
Name Regiment Place of death Location of memorial 
Lieutenant Robert Earnest 
Reade 
1st King's Royal 
Rifles Boshman's Pan Belfast, Co. Antrim 
Lieutenant Robert Earnest 
Reade 
1st King's Royal 
Rifles Boshman's Pan Drumbeg, Co. Antrim 
Kerr McClintock 
Imperial Light 
Horse Elandslaagte Derry City, Co. Derry 
Earl of Ava Archibald 
Imperial Light 
Horse 
Wagon Hill, 
Ladysmith Bangor, Co. Down 
Captain Charles James 
Kinahan Maguire 
Royal Sussex 
Regiment 
Diamond Hill, 
Pretoria Bangor, Co. Down 
Earl of Ava Archibald 
Imperial Light 
Horse 
Wagon Hill, 
Ladysmith Clandeboye, Co. Down 
Captain James Thomson 
Seeds 
5th Royal Irish 
Rifles Kroonstadt Down City, Co. Down 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry 
Averall Eagar 
2nd Royal Irish 
Rifles Stormberg Newcastle, Co. Down 
Lieutenant William Harold  
1st Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Pretoria Ballybrack, Co. Dublin 
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2nd Lieutenant Arthur Hugh 
Montgomery Hill 
1st Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Talana Hill Blackrock, Co. Dublin 
Patrick J. Lawlor and Peter 
J. Murphy 
Irish Hospital 
Orderlies 
Draghoendar/Bl
oemfontein Glasnevin, Co. Dublin 
Trooper Andrew Marshall 
Porter 
45th Dublin 
Imperial 
Yeomanry Lindley 
Memorial Buildings, 
Trinity College, Dublin 
Trumpeter Vernon A. 
Swaine 
14th King's 
Hussars Martizburg 
Rathfarnham, Co. 
Dublin 
Lieutenant Colonel Eustace 
Guinness 
84th Royal Field 
Artillery Bakenlaagte Stillorgan, Co. Dublin 
Lieutenant G.W. Morley 
and Lieutenant N.H. 
Lincoln  
2nd Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Relief of 
Ladysmith/Bosc
hbult 
Enniskillen, Co. 
Fermanagh 
Captain Robert Richards 
Challenor 
2nd Connaught 
Rangers Boschbult 
Church Lane, Co. 
Galway 
Captain George Antony 
Weldon 
2nd Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers Talana Hill Athy, Co. Kildare 
Captain George Antony 
Weldon 
2nd Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers Talana Hill Naas, Co. Kildare 
Robert George Buchanan 
Riddell 
3rd King's Royal 
Rifles Spion Kop 
Kilkenny Town, Co. 
Kilkenny 
Edward Erskine Wilmot-
Chetwode 
45th Dublin 
Imperial 
Yeomanry Lindley Emo, Co. Laois 
2nd Lieutenant William 
Charles Robert Croker 
1st Royal 
Munster 
Fusiliers Boshof 
Limerick City, Co. 
Limerick 
Captain Eyre Lloyd 
2nd Coldstream 
Guards Bakenlaagte 
Limerick City, Co. 
Limerick 
Trevor Taylor Preston 
Imperial Light 
Horse 
Waggon Hill, 
Ladysmith Julianstown, Co. Meath 
Captain William Atkins 
Wiltshire 
Regiment Nooitgedacht  
Monaghan Town, Co 
Monaghan 
Reginald Owen Gethin  N/A  
Relief of 
Mafeking 
(plaque) Sligo Town, Co. Sligo 
Reginald Owen Gethin  N/A  
Relief of 
Mafeking 
(altarpiece) Sligo Town, Co. Sligo 
Captain Alexander Charles 
Going 
Scottish 
Borderers  Karee Cahir, Co. Tipperary 
Captain William Ernest 
Davis Goff 
3rd Dragoons 
Guards Vryheid 
Waterford City, Co. 
Waterford 
Henry Walker 
2nd Coldstream 
Guards Bloemfontein  Bray, Co. Wicklow 
Men of the country and city 
of Cork Several listed N/A 
Connaught Avenue, 
Co. Cork 
Past pupils of Portora Royal N/A  N/A Portora Royal School, 
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School Co. Fermanagh 
 
The memorials are evidence of a further dimension to the relationship that existed between 
Ireland and the British Empire during this period. The detail recorded on the memorials 
reveals the extent of Irish representation in many battalions and units of the British army, and 
moreover, the importance of the military tradition in Irish society. Furthermore, the 
memorials and their location reveal an interesting connection between religion and the 
military. Of the thirty-one known personal memorials on the island of Ireland, twenty-five are 
located in parishes and cathedrals of the Church of Ireland; the other six are located in a 
former landed-estate, a barracks of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in Naas, the Graduate 
Buildings in Trinity College, Dublin, an Anglican school and a public space. With some 
eighty per cent of the personal memorials being commemorated by the Church of Ireland, it 
reflected the close unity between the Church, the military and the British Empire. Moreover, 
it reveals the importance of the military tradition that existed among families of the Protestant 
Ascendancy, which helped reinforce their social and economic reputation in Irish society.  
In tandem with other sources, the detail inscribed on the memorials offers the 
researcher further information on the extent of Irish participation during the conflict and the 
importance of commemorating their sacrifice.  For example, Lieutenant Colonel Eustace 
Guinness of the 84
th
 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, son of Henry Guinness of Stillorgan, died 
at the battle of Bakenlaagte (30 Oct., 1901), aged forty one, and is commemorated by a 
plaque at St Brigid’s Church Stillorgan. His conduct at the battle was deemed ‘heroic’ as he 
died attempting to fire a round of case shot; twenty nine of his thirty-two gunners were 
casualties.
78
 A further example is contained in St Mary’s Cathedral, County Limerick where a 
white marble plaque commemorates the death of 2
nd
 Lieutenant William Charles Robert 
Croker 1
st
 Royal Munster Fusiliers who was killed in action at Boshof (23 Feb., 1902). The 
Limerick native from Trough Castle was killed in the line of duty, after their company got 
separated from the main convoy. They held their position until their ammunition was 
expended; Lieutenant Croker refused to surrender when ordered to by the surrounding Boers, 
and was consequently shot dead. His memorial in the cathedral notes that he refused to 
surrender.
79
 A further memorial is mounted in St Fin Barre’s Cathedral, Cork, in memory of 
Lieutenant Colonel William Aldworth, D.S.O., Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry; the 
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following description that appeared on Aldworth’s memorial, demonstrates the immense 
strength and capability of the British Empire and it also gives an interesting insight in the 
career of a British officer with vast experience of different theatres in the Victorian Army; it 
reads: 
Born Oct 3
rd
 1855 fell at Paardeberg South Africa Feb 18 1900 whilst gallantly 
leading the charge of the Cornwalls. He served with much distinction in the Burmese 
Expedition 1885-6. The Isazai Expedition 1892. The Chitral Relief Force 1895. The 
Tirah Expeditionary Force 1897-8 including the actions of the Sampagna and 
Arhangh Passes. The operations against the Khanikhel Chamkanis and in the Bazar 
Valley. He is buried close to where he fell. 
As Aldworth led the charge against General Cronje’s defences at Paardeberg, he reportedly 
called out to his men; ‘we will make the name of the Cornwalls ring in the ears of the world, 
boys’. Major General Smith-Dorrien, one of handful of survivors of the battle of Isandlwana 
(1879) ‘deeply deplored the loss of this gallant and distinguished officer’.80  
These memorials acted as a ‘moral compass’, which sought to provide the youth with 
an understanding of the ideals which were the foundation for those who lived and died out of 
duty and sacrifice for their country. As the church was the centre of faith and a focal point for 
the community, it was inherently important to allow an opportunity for the families and 
friends of the deceased to preserve the honour of their dead in this place. Moreover, the 
attachment of faith to the monuments is significant, revealing the valued interaction between 
religion, society and warfare.  
In contrast to the many memorials of those who fought with the Empire, there is just 
one memorial in Ireland dedicated to a volunteer who died fighting alongside the Boers; 
Hugh Carberry aged 23, died on 23 October 1899 at Modderspruit. Upon hearing the news of 
his death, the Nationalist community of Armagh collected £125 for the erection of a 
memorial in his memory. In June 1902, Michael Davitt unveiled the memorial in a Roman 
Catholic cemetery with an inscription that reads; ‘Bravely fighting for the Boers and their 
independence and against the unjust aggression of England’. Michael Davitt considered him 
‘a great favourite with all the boys’ and Colonel Blake commented that he was one of the 
nicest soldier he had.
81
 The day of the unveiling witnessed a ‘riot’ between members of the 
Nationalist community and some fifty armed members of the police force, following the 
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refusal of the pro-Boers and Irish Nationalists to allow a government agent near the 
proceedings.
82
  
Concluding remarks 
As the years progressed, Irish interest in the affairs of South Africa declined. Occasionally 
reminders of the war appeared in the Irish press with reports of the death of veterans, 
anniversaries and commemorations. Following the Great War, the turbulence of domestic 
politics and the internal conflict in Ireland, the South African War increasingly became a 
distant memory for both Nationalists and loyalists. As a result of little modern research and 
public knowledge of the conflict and Ireland’s participation, the memorials continue to 
remain isolated, largely forgotten and disassociated with the country’s historiography. 
Fusiliers’ Arch has blended into the structural landscape of the city, with little public 
understanding, acknowledgment or appreciation of it. Furthermore, the isolated Royal Dublin 
Fusilier in Dublin Castle symbolises an inadequate understanding of the island’s shared past 
with the British Empire and the discomfort of approaching history with a fresh and objective 
perspective. 
 Across the British Empire, thousands of war memorials were erected that 
commemorated the war dead of the South African War, celebrating and remembering the 
participation of British and colonial units.
83
 The public memorials constructed in Ireland, 
were erected on the premise which honoured the dead and recognised Ireland’s proud 
contribution to the war effort – the various memorial committees often stated that the war 
memorials did not glorify armed conflict. Indeed, it can be seen in the evidence that the 
public monuments to the dead were a process of recognising the core strengths of the British 
military and Empire – duty, honour and sacrifice were essential themes. Similarly, the private 
memorials, that remembered an individual’s death, recognised the personal sacrifice of a 
soldier and the importance of the military tradition in Irish families. The memorials illustrate 
the importance of the political and military ascendancy in Ireland, and the role that the Irish 
landed gentry held in Irish society. As seen throughout the chapter, the Irish loyalist class 
were undoubtedly proud subscribers to the ideals of imperialism and Empire; notwithstanding 
the increasingly precarious position of Irish southern Unionists and the landed gentry, they 
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still exhibited a strong influence in Ireland. Their unflinching and determined dedication to 
Ireland’s war memory revealed their personal attributes and their desire to commemorate the 
country’s proud military tradition. It can be established that the political, loyalist and 
Protestant ascendency in Ireland had a level of responsibility in remembering those who had 
lost their lives during the conflict, with even the impression that the soldiers’ spiritual 
remains were in their ownership. Indeed, the contest for possession of the dead is a theme that 
has been prevalent in Irish commemoration.
84
  
 The celebrations and commemorations that followed the South African War signified 
the popularity of the military and the war in Ireland, amongst sections of the Irish public and 
press; certainly, the memorial process was a natural progression from the extensive interest 
that was witnessed during the war. The aspiration to commemorate the individuals who died 
for Queen and Country, was facilitated by the far-reaching contribution of Irish soldiers; the 
extent of Irish participation within the formation of the ‘Irish’ Imperial Yeomanry and the 
mobilisation of the militia; and the tens of thousands of pounds raised by Irish organisers and 
contributions, which helped maintain a civilian and local interest in the war and the 
livelihood of Irish troops. Notwithstanding the increased dissidence and the loss in power and 
finances, the Irish landed gentry still appeared strong and united in Irish society; the social 
group still had an influence in endorsing projects that reflected their own ambitions and 
interests, and demonstrated their resolute support for imperial culture and Empire. The 
memorials that appeared in Ireland reflected an island that was proud of its heritage and 
association with the British Empire. It was an expression of Ireland’s development within the 
United Kingdom as a loyal and proactive member of the union. For the individuals and 
committees that erected the memorials, it was an opportunity to signify positive aspects of 
Irish society within the Empire. In addition, it would demonstrate to the citizens of Ireland, 
the positives of continuing alongside their parent nation. Certainly, it was evident that 
celebrating and commemorating past triumphs and struggles, and highlighting Ireland’s 
contribution within the British Empire, revealed an underlining political motivation with 
connections to national identity and strong cultural links with the United Kingdom.
85
  
 Finally, the memorials that were erected across the Empire reflected a selective 
interpretation of Ireland’s contribution to the war effort. The memorials bore no inscriptions 
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that reminded the public of the concentration camps, Britain’s scorched-earth policy and the 
masses of deportations. Rather, the impressive array of memorials and monuments revealed a 
proud heritage of military tradition and its importance in society where memorials noted 
significant engagements that their country or local battalion were involved in, which would 
add to the illustrious military annals. However, the message inherent in the public memorials 
which were unveiled in Ireland came to be vehemently opposed and contested given that the 
commemorations did not represent a shared history that was representative of Irish 
Nationalism. Nevertheless, today in modern Ireland there has been a growing appreciation of 
Ireland’s rich heritage in the British military, with a special renewed interest in the Irish 
contribution during the two World Wars. This interest has been reignited with the Royal Visit 
of 2011, and the forthcoming centenary of the Great War. However, there remains a dearth of 
research and public interest in the contribution of Irish soldiers during the South African War. 
Were such a selective memory and policy to continue, Ireland’s historiography and the 
public’s understanding of its own history would largely remain patchy at best, and ignorant at 
worse, and colloquial names such as ‘Traitor’s Gate’ will continue to exist. The Office of 
Public Works’ planned removal of Fusiliers’ Arch, for the construction of the Metro North 
Line, is indicative of the lack of knowledge and understanding of the importance of the 
monument to Ireland’s historiography. 
Fig. 66: A modern photograph of the front of Fusiliers’ Arch. 
 
Source, ‘Inventory of South African War memorials in Ireland’ 
(http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/html/showPicture.php?pictureID=334) (14 Feb. 2014). 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to illustrate aspects of Ireland’s response during the South African 
War, and to examine the contribution and participation of the Irish soldiers and public. With a 
dearth in modern research, this thesis has attempted to sufficiently address certain aspects of 
Irish military and social history that have escaped the attention of most scholars and 
historians. Therefore, this study is an effort to address these issues of disparity in Ireland’s 
historiography, through five research chapters, in order to establish aspects of Irish society 
and military history that had an impact on the country. From the research presented in the 
preceding chapters, it can be shown that elements of Irish society were active and supportive 
of the British Empire.  
Chapter one and two emphasised the importance and extent of Irish recruitment and 
participation in the British army, with elements of the press and public recognising the 
courage, sacrifice and marital prowess of the Irish soldier. Notwithstanding the sheer volume 
of pro-Boer sentiment that existed during this period, it appears that the Irish soldier 
remained a loyal and valued component of the military. However this reaction is not 
surprising, considering the strong military tradition that existed in Ireland during the 
nineteenth century, and the overall professionalism of Irish troops, their comradeship, esprit 
de corps and loyalty towards their regiment and monarch. The importance of Ireland’s 
military contribution cannot be understated given the impressive numbers that fought during 
the war, the manner of their performance, and the close proximity of the Great War. 
Importantly, the study of the Irish experience was supported and analysed through an array of 
letters from soldiers at the front; this approach offered a unique understanding of the 
immense difficulties that were experienced by Irish soldiers and officers during the first six 
months of the conflict.  
The chapters on the Imperial Yeomanry and the Home Front argued that sections of 
Irish society supported the British Crown and the military. This can be witnessed with the 
creation of several Irish units into the Imperial Yeomanry following ‘Black Week’. The 
attestations of these men were indicative of the Irish response during this period. From the 
evidence, it can be argued that these men did not enlist due to financial pressures, but through 
the spirit of patriotism, duty and a strong imperial sentiment that had existed in Ireland. Such 
a reaction is of interest to Irish historiography, as it is generally assumed that Irishmen who 
were recruited into the British army, were dispirited and impoverished, with little other 
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options and opportunities available. Conversely, the Irish units that were formed were from a 
wide spectrum of society, which included: the landed gentry, students, labourers, farmers, 
clerks, drapers and engineers. With the reverses of ‘Black Week’, the existence of a strong 
Irish military tradition, the influence of the press, the involvement of Irish battalions and 
units, and the noteworthy response from across the Irish Home Front, it is no real surprise 
that individuals wished to respond to the war difficulties in a patriotic fashion.  
With the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry, the mobilisation of the militia, and the 
continued presence of the Irish in South Africa, it is understandable that Ireland was 
profoundly interested by the war. Through a range of press reports, contemporary 
publications and letters and diaries written by participants, it is clear that the military and the 
war were relatively popular amongst sections of Irish society. Such signs of interest were 
witnessed continuously, with civilians lining the streets, barracks and ports of Ireland, 
celebrating the departure and arrivals of British battalions, units and personnel. The evident 
public interest in the conflict, and the concern for the welfare of their troops, provided a 
strong foundation for the creation of several charities, which generated tens of thousands of 
pounds. The publically subscribed donations helped support families affected by the conflict, 
and also provided essential materials for soldiers at the front. In addition, with the creation of 
Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital, the recruitment of dozens of Irish doctors and nurses into 
the British medical services, and the involvement of the Irish Sisters of Mercy, it 
demonstrates a wider public interaction and interest in the conflict, and the importance of 
their contribution. This active civilian response illustrates that the war had an impressive 
level of popularity in the country, whilst demonstrating that elements of Irish society 
maintained a strong unity with the British Empire.    
Therefore, this response to the war effort is of interest when considering the gravity of 
powerful rhetoric that was being disseminated to the Irish public by the Irish Transvaal 
Committee and pro-Boers. It is apparent that pro-Boerism did not have an impact in deterring 
sections of the Irish public’s attention and interest away from supporting the involvement of 
Irish troops and Britain’s policies in Southern Africa. Indeed, it can be argued that pro-
Boerism was counter-productive in ways, as it galvanised opposition against Irish 
Nationalists, who were often considered offensive and disloyal amongst elements of Irish 
society. Overall, the loyalist reaction was characteristic of how Ireland naturally responded to 
the military and the British Empire during the nineteenth century. With the support of 
sections of the press, the landed gentry, the military, and loyalists, Ireland’s trusted place 
within the British Empire was reinforced continuously, which would arguably help support a 
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case for Ireland to achieve devolved power. However, the pro-loyalist measures witnessed in 
Ireland were often overshadowed by Irish Nationalists and pro-Boers; as evident throughout 
this thesis, several commentators, politicians, and elements of the British and Irish press, 
were steadfast in the belief that the Irish nation could not progress as a devolved power under 
the influence of Irish Nationalism and anti-English sentiment. Finally, the chapter on the 
Home Front also revealed an aspect of the war that had a drastic impact on the lives of dozens 
of families across Ireland and the United Kingdom – the committal of British soldiers into the 
Richmond Asylum. With this inclusion, it introduces a significant aspect of modern warfare 
that is rarely considered in modern histories prior to the Great War. It is a further example of 
the impact the war had on the lives of soldiers and their families during and after the 
cessation of the conflict. 
With regards to commemorating the war in Ireland, the memorials were erected with 
the idea of providing future generations with impressive reminders of the principles that 
underpinned the military and the British Empire. The memorials reflected the substantial 
interest that existed during the South African War, and the awareness of Ireland’s 
contribution within the British Empire. Moreover, the significant number of private 
memorials was a fitting tribute to how aligned certain aspects of Irish society were with the 
British military, and the importance of the Irish military tradition in Irish society. However, 
the aspirations that were promoted with the commemoration of Irish units and personnel were 
quickly erased with the formation of the Irish Free State. As Ireland attempted to recover 
from the Great War, the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War, little attention was 
paid to the past sacrifices of Irish units in the British army. With the protracted mission of 
distancing Ireland’s history away from the United Kingdom, the memorials became an 
inconvenient reminder of that shared heritage. Nevertheless for a brief period, the memorials 
represented a proactive nation that was loyal and duty-bound to the British Crown. The 
commemorations remembered that shared experience with the British Empire, and it was the 
intention for these memorials to fashion future generations with the ideology that helped 
maintain the Empire.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was an attempt to 
illustrate significant elements of Irish and military history during the South African War that 
have failed to generate serious research. Considering the significant participation of Irish 
soldiers and civilian interest, this study could not be a comprehensive history of Ireland and 
the South African War. Indeed, there is a wealth of material and research areas that warrant 
further study and examination. One could argue that the lack of historical research undertaken 
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on Ireland’s involvement in the war was a result of the dearth of accessible primary materials 
available. However, there is an impressive range of primary sources obtainable in Irish and 
British repositories, which include: the Public Record Office in Belfast, The National 
Archives in London, the National Army Museum, London, the Bodleian Library in Oxford, 
and the National Library of Ireland. The following paragraphs highlight areas of potential 
research that will hopefully be undertaken by this researcher in the coming years.  
 Following the relief of Ladysmith, the war continued on for a further two years. With 
their overwhelming strength in troops, coupled with crumbling Boer morale, further British 
successes were witnessed with the capture of the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein (13 
March), the relief of Mafeking (18 May) after 217 days, the fall of Johannesburg (31 May) 
and the capital of the Transvaal, Pretoria (5 June); the British believed that the war had 
reached a successful conclusion with the capture of the two Boer capitals. However the 
leadership misjudged the Boers ‘centre of gravity’, and consequently, the war entered a new 
phase of bitter, protracted guerrilla warfare, epitomised by the British implementation of 
scorched-earth, containment, and the introduction of the blockhouse system.
1
 This phase of 
the war lasted until May 1902, resulting in the death of tens of thousands of soldiers, 
insurgents, members of the native population and Boer women and children. The Boer forces 
increasingly dwindled under the might of the British Empire, but hard line guerrilla fighters – 
known as Bittereinder (Bitter-enders) – continued to struggle on. However, with the 
prolonged suffering of their families, the destruction of their livelihoods, limited resources, 
and constant mass deportations to the islands of St Helena and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the 
Bittereinders finally succumbed to British pressure, and peace was finally declared.  
The majority of the Irish battalions and cavalry units remained until the end of the war 
in South Africa, with further Irish units of the Imperial Yeomanry and militia battalions being 
mobilised and despatched to the front. As a result, the Irish soldier remained intimately 
involved in the war of attrition, manning blockhouses, conducting ‘sweeping’ operations, 
guarding concentration camps, slaughtering livestock, and burning wagons and homesteads – 
elements of involvement that needs further investigation.
2
 Moreover, there are other aspects 
of Irish involvement that need further examination. In a similar theme to Timothy Bowman’s 
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Irish regiments in the Great War: Discipline and morale (2003), it would be of interest to 
analysis the impact the war had on the discipline and morale of Irish soldiers’ during the 
conflict. The basis of this study can be measured by analysing the General Courts Martial 
Registers found in The National Archives in London, and comparing and contrasting the 
numbers and types of offences that occurred throughout various stages of the campaign. 
Indeed, as Stephen M. Millar suggested, as the British soldier began to increasingly interact 
with Boer civilians and insurgents, coupled with the monotony of service and the war’s 
longevity, there was an increasing likelihood of poor discipline.
3
 Following a study of the 
General Courts Martial Register from July 1900 to August 1901, this historian was able to 
establish that 785 soldiers attached to Irish units were tried in courts-martial for offences 
against military law; some of the reasons included: striking a commanding officer; 
insubordination; mutiny; stealing or receiving stolen goods; being drunk on duty; sleeping at 
his post; assaulting and stealing from civilians; damaging public property; desertion; and 
murder. The sentences would range from hard labour, jail, demotion in ranks, a heavy fine 
and execution. Of the 785 soldiers that were tried by courts-martial, forty-three were 
acquitted.
4  
Fig. 67: Men of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons implementing scorched-earth policy – 
slaughtering cattle that would prove useful to sustaining the Boer war effort. 
 
Source, J. Watkins Yardley, With the Inniskilling Dragoons: the record of a cavalry regiment during the 
Boer War, 1899-1902 (London, 1904), p. 262. 
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Further aspects of research could include the attestation of the Irish companies that formed 
the Second and Third Contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry. Individuals such as Adjutant-
General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny and historian Richard Price considered that these men, who 
were recruited, did so through economic necessity. It would be of interest to Irish military 
history and the history of the Imperial Yeomanry in general, to determine how accurate that 
statement is. Finally, an area that has failed to generate much scholarly research is the 
creation and formation of colonial units that were raised in South Africa during the war. As 
seen through the formation of the Driscoll’s Scouts and several other units, it is evident that 
Irish colonists formed a substantial component of British irregular cavalry and scouting. The 
study would be an attempt to understand the motivations of Irishmen to enrol in British units 
that aided the war effort. Moreover, it would offer another case study that demonstrates that 
Irish settlers actively engaged in the imperial process, to the detriment of natives and locals.  
Notwithstanding the wealth of primary sources available for research in archives 
across Ireland and the United Kingdom, there continues to be little research conducted on 
Ireland’s involvement, experience and support for the British war effort during the South 
African War. Of course this is not unexpected, as there is little acknowledgement or 
consideration for Ireland’s service in the British army prior to the Great War. Aside from 
David Murphy’s Ireland and the Crimean War (2002), there remains an obvious lack of 
research that investigates aspects of Ireland’s military history with the British army during 
the nineteenth century. In the opinion of David Murphy, this is part due to the ‘lack of will on 
the part of Irish historians to address this subject’ of Irish participation in British military 
campaigns. Furthermore, when compared to the lack of scholarly research undertaken on 
Ireland’s impressive military contribution during the Great War throughout the last century, 
Murphy notes ‘it is not surprising the Irish in the military campaigns of the nineteenth 
century have been forgotten.
5
 In the words of another historian, ‘Officially at least, the Boer 
War is simply not worth remembering’, especially when considered alongside the Irish 
participation in the Great War, which is ‘worth recalling’.6 Consequently, with the South 
African War being under the shadow of the Great War and the important domestic events that 
led to the formation of the Irish state, the conflict in South Africa and the wars throughout the 
nineteenth century continue to remain forgettable and largely irrelevant in the context of Irish 
history. In addition, the situation has not been aided by the lack of graduate programmes that 
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are available in Ireland, with a focus on military history; in the opinion of Ian Speller, The 
Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies at NUI Maynooth, is ‘something of an oasis 
in otherwise rather arid terrain’.7 Despite the constant relationship between Ireland and 
military service, there remains a reluctance to promote military history in academia – this is 
an issue that resonates across the globe. With regards to Ireland, this scepticism towards 
military history may be found with an unwillingness to consider the importance of Irish 
military service in the British army. Or perhaps in a wider context, in the words of historian, 
Michael Howard, is ‘due also to a certain fear in academic circles, where military history is 
liable to be regarded as a handmaid of militarism, that its chief use may be propagandist and 
“myth-making”.8 Furthermore, the reluctance to appreciate the importance of military history 
is replicated across many countries in the world. In the words of Stephen Morillo and 
Michael Pavkovic:  
Military history is not the most respected branch of historical inquiry in academic 
circles. In part this is because of its popularity with the general public and its 
importance in educating professional military personnel. The root of this disrespect, 
however, mostly lies in its subject: war’. There exists a deep suspicion that to write 
about war is somehow to approve of it, even to glorify it.
9
   
 
This issue of disrespect and neglect has not been aided by the popular readers market. 
Although popular military histories are accessible to the general public and have the potential 
of generating further interest in a subject, it is too often the case that the study is non-
academic, and gives the impression that the discipline is unscholarly.
10
 Despite this idea of 
irrelevance, military history allows a greater understanding of warfare and global history; in 
the words of historian John Keegan: ‘The written history of the world is largely a history of 
warfare...’11  
Alongside the South African War, there were many British campaigns during the 
Victorian era that boast an impressive Irish involvement that has basically escaped the 
attention of Irish historians and the wider public. This is illustrated by the dozens of war 
memorials that are scattered across the Irish landscape, revealing that military connection 
during the nineteenth century. Indeed, the relatively recent publications of Richard Doherty 
and David Truesdale, Irish winners of the Victoria Cross (2000), David Murphy, The Irish 
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Brigades, 1685-2006: a gazetteer of Irish military service past and present (2007), Thomas 
Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (ed.), A military history of Ireland (1996), and Kevin Kenny (ed.), 
Ireland and the British Empire (2004), offer an insight into service of Irishmen in the British 
army, the importance of recruitment in the country, and the impact of Irish natives in aiding 
the process of imperial expansion. Following the Crimean War (1854-56), Irishmen and Irish 
units were frequently despatched across the globe to protect and expand British interests. In 
Africa alone, prior to the South African War, the Irish would have a part to play during the 
Ashanti War (1873), the Ninth Cape Frontier War (1877), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), the 
Transvaal War or First Anglo-Boer War (1880-81), the Gordon Relief Expedition (1884) and 
the re-conquest of Sudan (1898). Overall, such evidence of participation demonstrates that 
Ireland actively engaged with the British Empire, having an important impact on Irish 
society, overseas colonialism, and on the foundation of states across the world. With such 
significant omissions in Irish historiography, it is important to readdress this imbalance and 
continue to investigate Ireland’s relationship with the British Empire and military.  
Fig. 68: ‘Ireland in the war’: The title page of an article that appeared in a special 
edition of The Illustrated London News. The article included a description of each 
regular Irish battalion’s performance during the first year of the campaign, 
accompanied by several illustrations and photographs. 
 
Source, The Illustrated London News record of the Transvaal War, 1899-1900: the achievements of the 
home and colonial forces in the great conflict with the Boer republics (London, 1900), p. 47. 
With the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, the political establishment began to 
systematically distance itself from the British Empire and the country’s role in imperial 
expansion. Following the Great War, and the domestic turmoil of the Irish War of 
Independence (1919-21) and the Irish Civil War (1922-23), the South African War was 
overshadowed and quickly became a distant memory. As a result, in the words of Donal P. 
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McCracken: ‘for ordinary Irish people the link with South Africa had largely gone’.12 
However, there were sporadic reminders of Ireland’s contribution to the war effort, with 
reported deaths of veterans, anniversaries, commemorations, and some references would 
appear occasionally in Dail debates. In 1920, Sergeant Thomas Craddock of the R.I.C. was 
gunned down outside the Great War Club in Athlone by suspected members of the I.R.A; it 
was reported by the Irish Times, that the victim was wearing his South African War service 
medal at the time of his death.
13
 That same year, a South African War veteran named James 
Franklin was sentenced to five years penal servitude, for ‘odious and heinous’ crimes against 
a girl, under the age of thirteen.
14
 In 1929, Irishman Captain John Tarleton, a veteran of the 
war in South Africa and Europe, who served in the 6
th
 Inniskilling Dragoons, was found dead 
after receiving a self-inflicted wound.
15
 Although there was a steady stream of information 
still being published in the press – mostly of Irish pro-Boer activity – within thirty years of 
the conflict, the Sunday Independent claimed that the war was ‘forgotten history’.16 Of 
course, veterans of the conflict still remembered their contribution and still maintained an 
association with their respective battalions; in 1927, it was reported that Catholic veterans 
from Enniskillen, held an annual parade in Fermanagh, placing a wreath on a South African 
War memorial.
17
 Three years following the end of the Second World War, some twenty 
veterans of the South African War, attached to Royal Irish Rifles, commemorated the 
anniversary of the battle of Stormberg, by placing wreaths at the war memorial in Belfast.
18
  
 It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the war sparked an interest and debate 
amongst government departments, the Irish president and members of the public. In 1952, 
Irish president Sean T O’Kelly received a letter from the National Committee of the Irish 
Brigade Memorial Fund at Johannesburg, South Africa; its purpose was to establish a fund to 
erect a monument to the Irishmen who fought alongside the Boers: 
... to the memory of those brave Irishmen, who risked their lives and in some cases 
made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of justice and freedom, when they fought for 
the Boers, in that small nation’s struggle against an imperialist’s aggressor.19  
Throughout the next twenty years, the committee continuously sought to encourage a 
significant contribution from the Irish government, as a token of good will between the two 
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countries and recognition of the strong historical links. The memorial fund was much 
publicised in the Irish media, and it generated much discussion, due to the delicate issue of 
establishing political and historical links with the apartheid regime in South Africa. One 
individual wrote to the Department of the Taoiseach:  ‘Is this showing good feeling towards 
Britain-the only market on your doorstep? Is it about time that your government stopped 
taking all it can from Britain while stabbing her in the back’;20 in the opinion of another, the 
individual found it ‘difficult’ to comprehend why the Irish government were considering this 
proposal:  
I suggest that the £500 would be better spent if it were donated to the society for the 
abolition of apartheid in S. Africa or maybe could be devoted to the erection of a 
monument to the hundreds of Irishmen who were killed fighting (what has emerged to 
be a deplorable administration) on the other side.
21
  
 
In 1975, the Irish government eventually donated the aforementioned sum to the memorial, 
despite the public and government departments’ concerns of commemorating a relationship 
between Ireland and an apartheid state. From this example alone, it revealed the ‘official’ 
stance of the Irish government and the country, by presenting a legacy of Irish Nationalism 
and rebellion against an ‘oppressive’ state. With an obvious reluctance to commemorate the 
thousands of Irishmen who fought for the British army during the South African War, it is 
evident that certain aspects of Ireland’s history are selective and subjective. Moreover, 
choosing to forget Ireland’s contribution to the British war effort and endorsing a memorial 
for a few hundred men that fought for the Boers, demonstrates how the Irish government and 
certain political and cultural bodies, wished Ireland to be perceived by their international 
neighbours. This selective ‘amnesia’ was an idea that was considered during the early stages 
of the South African War; in a speech made by Rev. Father Kavanagh, at the unveiling of a 
1798 memorial in Thurles in 1900, it was evident how Ireland would approach their past:  
...who will remember the Irish slaves, who fell in England’s battles in the cruel, 
cowardly – aye, and unjust war being made against the heroic Boers? The country 
will be glad to forget their existence, and will cover with the veil of contemptuous 
silence their unregretted memories.
22
 
Indeed, with such an approach that still resonates to this day, individuals unfamiliar with Irish 
history can be forgiven for assuming that Ireland was merely a ‘colony’, having no active role 
in overseas colonialism, and remaining a nation of rebellion towards the British Crown. This 
                                                          
20
 Letter to the Taoiseach from a member of the public, 5 July 1966 (N.A.I., Department of the Taoiseach, 
2000/6/308).   
21
 Irish Times, 6 July 1966. 
22
 Nenagh News, 24 Mar. 1900. 
 237 
 
is how Ireland’s history and relationship with the United Kingdom has been approached and 
projected to the outside world. However, notwithstanding the increasing domestic turmoil 
that existed in Ireland, for a brief period, the Irish soldier and elements of Irish society 
remained loyal and faithful to the Crown and the ideals that underpinned the British Empire. 
The importance of that relationship should not be downplayed or unappreciated; for example: 
the South African War was the last conflict that witnessed widespread celebration at the 
return of Irish soldiers to Ireland. Moreover, the soldiers were able to re-assimilate into Irish 
society. Conversely, in 1918, the bulk of Irish soldiers who returned home were distrusted for 
their association with the British military. Ireland’s participation was ‘officially’ forgotten 
and a collective national amnesia followed. Despite the continued participation of the Irish in 
the British army, the relationship that continued to exist was unmentionable, and remains 
somewhat of a taboo subject. However, in recent years there has been a growing public and 
official awareness of Ireland’s involvement in the Great War; this has been aided by Queen 
Elizabeth’s state visit in May 2011, and the centenary of the First World War (2014-2018). 
Furthermore, the passing of The Defence Forces (Second World War Amnesty and 
Immunity) Act 2013 by the Irish government, which granted amnesty and immunity for 
soldiers of the Defence Forces who served with the Allies during the conflict, has illustrated 
Ireland’s progression and respect for the country’s past involvement with the British military. 
Therefore, considering the public’s attitude and public showings of solidarity towards the 
Irish soldier in 1902, and comparing that reaction to future conflicts,  it could be argued that 
the South African War was a defining moment in Irish military and social history.    
The issue of commemoration and remembering Ireland’s involvement in the war and 
imperial development remains somewhat of a contentious issue and a distinct difference in 
opinion still exists. On 7 January 2012, an individual wrote to the editor of the Irish Times, 
explaining how she was able to locate the grave of her relative who lost his life during the 
South African War. The deceased relative was Private Dennis Kinsella, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, who had his name inscribed onto Fusiliers’ Arch; from this information, the woman 
was able to begin the search for a grave.
23
 In contrast, twelve days later, the editor of the 
aforementioned newspaper received a letter from an individual, who wished to remove 
Fusiliers’ Arch entirely, as it commemorated the ‘murder of innocent women and children by 
any so-called Irish man’. In its place, he proposed to build a memorial to the Irish pro-
                                                          
23
 Irish Times, 7 Jan. 2012. 
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Boers.
24
 From these recent examples, it is evident that the idea of remembrance remains a 
contested issue in modern Ireland. Although the case of the individual wishing to remove 
Fusiliers’ Arch can be considered somewhat excessive, it is evident that some remain 
unprepared to accept or consider the value of understanding and remembering the country’s 
symbiotic relationship and strong heritage with the British Empire. Despite the growing 
interest in Ireland’s role during the First and Second World Wars, there still remains a 
hesitancy to focus on the symbiotic connections that existed between Ireland and Britain. 
With a continued focus on projecting Ireland as a nation of dissidence and rebellion towards 
the British Crown, the country’s historiography, in this respect, will remain relatively 
unbalanced. Therefore it is imperative to encourage scholars to ‘revise’ certain aspects of 
Irish history, and to fairly assess and consider Ireland’s contribution towards imperial 
development. As a result of this research, it is hoped that it complements other Irish histories 
on this period, for a better appreciation and understanding of Irish involvement in the British 
Empire, as an important aspect of Irish historiography.  
Despite increased anti-English sentiment in Ireland, the South African War was not 
the last conflict that involved a large number of Irish soldiers and citizens. With the 
declaration of war between the United Kingdom and Germany in August 1914, Ireland was 
again entrusted to fight for the British Empire. Following their patriotic response witnessed 
during the South African War, it was a natural continuation for civilians to invest their 
interest in the affairs of the British Empire and for Irish soldiers to maintain the strong 
military tradition between Ireland and her parent nation. Similarly to the South African War, 
observers, politicians, the public and military personnel, generally believed that the war in 
Europe would be over by Christmas 1914. However, the British army and her allies would 
embark on a protracted conflict that would cost the lives of millions of soldiers, including the 
deaths of tens of thousands of Irishmen. In many respects, the high death toll was a result of 
poor innovation and imagination amongst British staff officers and commanders, who largely 
failed to adhere to the changing environment of the modern battlefield. Although lessons 
were provided during the South African War, British senior officers continued to rely heavily 
on offensive tactics, supported by the professional and discipline of the British soldier. Of 
course, this failure to adhere to the changing environment of the battlefield was widespread 
across the European armies in 1914. As detailed throughout the first two chapters of this 
thesis, the British soldier witnessed the advent of modern warfare, with the primacy of 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., 19 Jan. 2012. 
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smokeless weaponry, the superiority of the defence, the increasing futility of the offensive, 
and the incompetence of many British officers; therefore, it can be argued that war in South 
Africa had significant relevance to the frontline conditions in Western Europe. Considering 
the proliferation of modern weaponry and the wealth of knowledge and lessons gained from 
the South African War, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and the Balkan Wars (1912-13), 
it is rather incredible that many officers and leaders throughout the armies of the Great War 
continued to rely on tactics that were shown to be obsolete and outdated, on recent occasions.   
Fig. 69: ‘Figuring it out’. (Back row), ‘Russia’ (Nicholas II), ‘Germany’(Wilhelm II), 
and ‘England’ (John Bull), and in the front row, ‘Austria’ (Franz Joseph I), ‘France’ 
(Emile Loubet), ‘United States’ (Uncle Sam), ‘Japan’ (Emperor Meigi), and ‘Italy’ 
(Victor Emmanuel III), and on the left, sitting on a stool, is ‘Turkey’ wearing a ‘Dunce’ 
cap. 
 
Source, Puck, 4 Nov. 1903. Available on the website of the Library of Congress 
(http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2010652316/) (15 Dec. 2013). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Irish units  
Regular Infantry that served in South Africa 
1
st
 Connaught Rangers 
Irish Guards (some units were despatched to South Africa, acting as M.I.) 
1
st
 Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)  
2
nd
 Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)  
1
st
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
1
st
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Royal Irish Fusiliers 
1
st
 Royal Irish Regiment 
2
nd
 Royal Irish Rifles 
1
st
 Royal Munster Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers 
Militia infantry that served in South Africa 
3
rd
 The Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)  
4
th
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Queen’s Own Royal Dublin City Militia) 
5
th
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Dublin County Light Infantry Militia) 
5
th
 Royal Irish Rifles (Royal South Down Light Infantry) 
3
rd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers (South Cork Light Infantry Militia) 
Regular Cavalry 
6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
8
th
 King’s Royal Irish Hussars 
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5
th
 Royal Irish Lancers 
Militia artillery that served in South Africa
25
 
Antrim Artillery  
Donegal Artillery 
Infantry militia mobilised and despatched across Ireland and the United Kingdom
26
 
Unit Station 
4th Royal Irish Regiment Aldershot 
5th Royal Irish Regiment Salisbury Plain 
4th Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Aldershot 
5th Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Salisbury Plain 
3rd Royal Irish Rifles Newry 
4th Royal Irish Rifles Finner(Ballyshannon) 
5th Royal Irish Rifles Enniskillen 
6th Royal Irish Rifles Sheffield 
3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers Dublin 
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers Devonport 
4th Connaught Rangers Gravesend 
4th Leinster Regiment Salisbury Plain 
5th Leinster Regiment Aldershot 
6th Royal Munster 
Fusiliers Gosport 
7th Royal Munster 
Fusiliers Salisbury Plain 
3rd Royal Dublin Fusiliers Gosport 
4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers Shorncliffe 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Both companies worked on the lines of communication alongside the 3
rd
 Leinster Regiment, 3
rd
 Munster 
Fusiliers and 5
th
 Dublin Fusiliers. Royal Commission on the War in South Africa. Minutes  of evidence taken 
before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, [CD 1792], H.C. xlii.1, 57. 
26
 Data for the infantry and artillery militia were sourced from Royal Commission on the War in South Africa. 
Minutes  of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, [CD 1792], H.C. xlii.1, 
145 and 146. It is of interest to note that while numerous militia battalions did not officially serve in the war, 
they did despatch soldiers from their units to reinforce their parent battalion. An example of this occurred with 
the militia reserves of the 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
, and 6
th
 Royal Irish Rifles, who despatched reservists to the front, to 
reinforce the 2
nd
 Royal Irish Rifles following their losses at Stormberg. In addition, it is important to state that 
on the day of embodiment, 176 men of the 6
th
 Royal Irish Rifles (108
th
 Louth Rifles) refused to serve aboard in 
South Africa - a legal choice within their terms of services. The decision was a matter of contention amongst the 
Nationalist population of Ireland, who felt that hundreds more were coerced to enlist for South Africa against 
their wishes. See Donal Hall, ‘The Louth Militia munity of 1900’ in Journal of the County Louth 
Archaeological and Historical Society, xxiv (1998), pp 281-195. 
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Artillery militia mobilised and despatched across Ireland and the United Kingdom 
Unit Station 
Cork Artillery Cork Harbour 
Dublin City Artillery Portsmouth 
Limerick City 
Artillery Chatham 
Londonderry Artillery Lough Swilly 
Mid-Ulster Artillery Plymouth 
Sligo Artillery Portsmouth 
Tipperary Artillery Plymouth 
Waterford Artillery Plymouth 
Wicklow Artillery Portsmouth 
 
Embodiment of militia medical corps 
Dublin District Company 
Volunteer medical services 
Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital 
Irish units of the Imperial Yeomanry 
45
th
 Dublin Company 
46
th
 Belfast Company 
54
th
 Belfast Company 
60
th
 Belfast Company 
61
st
 Dublin Company 
74
th
 Dublin Company 
99
th
 Irish Company 
131
st
 Irish Company 
132
nd
 Irish Company 
133
rd
 Irish Company 
134
th
 Irish Company 
175
th
 Irish Company 
176
th
 Irish Company 
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Appendix 2: Irish Victoria Cross Winners
27
 
Name: 3733 Private John Barry 
Regiment: 1
st
 Royal Irish Regiment 
Born: 1 February 1873 
Died: Belfast, South Africa, 8 January 1901 
Action: Monument Hill, 7/8 January 1901 
London Gazette Citation: 8 August 1902 
 
During the night attack on the 7
th
 and 8
th
 January, 1901, on Monument Hill, Private 
Barry, although surrounded and threatened by the Boers at the time, smashed the 
breach of the Maxim gun, thus rendering it useless to its captors, and it was in doing 
this splendid act for his country that he met his death  
 
Name: Major Edward Douglas Brown, 14
th
 Hussars 
Regiment: 14
th
 Hussars 
Born: 6 March 1861 
Died: 3 February 1940 
Action: Geluk, 13 October 1900 
London Gazette Citation: 15 January 1901 
 
On the 13th October, 1900, at Geluk, when the enemy were within 400 yards, and 
bringing a heavy fire to bear, Major Brown, seeing that Sergeant Hersey's horse was 
shot, stopped behind the last squadron as it was retiring, and helped Sergeant Hersey 
to mount behind him, carrying him for about three-quarters of a mile to a place of 
safety. He did this under a heavy fire. Major Brown afterwards, enabled Lieutenant 
Browne, 14th Hussars, to mount, by holding his horse, which was very restive under 
the heavy fire. Lieutenant Browne could not otherwise have mounted. Subsequently 
Major Brown carried Lance-Corporal Trumpeter Leigh out of action 
 
Name: Surgeon-Captain Thomas Joseph Crean, 1
st
 Imperial Light Horse 
Regiment: 1
st
 Imperial Light Horse 
Born: 19 April 1873 
Died: 25 March 1923 
Action: Tygerkloof, 18 December 1901 
London Gazette Citation: 11 February 1902   
 
Thomas Joseph Crean, Surgeon Captain, 1st Imperial Light Horse. During the action 
with De Wet at Tygerskloof on the 18th December 1901, this officer continued to 
attend to the wounded in the firing line under a heavy fire at only 150 yards range, 
after he himself had been wounded, and only desisted when he was hit a second time, 
and as it was first thought, mortally wounded 
 
Name: Lieutenant William John English 
Regiment: 2
nd
 Scottish Horse 
                                                          
27
 Compiled from various issues of the London Gazette and Richard Doherty and David Truesdale, Irish 
Winners of the Victoria Cross (Dublin, 2000). The thirteen recipients of the Victoria Cross included here are 
either Irish-born or had Irish parents. The total number of Victoria Crosses awarded for gallantry during the 
South African War numbered seventy-eight. With almost seventeen percent of that figure being Irish, it 
demonstrates the bravery of Irish troops and the importance of Irish recruitment in the British military. 
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Born: 6 October 1882 
Died: 4 July 1941 
Action: Valkfontein 
London Gazette Citation: 14 October 1901 
 
This Officer with five men was holding the right of a position at Valkfontein on the 
3rd July, 1901, during an attack by the Boers. Two of his men were killed and two 
wounded, but the position was still held, largely owing to Lieutenant English's 
personal pluck. When the ammunition ran short he went over to the next party and 
obtained more; to do this he had to cross some 15 yards of open ground under a heavy 
fire at a range of from 20 to 30 yards 
 
 
Name: Captain Charles FitzClarence 
Regiment: The Royal Fusiliers, attached Protectorate Regiment  
Born: 8 May 1865 
Died: 12 November 1914 
Action: Near Mafeking, 14 and 27 October, and 26 December 1899 
London Gazette Citation: 6 July 1900 
 
On the 14th October, 1899, Captain FitzClarence went with his squadron of the 
Protectorate Regiment consisting of only partially trained men, who had never been in 
action, to the assistance of an armoured train which had gone out from Mafeking. The 
enemy were in greatly superior numbers, and the squadron was for a time surrounded, 
and it looked as if nothing could save them from being shot down. Captain 
FitzClarence, however, by his personal coolness and courage inspired the greatest 
confidence in his men, and, by his bold and efficient handling of them, not only 
succeeded in relieving the armoured train, but inflicted a heavy defeat on the Boers, 
who lost 50 killed and a large number wounded, his own losses being 2 killed and 15 
wounded. The moral effect of this blow had a very important bearing on subsequent 
encounters with the Boers. 
On the 27th October, 1899, Captain FitzClarence led his squadron from Mafeking 
across the open, and made a night attack with the bayonet on one of the enemy's 
trenches. A hand-to-hand fight took place in the trench, while a heavy fire was 
concentrated on it from the rear. The enemy was driven out with heavy loss. Captain 
FitzClarence was the first man into the position and accounted for four of the enemy 
with his sword. The British lost 6 killed and 9 wounded. Captain FitzClarence was 
himself slightly wounded. With reference to these two actions, Major-General Baden-
Powell states that had this Officer not shown an extraordinary spirit and fearlessness 
the attacks would have been failures, and we should have suffered heavy loss both in 
men and prestige. 
On the 26th December, 1899, during the action at Game Tree, near Mafeking, Captain 
FitzClarence again distinguished himself by his coolness and courage, and was again 
wounded (severely through both legs). 
 
Name: Sergeant Edward James Gibson Holland 
Regiment: Royal Canadian Dragoons  
Born: 2 February 1878 
Died: 18 June 1948 
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Action: Komati River, 7 November 1900. 
London Gazette Citation: 23 April, 1901. 
 
Sergeant Holland did splendid work with his Colt gun, and kept the Boers off the two 
12-pounders by its fire at close range. When he saw the enemy were too near for him 
to escape with the carriage, as the horse was blown, he calmly lifted the gun off and 
galloped away with it under his arm. 
 
Name: Captain Robert Johnston,  
Regiment: Imperial Light Horse 
Born: 13 August 1872 
Died: 24 March 1950 
Action: Elandslaagte 
London Gazette Citation: 12 February 1901 (The citation also included Captain Charles 
Herbert Mullin, Imperial Light Horse). 
 
On the 21st October, 1899, at Elandslaagte, at a most critical moment, the advance 
being momentarily checked by a very severe fire at point blank range, these two 
Officers very gallantly rushed forward under this heavy fire and rallied the men, thus 
enabling the flanking movement, which decided the day, to be carried out 
 
Name: Lieutenant James Edward Ignatuis Masterson 
Regiment: 1
st
 Devonshire Regiment 
Born: 20 June 1862 
Died: 24 December 1935 
Action: Wagon Hill, Ladysmith 
London Gazette Citation: 4 June 1901 
 
During the action at Wagon Hill, on the 6
th
 January, 1900, Lieutenant Masterson 
commanded, with the greatest gallantry and dash, one of the three companies of his 
regiment which charged a ridge held by the enemy and captured their positions.  
The company were then exposed to a most heavy and galling fire from the right and 
left front. Lieutenant Masterson undertook the message to the Imperial Light Horse, 
who were holding a ridge some hundred yards away, to fire to the left front and 
endeavour to check the enemy’s fire.  
In taking the message he crossed an open space of a hundred yards which was swept 
by a most heavy cross fire, and although badly wounded in both thighs, managed to 
crawl in the deliver the message before falling exhausted into the Imperial Light 
Horse trench. His unselfish heroism was undoubtedly the means of saving several 
lives. 
Name: Corporal George Edward Nurse 66
th
 Battery, Royal Field Artillery  
Regiment: 66
th
 Battery, Royal Field Artillery 
Born: 14 April 1873 
Died: 25 November 1945 
Action: Colenso 
London Gazette Citation: 2 February 1900 
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At Colenso on the 15th December, 1899, the detachments serving the guns of the 14th 
and 66th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, had all been either killed, wounded, or 
driven from their guns by Infantry fire at close range, and the guns were deserted. 
About 500 yards behind the guns was a donga in which some of the few horses and 
drivers left alive were sheltered. The intervening space was swept with shell and rifle 
fire. Captain Congreve, Rifle Brigade, who was in the donga, assisted to hook a team 
into a limber, went out; and assisted to limber up a gun. Being wounded, he took 
shelter; but, seeing Lieutenant Roberts fall, badly wounded, he went out again and 
brought him in. Captain Congreve was shot through the leg, through the toe of his 
boot, grazed on the elbow and the shoulder, and his horse shot in three places. 
Lieutenant Roberts assisted Captain Congreve. He was wounded in three places. 
Corporal Nurse also assisted. 
 
Name: Captain Hamilton Lyster Reed 
Regiment: 7
th
 Battery, Royal Field Artillery 
Born: 23 May 1869 
Died: 7 March 1931 
Action: Colenso 
London Gazette Citation: 2 February 1900 
 
Captain Reed, who had heard of the difficulty, shortly afterwards brought down three 
teams from his battery to see if he could be of any use. He was wounded, as were five 
of the thirteen men who rode with him, one was killed; and thirteen out of twenty-one 
horses were killed before he got half-way to the guns, and he was obliged to retire. 
 
Name: Lieutenant Frederick Hugh Sherston Roberts 
Regiment: King’s Royal Rifle Corp 
Born: 8 January 1872 
Died: 17 December 1899 
Action: Colenso 
London Gazette Citation: 2 February 1900  
 
At Colenso on the 15th December, 1899, the detachments serving the guns of the 14th 
and 66th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, had all been either killed, wounded, or 
driven from their guns by Infantry fire at close range, and the guns were deserted. 
About 500 yards behind the guns was a donga in which some of the few horses and 
drivers left alive were sheltered. The intervening space was swept with shell and rifle 
fire. 
Captain Congreve, Rifle Brigade, who was in the donga, assisted to hook a team into 
a limber, went out; and assisted to limber up a gun. Being wounded, he took shelter; 
but, seeing Lieutenant Roberts fall, badly wounded, he went out again and brought 
him in. Captain Congreve was shot through the leg, through the toe of his boot, grazed 
on the elbow and the shoulder, and his horse shot in three places. 
Lieutenant the Honourable F. H. S. Roberts (since deceased). Lieutenant Roberts 
assisted Captain Congreve. He was wounded in three places. 
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Name: Sergeant William Bernard Traynor 
Regiment: 2
nd
 West Yorkshire Regiment 
Born: 31 December 1870 
Died: 2o October 1956 
Action: Bothwell Camp 
London Gazette Citation: 17 September 1901 
 
During the night attack on Bothwell Camp on the 6th, February, 1901, Sergeant 
Traynor jumped out of a trench and ran out under an extremely heavy fire to the 
assistance of a wounded man. While running out he was severely wounded, and being 
unable to carry the man by himself he called for assistance. Lance-Corporal Lintott at 
once came to him and between them they carried the wounded soldier into shelter. 
After this, although severely wounded, Sergeant Traynor remained in command of his 
section, and was most cheerful, encouraging his men till the attack failed. 
 
Name: Sergeant-Major Alexander Young, Cape Police 
Regiment: Cape Police, South African Forces 
Born: 27 January 1873 
Died: 19 October 1916 
Action: Ruiter’s Kraal 
London Gazette Citation: 8 November 1901 
 
Towards the close of the action at Ruiter's Kraal on the 13th August, 1901, Sergeant-
Major Young, with a handful of men, rushed some kopjes which were being; held by 
Commandant Erasmus and about 20 Boers. On reaching these kopjes the enemy were 
seen galloping back to another kopje held by the Boers. Sergeant-Major Young then 
galloped on some 50 yards ahead of his party and closing with the enemy shot one of 
them and captured Commandant Erasmus, the latter firing at him three times at point 
blank range before being taken prisoner. 
 
Appendix 3: Below is a list of the men who were especially mentioned from General 
Buller for their conspicuous gallantry in the field throughout the Tugela Operations:
28
 
 
 1
st
 Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
 
Sergeant-Major Martin, 15
th
 December, 1899.  – Colenso, and all other actions in 
which he was engaged, he valiantly kept up the ammunition supply.  
 
3640 Private Thompson, 23
rd
 February, - He volunteered to rescue Private Nesbitt, a 
heavy wounded man, and laboriously brought him to cover through hot fire. 
 
5019 Drummer Fitzgerald, 15
th
 December 1899. – Colenso. Accompanied his Colonel 
and valiantly carried messages for him exposed to very heavy fire. 
 
3108 Lance – Corporal Cleland, 23rd-24th February. – Rendered very valuable 
assistance to the wounded under heavy fire.  
 
                                                          
28
 South African despatches, ii. Natal Field Army, [CD 458], H.C. xlvii, 52 and 53. 
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 2
nd
 Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers 
6039 Lance Corporal (Thomas) O’Neill, 27th February (killed). – Conspicuous 
gallantry in attack on Pieter’s Hill. His body was found by the side of a dead Boer, 
transfixed by his bayonet, he himself having been shot dead.   
 
 1
st
 Bn. Connaught Rangers 
5829 Private Livingstone. Colenso, 15
th
 December. – His Colonel being severely 
wounded, he removed him through a hot fire, and though receiving a bullet in the 
neck, continued till he had put Colonel Brooke under cover 200 yards back 
3309 Lance-Corporal Parslow. Colenso, 15
th
 December.- He pluckily placed a 
wounded man under cover, and in a similar attempt was severely wounded. 
3465 Private Kenny, 23
rd
 February.- Gallantry rescued a wounded man of the Imperial 
Light Infantry, who lay exposed to heavy fire. 
2
nd
 Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
1664 Sergeant Sheridan, 4290 Sergeant Hunt, 3861 Lance-Corporal Kelly and 5628 
Lance-Sergeant Church. – Distinguished by their great coolness, ability, and pluck, in 
fighting and commanding their men at the battle of Colenso and in other 
engagements. 
3892 Private Kelly, 27
th
 February.- Conspicuous gallantry in going forward under fire 
to carry out an Officer who was wounded, and again in going to the rear for 
ammunition which he brought and distributed under heavy fire. 
Appendix 4) In a written report to General Buller, White endorsed the commendations 
of dozens of officers, NCOs and men during the period prior and during the siege of 
Ladysmith. The short list below includes officers and men that were Irish or who were 
attached to Irish units:
29
 
 Brigadier-General J. Wolfe Murray, commanding Lines of Communication  
Major-General J.D.P. French, commanding the Cavalry 
Major A.J. Murray, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General  
Major A.C. King 5
th
 Royal Irish Lancers 
` Major W. Adye Royal Irish Fusiliers, Field Intelligence 
Lieutenant J.E.I. Masterson 1
st
 Devonshire Regiment 
Private M. Henley, Nursing Orderly 2
nd
 Royal Irish Regiment 
 Colour-Sergeant T. Linnane 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers 
 Colour-Sergeant J. Hayes 1
st
 Royal Irish Fusiliers  
 
 
                                                          
29
 South African despatches, ii. Natal Field Army, [CD 458], H.C. xlvii, 7,8, 10, 31, 37 and 38. 
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Appendix 5: Title: Return of casualties which occurred in Natal during the war
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Figures obtained from Maurice Harold Grant, History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902, iv (London, 
1910) pp 681-685. 
Irish 
Regiment 
Killed or 
died from 
wounds 
Died of 
disease Wounded Captured Missing Total 
 Rank 
Officers/NC
O's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
5th Royal 
Irish Lancers  1/3  1/15  8/22  /  /  10/40 
6th 
Inniskilling 
Dragoons  /  0/1  /  /  /  0/1 
8th Hussars  0/1  0/12  0/2  /  0/2  0/17 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers  6/88  3/22  16/222  1/5  0/12  26/349 
1st Royal 
Irish Fusiliers  2/32  0/19  9/88  14/518  /  25/657 
2nd Royal 
Irish Fusiliers  1/16  0/8  8/95  /  0/19  9/138 
1st 
Connaught 
Rangers  0/48 0/20  10/228   1/7  0/5 11/308  
1st Leinster 
Regiment  / 0/1  1/0   / /  1/1  
2nd Royal 
Munster 
Fusiliers  0/2 0/2  1/0  /  /  1/4  
1st Royal 
Dublin 
Fusiliers  3/70 0/27 8/219  /  0/18  11/334  
2nd Royal 
Dublin 
Fusiliers  3/41 0/17  10/151  1/0  0/116  14/325  
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Appendix 6: Title: Return of casualties which occurred in the Cape, Orange River and 
Transvaal Colonies during the war
31
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Figures obtained from Maurice Harold Grant, History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902, iv (London, 
1910) pp 686-691. 
Regiment 
Killed or 
died from 
wounds 
Died of 
disease Wounded Captured Missing Total 
  
Officers/NC
O's and men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
Officers/N
CO's and 
men 
5th Royal 
Irish Lancers  0/16 0/12  1/52  0/44  0/12  1/126  
6th 
Inniskilling 
Dragoons  4/31 1/42  10/81  2/17  /  17/171  
8th Hussars  3/12 0/19  8/40  0/2  /  11/73  
1st Irish 
Guards 1/4  /  1/1  /  /  2/5 
1st Royal 
Irish 
Regiment  5/39 1/39  8/87  0/32  0/4  14/201  
2nd Royal 
Irish Rifles  3/31 0/23  11/106  12/673  /  26/833  
1st Royal 
Irish 
Fusiliers  0/8 1/25  2/8  2/44  /  5/85  
2nd Royal 
Irish 
Fusiliers  3/20 1/33  1/53  0/10  0/81  5/197  
1st 
Connaught 
Rangers  0/10 0/26  6/24  0/11  /  6/71  
1st Leinster 
Regiment  1/3 4/64  0/31 0/21  0/1  5/120  
2nd Leinster 
Regiment  / 0/6 1/9  /  /  1/15  
1st Royal 
Munster 
Fusiliers  5/3 0/43  4/70  0/2  /  9/128  
2nd Royal 
Munster 
Fusiliers  / 0/1  /  /  /  0/1  
1st Royal 
Dublin 
Fusiliers  1/13 0/10  5/38  /  /  6/61  
2nd Royal 
Dublin 
Fusiliers  /  1/31 1/0  /  /  2/31  
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Appendix 7: List of Irish officers or officers that were attached to Irish battalions who 
died during the South African War
32
 
Name Regiment Cause of death Date 
Captain James Alderson 
1st Royal Irish 
Regiment Died of wounds at Bethlehem 
7 July 
1900 
Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Aldworth*  
Duke of Cornwall's 
Light Infantry Killed in action near Paardeberg 
18 Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant Cyril Arkwright  
5th Royal Irish 
Lancers Enteric fever at Ladysmith 
9 Mar. 
1900 
Captain Arthur Bacon 
1st Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Colenso 
15 Dec. 
1899 
Captain Charles Biddulph* 
3rd Leinster 
Regiment Enteric fever at Queenstown, SA 
26 Apr. 
1902 
2nd Lieutenant Hubert 
Bird* 
9th Battery, Royal 
Field Artillery Enteric fever at Winburg 
28 July 
1900 
Lieutenant Arthur Bull 
3rd Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds received at 
Rooival  
11 Apr. 
1902 
Lieutenant Richard 
Chaloner 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds received at 
Middlebult 
21 Apr. 
1902 
Major John Charley* 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds received at 
Colenso 
15 Dec. 
1899 
Captain Frederick Coates* 
1st 
Northumberland 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Elandslaagte 
25 Feb. 
1902 
Captain Frederick Connor 
Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Died of wounds received at Talana 
20 Oct. 
1899 
Major Francis Cooper* 
Royal Field 
Artillery Enteric Fever at Mooi Hospital 
26 May 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant William 
Croker* 
1st Royal Munster 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Boshof 
23 Feb. 
1902 
2nd Lieutenant Cornelius 
Daly 
Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Pieter’s Hill 
27 Feb. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant John Dennis 
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Enteric fever at Aliwal North 
2 May 
1900 
Brevet-Major Colin Dick 
Royal Irish 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds received at 
Vryheid 
29 Sep. 
1901 
Captain Wilfred Dimsdale 
2nd Royal Irish 
Rifles 
Died of wounds received near 
Reddersburg 
9 Apr. 
1900 
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry 
Eager 
2nd Royal Irish 
Rifles 
Died of wounds received at 
Stormberg (10 Dec 1899) 
13 Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant Thomas Ely 
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Enteric Fever on board SS Orcana 
15 Apr. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Francis 
Finlay 
1st Leinster 
Regiment Died of dysentery at Vrede 
11 Dec. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Arthur 1st Royal Irish Died of enteric at Bloemfontein  24 May 
                                                          
32
Mildred G. Dooner, The ‘Last Post’: a roll of all officers (naval, military or colonial) who gave their lives for 
their queen, king and country, in the South African War (London, 1903). Where there is an asterix placed beside 
a name, it indicates that this researcher can establish that the officer was either Irish or had Irish connections. 
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Fletcher Regiment 1900 
Captain Francis Fosbery 
Royal Irish 
Regiment Killed in action near Belfast 
7 Jan. 
1901 
Major Alexander Foulerton 
1st Leinster 
Regiment Died at Vrede 
5 Jan. 
1901 
Captain Alexander Fraser* 
19th Imperial 
Yeomanry  Died of enteric fever at Kimberly 
28 Apr. 
1901 
Captain Gough French 
Royal Irish 
Regiment Killed in action at Gaberones 
12 Feb. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Henry 
French-Brewster* 
King's Royal Rifle 
Corps Killed in action at Spion Kop 
24 Jan. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Charles 
Genge 
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Died of wounds received at Talana 
20 Oct. 
1900 
Captain Lionel William 
Gibton* 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died of dysentery at Ladysmith 
19 Mar. 
1900 
Captain William Gloster 
Royal Irish 
Regiment Killed in action at Stabbert's Nek 
23 July 
1900 
Lieutenant William 
Goodwin* 
Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers 
Died of pneumonia and heart 
failure at Pretoria 
8 July 
1902 
Major Edward Gray* 
Royal Army 
Medical Corps 
Killed in action at Farquhar's Farm 
near Ladysmith 
30 Oct. 
1899 
Lieutenant Colonel Eustace 
Guinness* 
Royal Field 
Artillery Killed in action near Brakenlaagte 
31 Oct. 
1901 
Lieutenant Eustace Harris 
Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Machadodorp 
8 Jan. 
1901 
Lieutenant Robert Henry 
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Colenso 
15 Dec. 
1899 
Captain Charles Hensley  
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds received near 
Venter's Spruit, Upper Tugela 
20 Jan. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Arthur Hill 
1st Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Talana 
20 Oct. 
1899 
2nd Lieutenant William Hill 
5th Royal Irish 
Lancers 
Killed in action at Wagon Hill, 
Ladysmith 
6 Jan. 
1900 
Major George Hilliard* 
Royal Army 
Medical Corps Died of wounds received at Ingogo 
7 Sep. 
1900 
Lieutenant Albert Hughes 
2nd Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Died of enteric fever at Pretoria 
18 Feb. 
1901 
2nd Lieutenant Stamford 
Hutton* 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died of enteric fever at Ladysmith 
15 Apr. 
1900 
Captain Lord Kensington* 2nd Life Guards 
Died from wounds received at 
Houtnek 
24 June 
1900 
Lieutenant Henry Leicester 
1st Leinster 
Regiment Died at Vrede 
13 Mar. 
1901 
Lieutenant Theodore 
Leslie* 
3rd Grenadier 
Guards 
Died of wounds received at 
Belmont 
4 Dec. 
1899 
Lieutenant Noel Lincoln 
2nd Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Boschbult 
31 Mar. 
1902 
Captain Thomas Lloyd* 
2nd Coldstream 
Guards 
Died of wounds received near 
Brakenlaagte 
31 Oct. 
1901 
Captain Francis Loftus* 1st Royal Killed in action at Colenso 15 Dec. 
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Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
1899 
Lieutenant Harry Low 
M.I. Royal Irish 
Rifles Killed at Vaal Bosh Pan 
10 Mar. 
1902 
Lieutenant James Lowry* 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died from blood poisoning 
19 Sep. 
1900 
Brevet-Major John 
MacBean 
Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Nooitgedacht 
13 Dec. 
1900 
Captain Donald Maclachlan 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Died from wounds received at 
Venter's Spruit, Upper Tugela 
1 Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant Charles Martin 
1st Leinster 
Regiment 
Died of pneumonia at sea on board 
SS Dilwara 
1 May 
1900 
Lieutenant Colonel William 
McCarthy-O'Leary* 
1st South 
Lancashire 
Regiment Killed in action at Pieter’s Hill 
27 Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant William 
McClintock-Bunbury* 2nd Dragoons Died of wounds near Kimberly 
14-16 
Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant John Meek 
6th Inniskilling 
Dragoons Died of wounds at Pretoria  
7 June 
1900 
Lieutenant Alexander 
Miller* 
3rd Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died of dysentery at Kaffir Kop 
15 May 
1902 
2nd Lieutenant Charles 
Moore 
Royal Munster 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Mooifontein  
25 May 
1901 
Major Stephen Moore* Imperial Yeomanry 
Died of enteric fever at Wynberg 
Hospital 
4 June 
1901 
Lieutenant Walter Moore* 
Gorringe's Flying 
Column 
Died of pneumonia at 
Burghersdorp 
6 Nov. 
1901 
Captain George Morley 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died of enteric fever at Mooi River 
10 Apr. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Hill Motum Donegal Artillery Died suddenly at Lindley 
14 Jan. 
1901 
Major Frederick Munn 
1st Royal Irish 
Fusiliers 
Died of measles and pneumonia at 
Springfontein  
31 Aug., 
1901 
Major the Earl of Munster* 3rd Royal Scots Accidently killed at Lace Miles 
2 Feb., 
1902 
Lieutenant Lord O'Hagan*  
3rd Grenadier 
Guards 
Died of enteric fever at 
Springfontein 
13 Dec. 
1900 
Major Arthur Pack-
Beresford* Royal Artillery Died from enteric at Bloemfontein 
5 Mar. 
1902 
Captain Sir Elliott Power* 1st Rifle Brigade Died of enteric fever at Standerton 
20 Jan. 
1902 
Captain Sir John Power* 
46th Imperial 
Yeomanry 
Died of wounds received at 
Lindley 
1 June 
1900 
Lieutenant Robert Reade* 
1st King's Royal 
Rifle Corps 
Died of wounds received at 
Boshman's Pan 
4 Feb. 
1901 
Lieutenant Frederick 
Roberts* 
King's Royal Rifle 
Corps 
Died of wounds received at 
Colenso 
17 Dec. 
1899 
Lieutenant Frank Russell-
Brown 
1st Munster 
Fusiliers 
Died of wounds in action at near 
Bloemfontein 
4 Apr. 
1900 
Major Francis Sanders Royal Inniskilling Killed in action at Tugela 24 Feb. 
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Fusiliers Operations 1900 
Captain Llewellyn 
Saunderson* Rifle Brigade 
Died of wounds received at 
Standerton 
24 Apr. 
1902 
Captain James Seeds* 
5th Royal Irish 
Rifles 
Died of dysentery and heart failure 
at Kroonstad 
1 June 
1901 
Lieutenant Percy Shaw 
3rd Royal Munster 
Fusiliers 
Died of enteric fever at 
Bloemfontein 
28 May. 
1900 
2nd Lieutenant Geoffrey 
Shea 
1st Royal Munster 
Fusiliers 
Killed at Schotland West, 
Kroonstad District 
20 Apr. 
1902 
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel 
Claude Sitwell 
Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers 
Killed in action at Tugela 
Operations 
23-24 
Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant H. Spratt* 
23rd Imperial 
Yeomanry 
Died of wounds received at 
Watervel 
3 June 
1900 
Sir William Stokes* Surgeon  
Died at Base Hospital, 
Pietermaritzburg 
18 Aug. 
1900 
Lieutenant Walter Stuart* 
1st Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Upper Tugela 
23 Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant Arthur Swanston 
6th Royal 
Inniskilling 
Dragoons Killed in action near Ermelo 
16 Oct. 
1900 
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas 
Thackeray 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
Killed in operations on Upper 
Tugela 
23-24 
Feb. 
1900 
Lieutenant Charles Walker 
1st Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers Died of wounds near Lietgat 
19 Feb. 
1902 
2nd Lieutenant Clifton 
Wallis 
2nd Royal Irish 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Jaskraal 
28 Aug. 
1901 
Lieutenant William Waudby Leinster Regiment Died of enteric fever  
3 Apr. 
1901 
Captain George Weldon 
2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Talana Hill 
20 Oct. 
1899 
Major Edward Whitehead 
1st Munster 
Fusiliers Killed in action at Doornfontein  
13 Jan. 
1902 
Lieutenant Frederick 
Wylam 
Royal Irish 8th 
Hussars 
Killed in action between 
Machadodorp and Heidelberg 
13 Oct. 
1899 
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Appendix 8: Total casualties for Irish line regiments in Natal and Cape, Orange River, 
and Transvaal Colonies
33
 
Officers 218 
NCOS and 
men 3,984 
Total 4,202 
 
The figure would be substantially more had the tables included the casualties attached to the 
Irish militia and Imperial Yeomanry; data acquired from various sources detail further 
casualty lists attached to Irish units:
34
 
Units include, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Munster Fusiliers, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 Dublin Fusiliers, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 
Leinster Regiment, 4
th
 and 5
th
 Royal Irish Rifles, 4
th
 and 5
th
 Royal Irish regiment, and 
45
th
, 46
th
, 54
th
, 60
th
, 61
st
, 74
th 
and 99
th
.
35
  
Casualties of militia = 234  
 Imperial Yeomanry: 45
th
, 46
th
 and 54
th
=345  
                                                   60
th
=34  
                                                   61
st
=25  
                                    74
th
=36 
                                    99
th
= 1 
              Lord Iveagh’s Irish War Hospital= 2               
              Estimated total casualties of Irish units = 4,879 officers and men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 Figures obtained from Maurice Harold Grant, History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902, iv (London, 
1910) pp 681-691. 
34
 Lists of casualties in the South African Field Force, 1899-1902 (T.N.A., WO 108/338); Royal Commission on 
the War in South Africa. Minutes  of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, 
[CD 1792], H.C. xlii.1; Colonel F. Luttman-Johnson, Records of services of the 3
rd
 Battalion. The Prince of 
Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) in the South African War, 1900, 1901, 1902 (London, 1913), p 
119. 
35
 At this point time, the author is unable to establish casualty lists for the 29
th
 Irish Horse Battalion: 131
st
, 132
nd
, 
133
rd
, 134
th
, 175
th
, and 176
th
.  
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Appendix 9: South African War Diary of Trooper James Clarke, 45
th
 Dublin Company, 
Imperial Yeomanry
36
 
Fig. 70: Trooper James Clarke, 45
th
 Dublin Company, Imperial Yeomanry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source, Boer War diary of James John Clarke, 1900 (MS in the possession of Michael Steemson, New 
Zealand). 
 
Name: 9651 Trooper James John Clarke 
Parish: Belclare, County Galway 
Age: 26 
Previous Occupation: Nil 
Religion: Roman Catholic 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Boer War diary of James John Clarke, 1900 (MS in the possession of Michael Steemson, Wellington, New 
Zealand).  
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Fig. 71: Attestation forms of Trooper James John Clarke, 45
th
 Dublin Company, 
Imperial Yeomanry 
 
Source, War Office: Imperial Yeomanry, soldiers’ documents, South African War (T.N.A., WO 128/32 
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Fig. 72: Boer War diary of Trooper James John Clarke, 45
th
 Dublin Company, Imperial 
Yeomanry 
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Source, Boer War diary of James John Clarke, 1900 (MS in the possession of Michael Steemson, 
Wellington, New Zealand). 
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Appendix 10: Fig. 73: Informal Will of Lance-Corporal Hamiliton Doake, 2
nd
 Royal 
Irish Fusiliers  
 
Source, Informal Will of Lance-Corporal Hamilton Doake, 21 Jan., 1900 (N.A.I., Irish Soldiers’ Wills, 
2002/119). 
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Fig. 74: Image of page one and four of Lance-Corporal Doake’s letter home  
 
Source, Informal Will of Lance-Corporal Hamilton Doake, 21 Jan., 1900 (N.A.I., Irish Soldiers’ Wills, 
2002/119). 
 
Extracts from the letter on the battle of Colenso, 15 December 1899. 
Page One:  
...First of all let me say that I have gone through many hardships + I am now in hospital but 
as soon as I get out I shall go through more of it is my hearts desire to lead such a life, some 
may be sick of such a life as this for my part, it is just the life for me + unless I am in the 
front, with bullets firing about me I am not content. I love the scene of such a thing, I know I 
should not write so plain as this to you, but keep up your heart + all will end up well even if I 
do get popped off, but what matter it will only be a chance for me to show some of them how 
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Irish soldiers would die fighting for Queen and country. Dear mother since I came out here I 
have done my duty being out every day + almost every night... 
Page Two:  
I shall go to the front again as soon as possible. I know that I would even get home for a 
month, if I liked, but I do not wish for that ... I am hoping that they should not have another 
fight until I get up to the front again, as I wish to take part in all that is in this part. I was in 
the big fight on the 15
th
 December + all the bullets were whirling like wasps around me, but 
we paid no attention to them, our battalion, marched up with their pipes lit+ smoking + and G 
Company were in the very front, how we got off with as little killed + wounded I cannot tell 
but we only had two killed. When we got word off command to retire the bullets were 
coming around us like a hail storm but we paid no attention to them some of us boys lighten 
their pipes + turning around + shaking our fists at the position the Boers were in. 
Page Three: 
You must know that although we were out for I may say 10 hours, we did not see a single 
boer as they kept well behind the rocks and it was very hard on us to be there firing + not 
knowing whether we were doing any harm or not. I got hit on the heel of the boot by a bullet, 
but it did not put me much about. It was hard to see the horses + men getting killed and 
wounded, one battery of artillery which were not 50 yards from me + it was hard to see the 
horses getting knocked over by the shells from the enemy + then the day was so hot ... I 
would have drank anything. I lay down ... until I saw the Boers came down out of the hills on 
their horses they came out in the shape of a half moon + closed in on all around the wounded 
+ cut off some the men that was attending to them. 
Page Four: 
As I lay where I was I thought they were coming to take me + I could not move I was so 
tired. I thought it very hard to be taken prisoner after having gone so far so I made up my 
mind that to sell my life dearly. I got my rifle ready + I had about 100 rounds of ammunition 
left + if they had come I would have  popped one or two of them + then turned my rifle on 
myself for I made up mind that no Boers should take me alive, however they did not come 
the length, they went back when they got within 50 yards of me + I believe they did not see 
me where I was lying, either that or they thought I was dead + did not want to have any 
trouble with me as I was the only one about that part of the field. There is a sergeant + two 
other men in hospital with me + they are not going to up again if they can help it... 
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Appendix 11: Photographs of South African War veterans on their day of admisson to 
the Richmond Asylum, Grangegorman, Dublin. 
 
Fig. 75: Private William McConnell, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, aged twenty-eight 
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              Fig. 76: Sergeant John Joseph Doherty, Royal Irish Regiment, aged thirty-seven  
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            Fig 77: Sergeant Laurence Bradley, Royal Irish Fusiliers, aged twenty-nine 
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Fig. 78: Private Patrick Brennan, 4
th
 Connaught Rangers, aged thirty-two. 
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Fig. 79: Private Thomas McCarthy, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, aged twenty-six 
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Fig. 80: Private Thomas McCarthy, 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, aged twenty-six, with 
head injury sustained at the battle of Colenso (15 December 1899) 
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